Iran Update, October 19, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• The Houthis are adopting new tactics to bypass Saudi air defenses, including launching various munitions at Saudi targets simultaneously and targeting locations without air defense coverage, according to an unspecified senior US official briefed on Saudi air defense efforts speaking to the Wall Street Journal on October 18.
• The Houthis’ strike tactics against Saudi Arabia demonstrate how Iran and the Axis of Resistance are learning and sharing tactics to more effectively bypass adversary air defenses. This does not necessarily mean that the Houthis learned these tactics from Iran, however.
• The Houthis are deploying reinforcements to Taiz Governorate, likely to try to break Yemeni government defenses surrounding Taiz City. The Houthis have attempted to make multiple advances near the city in recent days, but Yemeni government-aligned forces have largely repelled these advances.
• The Iranian regime’s appointment of Mehrdad Akhlaghi, who has extensive experience in missile technology, as Iran’s new defense minister indicates that the regime is prioritizing the reconstitution of its missile program. Akhlaghi stated that the regime will rebuild its defense industrial base in areas that are less vulnerable to airstrikes.
• The Iraqi federal government probably agreed to grant three Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control of some government ministries as part of a broader disarmament agreement between the Iraqi federal government and Iranian-backed Iraqi factions. These Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will likely continue to circumvent the Iraqi government’s disarmament efforts even after receiving control of some Iraqi ministries, howe

Toplines

The Houthis are adopting new tactics to bypass Saudi air defenses, according to an unspecified senior US official briefed on Saudi air defense efforts speaking to the Wall Street Journal on October 18.[i] The official stated that the Houthis are overwhelming Saudi air defenses by launching drones, low-flying cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles at defended targets in Saudi Arabia in one strike package.[ii] Unspecified regional officials previously told Western media on October 12 that the Houthis employed this tactic to strike King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on October 10.[iii] The officials stated that the Houthis launched slower-moving drones before launching cruise missiles and ballistic missiles in the attack.[iv]

The Houthis are also targeting locations in Saudi Arabia without air defense coverage to maximize drone and missile impacts on Saudi territory. The US official speaking to the Journal stated that Saudi forces have intercepted approximately 90 percent of Houthi attacks in the current conflict but noted that over half of the Houthi attacks have targeted undefended locations.[v] Saudi Arabia’s vast size hinders its ability to defend critical infrastructure from drone and missile attacks.[vi] The Houthis are striking Saudi Arabia's critical infrastructure to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its support for Yemeni government-aligned forces in Yemen and concede to Houthi demands.[vii]

The Houthis have previously employed similar tactics to try to bypass regional air defense systems. The Houthis struck Ben Gurion Airport in Israel in early May 2025 using either multiple ballistic missiles or a missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.[viii] The Houthis separately launched multiple Iranian-produced drones at Emirati-operated Patriot missile battery radar systems in Yemen in 2017 to enable subsequent missile strikes.[ix]

The Houthis’ strike tactics against Saudi Arabia demonstrate how Iran and the Axis of Resistance are learning and sharing tactics to more effectively bypass adversary air defenses. The Houthis’ use of multiple munitions to try to overwhelm air defenses closely resembles tactics that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have employed against Israel. Iran launched drones and cruise missiles ahead of faster-moving ballistic missiles at Israel in April 2024 to try to overwhelm Israeli air defenses, for example.[x] This tactic was not effective for Iran, given that Israel was able to shoot down the slow-moving drones and cruise missiles before they reached Israeli territory, however.[xi] Hezbollah similarly launched multiple munitions in its rocket and missile attack on Binyamina in northern Israel in October 2024.[xii] Iran and Hezbollah’s use of similar tactics does not mean that they taught these tactics to the Houthis, however. The Houthis have been engaged in conflict with Saudi Arabia for over a decade, and the group has likely shared tactics it has learned in this conflict with other members of the Axis of Resistance. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah advisers are currently in Yemen providing targeting intelligence and military support to the Houthis and are almost certainly collaborating on tactics to bypass regional air defense systems.[xiii]

The Houthis are deploying reinforcements to Taiz Governorate, likely to try to break Yemeni government defenses surrounding Taiz City. UK-based, Saudi-owned media reported on October 19 that the Houthis have begun deploying hundreds of fighters to Taiz Governorate from Houthi-controlled Sanaa, Dhamar, and Ibb governorates over the past 48 hours.[xiv] The Houthis encircled Taiz City on October 6 by severing the last Yemeni government ground line of communication connecting the city to other Yemeni government-controlled territory.[xv] The Houthis’ encirclement has almost certainly constrained Yemeni government-aligned forces’ ability to resupply and reinforce front-line positions as these forces seek to defend against Houthi advances on Taiz City.[xvi] The Houthis have attempted to make multiple advances near the city in recent days, but Yemeni government-aligned forces have largely repelled these advances.[xvii] Yemeni government media reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces repelled a Houthi attack in al Rahan, south of Taiz City, on October 19, for example.[xviii]

The Iranian regime’s appointment of Mehrdad Akhlaghi, who has extensive experience in missile technology, as Iran’s new defense minister indicates that the regime is prioritizing the reconstitution of its missile program.[xix] The UN Security Council listed Akhlaghi in 2007 as the head of the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, which is a subsidiary of the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and is involved in the development and production of Iran’s solid-propellant ballistic missiles.[xx] The United States sanctioned Akhlaghi in 2008 for his involvement in developing Iran’s ballistic missile program.[xxi] Akhlaghi subsequently served as the head of the AIO and the Defense Industries Organization, which are both subsidiaries of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).[xxii] The DIO is heavily involved in the development of Iran’s conventional ground weapons capabilities, including armored vehicles, heavy artillery, and ammunition.[xxiii] The AIO oversees Iran’s ballistic missile program.[xxiv]  Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian noted on October 17 that Akhlaghi had a close relationship with Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, who is regarded as the “father of Iran’s ballistic missile program,” and former IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, whom the United States sanctioned in June 2019 for overseeing Iran’s ballistic missile program.[xxv] Akhlaghi notably held his first “working meeting” on October 19 with IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Majid Mousavi, further indicating that Akhlaghi will prioritize the development of Iran’s aerospace capabilities during his tenure.[xxvi]

Akhlaghi indicated that the regime will rebuild its defense industrial base in areas that are less vulnerable to airstrikes. Akhlaghi stated on October 19 that Iran will not rebuild defense industrial facilities at old locations but will instead construct them “in mountains and security structures.”[xxvii] The US-Israeli combined force struck virtually every element of the Iranian ballistic missile production and supply chain from raw material facilities to final assembly plants.[xxviii] Many, but not all, of these facilities were located above ground, and their destruction gives the regime an opportunity to rebuild them in a way that protects them more effectively against future airstrikes.[xxix] Rebuilding the defense industrial base in underground areas at a time when it has sustained extensive damage eliminates the opportunity cost that would be associated with replacing existing infrastructure. Recent Western reporting that Iran has resumed ballistic missile production at underground facilities is consistent with Akhlaghi’s emphasis on the need to protect Iranian defense industrial sites from potential threats.[xxx]

The Iraqi federal government probably agreed to grant three Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control of some government ministries as part of a broader disarmament agreement between the Iraqi federal government and Iranian-backed Iraqi factions. The Iraqi Parliament voted on October 15 to approve four militia-affiliated individuals to fill a vacant deputy prime minister position and three ministerial roles.[xxxi] Individuals affiliated with Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali, which previously agreed to disarm, received two of the ministerial positions and the deputy prime minister position.[xxxii] An individual affiliated with Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada received the fourth ministerial position.[xxxiii] The leader of Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS) claimed in an October 13 interview that the group has agreed to comply with the Iraqi government’s disarmament plan, despite previously rejecting disarmament.[xxxiv] The framework approved some details of a disarmament plan in late September that aims to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias by June 2027.[xxxv] The details of this plan are not public at the time of this writing. Some Iraqi government officials have previously proposed offering government positions to militia members in exchange for their disarmament.^[xxxvi] The government probably calculates that offering these militias these positions may incentivize them to fully comply with disarmament efforts. The government may also calculate that rewarding the militias that agreed to comply with the disarmament plan could motivate militias that have refused to disarm to also agree to the plan.  

These Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will likely continue to circumvent the Iraqi government’s disarmament efforts even after receiving control of some Iraqi ministries, however. KSS leader Abu Alaa al Walai stated in the same October 13 interview that KSS will intervene to support Iran “if Iran faces a genuine threat to its existence,” which suggests that KSS seeks to retain control of its weapons and be able to use them at will.[xxxvii] Other militias that previously agreed to disarm, including Asaib Ahl al Haq, have also taken steps to circumvent disarmament efforts, including by handing over inoperable weapons to the Iraqi federal government.[xxxviii]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Pakistan’s closure of two prominent border crossings with Iran will likely disrupt one of Iran’s last remaining trade channels--overland trade--as the US naval blockade on Iranian ports and restrictions on Iranian flights have severely curtailed Iranian trade by sea and air. A Pakistani official announced on October 17 that Pakistan “temporarily closed” the Gabd-Rimdan and Taftan-Mirjaveh border crossings in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan Province to address “security concerns, prevent smuggling, and make the border system more effective.”^[xxxix] Both of these crossings play a significant role for Iran and Pakistan’s economies. The Gabd-Rimdan crossing is a key route for Pakistan’s liquefied petroleum gas and fuel imports from Iran, while the Taftan-Mirjaveh crossing serves as an important route for Iranian exports to Iranian trading partners in Asia, such as the People’s Republic of China.[xl] Iran has increasingly relied on overland trade as the United States has constrained Iran’s ability to trade by sea and air in recent months.[xli] The closure of these two border crossings will therefore likely exacerbate the economic restrictions Iran faces. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei confirmed on October 17 that the closures will be temporary but claimed that the closures are due to “technical problems.”[xlii]

The closure of these two border crossings in Sistan and Baluchistan Province comes amid an uptick in anti-regime militant activity in the province.[xliii] These closures are unlikely to prevent anti-regime groups from operating in the area, however, given that they can transfer weapons and personnel across multiple parts of the porous Iran-Pakistan border. Baloch militant groups in Iran and Pakistan are able to move fighters and arms across the porous border due to its enormous size and the large force commitment required to adequately secure it.[xliv] These groups may smuggle some personnel and materiel through border crossings, but they can exploit other parts of the border that are not sufficiently secured. Iranian security forces have tried to disrupt weapons smuggling efforts along the border. Iranian border guards seized ammunition for heavy and semi-heavy combat weapons in Mirjaveh, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on September 20, for example.[xlv] These efforts have thus far not successfully degraded anti-regime militant groups’ ability to operate in the province, however.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with multiple high-ranking Iranian officials in Tehran on October 19 as Russia continues to support Iran economically and militarily in the US-Iran War.[xlvi] Lavrov met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei to discuss accelerating the implementation of joint economic agreements and regional developments.[xlvii] Russia has provided Iran with satellite imagery for drone and missile attacks on US assets in the region as well as Russian-modified Shahed drones during the conflict.[xlviii]

Lebanon

Hezbollah is threatening the Lebanese government with civil unrest to deter the government’s recent efforts to disrupt Hezbollah’s reconstitution and challenge the group’s control over its traditional strongholds in Lebanon. The Lebanese government has conducted internal security missions in central Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs in recent weeks to disrupt Hezbollah’s efforts to smuggle weapons and raise funds.[xlix] The Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) seized a Hezbollah truck en route from the Bekaa Valley to Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut’s southern suburbs on October 5 that was carrying nearly 800 kilograms of high explosives.[l] The ISF later raided an illicit, likely Hezbollah-owned prescription drug warehouse in Beirut’s southern suburbs on October 16, without notifying Hezbollah in advance.[li] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) provided support to the ISF by confronting Hezbollah gunmen who attempted to prevent the raid.[lii]  The ISF’s lack of “coordination” with Hezbollah before entering the southern suburbs indicates that the government is willing to conduct limited action to assert the rule of law in areas that are under de facto Hezbollah control.[liii] The Lebanese government is demonstrating a growing confidence in challenging Hezbollah and signaling a commitment to asserting sovereignty in Lebanon by conducting these missions. The graphic below displays a timeline of recent tensions between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah since October 5:

Hezbollah officials and media have levied demonstrations and threats of civil conflict to deter the government from further threatening the group’s activities and to exploit the government’s priority of ensuring domestic stability. Several Hezbollah parliamentarians warned on October 19 that the government’s actions are placing Lebanon on the brink of civil conflict. Hezbollah has often leveraged threats of civil strife to render the government unwilling to disrupt Hezbollah’s activities.[liv] Hezbollah officials made similar threats in June and July 2026 in an attempt to prevent the government from implementing the Trilateral Framework Agreement, for example.[lv] Hezbollah officials also mobilized supporters to protest in Beirut and block a main roadway in the city on October 16 and 17 in response to the ISF raid in the southern suburbs.[lvi] A Sunni Lebanese parliamentarian told independent Lebanese media on October 17 that Hezbollah’s demonstrations and threats are a “dress rehearsal for May 7,” referring to Hezbollah’s violent takeover of West Beirut to stop government disarmament efforts in May 2008.[lvii]

Hezbollah’s threats have failed to deter the government from exercising legitimate sovereignty in the Beirut area at the time of this writing, however. The government has responded to the group’s threats by increasing military and security force deployments in the city and its suburbs.[lviii] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployed a “larger-than-usual" military force in Beirut and the southern suburbs on October 17 to ensure order and security in the area following the ISF’s successful raid on Hezbollah’s warehouse in Beirut’s southern suburbs on October 16.[lix] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun told senior Lebanese security officials on October 19 that the government must “strictly enforce the law” and not tolerate “any attempt to undermine security” in Lebanon.[lx]

It is unclear whether Hezbollah is willing to accept the potential political and material costs of a major confrontation with the government. A September 2026 Lebanese public opinion poll concluded that around 66 percent of Shia civilians support disarming Hezbollah, which indicates widespread disapproval of the group’s conduct even among its traditional support base.[lxi] Lebanese Health Minister and Hezbollah member Rakan Nasreddine notably supported the ISF’s October 16 raid in the southern suburbs.[lxii] Hezbollah could calculate that mounting significant civil unrest against the government could further erode public support for the group.

The government’s expanded force presence in the Beirut area also imposes a dilemma on Hezbollah by risking an armed confrontation with the government if the group’s protestors or gunmen attack soldiers and provoke a military response.[lxiii] The Lebanese government is currently demonstrating strong resolve to uphold the rule of law despite Hezbollah’s threats, which, if sustained, challenges the group’s calculation that it can deter the government from asserting sovereignty and disarming Hezbollah through threats of armed conflict.[lxiv]

Iraq

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis attacked a Yemeni government-aligned training camp in Shabwa Governorate on October 19, likely to disrupt Yemeni government reinforcement efforts in nearby Marib Governorate. Yemeni sources told Western media that three Houthi ballistic missiles struck the Yemeni government-aligned al Alam training camp in Shabwa Governorate on October 19, killing at least 53 recruits and injuring 200 others.[lxv] The attack on the camp comes several weeks after the Yemeni government issued a national mobilization order on September 29.[lxvi] Al Alam camp is roughly 150 kilometers east of the Houthi-Yemeni government frontlines in Marib Governorate, where Yemeni government-aligned forces have launched multiple counteroffensives in recent weeks.[lxvii]

The Houthis also launched multiple ballistic missiles targeting Yemeni government-aligned forces along the Red Sea coastal plain on October 19 in order to disrupt the Yemeni government counteroffensive there.[lxviii] The Houthis said they fired six ballistic missiles at Yemeni government-aligned forces in Ras al Ara and Suqqayan, Lahij Governorate, on October 19.[lxix] The Houthis conducted the attack amid ongoing fighting between Houthi and Yemeni government-aligned forces in Jabal Kahbub, Lahij Governorate, approximately 20 kilometers north of Ras al Ara and Suqqayan.[lxx] The Houthis have repeatedly conducted ballistic missile attacks targeting government-aligned staging areas, including near Ras al Ara, in recent days to disrupt the government’s counteroffensive on the Red Sea coastal plain.[lxxi]