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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 6, 2025
Assessment as of: 6:40 PM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
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Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:15 PM ET on December 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces launched 704 total missiles and drones against Ukraine overnight on December 5 to 6, heavily targeting railway and energy infrastructure across the country. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 653 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which over 300 were Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched three Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Ryazan and Tambov oblasts; 34 Kh-101/Iskander-K/Kalibr cruise missiles from Rostov Oblast and the Black Sea area; and 14 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Rostov oblasts, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 585 drones, 29 cruise missiles, and one ballistic missile; that an unspecified number of missiles and 60 drones hit 29 locations; and that debris fell on three locations.
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian rail, energy, residential, and port infrastructure in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Zaporizhia, Odesa, Lviv, Volyn, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[2] Ukraine's Energy Ministry reported that Russian forces struck electricity generation, distribution, and transmission facilities throughout Ukraine.[3] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that the Russian strikes caused power outages in Odesa, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts on the morning of December 6, leading to energy restrictions and rolling blackouts across the country. Ukrainian State Inspectorate for Energy Supervision Deputy Head Anatoliy Zamulko reported that Russian forces struck facilities that redistribute electricity between Ukrainian regions, forcing Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) to reduce their electricity generation capacity.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian drone strikes destroyed the Fastiv Rail Station in Kyiv Oblast.[5] Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that the Russian strikes against the station disrupted suburban routes, forcing Ukrainian authorities to limit railway operations.[6] Ukrzaliznytsia Chairperson Oleksandr Pertsovsky noted that the Russian strikes did not hit cargo trains but rather Fastiv Station and electric commuter trains that connect Kyiv City with its suburbs.[7] Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russian forces also struck food and medicine warehouses in Kyiv, Volyn, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[8]
The US and Ukrainian negotiating delegations agreed that any progress toward peace talks to end the war in Ukraine is dependent on Russia’s readiness to demonstrate a good-faith commitment to long-term peace.[9] The US Department of State and Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov issued a joint statement about the December 4-5 US-Ukrainian talks.[10] The statement noted that the delegations worked to find a “credible path” toward a durable and just peace in Ukraine. Umerov reaffirmed Ukraine's priority to secure a peace settlement that protects Ukraine's independence and sovereignty, ensures the safety of Ukrainians, and provides a stable foundation for Ukraine's prosperous democratic future. The delegations agreed on the framework of security arrangements; discussed the deterrence capabilities necessary for a lasting peace; and reviewed the agenda to support Ukraine's post-war reconstruction, joint US-Ukrainian economic initiatives, and long-term recovery projects. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated in an interview with Sky News published on December 6 that there can only be a just peace if there is a ceasefire along the current front lines, after which Russia and Ukraine can conduct negotiations.[11]
Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions within Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad while Russian forces are complicating Ukrainian logistics in the area. Geolocated footage published on December 6 shows three Ukrainian servicemembers raising a flag on Yakuba Kolasa Alley in northern Pokrovsk, indicating that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions within the town.[12] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi also stated in an interview with Sky News published on December 6 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Pokrovsk.[13] Additional geolocated footage published on December 6 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian drone launcher in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[14] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions within Myrnohrad.[15] The chief of staff of a Ukrainian drone battalion told The Telegraph in an article published on December 6 that Ukrainian and Russian forces in Pokrovsk are operating in “pockets” close to each other as Ukrainian and Russian positions are interspersed among neighboring buildings.[16] The chief of staff noted that there is no discernible front line in the area, in line with indicators that Russian forces have infiltrated between Ukrainian positions into Myrnohrad and northern Pokrovsk. Russian forces continue to hinder Ukrainian logistics in this direction, however. A Ukrainian drone unit servicemember stated to The Telegraph that unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are an insufficient replacement for logistics via manned vehicles, as the UGVs carry less cargo than traditional vehicles and often only survive a few missions before Russian forces destroy them. Ukrainian sources have recently noted that Ukrainian forces maintain limited logistics in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket, but Russian forces very likely can disrupt narrow Ukrainian exfiltration routes and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with artillery and drones.[17] ISW continues to assess that available open-source information indicates that Russian forces have not completed the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket but are attempting to completely deny Ukrainian tactical and operational level logistics in the area, even as Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions within both towns.[18]
A February 2025 Russian drone strike on the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) rendered the protective structure of the NPP unable to fulfill its primary safety functions. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi stated on December 5 that an IAEA inspection team confirmed during the week of November 28 to December 5 that the February 14, 2025 Russian drone strike on the Chornobyl NPP severely damaged the New Safe Confinement (NSC) structure enclosing the remains of the plant's reactor No.4 such that the NSC can no longer fulfill its primary safety functions, including its confinement capabilities.[19] Grossi added that the plant requires comprehensive repairs to “ensure long-term nuclear safety.” The Kremlin has periodically conducted information operations aimed at portraying Ukraine as endangering the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP (ZNPP), but continued Russian strikes and shelling against Ukrainian NPPs, as well as Russia's consistent mismanagement of the ZNPP, highlight that Russia remains the actual danger to Ukrainian NPPs.[20]
The Kremlin appears to be increasingly leaning on India to alleviate domestic labor shortages and is setting conditions for India to support drone production for Russia's war effort. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov announced on December 5 that Russia may accept an “unlimited number” of migrant workers from India under the new bilateral labor mobility agreement signed on December 5 in New Delhi.[21] Manturov stated that Russian manufacturing industries have a labor shortage of 800,000 workers, and that Russian trade, construction, and service industries have a labor shortage of 1.5 million workers. Manturov stated that it will likely take Russia well over a year to set the conditions necessary to accept, employ, and process many Indian migrants. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on December 6 that regional occupation authorities discussed possible business cooperation with Indian partners at a recent international investment forum.[22] Saldo stated that occupation authorities are ready to attract Indian migrant workers to strengthen the region's agricultural industry and to work with Indian partners to integrate occupied Kherson Oblast into international trade corridors.
Head of the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, Sergey Chemezov, stated on December 5 that Russia is in discussions with India to localize production of Russian drones, such as Lancet loitering munitions, in India.[23] Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an interview on December 4 to English-language news magazine India Today, wherein he highlighted that Russia is not just selling military equipment to India but also sharing technology for shipbuilding and missile and aircraft manufacturing.[24] Putin stated that India uses Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft and produces Russian T-90 tanks and Russian-Indian BrahMos cruise missiles in India. Putin and Chemezov's statements suggest that the Kremlin is considering expanding joint weapon production in India to drones that Russia would very likely use on the battlefield in Ukraine, possibly in exchange for Russian technological innovations and lessons learned in Ukraine. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger notably reported on December 5 that a delegation of the Smolensk Oblast First Person View (FPV) Drone Piloting Center arrived in India to complete objectives within the framework of the Russian-Indian strategic partnership.[25] The milblogger added that the center has already started training the first international FPV drone piloting group in Russia in cooperation with Smolensk Oblast Medical University and arrived in Goa, India to discuss training for Indian drone operations with the Indian Sport Ministry.[26]
India's increased partnerships with Russia come against the backdrop of Russia's growing reliance on North Korea and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to support the war in Ukraine. Russia is reportedly localizing Garpiya drone production in the PRC, and PRC-origin drone components have been critical in Russia's efforts to adapt its drones to gain battlefield advantages.[27] North Korea has reportedly started mass production of short range FPV drones and medium range strike drones in North Korea, possibly to provide to Russia in the future, and has provided Russia with soldiers, artillery shells, and missiles.[28] Russia is also reportedly relying on North Korea for migrant workers, including to work at Russia's Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan to produce Shahed-type drones.[29] North Korea, in turn, is also receiving direct combat experience operating drones in exchange for its materiel, manpower, and labor support.[30]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces launched 704 total missiles and drones against Ukraine overnight on December 5 to 6, heavily targeting railway and energy infrastructure across the country.
- The US and Ukrainian negotiating delegations agreed that any progress toward peace talks to end the war in Ukraine is dependent on Russia’s readiness to demonstrate a good faith commitment to long-term peace.
- Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions within Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad while Russian forces are complicating Ukrainian logistics in the area.
- A February 2025 Russian drone strike on the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) rendered the protective structure of the NPP unable to fulfill its primary safety functions.
- The Kremlin appears to be increasingly leaning on India to alleviate domestic labor shortages and is setting conditions for India to support drone production for Russia's war effort.
- India's increased partnerships with Russia come against the backdrop of Russia's growing reliance on North Korea and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to support the war in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka. Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City for the ninth time in 2025 overnight on December 5 to 6.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the low-temperature isomerization unit involved in gasoline production at the Ryazan Oil Refinery overnight.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Ukrainian forces are clarifying the damage inflicted and that the Ryazan Oil Refinery has a designed annual oil refining capacity of 17.1 million tons of crude oil; accounts for about five percent of Russia's total refining capacity; and produces gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and aviation fuel, including for Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) and Armed Forces. Russian opposition outlet Astra and Ukrainian sources assessed that Ukrainian forces struck the refinery; put the low-temperature isomerization unit out of order; and damaged a hydro processing and catalytic cracking and reforming unit.[33] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that a Ukrainian drone caused a fire at an apartment building and that drone debris fell on an industrial enterprise but did not cause any casualties or serious damage.[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 29 drones over Ryazan Oblast overnight.[35]
Russian insider sources confirmed that Ukrainian forces targeted the AlfaOil Oil Refinery in Uryupinsk, Volgograd Oblast, overnight on December 2 to 3.[36] Sources in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations told Astra that at least one Ukrainian drone targeted the AlfaOil Oil Refinery but that the consequences of the strike are unknown.[37] The AlfaOil Oil Refinery reportedly has 18 storage tanks and facilitates the transfer of petroleum products to other refineries or to customers.[38]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on December 5 and 6.[39] Ukrainian forces also counterattacked in unspecified areas of the Sumy direction.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on December 6 that the situation remains stable in the Kursk and Sumy directions.[41]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 6 that elements of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are only able to attack Yunakivka during foggy weather, likely because such weather inhibits Ukrainian drone operations.[42] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position near Kyyanytsya (northeast of Sumy City), and the milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces stated that Russian forces are using air, artillery, and Geran drone strikes to target Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[43]
The milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces complained that Russian forces lack the necessary Kuryer UGVs to support logistics on the Tetkino-Bezsalivka line (along the international border northwest of Sumy City), resulting in excessive casualties during resupply missions for elements of an unspecified territorial control motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Aerospace Forces' (VKS), possibly referring to the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control, VKS and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces).[44] The milblogger also amplified a letter from a claimed VKS servicemember who stated that the Russian military continues to transfer VKS specialists into the unspecified motorized rifle regiment for committing minor offenses or mistakes.[45] The milblogger noted that only five of 89 servicemembers in the 2nd Company of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) survived after conducting offensive operations near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) at an unspecified date.[46]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements and reconnaissance drone operators of the Russian 106th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[47]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 6 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on December 6 that Russian forces advanced in southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[48] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Lyman (northeast of Kharkiv City and just south of Vovchansk) and control 80 percent of Vovchansk.[49] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced in about 36 percent of Vovchansk as of December 6. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on December 5 that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain positions in southern and western Vovchansk.[50]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Prylipka, Lyman, Vilcha, and Synelnykove, and toward Izbytske on December 5 and 6.[51]
Trehubov reported on December 5 that Russian forces near Vovchansk are exploiting poor weather that degrades Ukrainian drone operations to conduct assaults and leverage their numerical manpower superiority.[52]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 6 that the command of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) continues to order attritional assaults in the Vovchansk direction, including a recent assault in which Russian forces suffered almost 60 servicemembers missing in action (MIA).[53] The milblogger claimed that artillery elements of the brigade have not received 152mm shells for the past several weeks. The milblogger criticized recent Russian flag raising infiltration missions in southern Vovchansk for needlessly wasting the lives of Russian servicemembers.
Order of Battle: Drone operators and assault elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly continue to operate in Vovchansk.[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Khatnie, east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne, and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Kolodyazne on December 5 and 6 but did not advance.[55]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 6 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Tyshchenkivka (northwest of Kupyansk) and along the Pivdenna railway east of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[56]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Stepova Novoselivka, and Hlushkivka; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on December 5 and 6.[57] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks in Kupyansk and the situation “remains difficult” for Russian forces.[58]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on December 5 that Ukrainian forces continue to clear Russian forces from northern Kupyansk, and that Russian forces' strength continues to decline.[59] Trehubov noted that the Russian military command’s exaggerated claims of advances in Kupyansk forced hastily planned attacks that degraded the Russian forces’ situation.
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka and Borivska Andriivka, north of Borova near Bohuslavka, and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Novovodyane, Hrekivka, and Tverdokhlibove and toward Novoserhiivka on December 5 and 6.[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Derylove and Novoselivka and toward Yarova and Korovii Yar; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on December 5 and 6.[61]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian fortifications and constant counterattacks are hindering Russian advances in the forest area near Yarova.[62]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and artillery elements of the 73rd Artillery Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[63]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of December 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the Alchevsk Metallurgical Plant in occupied Alchevsk, which produces artillery shell casings for Russian forces.[64] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) occupation authorities claimed on December 5 that a Ukrainian drone exploded in an industrial area of occupied Alchevsk.[65]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 6 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Siversk.[66]
Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Yampil, Dronivka, Zakitne, and Ozerne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka, Vasyukivka, and Svyato-Pokrovske on December 5 and 6.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near the bridge over the Siverskyi Donets River near Zakitne.[68]
A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of foggy weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations to infiltrate between Ukrainian positions in Siversk, in line with ISW's assessments of current Russian tactics across the frontline.[69] The NCO stated that Russian forces have to pass a 15 kilometer cordon to reach Ukrainian positions and that Ukrainian forces are also taking advantage of the fog to conduct logistics when the threat of Russian FPV drone strikes is lower.
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Kostyantynivka.[70]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka).[71]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 6 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in eastern Kostyantynivka in an area where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[72]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Mayske and advanced to the western outskirts of Markove (both northeast of Kostyantynivka).[73] Another Russian milblogger stated that the Russian MoD’s December 5 claim that Russian forces seized Bezimyane (north of Kostyantynivka and about 6.5 kilometers from the frontline) is unconfirmed.[74] ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD made this claim as part of a wider Russian effort to aggrandize Russian advances for political purposes and has observed Russian forces using similar tactics, such as raising flags during infiltration missions that do not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA), to claim false advances for informational effects.[75]
Russian forces attacked north of Kostyantynivka toward Vyrolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Novomarkove; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Kleban-Byk and toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka and Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on December 5 and 6.[76]
A Ukrainian source reported that Russian forces are increasing their activity in the Malynivka direction (east of Kramatorsk).[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian reconnaissance groups are operating in the windbreaks between Vyrolyubivka and Kurtivka (west of Vyrolyubivka).[78]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance for artillery strikes against Ukrainian drone control centers and positions near Berestok.[79] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian ammunition depots near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[80]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on December 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Toretske and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Mayak on December 5 and 6.[81]
Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
See topline text for reports indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Novopidhorodne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[82]
Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on December 5 and 6.[83] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilytske.[84]
The Telegraph reported on December 6 that a servicemember of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are wearing blue armbands, likely to try to disguise themselves as Ukrainian forces who wear such armbands.[85] ISW has observed numerous reports of Russian forces resorting to perfidy in the Pokrovsk direction, a war crime under the Geneva Conventions.[86] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that claims that Russian forces seized Rodynske are unconfirmed.[87] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Hryshyne and Myrnohrad.[88]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian personnel and equipment near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[89] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles near Myrnohrad.[90] Sappers of the 12th Engineering Brigade (Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly demining areas near Halytsynivka (southeast of Pokrovsk in the Russian rear).[91]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[92]
Russian forces continued attacking near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Yalta on December 5 and 6.[93]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are striking Ukrainian forces east of Filiya.[94] Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces liberated Tykhe (east of Oleksandrivka).[95] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces cleared Tykhe after Russian forces claimed to have seized the settlement in late November 2025.[96]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Dachne, Ivanivka, and Zelenyi Hai; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Oleksandrivka near Vorone, Yehorivka, Rybne, Pryvilne, and Krasnohirske; and south of Oleksandrivka toward Danylivka on December 5 and 6.[97]
Russian milbloggers claimed that drone operators of the Russian 657th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) detonated explosives attached to a bridge over the Haichur River near Andriivka (south of Oleksandrivka), complicating Ukrainian logistics over the river and to Ostapivske (immediately south of Andriivka).[98] Geolocated footage published on December 6 shows the explosion of a bridge near Andriivka.[99]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on December 6 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and south of Hulyaipole itself, near Zatyshshya (east of Hulyaipole), and toward Varvarivka (north of Hulyaipole).[100]
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions in an area of eastern Hulyaipole that Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces held.[101]
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke on December 5 and 6.[102]
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 6 that GUR drone operators struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system near occupied Svyatotroitske (about 50 kilometers southeast of Hulyaipole).[103]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are conducting strikes and other missions against Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[104] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[105]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 6 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claim: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[106]
Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on December 5 and 6.[107] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[108]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Mala Tokmachka is a contested “gray zone.”[109]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction, and drone operators of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Stepnohirsk and Prymorske.[110] Drone operators of the Russian Valkiriya Special Detachment (4th Military Base, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[111]
The IAEA reported that the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) temporarily lost all power for the 11th time since the start of the war overnight on December 5 to 6.[112]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction, including west of Kherson City near Karantynnyi Island, on December 5 and 6 but did not advance.[113]
Order of Battle: The GUR reported that elements of the Russian 76th VDV Division are operating in the Kherson direction.[114] The reason for the redeployment of elements of the 76th VDV Division is unclear. The Russian military command has notably redeployed elements of the 76th VDV Division to support offensive efforts across the theater, including most recently from the Sumy direction to the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions.[115] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are unlikely to undertake a significant offensive operation across the Dnipro River in the Kherson direction in the near term, however. The Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the 98th VDV Division from the Chasiv Yar direction to the Kherson direction, possibly to allow them time to rest and reconstitute or to support an interdiction campaign against the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast.[116]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text for reports on Russian combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of December 5 and 6.
The Ukrainian Air Force reported on December 6 that Russian forces have launched over 13,000 missiles, including Kinzhal ballistic and Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles; about 100,000 strike unmanned aerial vehicles; and 110,000 glide bombs against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[117]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
The Belarusian State Customs Committee announced on December 5 that Belarusian State Customs Committee First Deputy Chairman Alexander Valiev signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in customs capability development with the PRC State Customs Committee Minister Wu Haiping.[118] The Belarusian government also approved a draft development cooperation agreement with the PRC on December 5, which authorized the Belarusian Ministry of Economy to conduct negotiations with the PRC.[119]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/49152
[2] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17173; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1182412-armia-rf-atakuvala-energoobekti-u-dvoh-rajonah-cernigivsini/; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/26128; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/54353; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/06/u-dnipri-masshtabna-pozhezha-pislya-raketnogo-udaru-rf-do-gasinnya-zaluchyly-aviacziyu/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/54385 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/26123; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/12/06/rossiyskie-voyska-nanesli-massirovannyy-udar-po-ukraine-dronami-i-raketami-v-lutske-zagorelis-produktovye-sklady; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/06/na-kyyivshhyni-tryvaye-likvidacziya-naslidkiv-masovanogo-obstrilu/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/54347; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/54854; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/8069; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/06/u-fastovi-rosijskym-obstrilom-znyshheno-zaliznychnyj-vokzal/ ;https://suspilne dot media/1182310-troe-ludej-poraneni-vnaslidok-masovanoi-ataki-dronami-ta-raketami-na-kiivsinu/; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/8068; https://t.me/bmrada/18989; https://lviv.gp dot gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=406549; https://suspilne dot media/lviv/1182456-udari-po-energeticnih-obektah-lvivsini-pozezi-na-tes-i-pidstancii-poskodzeni-budinki/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/06/lvivshhyna-ogovtuyetsya-vid-vorozhogo-obstrilu-krayina-agresor-czilyla-u-krytychnu-infrastrukturu/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/54382; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/06/agresor-atakuvav-energoobyekt-na-odeshhyni/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/12684; https://www.facebook.com/dtekoem/posts/pfbid0t9PSWztsRBAFDvZq8idUkfxnwBUqZ5opHuQ3rvGnKLbWqZUfQNanQtcmZEL5NDCMl; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1182452-rf-znovu-atakuvala-energosistemu-odesini-bez-svitla-ponad-45-tisac-rodin/; https://www.facebook.com/oleksiikuleba/posts/pfbid024ZyUHjU72coAPJLSScxYwnpUtsnbcwurkJAAfPkEtZMMbHp622YSzBmJitVyzSMkl; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1182388-rf-atakuvala-port-pivdennij-na-odesini-aki-naslidki/; https://www.facebook.com/oda.odesa/posts/pfbid0RbxkWC9j7rY4Tc9XHJzgH3hgf7KWkwdj3e5MUxm6SqHpgC2rvADy1nSGsh1EMNAXl; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1182366-ataka-rf-poskodila-energoobekt-na-odesini-e-pereboi-z-elektro-ta-teplopostacannam/; https://www.facebook.com/uspa.gov.ua/posts/pfbid028tHT7UxehCQv4QEdcqWpKU6caYHfdnxy33rRA3QQNpUqUkkbaPzjZz2hnXCSSSGul; https://t.me/suspilne_lutsk/25358; https://suspilne dot media/lutsk/1182602-budinok-nas-trasnulo-lucani-rozpovili-pro-rankovu-ataku-rf/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/06/vorog-atakuvav-zaporizku-oblast-chotyry-lyudyny-poraneno/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/29451
[3] https://t.me/energyofukraine/5485
[4] https://suspilne dot media/1182624-cerez-obstrili-rf-ukrainski-aes-vimuseno-znizili-potuznist-generacii-elektriki-golova-derzinspekcii-energonagladu/
[5] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17173
[6] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/7495
[7] https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1182470-zaliznicna-stancia-u-fastovi-povnistu-zrujnovana-so-vidomo-pro-naslidki-ataki-po-mistu/
[8] https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/2051
[9] https://t.me/umerov_rustem/222; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/12/meeting-between-special-envoy-for-peace-steven-witkoff-jared-kushner-ukrainian-secretary-of-national-security-and-defense-council-rustem-umerov-and-chief-of-general-staff-general-andriy-hnatov/
[10] https://t.me/umerov_rustem/222; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/12/meeting-between-special-envoy-for-peace-steven-witkoff-jared-kushner-ukrainian-secretary-of-national-security-and-defense-council-rustem-umerov-and-chief-of-general-staff-general-andriy-hnatov/
[11] https://news.sky.com/story/giving-up-territory-would-be-unacceptable-says-ukraines-armed-forces-chief-13479634
[12] https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1997283876151157237; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/868; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32301; https://t.me/MaxximOSINT/112
[13] https://news.sky.com/story/giving-up-territory-would-be-unacceptable-says-ukraines-armed-forces-chief-13479634
[14] https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/1997272392994054184 ; http://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/27089
[15] https://t.me/rybar/75758
[16] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/12/06/pokrovsk-the-city-that-changed-the-war-ukraine/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2025/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/
[19] https://www.iaea dot org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-331-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine; https://suspilne dot media/1182312-magate-zahisna-konstrukcia-na-cornobilskij-aes-bilse-ne-vikonue-osnovnu-funkciu-cerez-poskodzenna-dronom/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/un-agency-says-chornobyl-nuclear-plants-protective-shield-damaged-2025-12-06/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_23-2/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_23-2/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_6-28/
[21] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25830813
[22] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/12138
[23] https://ria dot ru/20251205/rossija-2060109311.html
[24] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78649
[25] https://t.me/wargonzo/30917
[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/30917
[27] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-secret-war-drones-project-china-intel-sources-say-2024-09-25/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2025/
[29] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-cooperation-at-russias-shahed-factory-threatens-global-security/
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine/
[31] https://t.me/astrapress/98950
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32263
[33] https://t.me/astrapress/98950; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/14508 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/14510; https://united24media dot com/latest-news/ukrainian-drones-hit-rosnefts-biggest-ryazan-oil-refinery-for-ninth-time-14068; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/1997073041449177419
[34] https://t.me/pavelmalkov_official/5536; https://t.me/pavelmalkov_official/5537; https://t.me/astrapress/98949
[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/59151
[36] https://t.me/astrapress/98998; https://альфаойл dot рф/yrypinsk/
[37] https://t.me/astrapress/98998
[38] https://energybase dot ru/tank-farm/uryupinskaya-tank-farm
[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/30924; https://t.me/severnnyi/5946; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239; https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02gshmj2WrnSUnAEAaXTiuikk7vCV6WGtN68HdHQ5RaZfZ6Jk7BqScLLLFFwAd1pLl ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/740295652433375/ ; https://t.me/osirskiy/1331; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32253; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236
[40] https://t.me/severnnyi/5946
[41] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02gshmj2WrnSUnAEAaXTiuikk7vCV6WGtN68HdHQ5RaZfZ6Jk7BqScLLLFFwAd1pLl ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/740295652433375/ ; https://t.me/osirskiy/1331; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32253
[42] https://t.me/severnnyi/5946
[43] https://t.me/severnnyi/5946; https://t.me/tass_agency/351796; https://t.me/dva_majors/84529; https://t.me/rybar/75767
[44] https://t.me/severnnyi/5948
[45] https://t.me/severnnyi/5950
[46] https://t.me/severnnyi/5947
[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/59146
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37078
[49] https://t.me/notes_veterans/26189
[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/05/namagalysya-pidtyagnuty-realnist-do-zayav-i-zrobyly-girshe-v-kupyansku-za-vorozhymy-dyversantamy-polyuyut-ukrayinski-drony/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32267; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19786; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19788; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19785; https://t.me/severnnyi/5946; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37078; https://t.me/notes_veterans/26189; https://t.me/wargonzo/30924; https://t.me/dva_majors/84529
[52] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/05/namagalysya-pidtyagnuty-realnist-do-zayav-i-zrobyly-girshe-v-kupyansku-za-vorozhymy-dyversantamy-polyuyut-ukrayinski-drony/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA
[53] https://t.me/severnnyi/5944
[54] https://t.me/epoddubny/25767
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32267; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19786; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19788; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19785; https://t.me/dva_majors/84529; https://t.me/rybar/75767; https://t.me/wargonzo/30924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37038; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37078
[56] https://t.me/rybar/75757
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32267; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19788; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19785; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19786; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37038; https://t.me/wargonzo/30924
[58] https://t.me/rybar/75761
[59] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/05/namagalysya-pidtyagnuty-realnist-do-zayav-i-zrobyly-girshe-v-kupyansku-za-vorozhymy-dyversantamy-polyuyut-ukrayinski-drony/
[60] https://t.me/rybar/75757; https://t.me/rybar/75761; https://t.me/wargonzo/30924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37038
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32267; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19785; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19786; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19788; https://t.me/KrasnolimanskyFront/19194; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189649; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37035; https://t.me/wargonzo/30924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37076
[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37035
[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/17957; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/11853; https://t.me/milinfolive/161800
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32263
[65] https://t.me/government_lnr/53532; https://t.me/astrapress/98945
[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37063
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32267; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189649; https://t.me/rybar/75767; https://t.me/wargonzo/30924; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105180; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37038; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37063
[68] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189649; https://t.me/KrasnolimanskyFront/19194
[69] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1182584-v-rajoni-siverska-okupanti-prosocuutsa-zavdaki-postijnomu-tumanu-54-brigada/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2025/
[70] https://t.me/frontline_pvt/14104; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1997333333907235319
[71] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1997061489631310089; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/1393; https://t.me/DPSUkr/29850
[72] https://t.me/frontline_pvt/14104 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1997333333907235319
[73] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105115; https://t.me/yurasumy/25875
[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/84529
[75] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32267; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236; https://t.me/yurasumy/25875; https://t.me/wargonzo/30924
[77] https://t.me/officer_33/6537
[78] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105115
[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/59144
[80] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/48660
[81] https://t.me/wargonzo/30924; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32267; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236
[82] https://t.me/rybar/75761; https://t.me/rybar/75758
[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32267; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236; https://t.me/rybar/75758; https://t.me/wargonzo/30924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37074
[84] https://t.me/rybar/75758
[85] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/12/06/pokrovsk-the-city-that-changed-the-war-ukraine/
[86] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/
[87] https://t.me/rybar/75758
[88] https://t.me/dva_majors/84529; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189686; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37074
[89] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189701; https://t.me/milinfolive/161846
[90] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14690
[91] https://t.me/mod_russia/59162
[92] https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1997008064634147316 ; https://t.me/UralArmor90/3402
[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32267; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236
[94] https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1997008064634147316 ; https://t.me/UralArmor90/3402
[95] https://www.facebook.com/reel/833645776049666/; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1997331367260995772; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1997333427901681966; https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1997333830949392500; https://t.me/OMBr67/3523
[96] https://t.me/OMBr67/3523; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2025/
[97] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32267; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236
[98] https://t.me/voin_dv/17953; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105154; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37073
[99] https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1997351017038385277; https://t.me/voin_dv/17953
[100] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37036; https://t.me/wargonzo/30924
[101] https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1997021987575943215 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/17947
[102] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32267; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236; https://t.me/dva_majors/84529; https://t.me/rybar/75767; https://t.me/wargonzo/30924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37036 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37038
[103] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/06/svyatkove-urazhennya-prymary-gur-znyshhyly-vorozhyj-buk-v-zaporizkij-oblasti/; https://t.me/DIUkraine/7436
[104] https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1997144224777789853; https://t.me/Mavic_57/70; https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1997023556119810463; https://t.me/voin_dv/17948; https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1997021987575943215 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/17947 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/17954
[105] https://t.me/voin_dv/17954
[106] https://t.me/wargonzo/30924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37038 ;
[107] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32267; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236; https://t.me/wargonzo/30924
[108] https://t.me/dva_majors/84529; https://t.me/rybar/75767
[109] https://t.me/dva_majors/84529; https://t.me/rybar/75767
[110] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37037; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37062 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37042
[111] https://t.me/dva_majors/84567; https://t.me/vrogov/22527
[112] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1182568-na-timcasovo-okupovanij-zaporizkij-aes-stavsa-blekaut-odnu-z-linij-zivlenna-vidnovili-magate/; https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/1997240852910137687?s=46
[113] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32239; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32236; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189600; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37042
[114] https://t.me/DIUkraine/7437
[115] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/
[116] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/
[117] https://t.me/kpszsu/49154
[118] https://belta dot by/society/view/tamozhennye-sluzhby-belarusi-i-kitaja-podpisali-memorandum-o-vzaimoponimanii-752699-2025/; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/349215
[119] https://belta dot by/society/view/sovmin-odobril-proekt-soglashenija-s-kitaem-o-sotrudnichestve-v-oblasti-razvitija-752722-2025/













