Iran Update, February 10, 2023

February 10, 2023, 4:30 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Contributors: Ashka Jhaveri

CTP has rescoped these updates to provide more comprehensive coverage of Iran and its Axis of Resistance in addition to our usual coverage of the Mahsa Amini protest movement and supreme leader succession. We publish these updates Monday through Friday.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force is probably reinforcing its military presence in northern Syria under the guise of providing humanitarian relief following the earthquake on February 6. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani arrived in northern Syria on February 9—as CTP previously reported—with Quds Force official Mohammed Reza Zahedi—who formerly was a liaison to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and Syrian military intelligence for weapons shipments.[i] The Quds Force’s mission—covert lethal activities outside of Iran, including asymmetric warfare and special operations—is ill-suited for disaster relief operations. Their arrival of under the pretext of disaster relief suggests Iran is attempting to exploit the humanitarian crisis to entrench and expand its military presence in northern Syria, as CTP previously reported.[ii]

Ghaani and Zahedi’s appearance in northern Syria follows deployments around Aleppo that also indicate the IRGC Quds Force is reinforcing its presence in the province. Syrian Arab Army (SAA) personnel replaced LH militants “distributed within the front lines of western” Aleppo on January 10.[iii] Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) also formed a joint operations center with the Syrian Arab Army to facilitate engineering, medical, and logistics support in Aleppo Province, which demonstrates greater coordination between the two in northern Syria. [iv] Iran-backed Fatemiyoun militants—which the IRGC-QF or LH typically oversee—also established positions in northeast Aleppo on February 3.[v] CTP has not observed LH activity since January 10 in Aleppo Province, where it has held positions since at least 2013.

Iran possibly coordinated the movement of Iranian-backed forces in Aleppo Province with Russia and Syria. The newly appointed commander of Russian forces in Syria, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, was in Aleppo when Ghaani and Zahedi arrived on February 9.  CTP and ISW cannot confirm Serdyukov met with either of the IRGC Quds Force officials.[vi] Syrian President Bashar al-Assad meet with Iraqi PMF Chairman and Kata’ib Hezbollah leader Abu Fadak on February 10 in Aleppo.[vii]

The senior IRGC Quds Force and PMF officials’ highly publicized appearance in northern Syria probably also is part of an information operation aimed at Israel and Turkey. Iran may aim to demonstrate to Israel its ability to operate and remain in northern Syria. Israel acknowledged the implications of this development on February 8, when an unidentified Israeli military official asserted Iran will take advantage of the February 6 earthquake to move in weapons.[viii] Iran also possibly intends to signal its presence to deter a future Turkish ground incursion by occupying tactically advantageous points near the border.

Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid implicitly called for revolutionary change to the Iranian regime and sought to broaden his appeal beyond Sunni Iranians on February 10. Abdol Hamid stated in his weekly Friday prayer sermon in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province that the Iranian population had lost hope in the regime’s ability to manage ongoing economic issues and characterized recent protests as economically motivated. He criticized military officials for their overinvolvement in governance, stating “military persons should only be active in the military arena” whereas “politicians and political experts” should be engaged in the political administration of the country. Abdol Hamid also stated that "political experts" residing outside of the country should return to the country and govern Iran.[ix] Although his comments echo regular calls to reverse “brain drain” within Iran, singling out the need for “political” experts to return suggests applying Western theories of governance to Iran and subverting the anti-Western ideological core of the Islamic Republic. Combating “Westoxification”—a perceived loss of Iranian and Islamic identity due to the spread of Western ideas and practices—has been a rhetorical touchstone of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his predecessor.[x] Abdol Hamid’s comment conveys undermining the revolutionary nature of the regime.

Abdol Hamid likely sought to extend his influence beyond Sunni-Iranian communities during his Friday prayer sermon. Abdol Hamid downplayed religious divisions in Iran, stating that “there is no such thing as Shia or Sunni” and that the Iranian people “are one,” adding “officials should not worry about a dispute between Shias and Sunnis.”[xi] Abdol Hamid stated in a separate part of his sermon that women became second-class citizens and Sunnis became third-class citizens following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, possibly to signal that his movement seeks to address the grievances of various oppressed groups in Iran beyond the Sunni community.

Abdol Hamid’s Friday sermon was a rhetorical de-escalation from his Tweet on February 9 in which he declared explicit support for Mir Hossein Mousavi’s revolutionary call for “foundational” change in Iran.[xii] Abdol Hamid did not reference Mousavi in his February 10 sermon, possibly to avoid alienating segments of his congregation who oppose the controversial figure or the Green Movement he led in 2009. He may have also been preempting the possibility of protesters cohering around Mousavi, which would contain Abdol Hamid within his own movement. Abdol Hamid’s ability to strategically escalate and de-escalate against the regime—and the consistent protest turnout that he generates in Zahedan—underscores the skill with which he leads anti-regime activity within his community.

Key Takeaways

• The IRGC Quds Force is likely reinforcing its military presence in northern Syria under the guise of providing humanitarian relief following the earthquake on February 6.
• The senior IRGC Quds Force and PMF officials’ highly publicized appearance in northern Syria probably also is part of an information operation aimed at Israel and Turkey.
• Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid implicitly called for revolutionary change to the Iranian regime and sought to broaden his appeal beyond Sunni Iranians on February 10.
• At least five protests occurred in four cities across four provinces.
• Several senior regime officials called on the Iranian population to participate in pro-regime demonstrations commemorating the anniversary of the Islamic Republic on February 11.
• The Sunday Times reported on February 10 that IRGC personnel were experiencing “doubt and confusion” following the Mahsa Amini protest movement, citing inside sources.
• Russian Ambassador to Tehran Alexev Dedov announced on February 10 that the National Iranian Oil Company and Russian state-owned Gazprom were engaged in consultations on developing of gas fields inside Iran.
• The Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the IRGC Intelligence Organization published a joint statement announcing the arrest of perpetrators behind the drone attack on a military munitions factory near Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on January 28.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least five protests occurred in four cities across four provinces on February 10. CTP assesses with high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province[xiii]

• Size: Medium to Large
• Demographic: Anti-regime protesters gathered near the Makki Grand Mosque following prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid’s Friday prayer sermon.

Yazd City, Yazd Province[xiv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Yazd Tire Company workers

CTP assesses with moderate confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Galikash, Golestan Province[xv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Protesters gathered to express support for Sunni cleric Moulana Gargij.

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province[xvi]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Protesters gathered to express support for two recently arrested local Sunni clerics, Ibrahim Karimi and Luqman Amini.

Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province[xvii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: A group of women protested the recent arrest of Sunni cleric Moulavi Abdol Majid Mouradzahi.

Protest coordinators and organizations called for demonstrations on the following date:

February 16:[xviii]

• Type: Demonstrations, and 40-day commemoration ceremony of executed protesters in Tehran
• Location: Countrywide

Several senior regime officials called on the Iranian population to participate in pro-regime demonstrations commemorating the anniversary of the Islamic Republic on February 11. Ahvaz, Ghazvin, Mashhad, Qom, and Tehran Friday Prayer Leaders—clerics who are selected by and receive their messaging from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—stressed that the Iranian people need to participate in pro-regime rallies, citing Khamenei’s February 8 speech calling for “national unity.”[xix] Other senior Iranian officials framed the February 11 as a repudiation of the Mahsa Amini protest movement and claimed significant crowds would partake in the event.[xx] A protest organization group based in Najaf Abad, Esfahan Province claimed the regime had transported nearly 8,000 Afghan nationals into Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province to participate in pro-regime demonstrations. It is unclear whether the group is suggesting that Afghan nationals had travelled to Mashhad from Afghanistan or from within the country.[xxi] Social media reports additionally claimed education officials in West Azerbaijan Province sent a letter mandating student participation in pro-regime demonstrations.[xxii] CTP and ISW cannot corroborate these reports, and such claims should be treated with skepticism.

Large crowds are likely to participate in pro-regime marches on February 11, which will not definitively indicate the regime has reclaimed the support it lost during and since the Mahsa Amini protest movement. Regime officials largely described February 11 rallies as a manifestation of the regime’s legitimacy, which could signal confidence in their ability to generate significant turnout. The regime’s celebrations commemorating the anniversary of the Islamic Republic remain particularly tone deaf following the Mahsa Amini protest movement, however, especially since the regime has yet to meaningfully address protester grievances. Ghazvin Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah Abdol Karim Abedini stated on February 10 that individuals released on Khamenei’s order to pardon prisoners should participate in pro-regime rallies to demonstrate “that they truly deserve (Khamenei’s) grace.”[xxiii] Such statements from regime officials may fuel preexisting anti-regime sentiments ahead of country-wide, anti-regime demonstrations organized for February 16.

The Sunday Times reported on February 10 that IRGC personnel were experiencing “doubt and confusion” following the Mahsa Amini protest movement, citing inside sources. The Times stated that Iranian authorities had paid proxy forces like Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) significantly more than IRGC personnel, compounding low morale within the Guard. The Times’ sources statedpay gaps between the IRGC and Iranian proxies had “become a painful difference for the IRGC forces who have been on the front line for all these months. They feel undervalued and underpaid.”[xxiv]

Russian Ambassador to Tehran Alexev Dedov announced on February 10 that the National Iranian Oil Company and Russian state-owned Gazprom were engaged in consultations on developing of gas fields inside Iran. Dedov added that other Russian companies were interested cooperating with Iran, particularly the South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf. [xxv]

The Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the IRGC Intelligence Organization published a joint statement announcing the arrest of unspecified perpetrators behind the drone attack on a military munitions factory near Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on January 28.[xxvi] The statement added that the arrest proved Israel’s involvement without providing details or explanation and warned of a response for the attack, although IRGC spokesperson Ramezan Sharif claimed on February 9 that the regime had already retaliated.[xxvii]