Iran Update, February 19, 2026

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

US President Donald Trump stated on February 19 that he will likely decide on whether the United States will strike Iran within the next ten days.[i] Trump warned Iran to accept a deal and threatened unspecified consequences if it does not.[ii] One US official told Axios on February 19 that Iran has until the end of February 2026 to present the Trump administration with substantive steps to address US concerns regarding its nuclear program, which is consistent with Trump’s ten-day deadline.[iii] A second US official voiced pessimism that the Geneva talks on February 17 would result in a deal.[iv] ISW-CTP continues to assess that Iran is unlikely to meet US demands of zero-enrichment, limiting its ballistic missile program, or ceasing support for its proxies and partners in the region.[v] The US statements come amid a large number of US military deployments to the region, including the upcoming arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group.[vi]

Iranian naval forces hosted an Iranian-Russian naval exercise on February 19, which Iran likely used to signal its solidarity with Russia and practice offensive and defensive maneuvers in and around the Strait of Hormuz in preparation for US military action against Iran. The Iranian First Artesh Naval Base in Bandar Abbas hosted a joint Iranian-Russian naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman and the southern tip of the Persian Gulf on February 19, during which Iranian naval forces rehearsed detecting and freeing a hijacked commercial vessel using coordinated air, sea, and special-forces operations.[vii] Iranian Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) units – alongside Russian naval forces, helicopters, and a Steregushchiy-class corvette – participated in the exercise to practice joint command-and-control, rapid response, and combined assault methods.[viii] Iranian and Russian naval officials said that the February 19 drills aim to counter maritime security threats, enhance cooperation through counterterrorism operations, and strengthen bilateral naval interactions.[ix] Iran also issued a notice to airmen for missile launches on February 19 across southeastern Iran and in the Gulf of Oman, which appears to be related to the joint naval exercise.[x] Iranian media said the exercise demonstrated Iran’s independence in maintaining regional security and highlighted Iran’s growing long‑range anti‑ship and missile capabilities.[xi] The IRGC Navy recently conducted a similar exercise in the Strait of Hormuz on February 17 and 18.[xii]

Iranians held the most protests on a single day since January 11 on February 19. There were five large protests and 14 other protests. ISW-CTP classifies protests as “large” when they are estimated to include at least a thousand protesters. These protests illustrate that the motivations driving the initial days of the protest movement have not abated despite the pause in protests in late January and early February 2026.  ISW-CTP recorded 19 protests across eight provinces on February 19 during ceremonies marking the end of the 40-day mourning period for protesters killed on January 8 and 9, which is when protest activity peaked. The 40th day of mourning marks the end of the initial mourning period and is often observed with public commemorations and gatherings in Shia Islam. There were at least 1,000 individuals present in five of the 19 protests, which are the first protests of this size since at least January 11.[xiii] ISW-CTP previously assessed on January 15 that the regime had suppressed the recent protest movement, but that protests could resume if the regime eases its securitization measures, and because the regime has not addressed the underlying grievances that triggered the recent protest movement.[xiv]

Israeli and Lebanese officials appear to believe that there is a legitimate chance that Hezbollah may participate in any future conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran. Israeli media reported that Israel has initiated a state of alert on its northern border over concerns of an escalation with Hezbollah.[xv] The Israeli Home Front Command and Israeli rescue services have reportedly been instructed to prepare for war.[xvi] Israeli commanders have noted that Israel is preparing for a “large, multi-front scenario.”[xvii] Israel Defense Force (IDF) 91st Division Commander Brigadier General Yuval Ges said that the IDF has operational plans for immediate action in Lebanon, and has forces deployed along the Israel-Lebanon border and deep in Lebanese territory.[xviii] Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri is reportedly initiating intense political and security talks with Hezbollah in an attempt to prevent Hezbollah from militarily backing Iran.[xix]  Israel and Lebanese officials’ actions come amid reports that Iran is exerting pressure on Hezbollah to take part in any upcoming confrontation.[xx] Israeli media reported that Iran has undertaken a series of actions to increase pressure on Hezbollah.[xxi] Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Beirut in January 2026 reportedly sought to ensure that Hezbollah would intervene in the next war.[xxii]  

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened that Hezbollah could retaliate and “defend” against Israel’s frequent airstrikes targeting its operatives in Lebanon during a speech on February 16.[xxiii] Hezbollah is almost certainly attempting to highlight the Lebanese government’s inaction against Israel to justify its position as the “defender” of Lebanon. Qassem criticized the Lebanese government for protecting itself and emphasized that the Taif Agreement stipulates taking all necessary measures to remove Israeli forces from Lebanese territory.[xxiv] Qassem noted that Hezbollah has been waiting for the state to take action, but added that the ”situation we are in cannot continue.”[xxv] Qassem’s recent statements imply that Hezbollah has attempted to allow the Lebanese government to expel Israeli forces, but the state has failed to do so, which now (in Hezbollah‘s incorrect framing) requires Hezbollah to step in. Hezbollah’s existence, of course, is the reason for Israel’s presence, and the Lebanese government would not need to expel the Israeli forces if Hezbollah disarmed. Hezbollah officials, including Qassem, have consistently stated that Hezbollah will not respond with force to ongoing Israeli operations and will instead rely on the Lebanese state to resolve outstanding issues through political channels.[xxvi] Qassem said in October 2025 that Hezbollah has not responded to any Israeli airstrikes because it is the state’s responsibility, for example.[xxvii]

Lebanese officials have continuously called on the international community to pressure Israel to halt its operations in Lebanon since August 2025.[xxviii] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have historically not participated in any direct conflicts with Israel and have not directly confronted the IDF in recent months.[xxix] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, however.[xxx]

Hezbollah has employed this narrative about its role in Lebanon’s defense for decades, and since August 2025, has used continued Israeli operations in Lebanon to reject the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xxxi] Hezbollah has consistently initiated wars against Israel while using the excuse that Lebanon needs Hezbollah to “defend” against Israel to refuse disarmament. Hezbollah continues to view its weapons as the group’s core and has previously referred to its weapons as its ”soul.”[xxxii] Hezbollah refused to disarm after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, arguing that its weapons remained a critical element of national defense against any future Israeli operations.[xxxiii] Hezbollah attacked Israel in July 2006, kidnapping three Israeli soldiers and triggering a major Israeli ground operation.[xxxiv] Hezbollah subsequently similarly used national defense as justification to retain its arms after the 2006 war, despite the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, which called for the disarmament of all armed factions in Lebanon under UN Security Council Resolution 1701.[xxxv] Hezbollah also entered the war against Israel on October 8, 2023, by conducting offensive operations against northern Israeli towns.[xxxvi] Qassem emphasized on February 16 that Hezbollah does not seek war, which is true only in that Hezbollah likely does not seek to fight Israel or the United States directly at this time due to the group’s present weakness.[xxxvii] Hezbollah’s raison d’etre is the destruction of the Israeli state, which requires offensive wars against the Israeli state at places and times of Hezbollah’s choosing.[xxxviii] Israel has only fought wars against Hezbollah in response to Hezbollah attacks after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.[xxxix] Hezbollah officials, including Qassem, have continuously rejected calls to disarm and have maintained that Hezbollah will not disarm until Israel halts its operations in Lebanon and withdraws from southern Lebanon.[xl] Hezbollah has called for negotiations on a national defense strategy once Israel withdraws, which Qassem previously suggested would entail Hezbollah retaining its weapons and acting alongside Lebanese security forces.[xli]

This narrative is incorrect because Hezbollah is not the national army of Lebanon, and Israel would not attack Lebanon if Hezbollah did not present a threat to Israeli national security. Israel has decreased the number of airstrikes it has conducted south of the Litani since January 2026 and instead prioritized obvious Hezbollah reconstitution north of the Litani, which indicates that Israel perceives a reduced threat south of the Litani.[xlii] This decrease also suggests that reducing the threat that Hezbollah poses to Israel decreases Israel’s military activities in Lebanon.[xliii] Israel, therefore, would have no reason to enter Lebanon, and therefore the LAF would have no reason to ”defend” against Israel, if Hezbollah did not attack Israel in the first place. This suggests that decreasing Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon and its threat to Israel would decrease IDF actions in Lebanon, which in turn would undermine Hezbollah’s narrative that it is “protecting” Lebanon from Israel.[xliv]

The Syrian government is likely undermining the governing authority in Suwayda Province and pressuring it militarily to eventually reintegrate Suwayda into the Syrian state either through negotiations or through a rapid military offensive that leverages internal fissures in the Suwayda governing authority. The Suwayda Supreme Legal Committee, an autonomous governing authority led by Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, controls a large portion of Suwayda Province and has repeatedly demanded Suwaydawi autonomy.[xlv] The province subsists on international and Israeli aid and struggles to function as a self-sufficient entity due to its lack of resources.[xlvi] The committee controls an armed militia, the National Guard.[xlvii] The Syrian government has recently increased the pressure on Suwayda Province, and the government‘s internal security commander said on February 16 that the government would enter the province “soon” after he spoke with Suwaydawi civilians.[xlviii] He elaborated on February 18 that he would like to enter Suwayda peacefully, but implied military force could be necessary.[xlix] His statement on February 16 came on the same day as the defection of a Suwaydawi notable who said he left the region to “stop the bloodshed” between the central government and the Suwaydawi authorities.[l] The notable’s grandfather launched the Syrian revolt against French colonial rule in the 1920s.[li] The notable justified his defection with the slogan “Religion is for Allah, and the homeland is for everyone,” which suggests that the notable is at least partially supportive of the government’s efforts to extend Damascus’s control over the whole country.[lii] The Suwayda National Guard spokesperson said on February 17 that the Syrian government resorted to “cheap tactics, and fabricated narratives,” and implied that meetings and other coordination between the government and local Suwaydawis were ongoing.[liii] He also urged the people of Suwayda Province not to listen to lies from the Syrian government.[liv] The spokesperson’s accusations indicate that the government is attempting to undermine the governing authorities in Suwayda politically because his claims mirror prior efforts by Damascus to subordinate other political factions.[lv] Damascus undermined the SDF through months-long engagement with tribal figures in northeastern Syria, for example, and their defection from the SDF accelerated the SDF’s collapse.[lvi]

The Syrian government is likely leveraging the discontent among Suwaydawis caused by the ineffective governing of the province by the Supreme Legal Committee to undermine the committee’s authority. Unspecified Suwayda “National Guard” fighters accused the Men of Dignity militia, a Druze faction integrated into the “National Guard,” of stealing weapons and collaborating with the Syrian government on February 16.[lvii] The Men of Dignity denied the accusation on February 17 and said that it had secured an abandoned weapons cache to prevent arms traffickers from using it, and provided video evidence to support their claim.[lviii] Unknown fighters then reportedly kidnapped former Men of Dignity leader Yahya al Hajjar in Suwayda Province on February 19.[lix] A pro-Hijri Suwaydawi source said that Hajjar was returned to the Men of Dignity’s headquarters on February 19, however.[lx]

The Syrian government has largely consolidated its control over most of Syria, except for Suwayda Province, after the January 30 agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[lxi] Suwayda Province likely represents the next and final step for the Syrian government to consolidate its control over all of Syria. The Syrian government likely perceives the reported infighting and instability in Suwayda Province as an opportunity to undermine and subordinate different Druze factions over time by using a combination of political and military means. The Syrian government has previously employed similar “divide and conquer” strategies to integrate armed factions under government control, such as the mutinous Daraa Province-based Eighth Brigade in April 2025.[lxii] 

US officials told the Wall Street Journal on February 18 that all remaining US forces are currently withdrawing from Syria as part of a “conditions-based” withdrawal.[lxiii] Unspecified US officials said on February 18 that US forces will withdraw from the United States’ remaining bases in Syria “over the next two months,” but noted that the withdrawal would be contingent on Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) activity. The US officials added that US forces would have the flexibility to return to their positions in the event of an ISIS resurgence in northeastern Syria and would still be able to respond to any ISIS-related threats.[lxiv] [lxv] US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on February 14 that it conducted ten strikes targeting more than 30 ISIS targets, including ISIS infrastructure and weapons depots, between February 3 and 12.[lxvi] The withdrawal of all US forces from Syria demonstrates that the United States has shifted its counter-ISIS partner from the SDF to the Syrian government.

Key Takeaways

• US Military Action Against Iran: US President Donald Trump stated on February 19 that he will likely decide on whether the United States will strike Iran within the next ten days.
• Iranian-Russian Naval Cooperation: Iranian naval forces hosted an Iranian-Russian naval exercise on February 19, which Iran likely used to signal its solidarity with Russia and practice offensive and defensive maneuvers in and around the Strait of Hormuz in preparation for US military action against Iran.
• Iranian Anti-Regime Protests: Iranians held the most protests on a single day since January 11 on February 19. There were five large protests and 14 other protests. ISW-CTP classifies protests as “large” when they are estimated to include at least a thousand protesters. These protests illustrate that the motivations driving the initial days of the protest movement have not abated despite the pause in protests in late January and early February 2026.
• Hezbollah’s Participation in a US-Iran Conflict: Israeli and Lebanese officials appear to believe that there is a legitimate chance that Hezbollah may participate in any future conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened that Hezbollah could retaliate and “defend” against Israel’s frequent airstrikes targeting its operatives in Lebanon during a speech on February 16. Hezbollah is almost certainly attempting to highlight the Lebanese government’s inaction against Israel to justify its position as the “defender” of Lebanon. Hezbollah has long employed this incorrect narrative about its role in Lebanese defense.
• The Syrian Government’s Control of Suwayda Province: The Syrian government is likely undermining the governing authority in Suwayda Province and pressuring it militarily to eventually reintegrate Suwayda into the Syrian state either through negotiations or through a rapid military offensive that leverages internal fissures in the Suwayda governing authority.
• US Forces in Syria: US officials told the Wall Street Journal on February 18 that all remaining US forces are currently withdrawing from Syria as part of a “conditions-based” withdrawal. The withdrawal would be contingent on Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham activity.

Iran

The Iranian regime remains concerned that anti-regime Kurdish militant groups will infiltrate Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan and incite protests in Iran. Norway-based Kurdish human rights organizations reported on February 18 that Iran launched a drone strike targeting a vehicle in Sulaymaniyah Province, Iraq, which killed at least one Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-affiliated Peshmerga fighter and injured two others.[lxvii] Local Iraqi Kurdish media reported that an unknown actor targeted a civilian vehicle either by a drone or an improvised explosive device (IED) in Sulaymaniyah Province on February 18, but did not attribute the attack to Iran.[lxviii] The Iranian media has not acknowledged the incident at the time of this writing. Iranian authorities have reportedly launched previous attacks against Kurdish groups in Iraqi Kurdistan, including a January 21, 2026, ballistic missile and drone attack against the Kurdistan Freedom Party’s Kurdistan National Army Unit in Koya District, Erbil City.[lxix] The Iranian regime has long been concerned about cross-border Kurdish militant activity and has cooperated with Iraq to counter this activity as part of the March 2023 Iran-Iraq border security agreement.[lxx] Iran is particularly concerned that these anti-regime Kurdish militant groups may infiltrate Iran and incite unrest, especially in the wake of the recent protest wave. Several Kurdish groups called for an economic strike in western Iran during the recent protests, which Iranian media called ”an incitement of terrorism.”[lxxi]

Iraq

Some Iraqi political parties that previously publicly supported State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s bid to become prime minister are now suggesting that the Shia Coordination Framework should reconsider Maliki’s nomination due to US pressure.[lxxii] Sunni Azm Alliance Spokesperson Ali al Mutiouti said on February 19 that the party had told unspecified framework members that it supports a prime minister who does not cause Iraq to have problems with the United States, which is an implied rejection of Maliki.[lxxiii] The United States has repeatedly expressed its opposition to Maliki.[lxxiv] The Azm Alliance has publicly supported Maliki in recent weeks, though most other Sunni parties reject Maliki.[lxxv] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Maliki may have offered Azm inducements to back him, such as the parliamentary speakership.[lxxvi] A parliamentarian from Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada’s political wing, which is allied with Maliki, told al Araby al Jadeed on February 18 that Iraq cannot ignore its economic ties with the United States because Iraq is an oil-producing country.[lxxvii] The United States has threatened to limit the Iraqi federal government’s access to its oil revenue if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are included in the next Iraqi government.[lxxviii] The parliamentarian suggested that the framework reconsider Maliki’s nomination.[lxxix] The United States reportedly threatened in February 2026 to sanction Iraq’s “oil lifeline and financial core,” including the Iraqi Oil Ministry and Central Bank, on March 1 if the framework continues to support Maliki.[lxxx]

A member of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s coalition told Iraqi media on February 19 that Maliki should voluntarily withdraw his nomination for the premiership, which corresponds with Sudani’s continued efforts to obtain the premiership himself.[lxxxi]  Sudani has publicly remained supportive of Maliki becoming prime minister in recent weeks, even as he indicates his continued interest in the premiership.[lxxxii] Iraqi media leaked a letter from the Iraqi parliament to the Iraqi electoral commission on February 2, in which Sudani refused to assume his parliament seat, which would force him to relinquish his position as prime minister.[lxxxiii] Sudani currently leads a caretaker government with limited powers.[lxxxiv] A member of Sudani’s coalition also told Iraqi media on February 16 that Sudani’s coalition rejects extending Sudani’s current term as caretaker prime minister and choosing a “compromise candidate” because the former option reduces and the latter option extinguishes Sudani’s chance of a second term as prime minister.[lxxxv] Sudani has probably supported Maliki’s bid for the premiership publicly with the aim of becoming prime minister if Maliki withdraws from the race.

ISW-CTP continues to assess that the framework is unlikely to nominate Sudani for another term due to many framework members’ long-standing objections to Sudani. Top framework leaders chose Sudani for his malleability, not his independence, in 2022.[lxxxvi] Sudani’s decision to form his own power base and parliamentary bloc, combined with his national popularity, has increased his independence at the expense of the framework.[lxxxvii]

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

ISW-CTP suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.