1 day ago

Tigray Tensions; IS Sahel Offensive: Africa File, June 26, 2025

To receive the weekly Africa File and triweekly Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.

Contributors: Ellery White, Miles Charles, and Edlawit Tesfaye

Key Takeaways:

Ethiopia. The growing divide between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian federal government threatens to kill the Pretoria peace agreement and return violence to Tigray. The schism has likely prompted the TPLF to recalibrate its ties with Eritrea, which has exacerbated tensions between the TPLF and Ethiopia and Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Sahel. IS Sahel Province (ISSP) has launched a coordinated offensive across its area of operations, particularly in Niger, that highlights its growing capacity. ISSP and al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen are slowly encircling Niamey and attacking the various ground lines of communication that link the capital with the rest of the country.
Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces launched a major attack in southern Sudan against a key Sudanese Armed Forces position, which is a node between central Sudan, Darfur, and lucrative oil infrastructure in southern Sudan.
Democratic Republic of the Congo. CTP will cover the US-mediated peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in a special edition of the Congo War Security Review on June 27. You can subscribe here. The special edition text will also be retroactively added to this Africa File page on June 27.

Assessments:

Ethiopia

Authors: Kathryn Tyson with Edie Tesfaye

The Ethiopian federal government is backing a new Tigrayan political party to rival the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which exacerbates the divide between the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal government. The former head of the federally backed Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), Getachew Reda, established a new Tigray political party known as the Tigray Democratic Solidarity Party in April 2025.^[1] Ethiopia’s election authority gave Reda’s party a preliminary registration certificate on May 26.^[2] French media reported that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is supporting the new Tigray Democratic Solidarity Party to challenge TPLF dominance in Tigray.^[3] The Ethiopian National Election Board denied the TPLF its political party status in May 2025, citing the TPLF’s failure to implement “corrective measures” ordered by the board.^[4] The TPLF rejected the decision and said that the refusal to reinstate the TPLF’s political status poses a “grave threat” to the Pretoria agreement.^[5]

The latest disagreement is part of a yearslong rivalry between TPLF factions over the implementation of the Pretoria peace agreement that ended the Tigray war.^[6] TIA critics have accused the TIA of acting in the interests of the federal government, while the TIA has accused the TPLF of trying to regain control over Tigray.^[7] Unfulfilled aspects of the Pretoria agreement have exacerbated these tensions. The schism became violent in March 2025 after hardline factions of the TPLF aligned with TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael effectively couped Reda and the TIA in March 2025. Gebremichael-aligned forces attacked TIA offices, opened fire on civilians, and detained local TIA leaders.^[8] Several European governments warned against travel to Ethiopia and encouraged their citizens to either leave or stock up on supplies in case the situation deteriorated.^[9]

Figure 1. Attacks Against Tigray Interim Administration

Source: Liam Karr.

The schism has likely prompted the TPLF to recalibrate its ties with Eritrea, which has exacerbated TPLF-Ethiopia tensions and Eritrea-Ethiopia tensions and increased the risk of violence in Tigray. TPLF leadership said that it intended to strengthen its relationship with Eritrea in May 2025 in a message commemorating Eritrea’s Independence Day.^[10] Gebremichael said in a speech on June 22 that the TPLF intends to strengthen Tigray-Eritrea relations.^[11] Unspecified Ethiopian federal authorities accused TPLF leaders in March 2025 of reaching “covert arrangements” with Eritrea to possibly reignite conflict Tigray.^[12]

Ethiopia and Eritrea’s relationship has deteriorated since the end of the Tigray war in 2022.^[13] Abiy has made inflammatory statements since 2023 that Ethiopian Red Sea access, which Ethiopia lost when Eritrea became independent in 1993, was an existential issue and “natural right” that Ethiopia would fight to acquire if not through diplomacy.^[14] Eritrea increased cooperation with Egypt, which is one of Ethiopia’s main geopolitical rivals due in large part to Egypt’s staunch opposition to Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project on the Nile River, as part of a de facto anti-Ethiopian axis throughout 2024.^[15] American, European, and Tigrayan officials warned in early 2025 that a war between the two countries could be imminent after Eritrea implemented a nationwide military mobilization in February and Ethiopia deployed troops toward the Eritrean border in March.^[16]

The growing tensions threaten to effectively kill the Pretoria peace agreement, which is still largely unimplemented. These failures have driven tensions between the TIA, TPLF, and Ethiopian federal government. Federal authorities have lifted aid restrictions nominally, but humanitarian access remains severely limited in parts of central, western, and northwestern Tigray.^[17] Ongoing insecurity and the Ethiopian government’s systematic obstruction of aid deliveries have impeded food and medical aid distribution.^[18] Amhara regional forces and Eritrean military units remain entrenched in contested areas of Tigray, including Western Tigray and border regions, despite Pretoria agreement provisions requiring their withdrawal.^[19] The presence of these forces continues to obstruct the return of internally displaced persons and has been linked to human rights violations.^[20] Although the TPLF has surrendered some heavy weapons, the broader disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process remains stalled.^[21] TPLF units have refused to fully disarm until Eritrean and Amhara forces fully withdraw.^[22]

Sahel

Author: Liam Karr with Miles Charles

Islamic State Sahel Province’s (ISSP’s) latest offensive shows the group’s growing capacity across its area of operations, particularly in Niger. ISSP has increased the rate and scale of its attacks since late May. Hundreds of ISSP militants overran the Nigerian base at Banibangou and the adjacent town on June 19. Nigerien officials claimed the attackers killed 34 soldiers, wounded 14, and ransacked local buildings.[23] The attacks followed two of the deadliest ISSP attacks in Mali and Niger, respectively, when the group claimed to kill more than 50 Nigerien soldiers in an attack in the Tahoua region on May 25 and 42 Malian soldiers in an attack on Tessit on June 4.[24] ISSP separately massacred at least 70 civilians on June 19, 150 miles west of Banibangou in a commune less than 20 miles from the Burkinabe border.[25] The attack fits ISSP’s well-established strategy of establishing control through coercion, fear, and violence among “uncooperative” communities.[26]

Figure 2. IS Sahel Offensive Along Mali-Niger Border

Source: Liam Karr.

ISSP likely coordinated the offensive among its various military zones to augment its capacity and maximize the impact of the offensive. ISSP has targeted Banibangou, Eknewane, and Tessit previously in major attacks, but it has never conducted this many major attacks in less than a month.[27] The three military targets are spread across three of ISSP’s five military zones, signaling that ISSP central leadership coordinated with regional commanders to launch major attacks over the same period. The individual attacks likely involved ISSP forces from adjacent zones—a tactic ISSP has used previously to achieve overwhelming force concentration—given the scale of the attacks and their proximity to adjacent military zones.[28]

ISSP is using its support zones along the Mali-Niger border to spread deeper into Niger, including southward toward Niamey. ISSP’s rate of engagements along the Mali-Niger border has decreased so far in 2025.[29] The attacks that ISSP has conducted have been extremely deadly, however. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data has also recorded an increased number of ISSP support activities in the Tillaberi region and continued reports of ISSP control in the Tahoua region, which CTP has assessed previously is part of a major ISSP control hub that includes a significant portion of Mali’s Menaka region.[30] These trends indicate that ISSP is now able to move more freely and stage larger attacks along the border.

The ISSP attack on Banibangou further signals that ISSP has isolated many army installations and major population centers near the Malian border in northern Tillaberi. ISSP conducted a diversionary rocket attack against Inates—near the Malian border 95 miles northwest of Banibangou—to prevent the base from sending reinforcements.[31] This delay allowed militants to fully overrun the base and adjacent town for several hours before reinforcements arrived from Ouallam, which is over 90 miles southwest of Banibangou via the N24 highway.[32] ISSP has isolated other district capitals closer to the Burkinabe border since 2024, with some soldiers allegedly unwilling to follow orders without recieving additional intelligence and air support.[33]

Northern Tillaberi is a key defensive line for Nigerien forces protecting the capital. Banibangou is a lynchpin to the N24 and other highways that connect mostly rural areas north of Niamey. ISSP has been less active near Banibangou, Ouallam, and surrounding rural areas north of Niamey in recent years compared to other areas of northwestern Niger.[34] CTP has assessed previously that ISSP has had less success in these areas due in part to local peace agreements that have degraded ISSP’s ability to recruit locally.[35]

Figure 3. ISSP and JNIM Encircle Niamey

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

ISSP and al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) are slowly encircling Niamey and attacking the various ground lines of communication that link the capital with the rest of the country. Greater ISSP presence in Banibangou and Ouallam departments would create a third pressure point north of Niamey, as ISSP is already active along the other two major highways that run north from Niamey. The group attacks civilians and security forces along the N1 road northwest of Niamey and sporadically claims activity around Tillaberi city, which lies just over 50 miles away from Niamey along the N1. The group also clashes with security forces on the N23 road northeast of Niamey as close as Balleyara, which is also 50 miles from the capital along the N23. JNIM attacks security forces on the roads southwest of Niamey, and ISSP has significantly increased the rate of attacks on the southern segment of the N1 highway that runs along the Niger-Nigeria border southeast of Niamey in 2025.

ISSP may have launched its latest offensive to regain media attention after JNIM’s high-publicity activity in the last month. JNIM and ISSP are major rivals and have gone through various iterations of fighting that have resulted in hundreds of casualties.[36] This rivalry extends to the media and propaganda realm, where each group tries to paint itself as the more legitimate alternative.[37] JNIM carried out a string of high-publicity attacks between early May and early June, including attacks where it overran provincial centers and its fighters posed for pictures in government offices and central roundabouts.[38] The timing of ISSP’s offensive—and its focus on large-scale attacks and high-publicity targets—indicates an effort to match JNIM’s success.

Sudan

Author: Kathryn Tyson with Ellery White

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched a major attack against a key Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) position in West Kordofan, southern Sudan. The RSF on June 20 launched its largest coordinated offensive against the SAF’s 22nd Infantry Division headquarters in Babanusa since the RSF began besieging the town in 2023.^[39] The attack followed two days of RSF artillery shelling against Babanusa and SAF drone strikes targeting RSF positions on the city’s outskirts.^[40] The SAF repelled the offensive but remains vulnerable as the SAF has been unable to send reinforcements and the division relies on irregular airdrops for essential supplies.^[41] The RSF reportedly deployed new reinforcements to the city over the past week to encircle the town from the north and east, according to local witnesses.^[42]

Babanusa is the last major SAF stronghold in West Kordofan, a region that serves as a logistic corridor between the RSF’s center of gravity in Darfur and central Sudan. The RSF has captured nearly all major towns and military positions in West Kordofan over the past year.^[43] The RSF captured al Fula, the West Kordofan state capital, in June 2024, as well as al Nahud and al Khwai in May 2025.^[44] The loss of al Fula and al Nahud prevents the SAF from using the bases to threaten Darfur.^[45] Important transportation junctions, such as al Khwai, additionally facilitate RSF supply lines and troop movements.^[46]

Figure 4. Control of Terrain in Sudan's Civil War

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas Van Linge.

Control of Babanusa is also key to accessing lucrative oil infrastructure in southern Sudan. Several oil production sites are located near Babanusa, and the town lies on a highway linking West Kordofan to Heglig, a major oil-producing area approximately 248 miles southeast of Babanusa.^[47] The RSF seeks to attack the SAF 90th Infantry Brigade Command in Heglig, according to unspecified military sources cited by Egyptian media.^[48] The Heglig oilfield previously accounted for half of Sudan’s oil output in the early 2010s, before South Sudan’s secession in 2011.^[49]

Figure 5. Area of SAF and RSF Operations in the Kordofan Region, Southern Sudan

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas Van Linge.

The RSF will gain greater leverage over the SAF and South Sudanese government with control over the segment of a pipeline carrying oil from South Sudan to Sudan that runs through Heglig. The pipeline carries crude oil from South Sudan through Sudanese territory to Port Sudan.^[50] These cross-border oil flows are vital for both countries.^[51] The SAF collects transit fees—reportedly hundreds of millions of dollars annually before the civil war—that provide a critical source of hard currency, and oil comprises approximately 98 percent of landlocked South Sudan’s budget.^[52] The RSF reached an agreement with the Sudanese government and other armed groups that control territory where the pipeline runs to allow for repairs in January 2025 after damage to the pipeline forced Sudan to declare force majeure on its oil exports in March 2024.[53] Control over more of the pipeline gives the RSF more leverage to extract greater rents and concessions in negotiations. RSF control over another segment of the pipeline would increase the RSF’s opportunities to disrupt operations and extract protection money and other concessions from the SAF and South Sudan.

Africa File Data Cutoff: June 26, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.