Iran Update, February 5, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

There are inconsistent reports about whether US-Iran talks in Oman on February 6 will be limited to the nuclear program or also include discussions on Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional proxy and partner network.  Three unspecified Iranian officials and an Arab official told the New York Times on February 5 that the United States and Iran agreed to focus on Iran’s nuclear program, but will also discuss Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and regional proxies during their upcoming talks.[i] Axios, in contrast, cited US officials who reported that the bilateral US-Iran talks in Oman on February 6 will only cover nuclear issues.[ii] A political analyst close to the Iranian regime stated that the regime only authorized officials to discuss the nuclear issue among “other minor issues” and noted that Iran will never negotiate over its ballistic missiles. [iii] Iranian officials have also continued to publicly insist that Iran will only discuss the nuclear program and will not negotiate on its ballistic missile program or its Axis of Resistance.[iv] 

Iran may offer limited concessions on its nuclear program, but there appears to be continued disagreement among regime elements over some specific concessions. Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar reportedly proposed a framework on February 5 for the upcoming US-Iran negotiation, which stipulates that Iran has to commit to zero uranium enrichment for three years before limiting its enrichment below 1.5 percent, transferring its highly enriched uranium to a third country, and halting all weapons transfers to its proxies. It is unclear whether Iran would be okay with moving its highly enriched uranium to a third country, however. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani reportedly said that Iran would be willing to transfer its uranium to a third party, such as Russia. Other Iranian officials, such as Supreme Leader Representative to the Supreme National Security Council’s Defense Council Ali Shamkhani, have rejected such a transfer.[v]

Iran remains unlikely to make any other concessions related to its missile capabilities and its support for its partner and proxy network in the region, however. Iran’s partner and proxy network and its missile capabilities are two long-standing pillars of its defensive strategy.[vi] Abandoning these capabilities would require a complete rethink of Iranian defense strategy. A rethink of this magnitude is theoretically possible, but Iranian officials have shown no willingness to rethink their strategy.[vii] Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that they believe that their ballistic missiles performed admirably during the 12-Day War and have discussed developing more technologically advanced missiles.[viii] Iran has likewise shown no willingness to decrease its support for its proxies and partners in the region.[ix] Iran has continued to help fund Hezbollah, for example.[x] Shamkhani also told Hezbollah-affiliated media on February 2 that Iran will continue to support the members of its Axis of Resistance and that Iran would not give in to the US demand to halt its support.[xi]

Iran has reportedly continued to take steps to rebuild its nuclear program as part of its nuclear reconstitution efforts to help Iran’s nuclear facilities withstand Israeli and US airstrikes. US President Donald Trump told NBC on February 4 that the United States found that Iran is trying to restart the nuclear program at a new, unspecified site in a “different part of Iran.”[xii] Trump warned Iran that the United States will do “very bad things” to Iran if Iran restarts its nuclear program.”[xiii] It is unclear which part of Iran Trump was referring to and whether Iran is relocating any elements of its nuclear program. CNN also reported on February 4 that US intelligence has found that Iran is trying to rebuild its nuclear facilities “deeper underground."[xiv]

Iran probably calculates that by dispersing elements of its nuclear program and burying them deeper, it will be able to increase the military requirements to destroy nuclear facilities. These efforts would presumably incorporate lessons learned from the vulnerabilities at the Fordow facility that the United States exploited in the June 2025 strikes.

The Chairman of the SNSC's Defense Council, President Masoud Pezeshkian, appointed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani, as the Defense Council’s secretary on February 5.[xv] Shamkhani’s appointment is almost certainly at the behest of the supreme leader. The Defense Council is Iran’s highest national security decision-making body’s sub-council on strategic defense, which the SNSC established in August 2025 to streamline decision-making during wartime.[xvi] Khamenei appointed Shamkhani, alongside former SNSC Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian, as his representative on the council three days after its establishment.[xvii] A Shamkhani-affiliated outlet reported on February 5 that the secretary’s role involves coordinating an integrated defense strategy that strengthens preparedness, addresses emerging threats, aligns state institutions with defense priorities, and oversees defense diplomacy and strategic communications.[xviii] The same outlet proposed in July 2025 the establishment of a notably similar “Strategic Command Center” that would have “cross-sectoral authority” to rapidly respond to evolving threats.[xix] This outlet's affiliation with Shamkhani suggests that the July 2025 op-ed reflects his broader ambitions for shaping Iran’s strategic defense policy. His appointment as secretary of the newly-formed Defense Council — whose mandate has not yet been publicly defined — indicates that the Defense Council will function as a central body enabling rapid and coordinated decision-making.

Key Takeaways

• US-Iran Negotiations: There are inconsistent reports about whether US-Iran talks in Oman on February 6 will be limited to the nuclear program or also include discussions on Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional proxy and partner network. Iran may offer limited concessions on its nuclear program, but Iran remains unlikely to make any other concessions related to its missile capabilities and its support for its partner and proxy network in the region.
• Iran’s Nuclear Program: Iran has reportedly continued to take steps to rebuild its nuclear program as part of its nuclear reconstitution efforts to help Iran’s nuclear facilities withstand Israeli and US airstrikes. Iran probably calculates that by dispersing elements of its nuclear program and burying them deeper, it will be able to increase the military requirements to destroy nuclear facilities.
• Iranian Leadership: The Chairman of the SNSC's Defense Council, President Masoud Pezeshkian, appointed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani, as the Defense Council’s secretary on February 5. His appointment as secretary of the newly-formed Defense Council — whose mandate has not yet been publicly defined — indicates that the Defense Council will function as a central body enabling rapid and coordinated decision-making.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) denied on February 5 that a “joint security force” expelled the 17th PMF Brigade from its base in al Dora, south of Baghdad City.[xx] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[xxi] The PMF’s denial comes after the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) reportedly expelled Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Saraya al Jihad, which controls the 17th PMF Brigade, from its base south of Baghdad City on January 31 after the militia refused to comply with an unspecified judicial order to leave the base.[xxii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have long maintained a presence in al Dora and other areas surrounding Baghdad C Iranian-backed militias previously cleansed Jurf al Sakhr of its Sunni residents and replaced the town with a PMF base that is inaccessible to the Iraqi government, for example.[xxiv] Many of these militias have also refused Iraqi government oversight.[xxv] The United States continues to pressure the Iraqi government to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxvi] 

Iraqi Sunni political parties remain divided over State of Law Coalition leader and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s nomination for the premiership. The Sunni National Political Council, with the exception of the Azm Alliance, met at Progress Party member and Iraqi Parliament Speaker Haibat al Halbousi’s house on February 4.[xxvii] Multiple Sunni parties, including the Progress Party, the National Hasm Alliance, and the Azm Alliance, formed the Sunni National Political Council in November 2025 to unify their political efforts and positions on key issues.[xxviii] Some council members, like the Azm Alliance and the National Hasm Alliance, support Maliki’s nomination.[xxix] The Progress Party opposes Maliki’s nomination, and its leader, Mohammad al Halbousi, reiterated that the party would not participate in a Maliki-led government in a February 4 interview with Iraqi media.[xxx]

The National Political Council also decided during its February 4 meeting that its decisions would now require a two-thirds majority.[xxxi] This is likely in response to the Azm Alliance’s previous complaints that the council’s January 24 statement did not reflect the council’s consensus.[xxxii]  The council implicitly warned the Shia Coordination Framework against nominating Maliki on January 24.[xxxiii]     

Syria

The Syrian government and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) manned joint checkpoints and conducted joint patrols as part of the ongoing implementation of the January 30 Syrian government-SDF agreement. These patrols and checkpoints are key trust-building steps as integration progresses. The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) conducted joint patrols with SDF internal security forces (known as Asayish) in the Ghuwayran neighborhood of Hasakah City on February 4, following the GSS’s initial deployment to Hasakah on February 2.[xxxiv] Ghuwayran is located near the SDF-controlled al Sinaa prison, where US forces continue to move Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) detainees from Syria to Iraq.[xxxv] GSS and Asayish forces also established joint checkpoints in villages south of Kobani, Aleppo Province, including in al Shuyoukh, on February 5.[xxxvi] The GSS was previously deployed to al Shuyoukh and al Qasimiyah and reportedly established joint checkpoints in the nearby village of Shayklar on February 2.[xxxvii] SDF sources separately told Syrian media on February 5 that preparations are underway for the SDF to hand over Qamishli Airport to GSS forces.[xxxviii] The SDF’s handover of the Qamishli Airport, SDF-controlled border crossings, and oil fields to the Syrian government is explicitly stipulated in the 14-point January 30 agreement.[xxxix] 

The SDF’s reported refusal to allow GSS units to deploy to Kobani, Aleppo Province, emphasizes the importance of continued Syrian government-SDF trust-building efforts to reduce friction that could delay the implementation of the January 30 agreement. SDF Commander Mahmoud Berhudan told Kurdish media on February 4 that no GSS forces will enter Kobani under the January 30 agreement because the Asayish is already deployed to Kobani.[xl] An analyst on Kurdish affairs reported that residents in Kobani are also extremely opposed to GSS deployments there.[xli] The January 30 agreement text that is publicly available explicitly stipulates that SDF forces in Kobani will integrate into a single brigade subordinate to an unspecified parent division in Aleppo Province, but does not outline GSS deployments to Kobani, unlike in Hasakah City and Qamishli.[xlii] The Syrian government presumably seeks to deploy GSS forces to Kobani to integrate Asayish forces into the GSS as part of the agreement, however. An AANES delegation met with Syrian government representatives, including Aleppo Province GSS Commander Colonel Mohammad Abdul Ghani, in Aleppo City on February 5 to discuss mechanisms to integrate the Asayish into the GSS and ways to end the siege on Kobani, which has been without water or electricity since January 20.[xliii] Ghani previously met with Asayish leaders in Kobani on February 1.[xliv] 

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with French Foreign Affairs Minister Jean Noel Barrot in Damascus on February 5 to reportedly “verify the implementation” of the January 30 agreement.[xlv] Barrot and Shaibani also reportedly discussed ways to strengthen bilateral cooperation, according to Syrian state media.[xlvi] Kurdish media reported that Barrot will meet with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi, Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) Foreign Affairs co-chair Ilham Ahmed, and Women’s Protection Unit (YPJ) Commander Rohilat Afrin on February 6 in Erbil, Iraq.[xlvii] Barrot’s visit follows the French Foreign Affairs Ministry's sustained diplomatic cooperation with the United States to mediate the January 30 agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF.[xlviii]   

Syrian Chief of General Staff Ali al Nassan and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov in Damascus on February 4 to discuss Russian basing rights in Syria, defense cooperation, and Syrian economic development.[xlix] Yevkurov’s discussions with Ali and Shaibani on Russian basing rights come after the Russian military abandoned its airbase at Qamishli Airport on January 26 due to the Syrian army-SDF fighting in northeastern Syria.[l] Russian forces currently maintain a presence at the Tartous Naval Facility and the Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia Province, both of which Russia uses to facilitate operations in the Mediterranean Sea and Africa.[li] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Syrian defense officials recently met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian defense officials in Moscow on January 28.[lii] Syrian and Russian defense officials have consistently met over the past six months to discuss Russia’s military presence in Syria and the possible training and expertise that Russia could offer the Syrian military.[liii]

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.