Iran Update, February 17, 2026

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the United States’ demands for Iran to halt uranium enrichment and limit its ballistic missile program in a speech on February 17.[i] Khamenei’s speech coincided with the second round of US-Iran talks in Geneva, Switzerland.[ii] Khamenei stated that Iran has a “right” to have a “nuclear industry,” which is a reference to Iran’s nuclear program and uranium enrichment capabilities.[iii] Khamenei also described Iran’s "possession of deterrent weapons," almost certainly in reference to Iran’s ballistic missiles, as “essential and obligatory” and claimed that this issue has "nothing to do with" the United States.[iv] Iran’s ballistic missile program poses a threat to the United States because Iran has used its ballistic missiles to target US forces and allies in the region.[v] Iranian officials at all levels have echoed Khamenei's position on these issues in recent days.[vi] Khamenei's speech comes as the United States and Iran held a second round of talks in Geneva on February 17.[vii] Chief mediator and Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi said that both sides made "good progress towards identifying common goals and relevant technical issues” during the talks.[viii] Iran and the United States do not appear to have agreed on anything substantial, however. Iranian lead negotiator and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi acknowledged after the talks that the United States and Iran “still hold positions that require work to reconcile.”[ix] A former adviser to Araghchi described the atmosphere of the talks as "not great" but later deleted his comment.[x] US Vice President JD Vance told Fox News on February 17 that US President Donald Trump “set several red lines that the Iranians are not yet willing to acknowledge and work through.”[xi] A US official speaking to Western media on February 17 noted that the Iranian delegation agreed to resume talks in two weeks to address the "open gaps" between the Iranian and US positions.[xii]

Iran has presented several proposals to the United States that do not meet the United States’ demand for zero enrichment. Iranian diplomats have reportedly suggested in negotiations that Iran could agree to temporarily halt enrichment for up to three years or establish a regional enrichment facility on Iranian soil to provide low-enriched uranium to regional countries, according to US, Iranian, and regional diplomats speaking to Western and Israeli media.[xiii] Temporarily halting uranium enrichment would enable Iran to continue enriching uranium in the future. Iran reportedly rejected a recent proposal from US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff to halt uranium enrichment for three to five years and then enrich uranium at 1.5 percent, although a US official denied that Witkoff presented such a proposal to Iran.[xiv] Establishing a regional enrichment facility in Iran would similarly enable Iran to continue enriching uranium. The United States previously proposed a regional consortium framework before the June 2025 Israel-Iran War that would have given Iran access to enriched uranium.[xv] Iran rejected this proposal because the consortium’s enrichment facility would have been located outside Iran.[xvi]

Iran seeks significant economic relief in return for the limited nuclear concessions it is offering to make.  Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal that, “at a minimum,” Iran wants the United States to unfreeze the $6 billion USD worth of frozen Iranian assets in Qatar.[xvii] The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head recently stated that Iran could dilute its highly enriched uranium if the United States lifts “all sanctions” on Iran.[xviii] Iran could use money that it gains access to through an agreement with the United States to develop its missile program and support the Axis of Resistance, which would pose a threat to US assets and allies in the region.

Iran is continuing to try to prepare for and deter potential US military action by conducting a multi-day naval exercise in the Strait of Hormuz.[xix] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy started an exercise on February 16 and reportedly closed off areas of the Strait of Hormuz to conduct various offensive and defensive drills. These drills include deploying fast attack craft and testing unspecified missiles and drones.[xx] IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri claimed on February 17 that the IRGC Navy has deployed military equipment during this exercise that it did not use in the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[xxi] The IRGC Navy will conduct the second phase of this exercise on February 18.[xxii]

Some Iranians held anti-regime protests on February 17 despite the regime’s recent brutal crackdown on protesters, which highlights how some parts of the Iranian population remain extremely frustrated and disillusioned with the regime. CTP-ISW recorded 12 protests across seven provinces on February 17 during ceremonies marking the end of the 40-day mourning period for protesters killed on January 8.[xxiii]  The 40th day of mourning marks the end of the initial mourning period and is often observed with public commemorations and gatherings in Shia Islam. CTP-ISW recorded one instance of Iranian security forces shooting at memorial participants who were chanting an anti-regime slogan in Abdanan, Ilam Province.[xxiv] Iranian security forces pressured a family to cancel its 40-day memorial in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, which highlights the regime’s concern that memorials honoring killed protesters can transform into anti-regime protests.[xxv] Shopkeepers in Ilam Province also closed their shops in solidarity with those mourning the killing of protesters.[xxvi] Protest activity peaked on January 8 and 9.[xxvii] Iranian Health Ministry officials previously told TIME Magazine that security forces may have killed over 30,000 protesters on January 8 and 9 alone.[xxviii] The protests on February 17 highlight how the regime’s repression of its population creates greater disaffection and anger toward the regime, which can in turn set conditions for further anti-regime activity.[xxix] CTP-ISW previously assessed on January 15 that the regime had suppressed the recent protest movement but that protests could resume if the regime eases its securitization measures and because the regime has not addressed the underlying grievances that triggered the recent protest movement.[xxx]

Iranian security forces conducted a targeted raid in Chenar town, Asadabad District, Hamedan Province, on February 16, likely to preempt or disrupt some kind of anti-regime activity.[xxxi] It is unclear what type of activity the regime sought to prevent or disrupt, but the timing of the raid suggests that security forces may have sought to prevent protests from breaking out during 40-day mourning ceremonies. The fact that security forces only conducted a raid in a small town in Hamedan Province suggests that this raid is not part of a broader regime effort to crack down on mourning ceremonies across Iran. The limited scope of the raid suggests that security forces were instead targeting a specific individual, network, or infrastructure in the town linked to anti-regime activity.

Most of the Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework has agreed to rescind State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s nomination as prime minister designate if Maliki does not voluntarily withdraw his nomination in order to avoid US sanctions, according to a senior framework political adviser speaking to an Iraqi journalist on February 16.[xxxii] The adviser said that the United States has threatened to sanction “Iraq’s oil lifeline and financial core,” including the State Organization for the Marketing of Oil, the Iraqi Central Bank, the Oil Ministry, and senior Shia officials linked to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if the Shia Coordination Framework continues to support Maliki’s nomination.[xxxiii] The adviser added that the United States would implement these sanctions on March 1.[xxxiv] The United States has repeatedly expressed its opposition to Maliki. US President Donald Trump warned on January 27 that the United States will “no longer help Iraq” if Maliki becomes prime minister, for example.[xxxv] Maliki pursued authoritarian and sectarian policies after the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 that contributed to the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Iraq.[xxxvi] The United States ultimately conditioned its support for Iraq against ISIS in 2014 on Maliki’s removal from power due to his direct role in destabilizing Iraq.[xxxvii] The United States has also threatened to limit the Iraqi federal government’s access to its oil revenue if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are included in the next Iraqi government.[xxxviii] Oil revenue accounts for about 90 percent of Iraq’s state budget.[xxxix]

Maliki's insistence on the premiership will probably force the framework to revoke his nomination. Maliki has continued to affirm his desire for the position and a member of his coalition claimed on February 16 that the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the United Arab Emirates support Maliki.[xl] Maliki has claimed that he would withdraw from the premiership race if a majority of the framework supports his withdrawal, but it is unclear if he would follow through on this promise if the framework rescinded its support for him.[xli] The framework nominated Maliki as prime minister designate via a majority vote on January 24.[xlii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali reportedly failed on February 10 to convince unspecified Iranian officials to abandon their support for Maliki’s nomination.[xliii] CTP-ISW assessed on February 10 that framework leaders who oppose Maliki, including Khazali and National State Forces Alliance head Ammar al Hakim, likely sought for Iran to withdraw its support for Maliki after US and domestic opposition to Maliki failed to pressure the framework to nominate a new prime minister designate.[xliv] The Iranian regime may have refused to revoke its support for Maliki in order to not succumb to US opposition to Maliki.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani continues to vie for the premiership. It remains unlikely that the framework will select him given many framework members’ long-standing objections to Sudani. A member of Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition told Iraqi media on February 16 that the coalition rejects extending Sudani’s current term or the framework choosing a “compromise candidate” because both options risk reducing Sudani’s chance of a second term as prime minister.[xlv] Sudani currently leads a caretaker government with limited powers.[xlvi] This parliamentarian’s statement comes after an unspecified “influential” framework member reportedly proposed extending Sudani’s premiership for one year due to the current political deadlock.[xlvii] A framework source told Iraqi media on February 9 that Sudani would have “specific and conditional powers” if his term was extended and that Sudani is expected to discuss the proposal at upcoming framework meetings.[xlviii] It is unclear which framework party proposed this extension given that many framework leaders oppose Sudani remaining in power.[xlix]

Unspecified individuals close to Sudani suggested to Iraqi media on February 16 that Sudani’s control of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias is a “trump card.”[l] This statement could reflect an effort by Sudani to use his purported control over the militias to gain US support for him to become prime minister amid US objections to Maliki. The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government since early 2025 to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[li] Sudani heads the Iraqi security establishment, which includes Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that operate under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[lii] Many of the militias that operate under the PMF answer to Iran instead of the prime minister, however.[liii] Sudani has taken limited steps to meet US demands to disarm the militias, such as withdrawing a bill from parliament in August 2025 that would have formally institutionalized parts of the PMF due to US concerns over the legislation.[liv] Maliki has similarly attempted to gain US support by claiming that he could disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias while in office.[lv] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Maliki would likely attempt to transform elements of the Iraqi security establishment into a force that he could use to enhance his personal power as prime minister, however.[lvi]

The Syrian government transferred some authorities from the central government to governors and local officials on February 15, which may satisfy some of the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) demands regarding decentralization.[lvii] The Syrian Ministry of Local Administration’s Decision No. 13 aims to expand the powers of governors and city council heads.[lviii] The Syrian government delegated several environmental, financial, and administrative powers, including the authority to appoint and transfer personnel, to governors to allow them to make decisions “without returning to central authorities.”[lix] The decision also delegates the authority to oversee “employee affairs” to city council heads.[lx] The decision builds on Law No. 107 of 2011, which is an Assad-era law that devolves important economic and community support authorities to local leaders but places them under a centrally appointed governor.[lxi] Law No. 107 gave significant authority to governors and comparatively less to local leaders, as does Decision No. 13.[lxii]

The Syrian transitional government and the SDF’s fundamentally different interpretations of decentralization was one of the principal political issues that delayed the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state prior to the government offensive.[lxiii] The Syrian transitional government insists that a central authority should rule Syria through appointed governors and views SDF decentralization as a path toward secession.[lxiv] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara in particular has continually insisted on a highly centralized government model.[lxv]

The SDF has not explicitly responded to Decision No. 13, but the delegation of certain powers to Syrian governors and local officials could satisfy some of the SDF’s demands regarding decentralized governance, particularly in Hasakah Province. The SDF views decentralization as a way to ensure local authority over regional affairs and views the government’s push to concentrate power in Damascus as an attempt to impose autocratic rule.[lxvi] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi told Kurdish media on February 16 that Syrian Kurds’ core demand is “decentralized local rule.”[lxvii] Abdi has previously defined this demand as a decentralized form of governance in which “powers [are] distributed between the center and the provinces” within a unified Syrian state.[lxviii] The only Syrian governor who is not centrally appointed is Hasakah Governor Noureddine Issa Ahmed, who was nominated by the SDF.[lxix] Decision No. 13 delegates certain central authorities to Ahmed and allows him greater autonomy to delegate authorities to local officials and leaders, if he chooses to do so.

The Syrian government’s decision to delegate some local powers may be in response to the United States’ clear preference for decentralization. Shara’s offensive in northeastern Syria compelled moderate Kurdish leaders to drop their opposition to Shara’s model of state centralization and accede to Shara’s demand to integrate the SDF and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) into the state without decentralization under the January 30 agreement.[lxx] The United States has reportedly told Shara to exercise flexibility in addressing the SDF’s demands.[lxxi] An unspecified Western official told Reuters on February 13 that the United States has advised Shara to avoid taking a hardline stance and that the United States supports granting the Kurds a degree of autonomy as long as it does not threaten Syria’s central authority in Damascus.[lxxii] Senior US officials, including US President Donald Trump, played a meaningful role in encouraging Shara to exercise restraint during his offensive against the SDF.[lxxiii]  

Key Takeaways

• US-Iran Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the United States’ demands for Iran to halt uranium enrichment and limit its ballistic missile program in a speech on February 17. Khamenei’s speech coincided with the second round of US-Iran talks in Geneva, Switzerland. Iran has presented several proposals to the United States that do not meet the United States’ demand for zero enrichment. Iran seeks significant economic relief in return for the limited nuclear concessions it has offered to make.
• Protests in Iran: Some Iranians held anti-regime protests on February 17 despite the regime’s recent brutal crackdown on protesters, which highlights how some parts of the Iranian population remain extremely frustrated and disillusioned with the regime.
• Iranian Security Forces Activity: Iranian security forces conducted a targeted raid in Chenar town, Asadabad District, Hamedan Province, on February 16, likely to preempt or disrupt some kind of anti-regime activity. The limited scope of the raid suggests that security forces were targeting a specific individual, network, or infrastructure in the town linked to anti-regime activity.
• Iraqi Government Formation: Most of the Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework has agreed to rescind State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s nomination as prime minister designate if Maliki does not voluntarily withdraw his nomination in order to avoid US sanctions, according to a senior framework political adviser speaking to an Iraqi journalist on February 16. Maliki's insistence on the premiership will probably force the framework to revoke his nomination.
• The Iraqi Premiership: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani continues to vie for the premiership. It remains unlikely that the framework will select him given many framework members’ long-standing objections to Sudani. Unspecified individuals close to Sudani suggested to Iraqi media on February 16 that Sudani’s control of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias is a “trump card.” This statement could reflect an effort by Sudani to use his purported control over the militias to gain US support for him to become prime minister amid US objections to Maliki. 
• Syrian Decentralization: The Syrian government transferred some authorities from the central government to governors and local officials on February 15, which may satisfy some of the Syrian Democratic Forces’ demands regarding decentralization.

Iran

The Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of anti-regime Baloch groups, claimed on February 15 that its fighters targeted and destroyed an Iranian security forces vehicle. The group claimed that the vehicle was headed to Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, to “suppress citizens.”[lxxiv] The MPF has carried out several attacks against Iranian security forces since the group was formed in early December 2025.[lxxv]

Iraq

Iraqi Parliament Speaker Haibat al Halbousi asked the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court (FSC) on February 15 to issue a ruling on whether the Iraqi parliament can continue to hold sessions even though it has not elected a president.[lxxvi] Halbousi asked the FSC to provide its “legal opinion” on parliament continuing to hold sessions without “including the item of electing the president” on its agenda.[lxxvii] The Iraqi Constitution stipulates that parliament must elect a president by a simple majority with a two-thirds quorum within 30 days of parliament electing a parliament speaker.[lxxviii] Parliament elected Halbousi as parliament speaker in late December 2025 but has not yet elected a president.    

Syria

The Syrian government has begun to transfer families from al Hol internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Hasakah Province to Aleppo Province.[lxxix] A Syrian government official in charge of the camp’s activities told Kurdish media on February 17 that the Syrian government started to move residents from the camp on February 17 in preparation for the camp’s closure “within a week.”[lxxx] Syrian media and journalists reported on February 17 that the Syrian government transported around 300 primarily Syrian and Iraqi residents from al Hol IDP camp to Akhtarin camp.[lxxxi] Akhtarin camp is a “largely vacant” IDP camp in northern Aleppo Province.[lxxxii] The transfer of families and impending closure of al Hol camp come as Syrian government forces have been unable to effectively manage the camp since Syrian government forces arrived at the camp on January 20.[lxxxiii]  At least 10,000 al Hol residents have escaped from the camp since January 20.[lxxxiv]  Multiple al Hol residents told New Lines Magazine that they intentionally “sought to make daily life impossible” by rioting and starting fires at the camp, not necessarily to escape, but rather to force Syrian government authorities to transfer them.[lxxxv] A significant proportion of al Hol camp residents—particularly third-country nationals—are family members of ISIS fighters and left ISIS’s last remaining territory in Baghouz when it was seized by the SDF in 2019.[lxxxvi]

The Syrian government continues to face challenges in repatriating third-country nationals.[lxxxvii] Syrian officials told Reuters on February 16 that the Syrian government returned 34 Australian citizens who were supposed to return to Australia to al Roj IDP camp due to unspecified "technical reasons."[lxxxviii] The Australian government later announced on February 16 that Australia “is not and will not repatriate people from Syria” due to national security concerns.[lxxxix] Many countries have little incentive to repatriate their nationals who joined or supported ISIS. 

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has continued to strike ISIS targets in Syria in recent weeks.[xc] CENTCOM reported on February 14 that it conducted ten strikes targeting more than 30 ISIS targets, including ISIS infrastructure and weapons depots, between February 3 and 12.[xci] US officials have recently stated that the United States will continue to conduct counter-ISIS airstrikes despite the United States’ handover of its bases to the Syrian government.[xcii] US CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper said on February 12 that US forces remain “poised” to address and respond to threats from ISIS.[xciii]

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi announced the formation of a united Kurdish leadership body to represent the Kurds on February 16.[xciv] Abdi told Kurdish media on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference that the Democratic Union Party (PYD), Kurdish National Council (KNC), and other smaller parties have come together to create a “Kurdish political body.”[xcv] Abdi stated that this body represents the “general interests of Kurds,” even though there may be political differences among its members.[xcvi] Several SDF and AANES leaders have expressed an intent to “shift” the struggle for Kurdish rights from military action to political and legal advocacy.[xcvii] Kurdish political parties will almost certainly continue to attempt to advocate for Kurdish rights in Damascus, as they have done since the fall of the Assad regime. Abdi noted that the joint Kurdish delegation—which includes officials from rival political parties, the PYD and the KNC—will soon travel to Damascus to discuss Kurdish issues with the Syrian central government.[xcviii] KNC officials reportedly traveled to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara on February 3 without the support or foreknowledge of the PYD, possibly in an attempt to sideline the PYD.[xcix]

The Syrian government and the SDF continue to negotiate the terms of the SDF’s military integration into the Syrian army. The SDF and the Syrian government agreed on January 30 to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army by establishing three brigades comprised of SDF fighters that will be deployed in Hasakah Province.[c] SDF Spokesperson Farhad Shami said on February 13 that there will be a "Hasakah Brigade," “Qamishli Brigade,” and “Derik Brigade,” referring to the geographic areas in which each brigade will operate.[ci] Derik is also known as al Malikiyah and is located in northeastern Hasakah Province near the Iraqi border. SDF and Syrian government officials told Reuters on February 13 that they reached a preliminary understanding on a brigade near Qamishli but have not reached an agreement on the locations of the other two brigades.[cii]

Abdi also alluded to an unspecified “problem” regarding the appointment of SDF nominee Azad Simi Jia Kobani for Assistant Defense Minister of the Eastern Region.[ciii] Kobani is the SDF’s intelligence chief and a member of the SDF’s General Command.[civ] Kobani has previously collaborated with US forces during counter-ISIS operations in northeastern Syria.[cv] Pro-Erdogan Turkish media has alleged that Kobani has played a role in Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) attacks in Turkish territory, including the PKK’s 2007 Daglica attack.[cvi] Abdi did not provide any information about the "problem" with Kobani's appointment, but it is possible that Turkey played a role in the ”problems” regarding Kobani’s appointment given that Turkish officials have previously sought to bar senior People's Protection Units (YPG) commanders from assuming leadership positions in the Syrian Defense Ministry.[cvii]

A northern Syria-based source reported that Syrian Interior Ministry forces deployed to several villages south of the M4 highway between Qamishli and the Syria-Iraq border on February 17.[cviii] The source reported that Interior Ministry forces deployed to the villages of Qasrak al Syriac, Abu Fara, and Abu Hujira Fawqani in Hasakah Province.[cix] The January 30 agreement requires Syrian army and SDF units to withdraw from frontlines in Hasakah Province and for their respective internal security units to backfill these positions.[cx]

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The United States and regional actors are reportedly attempting to reach a security agreement between the Lebanese government and Israel.  Informed sources told Lebanese media on February 17 that the United States and regional actors are holding discussions on a potential preliminary proposal to hold “parallel” discussions between Israeli and Lebanese officials.[cxi] The preliminary proposal stipulates that Hezbollah would not conduct any attack against Israel and the ceasefire monitoring mechanism would ensure that Hezbollah does not use its weapons.[cxii] The proposal would also include some Israeli concessions, including the cessation of Israeli operations, an Israeli military withdrawal from some of its permanent points in Lebanese territory, and the release of a number of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel.[cxiii] The sources stated that the United States has demanded that Israeli and Lebanese officials move talks to a “new level,” including direct discussions on security agreements beyond the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.[cxiv] The “new level” presumably refers to engaging in higher-level negotiations between Lebanese and Israeli officials.[cxv] Hezbollah reportedly does not oppose the terms of this proposal with the United States.[cxvi]

Neither Israel nor the Lebanese government has changed its positions, however, which may complicate these diplomatic efforts. Lebanese officials insist on maintaining the ceasefire monitoring mechanism instead of participating in direct, high-level negotiations with Israel.[cxvii] The Lebanese government also reportedly supports expanding the role of the ceasefire monitoring committee.[cxviii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Lebanese officials likely seek to avoid high-level negotiations with Israel because such negotiations would presumably require the Lebanese government to make firm commitments to disarm Hezbollah across all Lebanese territory, which it has thus far been hesitant to do.[cxix]  Israel reportedly supports negotiating with the Lebanese government outside of the mechanism and confining the mechanism’s discussions to economic cooperation, according to Lebanese media.[cxx] Israeli officials, including Defense Minister Israel Katz, have also maintained that Israel will not withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon so long as Hezbollah maintains its weapons.[cxxi] Katz also noted on February 17 that Israeli forces’ presence in southern Lebanon is separate from the ceasefire agreement.[cxxii]

The Lebanese government has given the LAF a four-month deadline to implement the next phase of its disarmament plan. LAF Commander Rodolphe Haykal presented the LAF’s plan for the next phase of its disarmament plan to the Lebanese cabinet on February 16.[cxxiii] The second phase of the LAF’s disarmament plan includes Hezbollah’s disarmament between the Litani and Awali rivers.[cxxiv] Haykal did not provide details about the second phase but noted that the LAF has started conducting reconnaissance as part of the second phase.[cxxv] Haykal reportedly asked the Lebanese cabinet for an eight-month deadline to implement the second phase, but the Lebanese cabinet gave the LAF four months.[cxxvi] Lebanese Information Minister Paul Morcos confirmed the four-month deadline but noted that it is extendable “depending on available capabilities, Israeli attacks, and hindrances on the ground.”[cxxvii] The Lebanese cabinet’s deadline aligns with the amount of time that it took the LAF to complete its first phase.[cxxviii] The LAF's request for an eight-month deadline reflects how the LAF is adopting a cautious approach toward disarming Hezbollah north of the Litani River given that Hezbollah has framed its disarmament in the north as an existential issue.[cxxix]

LAF Commander Rodolphe Haykal met with multiple international officials at the Munich Security Conference in Germany between February 13 and 15 to garner international support for the LAF.[cxxx] Haykal held a series of bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the conference with US, European, and regional officials, including US Senior Adviser to US President Donald Trump on African and Middle Eastern Affairs Massad Boulous, to discuss enhancing cooperation and support for the LAF.[cxxxi] Haykal's meetings are part of the Lebanese state’s efforts to increase international support and funding for the LAF.[cxxxii] Lebanon’s regional and Western partners, including the United States, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, continue to prepare for the March 2026 French-hosted LAF support conference.[cxxxiii]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed two Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters in an airstrike along the Syria-Lebanon border on February 15.[cxxxiv] The IDF struck and killed two PIJ fighters in Majdal Anjar, eastern Bekaa Valley, as the fighters reportedly attempted to cross the border from Lebanon into Syria.[cxxxv] The IDF said that PIJ has taken steps to advance its “terrorist operations” against Israel from Lebanese territory.[cxxxvi]  Palestinian militias, including PIJ, have long operated in Lebanon and have launched attacks against Israel from southern Lebanon.[cxxxvii] The Syrian government and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara pressured Palestinian militia leaders, including PIJ leaders, to leave the country and disarm their forces at the request of the United States between April and May 2025.[cxxxviii] Many Palestinian militias operated in Syria under Assad.