Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 5, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:45 PM ET

Data cutoff: 12:30 PM ET on March 5

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine will support US air defense efforts against Iranian Shahed drone strikes in the Middle East. Zelensky stated on March 5 that Ukraine received a request from the United States for "specific support" to defend against Iranian Shahed drone strikes in the Middle East, and that Zelensky gave the instructions to provide equipment and Ukrainian specialists to assist in air defense efforts.[i] Zelensky stated on March 4 that he discussed Ukrainian air defense assistance against Shahed drone strikes with the leaders of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait.[ii] The Financial Times (FT) reported on March 5, citing Ukrainian industry figures, that the United States Department of Defense and at least one Gulf state are in talks to purchase Ukrainian-made interceptor drones to repel Iranian Shahed drones.[iii] A person familiar with the talks told FT that about 12 Ukrainian companies manufacture relatively cheap interceptor drones that cost a few thousand dollars each, compared to the millions of dollars that PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems cost. Ukrainian officials have offered several times in recent days to support US air defenses against Iranian strikes.[iv] Ukraine has years of experience defending against almost nightly large-scale Russian drone and missile strike packages, which have included Iranian-origin strike drones much like those the United States currently faces in the Middle East, and reportedly has a 90 percent interception rate of such drones.[v]

Kremlin officials are criticizing the United States for military operations against Iran and are using the escalation in the Middle East to set conditions to blame the United States for any future failures in negotiations for a peace in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov criticized on March 5 the US rhetoric about the US-Israeli operations against Iran, claiming that US President Donald Trump and US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth are making contradictory statements about US motivations in Iran and that the United States intended to sow discord in and destabilize the broader Middle East, particularly to drive a wedge between Iran and the Gulf States.[vi] Lavrov connected the military operation in Iran to Russia's war in Ukraine, claiming that the United States and Israel intend to draw the Gulf States into conflict just as the West allegedly drew Ukraine into conflict with Russia. Lavrov claimed that many Russian politicians, political scientists, and analysts are concerned about the timing of US operations against countries it negotiates with and how this relates to peace negotiations in Ukraine. Lavrov accused the United States of conducting military operations against Iran and Venezuela even when negotiations were going well, explicitly referencing the June 2025 Israel-Iran war in which the United States also conducted strikes against Iran, the US operation against Venezuela on January 3, and the current US-Israeli operations against Iran. Lavrov claimed that these Russian officials and political voices are concerned that the "spirit" of the August 2025 US-Russian summit in Alaska is fading and agreed with this assessment. Lavrov hedged some of his complaints, however, claiming that the "spirit" of the Alaska summit is not as important as the summit's so-called "understandings," a vague term the Kremlin utilizes to claim that the United States and Russia concluded a formal agreement. Lavrov also claimed that the Kremlin itself has not observed indications that the United States is negotiating with Russia in bad faith, acting as a moderate voice to send a certain message to the Russian people and Russia's allies without overly criticizing the Trump administration.

Other Russian officials are using US military operations against Iran to harshly criticize the United States and rhetorically place Russia and the United States in opposition and discredit US-led negotiations in Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev directly criticized US President Donald Trump for conducting peace efforts while conducting military operations against Iran.[vii] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Chepa claimed that the operations in Iran are unlikely to fully derail negotiations on Ukraine but warned that Russia may question its trust that the United States can act as an "impartial and honest" mediator.[viii] Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik called for Russia to increase its military support for Iran as Russia "cannot allow Iran to be destroyed."[ix] The Kremlin typically uses Medvedev to express more extreme rhetoric than the Kremlin itself is willing to platform, while still reflecting the Kremlin's true views.[x] The Kremlin also uses Duma deputies to act as bullhorns for its rhetorical lines, particularly to domestic Russian audiences.[xi] The Kremlin has long been attempting to delay and stall peace negotiations in Ukraine as it has demonstrated no interest in engaging in any negotiations that fall short of its original war demands, but has had to balance this objective with avoiding US sanctions or other measures that could force Russia to meaningfully negotiate.[xii] The Kremlin has also had to balance its bilateral relations with the United States and its relationships with its allies and partners, including those who are adversaries to the United States, such as Iran.[xiii] The escalation in Kremlin rhetoric against the United States following the start of US-Israeli operations against Iran on February 28 indicates that the Kremlin may be increasingly struggling to balance preserving relations with the United States and preserving relations with its partners as the operations against Iran continue. Russia may also use these direct criticisms of the United States as a negotiating partner to exculpate itself from the future failure of negotiations on the war in Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a routine decree on March 4 marginally increasing the authorized end strength of the Russian military as part of the ongoing Russian military reforms. Putin signed a decree on March 4 increasing the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces to 2,391,770 total personnel, including 1,502,640 military personnel.[xiv] The March 4 decree only increases the end strength of the Russian Armed Forces by 2,640 total personnel compared to 2024.[xv] Russia has expanded the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces nearly every year since launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the 2026 expansion is the smallest so far. Putin signed decrees increasing the size of the Russian military by 137,000 in 2022, 170,000 in 2023, and 180,000 in 2024.[xvi] The extension of the Russian Armed Forces’ end strength is likely linked to the expansion of the Russian force structure announced under then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in January 2023, as the formation of new Russian military districts, formations, and subordinate units requires more personnel to fully staff them.[xvii] The March 4 decree is therefore unlikely to impact the battlefield situation in Ukraine in the immediate term, and is more likely oriented towards Russia's long-term efforts to bolster its force for future conflicts, including with NATO.

Russian authorities arrested a fourth deputy of former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, continuing the long-standing Kremlin campaign to remove personnel loyal to Shoigu and neutralize his influence within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russian officials arrested former Deputy Defense Minister Ruslan Tsalikov on March 5 on charges of founding a criminal organization that embezzled Russian budget funds between 2017 and 2024, money laundering, and bribery.[xviii] Tsalikov resigned from his post as deputy defense minister in May 2023, soon after Russian President Vladimir Putin removed Shoigu as defense minister.[xix] Tsalikov had close ties to former Shoigu and reportedly left his deputy defense minister position after Russian authorities questioned him over possible corruption charges.[xx] Tsalikov is the fourth Shoigu deputy to face charges, following the arrests of former deputy defense ministers Timur Ivanov, Pavel Popov, and Dmitry Bulgakov for various charges, including corruption, fraud, and treason in 2024.[xxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine will support US air defense efforts against Iranian Shahed drone strikes in the Middle East.
• Kremlin officials are criticizing the United States for military operations against Iran and are using the escalation in the Middle East to set conditions to blame the United States for any future failures in negotiations for a peace in Ukraine.
• Other Russian officials are using US military operations against Iran to harshly criticize the United States and rhetorically place Russia and the United States in opposition and discredit US-led negotiations in Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a routine decree on March 4 marginally increasing the authorized end strength of the Russian military as part of the ongoing Russian military reforms.
• Russian authorities arrested a fourth deputy of former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, continuing the long-standing Kremlin campaign to remove personnel loyal to Shoigu and neutralize his influence within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces may have targeted oil infrastructure in Saratov Oblast overnight on March 4 to 5. A Ukrainian Telegram channel reported on the evening of March 4 that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified location near the Saratov Oil Refinery and posted footage of an explosion and fires in the area.[xxii] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that Ukrainian strikes hit civilian facilities in Saratov City.[xxiii]

Ukrainian strikes on March 1 to 2 have reportedly rendered a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) frigate unable to launch missiles.[xxiv] Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on March 5 that Ukraine's March 1 to 2 strikes against the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai critically damaged the Project 11356R Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate Admiral Essen, rendering the frigate unable to launch Kalibr cruise missiles.[xxv] The SBU sources stated that the Ukrainian strikes detonated grenade launchers on the Admiral Essen, causing a fire that burned for about 18 hours.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and east of Sumy City near Marine on March 4 and 5.[xxvi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Marine.[xxvii] Elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in the Kursk Oblast border area.[xxviii] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[xxix]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 5 but did not advance

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchanski Khutory, Hrafske, and Starytsya and toward Verkhnya Pysarivka on March 4 and 5.[xxx]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kruhle, Nesterne, and Pishchane (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxi]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 5, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.[xxxii]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly struck a Ukrainian ammunition depot near Anyskyne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xxxiii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Podoly, Petropavlivka, and Kucherivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kivsharivka, Pishchane, and Kurylivka; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on March 4 and 5.[xxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; and southeast of Borova toward Cherneshchyna on March 4 and 5.[xxxv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles east of Borova.[xxxvi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on March 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 5 that Russian forces seized Yarova (northwest of Lyman).[xxxvii] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) with the claimed seizure of Yarova.[xxxviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Lyman and into eastern Fedorivka Druha and through Nykyforivka (both southeast of Slovyansk).[xxxix]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova and toward Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky and Drobysheve; east of Lyman near Maslyakivka and Zarichne; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka; east of Slovyansk near Kalenyky, Kryva Luka, Riznykivka, and Platonivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Lypivka and Fedorivka Druha on March 4 and 5.[xl] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Drobysheve and in southern Lyman.[xli]

Order of Battle: Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[xlii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 3 and 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast and south of Kostyantynivka.[xliii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 5 that Russian forces seized Maiske (east of Druzhkivka).[xliv]

Refinement of areas under Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 3 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian servicemembers southeast of Kostyantynivka in an area where ISW previously assessed that Russian forces had advanced in.[xlv] The Assessed Russian Infiltration Areas layer is not Russian-controlled territory and is permissive of Ukrainian-held positions within any given infiltration area.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 3 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions south of and in southeastern Kostyantynivka in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[xlvi]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Bondarne and toward Mykolaivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; northeast of Druzhkivka near Minkivka, Markove, Pryvillya, and Novomarkove and toward Fedorivka; southeast of Druzhkivka toward Popasne; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on March 4 and 5.[xlvii] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 5 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Maiske and near Vyrolyubivka (southeast of Druzhkivka).[xlviii]

A commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on March 5 that Russian forces managed to restore their communication capabilities to around 50 to 60 percent of their pre-Starlink shutdown levels of effectiveness.[xlix] The commander added that Russian forces continue to install Wi-Fi bridges and place directional antennas on key tactical heights.

Order of Battle: Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic FPV drone operators and other elements of the Russian 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian positions and vehicles in northern and eastern Kostyantynivka.[l] KVN drone operators of the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions and equipment in central Kostyantynivka.[li] Drone operators of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade are striking Ukrainian positions in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[lii] Molniya-2 fixed-wing FPV drone operators of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Novodmytrivka (north of Kostyantynivka).[liii] Incendiary FPV drone operators of the 4th Assault Battalion of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) (Usaty Battalion Afipsa) are striking Ukrainian positions south of Kostyantynivka.[liv] FPV drone operators of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lv] Artillery elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on March 4 and 5.[lvii]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Dobropillya.[lviii] Drone and artillery operators of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[lix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Molodetske, and Kotlyne on March 4 and 5.[lx]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 5 that Russian forces have decreased the intensity of their infiltration efforts in the Pokrovsk direction, possibly because Russian forces have insufficient unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to provide logistical support for forward assault groups.[lxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU], reportedly operationally subordinated to the Central GoF), and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxii]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Russian near rear on the night of March 3 to 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Pokrovsk overnight.[lxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on March 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself and northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykolaivka on March 4 and 5.[lxiv]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 1444th Motorized Rifle Regiment (74th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 41st CAA, CMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Fedorivske (northwest of Novopavlivka).[lxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka, Andriivka-Klevtsove, and Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Novohryhorivka and Krasnohirske on March 4 and 5.[lxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Oleksandrivka and Dobropasove (east of Oleksandrivka).[lxvii]

Geolocated footage published on March 5 shows bomber elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) forces striking a dam on the Vovcha River between Pokrovske (north of Oleksandrivka) and Oleksandrivka.[lxviii]

Order of Battle: Grad multiple rocket launcher system (MLRS) artillery elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces southwest of Andriivka-Klevtsove.[lxix] Bomber elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pokrovske.[lxx]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Russian near rear on the night of March 3 to 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration on the outskirts of Berezove (on the frontline southeast of Oleksandrivka) overnight.[lxxi]

Ukrainian forces continue their mid- and long-range strike campaign against Russian military and logistics targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Nyzhnia Krynka (roughly 55 kilometers from the front line) and a logistics depot near occupied Chystiakove (roughly 85 kilometers from the front line) on the night of March 3 to 4.[lxxii] Geolocated footage published on March 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian drone repair facility near occupied Zachativka (roughly 65 kilometers from the front line).[lxxiii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers west of Varvarivka (north of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lxxiv]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Varvarivka, Ternuvate, Zelene, Rizdvyanka, and Verkhnya Tersa and toward Vozdvyzhivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Staroukrainka on March 4 and 5.[lxxv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian quadcopter first-person view (FPV) drones near Svyatopetrivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxvi] Drone operators of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) are intercepting Ukrainian drones near Varvarivka.[lxxvii] Drone operators of the Martyn Pushkar Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Verkhnya Tersa, Staroukrainka, and Zaliznychne.[lxxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Hulyaipilske, and Myrne, and northwest of Orikhiv near Zapasne and Mahdalynivka on March 4 and 5.[lxxix]

Order of Battle: Supercam drone operators and other elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and positions near Orikhiv and Stepnohirsk.[lxxx] Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment and forces near Myrne and Charivne (both east of Orikhiv).[lxxxi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) with the March 3 claimed seizure of Veselyanka (northwest of Orikhiv).[lxxxii] Drone operators and other elements of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly continuing to strike Ukrainian equipment and positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxxiii]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on March 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge and southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on March 4 and 5.[lxxxiv]

Order of Battle: Interceptor drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Kherson direction.[lxxxv]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on March 5 that Ukrainian drone units recently destroyed a Russian S-400 air defense system in occupied Orlivka (roughly 190 kilometers from the frontline).[lxxxvi] Geolocated footage published on March 5 shows a Ukrainian drone striking a building in Orlivka.[lxxxvii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Geran and Gerbera-type drone control point ground relay near occupied Chornomorske (approximately 280 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of March 3 to 4.[lxxxviii] The Ukrainian Navy reported on March 5 that Ukrainian Naval Forces destroyed a Russian Ka-27 naval helicopter over the Black Sea.[lxxxix]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on March 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 155 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which about 100 were Shaheds, from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[xc] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 136 Russian drones, that 18 strike drones struck eight locations, and that downed debris fell on three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, civilian, commercial, and rail infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Kherson Oblasts.[xci] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts.[xcii] The Ukrainian Navy reported that Russian forces struck the Panamanian flagged cargo ship BULL on the evening of March 4 after it had left the port of Chornomorsk carrying Ukrainian corn.[xciii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian and Vietnamese military delegations continued on March 5 bilateral cooperation talks that began on March 4.[xciv]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.