Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 10, 2026

Assessment as of: 9:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 1:40 PM ET

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Ukrainian forces advanced 10 to 12 kilometers deep in two separate drives in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast that have reportedly liberated more than 400 square kilometers since late January 2026. Ukrainian 1st Separate Assault Regiment Commander Captain Dmytro Filatov, whose regiment is operating in the Hulyaipole direction, stated on March 10 that the regiment pushed 12 kilometers deep into Russian positions between Nove Zaporizhzhia and Dobropillya (both north of Hulyaipole and south of Oleksandrivka).[i] The commander of a Ukrainian airborne assault battalion stated on March 10 that the battalion had advanced 10 to 11 kilometers in the Oleksandrivka direction.[ii] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on March 10 that Ukrainian forces have regained the initiative in some areas near the Zaporizhia-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[iii] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces have not been advancing in the Hulyaipole direction for the past three months (since mid-December 2025) and have now shifted their focus to attacking toward Zalizynychne (west of Hulyaipole), Myrne, and Charivne (both southwest of Hulyaipole), likely due to successful Ukrainian counterattacks north and northeast of Hulyaipole.

Major General Oleksandr Komarenko, the head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff, stated on March 10 that Ukrainian forces have liberated more than 400 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka direction.[iv] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have liberated roughly 279 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions since January 1, but ISW’s conservative mapping methodology underestimates Ukrainian advances. Komarenko also stated that Ukrainian forces have liberated almost all of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but have not seized three small settlements nor cleared two other settlements – likely referring to five settlements that are both in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and the Oleksandrivka direction.[v] Ukraine's Airborne Assault Troops previously reported that Ukrainian forces had liberated nine settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction as of March 2.[vi]

ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Novohryhorivka, Kalynivske, and Stepove (all southeast of Oleksandrivka). Geolocated footage published on March 10 shows a Ukrainian armored vehicle operating within central Novohryhorivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area and likely also liberated Kalynivske and Stepove (both just north of Novohryhorivka).[vii] A Ukrainian source stated that Ukrainian forces liberated Kalynivske and Stepove.[viii] ISW is also changing its previous assessment that geolocated footage published on March 7 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southern Ternove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) occurred after a Russian infiltration mission into the settlement.[ix] ISW now assesses that the March 7 footage likely occurred before  – not after  –Ukrainian forces liberated Ternove as of March 6, indicating that Russian forces do not maintain position within the settlement.[x] A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on March 10 that Ukrainian forces have liberated Ternove.[xi]

ISW therefore assesses that the five settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, where Russian forces maintain positions and to which Komarenko was likely referring, are Novomykolaivka, Zaporizke, Novoheorhiivka, Sichneve, and Maliivka (all southeast of Oleksandrivka). Ukrainian military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko assessed on March 10 that Russian forces maintain positions within Novomykolaivka, Sichneve, Maliivka, Ternove, Berezove (just west of Ternove), and in parts of Vorone (north of Ternove).[xii] Kovalenko noted, however, that Ukrainian forces may have already liberated and cleared some of these settlements. The status of three additional settlements in eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast’s Synelnykivskyi Raion (notably outside of the Oleksandrivka direction) that were recently contested – Novopidhorodne, Novopavlivka, and Ivanivka - remains unclear.

Ukrainian forces conducted mutually supporting drives in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions in late 2025 and early 2026, respectively, to push Russian forces from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and to undermine Russian preparations for a spring offensive. Ukrainian forces first set conditions for a flank attack north of Hulyaipole in late 2025 and later launched counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction starting in late January 2026. Ukrainian 1st Separate Assault Regiment Commander Captain Dmytro Filatov stated that the regiment's elements redeployed to an area between Dobropillya and Nove Zaporizhzhia (both north of Hulyaipole and on the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border) in late 2025 to conduct a flank attack and push Russian forces from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[xiii] Filatov stated that Ukrainian offensive operations in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast do not mark the start of a new "counteroffensive," as these counterattacks aim to stabilize the frontline and improve Ukraine's positions amidst Russian troop redeployments to the area. Filatov stated that Russian forces considered conducting offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction as part of their "pre-spring" offensive campaign, implying that Russian forces may have sought to use attacks in the Oleksandrivka direction to set conditions for offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Lyman direction in the spring. Ukraine's Airborne Assault Forces reported on March 2 that its elements launched an "offensive operation" in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 29, and Komarenko stated that Ukrainian counterattacks in the area are part of a planned operation.[xiv]

Ukrainian forces were likely able to rapidly advance in the Oleksandrivka direction after infiltrating dispersed Russian positions in poor weather conditions and suppressing Russian drone-based defenses. The commander of a Ukrainian airborne assault battalion, which deployed to the Oleksandrivka direction in late January 2026, reported that Ukrainian forces infiltrated into Russian positions under the cover of snow and fog during the winter.[xv] Snowy and foggy weather conditions likely hindered Russian drone operations, such as aerial reconnaissance and strikes, due to poor visibility. The commander noted that the battalion's infantry elements suppressed Russian reconnaissance capabilities and drone operators, encircled 60 Russian servicemen, and captured three prisoners of war (POWs) after successfully infiltrating behind Russian lines. Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces Commander Major General Oleh Apostol, who reportedly commands the Ukrainian counterattacks in Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions, stated that the Ukrainian General Staff selected a frontline sector where Russian forces did not have significant manpower concentrations, which likely enabled Ukrainian infiltrations.[xvi] Apostol stated that Ukrainian forces have also eliminated two Russian battalion commanders during the counterattacks. Russian milbloggers similarly acknowledged that Ukrainian forces were able to infiltrate Russian positions in small groups and conduct mechanized assaults into Novohryhorivka due to the dispersed and non-linear character of the frontline.[xvii] ISW assessed in December 2025 that Russia did not have sufficient manpower and equipment to defend and develop simultaneous advances along the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions and would need to either reduce the area of responsibility or commit additional resources to these directions.[xviii] Ukrainian forces  – both infantry and mechanized elements  – appear to have exploited gaps in Russian defenses, exacerbated by decreased Russian drone activity amid poor weather conditions.

SpaceX's blocking of Russia's Starlink satellite connection in Ukraine in early February 2026 likely also enabled Ukrainian advances in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces reported that SpaceX's blocking of Starlink satellite connection on February 1 further degraded Russian situational awareness and complicated Russian command and control (C2) in the Oleksandrivka direction.[xix] Ukrainian forces may have also replicated their improved tactics for hunting Russian drone operators from other frontline directions in the Oleksandrivka direction. The planning group head of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces turned to less effective technological solutions following the blocking of Starlink, which allowed Ukrainian forces to more effectively destroy Russian communication systems and hunt down Russian drone operators and drone launch sites.[xx] The planning group head reported that Russian forces now have to rely on large antennas to maintain connectivity and fly drones, which expose Russian positions from afar and are more vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes. The planning group head reported that Ukrainian strikes against these antennas are disrupting Russia's information transmission system and reconnaissance capabilities, consequently undermining Russian combat operations. The planning group head added that Ukrainian strikes against Russian drone operators before the Starlink block had already reduced drone support for Russian assault groups and affected Russian forces' ability to track Ukrainian drone operators. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction similarly reported that Russian forces are placing antennas and communications repeaters on the roofs of high-rise buildings in central Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) to compensate for their loss of Starlink, indicating that these Russian vulnerabilities likely exist across the frontline.[xxi]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to exaggerate Russian battlefield advances despite Ukrainian forces’ recent liberation of significant territory in southern Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Putin told US President Donald Trump in a March 9 call that Russian forces are “successfully advancing” and that Ukraine should therefore "finally" move toward a negotiated settlement to end the war, likely claiming that Ukraine should concede to Russian demands.[xxii] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed in a meeting with Putin on March 10 that Ukrainian forces controlled 25 percent of Donetsk Oblast six months ago (in September 2025) but now control 17 percent - claiming that Russian forces have seized eight percent of the oblast in six months.[xxiii] Putin claimed, however, that his subordinates have given figures of between 15 and 17 percent,  additionally claiming that Russian forces may have seized 10 percent of Donetsk Oblast. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces control roughly 19 percent of Donetsk Oblast, however, compared with about 23.4 percent in September 2025. The Kremlin is overstating Russian gains in Donetsk Oblast since September by a factor of two or more.

Putin further claimed that Russian forces are bypassing Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) "from all sides."[xxiv] ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces have advanced north and west of Hryshyne, however. Putin’s mention of Hryshyne, a settlement with a pre-war population of roughly 2,000 people, highlights his focus on minor tactical details about small settlements that aim to create the impression of broad Russian advances to audiences that have no idea where these settlements are or how significant they might be.[xxv] Ukraine’s recent liberation of at least 275 square kilometers of territory in southern Ukraine clearly contradicts Putin’s ongoing claims that Russian forces are successfully advancing along the entire front and that Ukrainian defenses are on the verge of collapse.[xxvi] Ukrainian gains, in fact, exceeded Russian gains in February 2026.[xxvii] A Russian insider source noted on March 10 that Putin has not visited any frontline command posts in 2026, whereas he did so regularly in 2025.[xxviii] The source claimed that Putin's failure to visit his troops is due in part to a lack of Russian successes on the front, suggesting that the Kremlin is aware of Russia's slowing advances and is knowingly lying about supposed Russian military successes.

Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine are likely interfering with the anticipated Russian spring-summer 2026 offensives in Donetsk Oblast and southern Ukraine despite Putin's claims of Russian battlefield successes. The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Oleksandrivka direction stated on March 10 that the Russian military command was transferring forces to the area as part of its "pre-spring campaign."[xxix] The commander assessed that Russian forces will begin their spring campaign first in the Pokrovsk direction, then in the Lyman direction, likely to try to advance to the Donetsk Oblast border and to attack the Fortress Belt from the north. Komarenko assessed that Russian forces will prioritize the Pokrovsk, Oleksandrivka, and Zaporizhia directions in spring 2026 to fulfill their tasks of seizing all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and to advance as far as possible in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[xxx] The Ukrainian liberation of all but five small settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is obviously a setback to this plan.

ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka, Hulyaipole, and Zaporizhia directions are having cascading effects on other sectors of the front that are likely disrupting the Russian military command's spring and summer plans.[xxxi] Ukrainian counterattacks are likely affecting Russian plans to use relatively elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry forces in the spring-summer offensives in eastern and southern Ukraine. A Ukrainian journalist who visited a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on March 10 that Russian VDV and naval infantry elements have appeared in the area, likely in preparation for intensified assaults in southern Ukraine.[xxxii] ISW recently observed reports that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 76th VDV Division from the Pokrovsk direction to the Zaporizhia direction in January and February 2026, likely in preparation for intensified Russian attacks in the area.[xxxiii] ISW also recently observed reports that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and 55th Naval Infantry Division (both of the Pacific Fleet) redeployed from the Dobropillya tactical area to the Hulyaipole direction as of late February 2026, likely in response to the successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the area.[xxxiv] ISW has yet to observe other reports of naval infantry forces operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and the timing of this reported redeployment is unclear at this time. The Russian military command has committed naval infantry units to respond to Ukrainian successes in the past, however, and may have also redeployed naval infantry elements to western Zaporizhia Oblast to respond to recent Ukrainian counterattacks that have largely halted Russian advances in that area.[xxxv] Komarenko noted on March 10 that Ukrainian forces have stopped Russian advances near Plavni and Prymorske (both west of Orikhiv) and are counterattacking.[xxxvi] Komarenko added that the number of Russian attacks near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad has somewhat decreased as Russian forces focus on the Oleksandrivka direction.[xxxvii] The diversion of Russian forces and means away from the Pokrovsk direction to respond to Ukrainian counterattacks and try to regain lost territory in southern Ukraine is likely hindering Russian forces' ability to reach the intended starting positions to launch the spring-summer 2026 campaign in both southern and eastern Ukraine.

Russia also continues to suffer massive losses on the battlefield that will continue to hinder Russia's ability to achieve its sweeping goals for the spring-summer 2026 campaign. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 10 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) obtained Russian documents assessing Russia's own battlefield losses.[xxxviii] The document reportedly states that Russian forces have suffered 1.315 million killed in action (KIA) and seriously wounded in action (WIA) in the full-scale invasion. ISW recently assessed that the Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine are highlighting the constraints on Russia's options to redeploy forces to reinforce unstable sectors.[xxxix] Continued heavy losses on the battlefield, particularly if Russia continues to struggle to recruit enough new volunteers to replace its losses, will hinder Russia's ability to respond to Ukrainian advances, let alone to launch large-scale summer offensives to try to meet the Kremlin's unrealistic goals.

Ukrainian forces are intensifying their theater-wide mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower, which will likely also interfere with the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive. Russian milbloggers observed in March 2026 that Ukrainian forces have increased their use of first-person view (FPV) drones across all frontline sectors, including by leveraging drones that are harder to suppress or jam, such as high-frequency, fiber-optic, and mothership drones.[xl] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are switching to flying drones on new frequencies to bypass Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and expand the "kill zone" by tens of kilometers.[xli] The kill zone refers to an isolated frontline area of elevated drone strike risk, and Ukrainian officials reported on March 10 that the current kill zone in Ukraine is 20 to 25 kilometers and that the infiltration zone is 10 kilometers.[xlii] Some Russian milbloggers cautioned that Ukrainian forces increased the number of drone operators in the Kostyantynivka direction, are conducting precise strikes against vehicles traveling along highways northeast of occupied Donetsk City (approximately 55 kilometers behind the frontline), and are complicating Russian logistics.[xliii] Geolocated footage published in March 2026 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian trucks and vehicles traveling along highways north and northeast of Donetsk City.[xliv] Ukrainian forces are reportedly conducting similar precise strikes in southern Ukraine. Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian freight train in occupied Crimea.[xlv]

Ukraine's increased drone operations may also be degrading Russia's battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, which enabled some Russian tactical advances in mid to late 2025.[xlvi] BAI refers to the use of air power to strike targets in the operational or near rear of the frontline (within 100-120 kilometers) to impact battlefield operations in the near term. Ukrainian Commander in Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 9 that Russian FPV drone use decreased by 18 percent in February 2026, possibly as a result of Ukrainian strikes against Russian drone storage facilities.[xlvii] A Russian milblogger implied that elements of the Russian BAI campaign, such as strikes against Ukrainian drone operator positions and warehouses, are no longer generating the desired effects, judging by the abundance of Ukrainian drones in the air.[xlviii]

Kremlin officials provided varying accounts of US President Donald Trump’s statements about a ceasefire in Ukraine during his March 9 call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Trump reiterated his interest in a speedy end to Russia’s war in Ukraine through a ceasefire that achieves long-term peace.[xlix] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov subsequently responded to a question asking if Trump had set conditions for a ceasefire to move forward with negotiations, stating that Trump did not set such conditions.[l] The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected any proposals for a ceasefire in Ukraine that do not concede to the Kremlin’s demands.[li]

Putin continued to call on the United States to halt its ongoing military operation in the Middle East while refusing to end Russia’s own war in Ukraine. Ushakov claimed on March 9 that Putin used his call with Trump to propose many measures aimed at achieving a speedy political and diplomatic settlement to the US-Israeli campaign in the Middle East.[lii] Putin highlighted his contacts with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in particular. Trump stated on March 9 that Putin wanted to be helpful with the situation surrounding Iran but that it would be ”more helpful” for Putin to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.[liii] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth responded to the Putin-Trump call and stated that Russia ”should not be involved” in the military operation in the Middle East.[liv] Putin continues to insist that the United States halt its campaign, despite simultaneously refusing to allow the ceasefire necessary to end the war in Ukraine that Putin himself started.[lv]

The Russian government is reportedly considering a bill that would grant the Russian president powers for extraterritorial military operations to protect Russian citizens abroad. The Russian Government Commission submitted a bill to the State Duma on March 10 that would allow the Russian president to use Russian military forces to protect Russian citizens abroad in the event of their arrest, detention, criminal prosecution, or other legal proceedings in foreign courts.[lvi] The bill’s explanatory note reportedly states that the measure is intended to protect the rights of Russian citizens in foreign courts without Russia's participation or in international courts that are not based on international treaties with Russia or a United Nations Security Council resolution. This legislation, if passed, may set informational and legal conditions for Russia to justify future military activity abroad under the pretext of protecting Russian citizens. The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Baltic states are persecuting Russian speakers and ethnic Russians, for example.[lvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces advanced 10 to 12 kilometers deep in two separate drives in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast that have reportedly liberated more than 400 square kilometers since late January 2026.
• Ukrainian forces conducted mutually supporting drives in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions in late 2025 and early 2026, respectively, to push Russian forces from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and to undermine Russian preparations for a spring offensive.
• Ukrainian forces were likely able to rapidly advance in the Oleksandrivka direction after infiltrating dispersed Russian positions in poor weather conditions and suppressing Russian drone-based defenses.
• SpaceX's blocking of Russia's Starlink satellite connection in Ukraine in early February 2026 likely also enabled Ukrainian advances in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to exaggerate Russian battlefield advances despite Ukrainian forces’ recent liberation of significant territory in southern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine are likely interfering with the anticipated Russian spring-summer 2026 offensives in Donetsk Oblast and southern Ukraine despite Putin's claims of Russian battlefield successes.
• Russia also continues to suffer massive losses on the battlefield that will continue to hinder Russia's ability to achieve its sweeping goals for the spring-summer 2026 campaign.
• Ukrainian forces are intensifying their theater-wide mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower, which will likely also interfere with the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive.
• Kremlin officials provided varying accounts of US President Donald Trump’s statements about a ceasefire in Ukraine during his March 9 call with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• Putin continued to call on the United States to halt its ongoing military operation in the Middle East while refusing to end Russia’s own war in Ukraine.
• The Russian government is reportedly considering a bill that would grant the Russian president powers for extraterritorial military operations to protect Russian citizens abroad.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Oleksandrivka. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Pokrovsk.
• Ukrainian forces struck a defense plant in Russia. Russian forces launched 137 drones against Dnipro and Kharkiv cities.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russia’s defense industrial base on the night of March 9 to 10. Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on March 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the Kremniy El defense plant in Bryansk City, causing a large fire and multiple explosions.[lviii] Several social media sources posted footage showing smoke caused by the strike.[lix] Militarnyi added that the Kremniy El defense plant produces microelectronics and semiconductors used in Russian military systems and that the plant manufactures over 1,000 to 1,500 types of electronic components. Militarnyi noted that the plant reportedly supplies Russia’s state defense conglomerate Almaz-Antey, which produces air defense systems, and the state corporation Tactical Missiles Corporation, which manufactures cruise missiles, including the Kh-59, Kh-69, Kh-101 and the Kh-55 missiles that Russia uses to strike Ukraine. Militarnyi reported that Ukrainian forces have struck the Kremniy El plant at least six times since 2022. Russian milbloggers claimed on March 10 that Ukrainian forces used Franco-British-made, long-range air-launched Storm Shadow (SCALP-EG) cruise missiles in the strike.[lx] Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz confirmed on March 10 that Ukrainian forces struck Bryansk City, with witnesses observing smoke rising from the Sovetskiy Raion.[lxi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on March 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Mala Korchakivka and southeast of Sumy City near Pokrovka and toward Krasnopillya on March 9 and 10.[lxii]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi told Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda on March 10 that Russian attempts to create a “buffer zone” in border areas of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts are “tactical diversionary actions” that Russian forces do not follow with the use of heavy equipment or active assaults.[lxiii] Drapatyi reported that Ukrainian forces have identified 12 sectors in the area in which Russian elements, ranging from assault company-sized to battalion-sized, will attempt to advance in and toward Krasnopillya (roughly nine kilometers from the international border and southeast of Sumy City), Velyka Pysarivka (roughly three kilometers from the international border and 62 kilometers southeast of Sumy City), and Zolochiv (roughly 15 kilometers from the international border and northwest of Kharkiv City).

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene, Hrafske, Vovchanski Khutory, Symynivka, and Lyman and toward Vesele, Zybyne, and Verkhnya Pysarivka on March 9 and 10.[lxiv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Zelene.[lxv] Drone operators of the 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division), Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment), the Federal Security Service (FSB) Special Purpose Center, and the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[lxvi]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 9 and 10, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.[lxvii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on March 10.[lxviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked with armored vehicles toward Kupyansk.[lxix]

A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces continue to fully control Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) and claimed that Russian forces lack a stable defensive line in Kupyansk on the left (east) bank of the Oskil River.[lxx]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Borova itself and north of Borova near Novoplatonivka on March 9 and 10.[lxxi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating toward Borova.[lxxii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on March 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova and Drobysheve and toward Sosnove; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne; east of Slovyansk near Zakitne, Platonivka, and Riznykivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka, Dibrova, and Fedorivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on March 9 and 10.[lxxiii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position northwest of Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[lxxiv] Geolocated footage published on March 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions east of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[lxxv]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) and advanced in southern Kostyantynivka.[lxxvi] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger refuted on March 10 the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) claim that Russian forces seized Holubivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka) on March 9.[lxxvii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Illinivka; east of Druzhkivka near Maiske; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on March 9 and 10.[lxxviii]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 10 that Ukrainian forces are present in Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka), contrary to the Russian MoD’s claim that Russian forces seized the settlement as of January 30.[lxxix]

The chief non-commissioned officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area stated on March 10 that Russian forces have significantly reduced their offensive activity in the Kostyantynivka direction and are likely accumulating reserves to resume attacks under favorable conditions.[lxxx] The chief non-commissioned officer added that Russian forces are conducting small-group infiltrations to accumulate near the frontline and Russian forces have not accumulated enough forces, armor, or weapons to resume attacks in the near future.

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones west of Berestok and striking Ukrainian positions in western and southern Kostyantynivka.[lxxxi] Artillery elements of the 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are shelling Ukrainian positions and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in eastern and northern Kostyantynivka.[lxxxii] Vertical take-off and landing first-person view (VTOL FPV) drone operators and other elements of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC) are striking Ukrainian positions in eastern Kostyantynivka.[lxxxiii]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military targets in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area overnight on March 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 10 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian fuel and lubricants warehouse near occupied Koptieve (roughly nine kilometers behind the frontline).[lxxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and Vilne; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on March 9 and 10.[lxxxv]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Dobropillya tactical area overnight on March 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 10 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian artillery gun near Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxxxvi]

Order of Battle: Lancet loitering munition operators of the Russian 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet, newly formed from the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade) are reportedly striking Ukrainian T-72 and T-64 tanks in the Dobropillya tactical area.[lxxxvii] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya tactical area.[lxxxviii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 9 and 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of and in western and central Hryshyne.[lxxxix]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk).[xc]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske; and west of Pokrovsk toward Novooleksandrivka and Serhiivka; and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko on March 9 and 10.[xci]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Russian near rear overnight on March 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Myrnohrad (roughly six kilometers from the frontline), a Russian artillery unit near Sukhetske (roughly a kilometer and a half from the frontline), and a Russian manpower concentration near Pokrovsk (roughly a kilometer from the frontline).[xcii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) airstrikes west of Pokrovsk.[xciii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka on March 9 and 10.[xciv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

See topline text for assessed Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Berezove, Ternove, and Novohryhorivka, and toward Orestopil and Hai on March 9 and 10.[xcv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 2nd Battalion of the Russian 1461st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) operated in Novohryhorivka on a prior date.[xcvi]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight on March 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 10 that Ukrainian drone operators struck a Russian fuel and lubricants depot near occupied Makiivka (roughly 45 kilometers behind the frontline) and an EW station near occupied Donetsk City (roughly 43 kilometers behind the frontline).[xcvii] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on March 10 and reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Volna-3 EW station in occupied Donetsk City.[xcviii] A Russian Telegram channel, which claims to have insider information, claimed on March 10 that a March 8 Ukrainian drone strike against an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) assembly facility of the Russian 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) in occupied Donetsk City caused an ammunition detonation that inflicted casualties of three Russian servicemembers killed, five wounded, and one missing in action (MIA).[xcix] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on March 9 that sources in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that a March 7 Ukrainian strike against a Shahed drone depot at the occupied Donetsk Airport wounded three Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) employees and four servicemembers of the Grom-Kaskad drone brigade (reportedly of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]).[c]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions in the Hulyaipole direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 10 suggests that Russian and Ukrainian positions are intermixed between Zaliznychne and northwestern Hulyaipole in an area where ISW previously assessed that Russian forces had advanced.[ci] The Assessed Russian Infiltration Areas layer is not Russian-controlled territory and is permissive of Ukrainian-held positions within any given infiltration area.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Nove Zaporizhzhia and Zarichne; northwest of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Varvarivka, Zelene, Staroukrainka, and Verkhnya Tersa and toward Olenokostyantynivka and Vozdvyzhivka; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne on March 9 and 10.[cii]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on March 10 that Russian forces have shifted their focus from the south of Hulyaipole toward the Zaliznychne direction and have resumed attacks near Myrne and Charvine (southwest of Hulyaipole).[ciii]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 10 that Ukrainian forces shelled a Russian manpower concentration near occupied Novomykolaivka (roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline).[civ]

Order of Battle: Bomber aircraft of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (VKS and Eastern EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Lyubitske (northwest of Hulyaipole).[cv] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly destroying Ukrainian communications equipment in the Zaporizhia direction.[cvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on March 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk and toward Pavlivka and Mahdalynivka; southeast of Orikhiv near Luhivske; and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky on March 9 and 10.[cvii]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 10 that Ukrainian forces are increasing their use of drones with a 25-kilometer range in the Zaporizhia direction.[cviii]

Order of Battle: Reconnaissance, assault, and other elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 3rd Assault company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating toward and near Orikhiv.[cix] Medical elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly using modernized unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for evacuation in the Orikhiv direction.[cx]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on March 10.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast.[cxi]

The command of a Russian air defense division near occupied Sevastopol is reportedly under the threat of dismissal due to systematic losses. The Atesh Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on March 10 that the Russian military command sent a review commission from Moscow to Sevastopol and is considering relieving the command of the Russian 31st Air Defense Division (reportedly of the 4th Air Force and Air Force of the SMD) due to significant losses.[cxii] Atesh added that significant recent Russian air defense system losses weakened Russian air defenses in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 137 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which about 80 were Shaheds — from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[cxiii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 122 drones; that 12 drones struck 10 locations; and that drone debris fell at 10 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and residential infrastructure in Dnipro and Kharkiv cities, injuring at least 14 civilians.[cxiv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Ukrainian officials confirmed that the Russian Izdeliye-30 missile that recently struck an apartment building in Kharkiv City on March 7, killing at least 11 civilians, had Belarusian components.[cxv] Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy of Ukraine, Vladyslav Vlasyuk, reported on March 10 that the Belarusian components came from the Integral plant in Minsk City that assists with Russian missile production and supplies electronic component bases for various weapons systems.[cxvi] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported that Russian forces used an Izdeliye-30 missile for the first time against Ukraine in late 2025.[cxvii]

Russia and Belarus continue to strengthen their military cooperation through the upcoming Barrier-2026 military exercise that will take place in Belarus on October 26. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Joint Staff held a meeting on March 10 in preparation for the upcoming Barrier-2026 military exercise.[cxviii] The representatives of the Russian and Belarusian MoDs and the CSTO Joint Staff discussed priorities in military medicine, protection measures against biological threats, and research and development related to chemical, biological, and radiological defense.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.