Iran Update, October 22, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran. 

Key Takeaways:

• The Houthis almost certainly captured a major roadway segment that links Houthi frontlines on the outskirts of Taiz City to other frontlines in central Taiz Governorate on October 22. The Houthis posted footage of fighters in vehicles at various geolocated positions along a segment of the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC) in the al Dhabab valley between al Misrakh District and Taiz City's southwestern limits.
• The United States and Israel are reportedly making preparations for renewed strikes on Iran after the US midterm elections. The New York Times reported on October 21 that the US and Israeli militaries have developed specific plans for a short and intensive operation against Iran after the US midterm elections on November 3, citing US officials and other people briefed on the deliberations.

Toplines

The Houthis almost certainly captured a major roadway segment that links Houthi frontlines on the outskirts of Taiz City to other frontlines in central Taiz Governorate on October 22. The Houthis posted footage of fighters in vehicles at various geolocated positions along a segment of the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC) in the al Dhabab valley between al Misrakh District and Taiz City's southwestern limits.[i] These geolocated positions indicate that the Houthis have effectively secured the Taiz-Aden GLOC between al Turbah in southern Taiz Governorate and the outskirts of Taiz City.[ii] The Houthis can exploit control over this roadway to quickly transport supplies and reinforcements between frontlines surrounding Taiz City and other combat areas further south in al Misrakh District.[iii] The Houthis are simultaneously attempting to capture favorable terrain on Taiz City's western outskirts and prevent Yemeni government-aligned forces in al Misrakh District from breaking out of the Houthis' encirclement. The Houthis could use this newly-obtained GLOC segment to reinforce positions on either front.[iv]

Houthi fighters also likely captured the Hangar Checkpoint, which lies along a key roadway through Taiz City’s southwestern limits, according to geolocated footage released on October 22.[v] The Houthis have repeatedly attacked Yemeni government-aligned forces at this checkpoint in recent days, likely in order to secure a roadway into Taiz's city center from the southwest.[vi] The Houthis also posted footage of fighters at a geolocated position on Jabal Han, which is a mountain that overlooks western Taiz City and provides favorable positions for observing and targeting nearby Yemeni government-aligned forces.[vii] CTP-ISW cannot assess whether the Houthis have consolidated control over Jabal Han at the time of this writing because the Yemeni government has repeatedly recaptured parts of the mountain following brief Houthi advances in recent weeks.[viii]

The United States and Israel are reportedly making preparations for renewed strikes on Iran after the US midterm elections. The New York Times reported on October 21 that the US and Israeli militaries have developed specific plans for a short and intensive operation against Iran after the US midterm elections on November 3, citing US officials and other people briefed on the deliberations.[ix] US officials added that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in recent days to discuss renewed strikes.[x] Axios, citing US and Israeli officials, reported on October 19 that dozens of Israeli fighter jets and aerial refueling tankers executed a sortie through Syrian and Iraqi airspace and turned back just as they reached the Iranian border.[xi] Some US and Israeli officials stated that the sortie sought to deter Iran from attacking Israel ahead of Israel’s elections on October 27.[xii]

Iranian officials and media have recently threatened to expand their target base if the United States and Israel strike Iran, including threatening strikes on Gulf undersea cable infrastructure.[xiii] Iran also reportedly conducted over 30 tests of medium-range solid-fuel Emad and Kheibar Shikan ballistic missiles on October 11, almost certainly in preparation for a possible renewed conflict with the United States and Israel.[xiv]

US and Partner Military Operations

Several sources, including an Israeli media outlet and an open-source intelligence (OSINT) account, claimed on October 22 that US forces struck Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) missile launchers near Sirik, Hormozgan Province.[xv] US CENTCOM has not confirmed any US strikes in Iran as of this writing. The exact target of the IRGC’s attempted missile launch is unclear, assuming the reports are accurate. Iranian forces have targeted commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz at an increased rate over the past month in order to reestablish control of the strait. CTP-ISW assessed on October 21 that Iran may be using more accurate systems, such as weapons systems with infrared terminal guidance, to attack some of these ships.[xvi] The regime previously faced targeting constraints in August and early September 2026 as a result of US strikes on Iranian coastal radar infrastructure.[xvii] It is also possible that Iran attempted to target US naval forces. Iran fired a number of ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles targeting US naval forces in early September 2026, but CTP-ISW has not observed any Iranian attempts to target US naval forces since.[xviii]

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

The US naval blockade on Iranian ports has degraded Iran’s ability to earn revenue from oil exports, which may motivate the Iranian regime to intensify efforts designed to break the US blockade. The Wall Street Journal reported on October 21, citing oil analysis firm Kpler, that Iran has exhausted the oil reserves that it has stored on vessels anchored beyond the US blockade line and previously sold to the People’s Republic of China to earn revenue.[xix] US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated on October 17 that the blockade has denied the regime at least $25 billion USD in oil revenue.[xx] Oil revenue is vital to the regime’s operations, which include reconstituting its ballistic missile and drone programs.[xxi] Increasing costs imposed by the US naval blockade may motivate the Iranian regime to intensify military efforts designed to break the US will or ability to maintain the blockade. The IRGC Aerospace Force claimed on September 5 that it targeted a US aircraft carrier and destroyer that were enforcing the US naval blockade, for example.[xxii]
Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

The Iraqi federal government has continued its efforts to prevent Iranian-backed militia attacks on neighboring countries from Iraqi territory, likely in response to US and Saudi pressure. Unspecified sources told Iraqi media on October 22 that Iraqi authorities have increased surveillance in the past two weeks over militia sites in Maysan Province that the authorities suspect militias are using to conduct attacks.[xxiii] The Iraqi media report assessed that the Houthis may be involved in operations at these sites and also noted the involvement of “shadow militias,” probably referring to militia cells that the IRGC directly manages.[xxiv] IRGC-managed Iraqi militia cells based along the Iraq-Iran border, including in Maysan Province, have conducted multiple attacks on neighboring countries in recent months, including a September 10 attack on Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline.[xxv] The Houthis, who maintain an active presence in Iraq, reportedly coordinated some of these cross-border attacks with Iraqi militias.[xxvi] Baghdad temporarily closed multiple border crossings on the Iraq-Iran border in response to the attacks and dismissed security officials that were allegedly connected to the attacks.[xxvii] The Iraqi federal government has more recently taken some steps to limit the Houthis’ presence in Iraq, including by ordering the closure of unspecified Houthi-owned offices in Iraq on October 21.[xxviii]

Arabian Peninsula

Yemeni government-aligned forces are continuing to steadily consolidate control over terrain on the southern end of the Red Sea coastal plain. Anti-Houthi Yemeni media and independent Yemeni journalists reported on October 22 that the Southern Giants Brigades and Homeland Shield Forces, which are government-aligned military factions, reestablished full control over the al Aradi military camp on the southern end of the Red Sea coastal plain.[xxix] These claims suggest that at least some Houthi fighters are continuing to contest control of terrain by fighting government-aligned forces in areas south of Dhubab Airport, which is the site of the Yemeni government's northernmost advance on the coastal plain.[xxx] Al Aradi is of high tactical significance because it lies astride the Bab al Mandeb Strait, where the Houthis could fire close-range weapons at civilian vessels in the Strait if they were to maintain control over the area.[xxxi] The Houthis still pose a broader operational threat to international maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandeb and Red Sea, however, because the group maintains control over most of the coastal plain and possesses weapons with sufficient range to attack vessels throughout the waterway at any time.[xxxii]

The Houthis are continuing to attack Saudi government, civilian, and oil infrastructure sites in order to compel Saudi leaders to withdraw support for the Yemeni government and capitulate to Houthi demands. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree announced on October 22 that the Houthis launched ballistic missiles and drones targeting a Saudi Aramco oil site in Yanbu, Abha International Airport, King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, and the Saudi Defense Ministry (MOD) headquarters in Riyadh.[xxxiii] The Houthis' claimed strike on the Saudi MOD headquarters is the first Houthi attempt to attack a Saudi ministry headquarters since the current conflict began in July 2026. Saudi authorities also reported on October 21 and 22 that Saudi air defenses intercepted Houthi drones over Riyadh, Medina, and a Saudi Aramco oil processing plant at the Shaybah Oil Field, Eastern Province.[xxxiv] The Houthis' high volume and broad geographic scope of the targeting is consistent with Houthi efforts in recent weeks to expand their strike campaign against Saudi airports, oil facilities, and other infrastructure.[xxxv] The Houthis calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia to withdraw support for the Yemeni government and capitulate to other Houthi demands by maximizing the kingdom's domestic political and economic costs.[xxxvi]

The Yemeni government announced on October 21 that it will begin attacking Houthi public assemblies, recruitment events, and tribal gatherings, almost certainly to hinder Houthi efforts to sustain the group’s military forces and public support.[xxxvii] The Yemeni government is almost certainly responding to the Houthis' strike campaign against staging areas and training camps of Yemeni government-aligned forces, which has sought to disrupt the government's counteroffensives in southern and eastern Yemen.[xxxviii] The Houthis routinely use tribal gatherings and other public assemblies to recruit and mobilize fighters, including child soldiers, to support the group's offensive efforts across frontlines throughout Yemen.[xxxix] The Yemeni government's announcement is likely in part an informational effort to deter Yemeni tribes and civilians from cooperating with the Houthis or providing manpower for the Houthi war effort. Yemeni government intent to strike public assemblies and tribal gatherings also represents a discrete government effort to disrupt Houthi recruitment, training, and reinforcement.