Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 5, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on September 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the legitimacy of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and said that it is impossible to conclude a peace agreement with the current Ukrainian government, effectively eliminating the possibility of serious peace negotiations. Putin said on September 5 at the Eastern Economic Forum that he "do[es] not see much point" in negotiating with Ukraine, as it will be "impossible" to reach an agreement with Ukraine.[1] Putin falsely claimed that even if Russia and Ukraine conclude a peace agreement, Ukraine must lift martial law and hold presidential elections ahead of a national referendum to codify the agreement, and that the Ukrainian Constitutional Court must then make a decision on the referendum. Putin claimed that Ukraine lacks the "political will" to make an agreement at all, however, and that the Ukrainian Constitutional Court is non-functional as Zelensky is still in power, effectively reiterating his false claims that Zelensky and the current Ukrainian government are illegitimate. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected the legitimacy of Zelensky and his government, deliberately misreading the Ukrainian constitution.[2] Putin’s statement is part of his continued effort to portray Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials as partners with whom Russia cannot negotiate or sign a final peace agreement.[3] ISW has long assessed that Putin is uninterested in meaningful negotiations to end the war and instead sought to delay or prolong negotiations, and his September 5 statements are now attempting to justify Russia's refusal to negotiate at all.[4] Putin is attempting to make peace negotiations impossible and falsely deflecting the blame onto Ukraine.

Putin and other Russian officials continue efforts to degrade Western unity and deter Western support for Ukraine, including undermining potential postwar security guarantees. Putin also stated at the Eastern Economic Forum that Russia will consider any foreign troops in Ukraine to be legitimate targets if the war in Ukraine continues.[5] Putin claimed that he "simply do[es] not see any point" in deploying foreign troops to Ukraine after the war because Russia will "respect those security guarantees" that Russia and Ukraine develop. Putin's statement threatening to strike foreign military assets in Ukraine is an attempt to provoke fear in the West about a possibility that European states are not considering. European member states of the Coalition of the Willing have consistently reiterated that any peacekeeping contingents that deploy to Ukraine will only do so after the conclusion of a long-term peace deal and even then would only operate in unspecified rear areas rather than on the frontline.[6] The Kremlin is also intensifying its effort to deter Western states from taking actions unfavorable to Russia writ large, including supporting Ukraine. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev accused Finland on September 5 of senselessly "interfering" in Ukraine and reiterated that Russia cannot accept security guarantees for Ukraine if Russia feels its opinions are not considered.[7] Medvedev also accused Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland of increasing military activity along the Russian border and urged Russia to increase its border protection in response to Finland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and increased military activity in the Baltics.[8] Putin's accusations ignore Russia's own electronic warfare (EW) jamming operations that have significantly affected the Baltics and other states along Russia's western border in recent months, including jamming the GPS of planes carrying government officials.[9] Putin and other Russian officials continue to reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine and to aggressively posture against NATO allies in an effort to dissuade European states from supporting Ukraine, including through post-war guarantees, and to demand that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[10]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff and Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of September 5.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes hit the ELOU-AVT-6 primary oil refining unit, which has an estimated oil refining capacity of six million tons per year out of the Ryazan Oil Refinery's entire refining capacity of 17.1 million tons of oil per year.[12] Geolocated footage published on September 4 shows a fire at the Ryazan Oil Refinery's ELOU-AVT-6 and AVT-4 refining units.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest oil refineries in Russia and produces gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, liquified gases, and other petroleum products.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian SSO also struck an S-400 air defense system in Kaluga Oblast and that preliminary reports indicate that the strikes damaged a Russian command and staff vehicle and a control point. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck a Russian military warehouse containing ammunition and drones in occupied Luhansk City.

Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on September 4 that Azerbaijan could help restore bilateral relations with Russia by releasing 13 Russian citizens in Azerbaijani detention.[15] Azerbaijani authorities detained Russian citizens and conducted a raid on ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg in June 2025 after Russian law enforcement conducted a raid on the regional headquarters of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku.[16] The Russian MFA issued a separate statement on September 4 rejecting reports that Russia had not compensated Azerbaijan for the December 2024 Azerbaijani Airlines Plane crash, which was likely the result of Russian air defenses shooting down the passenger plane.[17] The Russian MFA stated that a Russian insurance company had made insurance payments to the families of those killed in the December 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines plane crash. The Azerbaijani MFA responded to Zakharova's September 4 statement and stated that it is wrong for Zakharova to portray the detentions of Russian citizens as the reason for deteriorating bilateral relations and to place the release of the Russian citizens as a condition for improving bilateral relations.[18] The Azerbaijani MFA named Russia's failure to take responsibility for shooting down the Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 as the reason for deteriorating bilateral relations. The Azerbaijani MFA also criticized the Russian MFA's September 5 statement that Russian insurance companies paying individual families satisfies Azerbaijan's demand that the Russian Government compensate Azerbaijan for the lost aircraft.[19] The Russian MFA responded to the Azerbaijani MFA on September 5 and rejected the Azerbaijani MFA's claim that Zakharova had named the release of the 13 detained Russian citizens as a condition to improving relations but emphasized that this release would help normalize bilateral relations.[20] The Russian MFA claimed that the investigation into the December 2024 plane crash is still ongoing. Bilateral Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated since the December 2024 plane crash and faced further strain due to the mutual detentions in the summer of 2024.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the legitimacy of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and said that it is impossible to conclude a peace agreement with the current Ukrainian government, effectively eliminating the possibility of serious peace negotiations.
• Putin and other Russian officials continue efforts to degrade Western unity and deter Western support for Ukraine, including undermining potential postwar security guarantees.
• Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Siversk. Russian forces advanced near Lyman and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for Ukrainian strikes against Russia and occupied Ukraine.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[22]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City) and Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[23]

Russian forces attacked within Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka, north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on September 4 and 5.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka, Varachyne, and Andriivka (all north of Sumy City) and near Yunakivka.[25]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command redeployed the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division to an unspecified location but noted that unspecified sources suggest that the Russian military command redeployed forces to Chasiv Yar.[26] The milblogger complained that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are attempting to give orders to elements of the Russian 1220th Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), which is already overextended due to its large area of responsibility (AoR).[27] The milblogger noted that the Russian military command may leverage North Korean troops to fill gaps in the AoR.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) are operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[28] Drone operators of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[29] Drone operators of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy-Kursk border area.[30] Elements of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade, reconnaissance elements of the 106th VDV Division, and drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[31]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and toward Synelnykove on September 4 and 5.[32]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 5.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka, north of Kupyansk near Radkivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pischane on September 4 and 5.[33]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on September 5 that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction are trying to leverage foliage to advance and are sometimes sending Russian servicemembers to infiltrate Ukrainian positions one-by-one or in pairs carrying flags, but that this activity does not represent Russian control of territory.[34]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Ukrainian positions near Smorodkivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Kolisnykivka and Novoplantonivka; northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; and southeast of Borova near Andriivka, Druzhelyubivka, and Hrekivka, and toward Olhivka on September 4 and 5.[36]

Geolocated footage published on September 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently conducted a drone strike against a Russian EW system in occupied Svatove (east of Borova).[37]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Stavky (north of Lyman).[38]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Derylove (northwest of Lyman) and in northeastern Zarichne (east of Lyman).[39]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and Shandryholove and toward Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Novyi Myr, Novomykhailivka, and Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske, Zarichne, and Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area and toward Yampil on September 4 and 5.[40]

The spokesperson of the Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on September 5 that Russian forces are leveraging infiltration tactics to deploy one or two soldiers in the Lyman direction to evade direct engagement with Ukrainian forces in an effort to penetrate deeper into Ukrainian defensive lines and establish assembly points.[41] The spokesperson noted that the Russian military command often ignores logistical support requests from forward teams.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Note: ISW has reorganized its axes in Donetsk Oblast to better analyze and assess the Russian military command's tactical and operational objectives east and west of Ukraine's fortress belt. ISW combined the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions into the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka Tactical Area, given that the previously separate Chasiv Yar and Toretsk axes have now converged into a single tactical area around Kostyantynivka. ISW also created a separate Dobropillya Tactical Area, given that the Dobropillya salient is supporting operations beyond Pokrovsk in the fortress belt area of operations. ISW will continue refining its operational-tactical framework for the fortress belt as the situation evolves.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along the northern outskirts of Siversk and to eastern Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[42]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on September 4 and 5.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian sources claimed on September 5 that Russian forces seized Markove (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[44] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Bila Hora (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[45]

Russian forces attacked north of Kostyantynivka toward Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Bondarne and Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne and Bila Hora; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, and Kleban-Byk; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on September 4 and 5.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Shcherbynivka.[47]

Russian milbloggers claimed that western Oleksandro-Shultyne is a contested "gray zone."[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka tactical area.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar and Rubizhne; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, and Vilne; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne, Ivanivka, and Mayak on September 4 and 5.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Zapovidne and regularly counterattack toward Novotoretske (southeast of Dobropillya).[51]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[52]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin and toward Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenkse and toward Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, and Molodetske on September 4 and 5.[53]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on September 5 that Russian forces are relying more on unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for logistics due to Ukrainian forces effectively interdicting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and that the UGVs are struggling to navigate the difficult terrain.[54]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR], SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Novoekonomichne and near Balahan.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on September 4 and 5.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the northern part of Filiya.[57]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on September 5 that Russian forces began assaulting Ukrainian positions near the junction between Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts with small groups and that Russian forces are using various drones, particularly fiber-optic drones, to strike Ukrainian logistic routes.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka, Oleksandrohrad, and Sichneve; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha, Shevchenko, Vorone, Khoroshe, Novomykolaivka, and Maliivka on September 4 and 5.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Andriivka-Klevtsove.[60]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are moving simultaneously from Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka) toward Lisne (northeast of Velykomykhailivka) and Velykomykhailivka.[61]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sosnivka and Khoroshe (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka), and drone operators of the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[62]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, northeast of Hulyaipole near Novomykolaivka, Temyrivka, and Olhivske on September 5 but did not advance.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the outskirts of Hulyaipole.[64]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[65]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhivk near Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Plavni on September 4 and 5.[66]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including elements of its 108th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhzhia direction, including near Kamyanske and Stepnohirsk.[67]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near Antonivka, on September 4 and 5 but did not advance.[68]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 104th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City on the left [east] bank of the Dnipro River).[69]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[70] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched six S-300 missiles from Kursk Oblast, and one Kh-59 cruise missile from Voronezh Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 121 drones in northern and eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that seven missiles and 35 drones struck 10 unspecified locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged an enterprise in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and critical and industrial infrastructure in Sumy Oblast.[71]

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on September 5 that Russia launched repeated strikes while emergency responders worked to extinguish fires on critical and industrial infrastructure in Sumy Oblast on September 4 and that Ukrainian first responders were not injured.[72]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 4 that the Belarusian economy is suffering from high inflation and labor shortage, like Russia, as its economy has been acutely impacted by high defense spending.[73]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.