3 hours ago

Iran Update: September 16, 2026

Adham Fattah, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy and Annika Ganzeveld

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran. Most updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas Monday updates also include events from the preceding weekend, collected after ISW-CTP's 2:00 PM ET Friday data cutoff. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however.

Key Takeaways:

The Houthis are pursuing diplomatic efforts that are likely intended to prevent the United States or its partners from supporting or joining the Saudi offensive campaign against the Houthis by claiming that the group currently has no intention to target international shipping. Allowing the Houthis to consolidate their recent advances near the Bab al Mandeb Strait would enable the group to disrupt shipping at any time and for any reason in the future, even if the Houthis have no immediate plans to attack international shipping.
The Houthis announced on September 16 that Houthi forces conducted ballistic missile and drone attacks targeting military and oil infrastructure sites in western Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have attacked Saudi oil infrastructure since July 2026 to maximize the political and economic costs of the Saudi campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to surrender to Houthi demands, which include ending Saudi military activity and support for anti-Houthi forces in Yemen and lifting the Saudi blockade on Houthi-controlled territory.
The Shia Coordination Framework, which includes some Iranian-backed Shia parties, reportedly negotiated a three-phase disarmament agreement with some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that would enable the militias to keep their weapons and fail to meet US expectations for militia disarmament. The reported agreement also appears to meet Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' demand for the expulsion of Turkish forces from Iraq as a condition for their disarmament.

Toplines

The Houthis are pursuing diplomatic efforts that are likely intended to prevent the United States or its partners from supporting or joining the Saudi offensive campaign against the Houthis by claiming that the group currently has no intention to target international shipping. Allowing the Houthis to consolidate their recent advances near the Bab al Mandeb Strait would enable the group to disrupt shipping at any time and for any reason in the future, even if the Houthis have no immediate plans to attack international shipping. Several unspecified sources told Reuters on September 16 that US officials met with Houthi representatives, including the Houthis' primary spokesperson and diplomat Mohammad Abdulsalam, in Muscat, Oman, on September 13.[i] Two of the sources claimed that the Houthis told US officials that the group has no intention to target US vessels and that the Houthis are committed to the May 2025 US-Houthi ceasefire.[ii] The US government has not confirmed the meeting at the time of this writing.[iii] US President Donald Trump previously told reporters on September 12 that the Houthis had contacted the United States to clarify that the group does not seek a conflict with the United States.[iv] Trump characterized the war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia as a limited and contained conflict.[v] These Houthi efforts come amid concurrent Saudi efforts to secure international support for and participation in military operations against the Houthis.[vi]

The Houthis are likely attempting to assure the United States that they will not attack US vessels in order to avoid provoking a renewed large-scale US air campaign, similar to Operation Rough Rider, that would target and degrade Houthi military capabilities and infrastructure.[vii] The Houthis likely seek to contain the current conflict because a limited conflict provides them with the most favorable conditions to erode Saudi Arabia’s willingness to continue fighting. The Houthis almost certainly calculate that a single adversary is easier to coerce than a multinational coalition with vast military capabilities.

The Houthis’ diplomatic efforts come amid the group’s efforts to try to consolidate their recent territorial gains in southwestern Yemen to establish long-term leverage over international shipping.[viii] The Houthis captured the last key Yemeni government-controlled ports on the Red Sea coast, along with the rest of the Red Sea coastal plain, the Hanish Islands, and Perim Island, between September 9 and 11.[ix] Houthi control over this terrain renders the group the sole de facto political authority on Yemen’s Red Sea coast and sets conditions for the Houthis to assert authority over the Bab al Mandeb.[x] The Houthis could use a permanent force presence along the Red Sea coastal plain and on islands in the southern Red Sea to attack international vessels at a closer range in the future. Current Houthi promises to refrain from restricting international, non-Saudi maritime traffic through the Bab al Mandeb offer no guarantee that the group will perpetually refrain from attacking vessels belonging to the United States and its allies. The Houthis could also credibly threaten to attack such vessels at close range in order to extract demands from their adversaries.

The Houthis announced on September 16 that Houthi forces conducted ballistic missile and drone attacks targeting military and oil infrastructure sites in western Saudi Arabia. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea announced on September 16 that the Houthis launched ballistic missiles and drones targeting the Saudi Aramco oil refinery in Yanbu, which is about 900 kilometers northwest of the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border.[xi] The Houthis have attacked Saudi oil infrastructure since July 2026 to maximize the political and economic costs of the Saudi campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to surrender to Houthi demands, which include ending Saudi military activity and support for anti-Houthi forces in Yemen, lifting the Saudi blockade on Houthi-controlled territory, securing Saudi support for Houthi civil servant salaries, and extracting Saudi war reparations for attacks on Houthi-controlled territory.[xii] Sarea also claimed that the Houthis fired ballistic missiles targeting a Saudi air base in Khamis Mushait, which almost certainly refers to the King Khalid Air Base.[xiii] Attacks on King Khalid Air Base, which Saudi Arabia uses to conduct airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen, are intended to disrupt Saudi air campaign operations.[xiv] Disruptions to Saudi air capabilities are intended to relieve pressure on Houthi ground forces, which are currently engaged in heavy combat with Yemeni government-aligned forces across various fronts in northern, central, and southern Yemen.[xv] The Saudi Civil Defense issued early warning alerts for various cities and areas in western Saudi Arabia, including Khamis Mushait and Mecca, on September 15.[xvi] Saudi authorities did not issue an alert for Yanbu, however.

Saudi air defenses intercepted a Houthi drone in Saudi airspace near Mecca on September 15 that may have been targeting Saudi military or oil infrastructure sites near or north of Mecca.[xvii] The Saudi Coalition Joint Forces Command announced on September 16 that Saudi air defenses intercepted the drone before it entered Mecca's restricted airspace.[xviii] The Saudi government accused the Houthis of attempting to attack Mecca and deemed any attack on the city or its holy sites to constitute a "red line" because of its religious importance in Islam.[xix] The Houthis denied the Saudi claim, and Iranian media characterized the incident as a Saudi “false flag” operation intended to turn popular and government opinions in the Islamic world against the Houthis.[xx] It is unlikely that the Houthis deliberately attempted to attack Mecca because the city is of universal significance in Islam and possesses few Saudi military or economic targets that would meaningfully advance the Houthi strike campaign in Saudi Arabia. The Houthis also have an incentive to avoid targeting Mecca because a strike on the holy city would draw widespread Yemeni and worldwide condemnation and opposition to the Houthis.[xxi] A Houthi drone launched from western Yemen could have approached Mecca airspace while en route to a target further north, such as Yanbu. Mecca is also situated between the major Saudi cities of Jeddah and Taif, which possess industrial and military targets that the Houthis would have greater incentive to target. The Saudi Civil Defense issued simultaneous early warning alerts for Mecca, Jeddah, and Taif on September 15.[xxii]

The Shia Coordination Framework, which includes some Iranian-backed Shia parties, reportedly negotiated a three-phase disarmament agreement with some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that would enable the militias to keep their weapons and fail to meet US expectations for militia disarmament.[xxiii] Several sources and officials told Saudi-owned media on September 15 that the framework committee tasked with negotiating with the militias reached an agreement with some militia representatives.[xxiv] It is unclear which militias support this agreement. Saudi-owned media, citing a draft of the agreement that it reviewed, reported that the agreement has three phases, the first of which would begin on September 30 and last until December 31.[xxv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would "pledge to integrate their fighters” into Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigades during the first phase.[xxvi] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades.[xxvii] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that integrating militia fighters into the PMF, which is an Iraqi state security service, without addressing the militias’ networks and allegiance to Iran would likely further embed Iranian influence within the Iraqi state.[xxviii] Saudi-owned media did not indicate that the agreement it reviewed includes any measures to address militia fighters’ allegiance to Iran.[xxix] The agreement’s text is not publicly available at this time.

The reported agreement also allows Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to maintain access to their weapons on the condition that they do not use them.[xxx] This stipulation is consistent with one reported framework plan to “regulate militia weapons” that would allow the militias to retain control over their weapons under unspecified rules.[xxxi] CTP-ISW assessed on September 11 that the ambiguity of the rules that would govern this “regulation” and how they would be enforced suggests that this framework proposal is intended to enable the militias to retain their weapons and use them at will.[xxxii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and the Badr Organization supported this proposal, according to US-funded regional media on September 10.[xxxiii] Both of these militias have repeatedly refused to disarm. Their support for this proposal therefore further suggests that the proposal fails to adequately address the militias’ access to their weapons.[xxxiv]

The reported agreement between the framework and unspecified militias also stipulates that “any agreement on the non-use of weapons shall be deemed void under specific circumstances," according to Saudi-owned media on September 15.[xxxv] It is unclear what "specific circumstances” refers to, but two informed individuals told Saudi-owned media that unspecified militias only supported the agreement on the condition that any party can void the agreement if the "Iran War" resumes during any stage of its implementation or if any framework party or militia faces an "existential threat."[xxxvi] The threshold for what the militias or framework parties would consider an “existential threat” is unclear. The ambiguity of these conditions suggests that they serve to preemptively justify the militias’ use of their weapons. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and Iran could also decide at any time, and for any reason, that the agreement is null and void.

The reported agreement also appears to meet Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' demand for the expulsion of Turkish forces from Iraq as a condition for their disarmament.[xxxvii] The agreement's second phase, which would begin in early 2027, stipulates that unspecified actors would schedule the complete withdrawal of Turkish forces from Iraq by July 1, 2027.[xxxviii] The third phase proposes the creation of a committee comprised of the PMF, the framework, Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, and the Iraqi government to monitor the integration of militia fighters into the PMF and the implementation of the Turkish withdrawal until early 2028.[xxxix] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have recently conditioned their disarmament on Turkey’s withdrawal from northern Iraq.[xl] Turkey has maintained several permanent military bases across northern Iraq since 2018 to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), according to a BBC analysis in 2025.[xli] Turkey, Iraq, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) agreed in September 2026 on a framework to disarm the PKK, which previously announced its intention in May 2025 to disband and disarm.[xlii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Iraq since 2024 and view the Turkish presence as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.[xliii] It is unclear whether Turkey intends to withdraw from Iraq if the PKK disarms, however. Linking the withdrawal of Turkish troops with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias' compliance with this agreement could be designed to give the militias’ leeway to use their weapons if Iraqi militias assume that Turkey will not withdraw from Iraq.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi also reportedly pursued separate bilateral negotiations with Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada as part of his ongoing disarmament efforts.[xliv] Saudi-owned media, citing “reliable” sources, reported on September 15 that Zaydi engaged in separate, bilateral dialogues with Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, during which he reportedly offered them “civilian privileges,” which likely refers to government jobs, in exchange for disarmament.[xlv] Both militias were also engaged in the framework's negotiations.[xlvi] It is unclear why Zaydi decided to pursue separate negotiations with both militias, but Saudi-owned media reported that Zaydi reportedly told Shia party leaders that the framework committee negotiating with the militias is “biased.” The framework’s negotiating committee includes several Iranian-aligned actors, including State of Law head Nouri al Maliki and Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri.[xlvii] Zaydi’s reported offer to both militias is consistent with previous reports that Zaydi offered to allocate jobs in security institutions to militias that agree to disarm.[xlviii] A source close to one of the militia’s leaders told Saudi-owned media that the militias that engaged in the bilateral negotiations with Zaydi demanded legal guarantees against legal prosecution and a “waiver on background checks for their members and leaders.”[xlix] The source added that these guarantees are impossible for the Iraqi government to meet but said that the militias demanded them to buy time, which underscores that neither militia was negotiating with Zaydi in good faith or intended to disarm.[l]

US and Partner Military Operations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Strike Campaign

Assessed Iranian War Aims:
- Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
- Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
- Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
- Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

Multiple shops in northwestern Iran went on strike on the fourth anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death, which highlights how parts of the Iranian population maintain grievances against the regime. Anti-regime media reported on September 16 that multiple Iranian businesses across Kermanshah, Kurdistan, and West Azerbaijan provinces in western Iran closed in honor of the anniversary of Amini’s death.[li] The regime’s killing of Amini in September 2022 sparked a series of spontaneous demonstrations that evolved into a countrywide and months-long protest movement.[lii] Anti-regime media reported that regime security forces deployed across western Iran to pressure businesses to reopen and patrol the area.[liii] These strikes come amid heightened regime concern about the potential for economic-related unrest and follow the largest protest wave in Iran’s modern history in Winter 2025-2026.[liv] The Winter 2025-2026 protests stemmed from public grievances against the regime’s economic mismanagement but evolved into widespread anti-regime protests.[lv]

Iran is engaging international trading partners that have historically supported Iranian sanctions evasion efforts, almost certainly as part of a broader Iranian effort to offset growing US economic pressure. Senior Iranian government officials have attended several BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) events in recent weeks and repeatedly emphasized the importance of developing alternatives to the US dollar-based financial system.[lvi] Iranian Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati met with his Turkish and Tunisian counterparts to discuss strengthening bilateral and multilateral trade and banking cooperation on the sidelines of the OIC Central Bank Governors’ meeting in Istanbul on September 14, for example.^[lvii] Turkey has previously hosted US-sanctioned front companies that the Iranian regime has used to obfuscate its transactions.[lviii]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed al Nayhan on the sidelines of a BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12.[lix] The meeting comes after the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced in August that it would halt all trade and financial transactions with Iran.[lx] The UAE has historically been one of Iran’s top trading partners as well as a critical hub for Iran’s shadow banking and sanctions evasion networks through which Iran generates significant revenue.[lxi]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately met with People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on September 16.[lxii] The PRC Foreign Ministry readout of the meeting highlighted that Wang called on “all parties to take effective measures to open the Strait of Hormuz as soon as possible” and that the PRC does “not want regional tensions to spill further over into Yemen and the Red Sea.”[lxiii] The Iranian regime media readout notably omitted these details.[lxiv] Iran has been engaged in a months-long effort to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz to raise global oil prices, which has impeded the PRC’s ability to trade with Iran, among its other Middle Eastern trading partners.[lxv] The PRC accounts for about 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports.[lxvi] Recent Houthi efforts to consolidate control over the Bab al Mandeb and Yemen’s Red Sea coastline also support the Iranian campaign to increase pressure on the global economy. Araghchi and Wang may have discussed the PRC’s shipping concerns and potential solutions, including methods for Iran and the PRC to circumvent the US naval blockade.

Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

See topline section.
Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis purportedly shot down a Saudi F-15 fighter jet for the first time over Marib Governorate on September 15.[lxvii] Houthi footage published on September 15 shows an unidentified Houthi air defense system striking a Saudi F-15, after which the aircraft crashes in Marib Governorate.[lxviii] The footage also shows Houthi fighters inspecting the crash site, including one of the F-15's vertical stabilizers, which displays the Saudi flag and tail number.[lxix] Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) accounts assessed that the Saudi F-15 likely belonged to the Royal Saudi Air Force 55th Squadron, which is based at King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait.[lxx] The footage suggests that Houthi forces engaged the Saudi F-15 with radar-guided surface-to-air missiles (SAM) rather than infrared systems because the jet does not appear to deploy countermeasures in the footage.[lxxi] The Houthis possess a variety of advanced radar-guided SAM systems that the group previously employed to shoot down US drones during “Operation Rough Rider” in 2025.^[lxxii] Iran previously shot down a US F-15E for the first time with a man-portable air defense system in April 2026, reportedly using tactics adapted from the Russia-Ukraine war.[lxxiii] Saudi sources have not confirmed the incident at the time of this writing. There is also no conclusive evidence of whether the Houthis doctored the September 15 footage. If the Houthis doctored the footage, its release likely represents an informational effort to increase domestic support for the Houthis or to deter the United States from entering the conflict.

[i] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-officials-met-iran-backed-houthis-oman-over-weekend-sources-say-2026-09-16/

[ii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-officials-met-iran-backed-houthis-oman-over-weekend-sources-say-2026-09-16/ ; https://news.usni.org/2025/05/06/u-s-stops-houthi-bombing-campaign-on-presidential-orders ; https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13/

[iii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-officials-met-iran-backed-houthis-oman-over-weekend-sources-say-2026-09-16/

[iv] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-12/trump-says-iran-backed-houthis-asked-us-not-to-target-them

[v] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-12/trump-says-iran-backed-houthis-asked-us-not-to-target-them

[vi] https://apnews.com/article/houthi-saudi-warplanes-shipping-september-15-2026-bfee618a925924b8562f9fb0a58538b7 ; https://www.axios.com/2026/09/11/houthis-yemen-saudi-trump-mbs-strikes

[vii] https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13/

[viii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-10-2026/

[ix] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-10-2026/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-reach-strategic-island-mouth-vital-shipping-lane-2026-09-11/

[x] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-10-2026/

[xi] https://t.me/army21ye/3721

[xii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-15-2026/ ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2089422249862590886?s=20 ; https://sarabic dot ae/20260723/أنصار-الله-تحدد-شرطين-لإنهاء-التصعيد-مع-السعودية-1115450869.html ; https://t.me/army21ye/3691

[xiii] https://t.me/army21ye/3721 ; https://t.me/army21ye/3703

[xiv] https://t.me/army21ye/3703

[xv] https://x.com/alamalikah/status/2100227191200002274 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2099649608783626307?s=20 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2099952507824783430?s=20 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2098623825906696257?s=20 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2098544210081140845?s=20

[xvi] https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2099939916813619525?s=20 ; https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2099789832276811908 ; https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2099939256302981401?s=20 ;https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2099939710164414503?s=20

[xvii] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2100014957244961101?s=20

[xviii] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2100014957244961101?s=20

[xix] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2100014957244961101?s=20

[xx] https://t.me/defapress_ir/67641 ; https://saba dot ye/ar/news3789252.htm?cid=1

[xxi] https://www.trtworld dot com/article/30c08c2ebb61

[xxii] https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2099789273486467343 ;

https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2099789832276811908 ; https://x.com/SaudiDCD/status/2099790600098721984

[xxiii] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-11-2026/

[xxiv] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’

[xxv] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’

[xxvi] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’

[xxvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/

[xxviii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/ ;

[xxix] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’

[xxx] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’

[xxxi] https://alhurra dot com/en/39050

[xxxii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-11-2026/

[xxxiii] https://alhurra dot com/en/39050

[xxxiv] https://shafaq dot com/en/Security/Iraq-s-Kataib-Hezbollah-rejects-disarmament-Weapons-for-Imam-Mahdi ; https://shafaq dot com/en/Security/Al-Nujaba-defies-disarmament-calls-Weapons-belong-to-al-Mahdi

[xxxv] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’

[xxxvi] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’

[xxxvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-18-2026/ ; https://t.me/AbumujahidAlasaf/15 ; https://t.me/Smedia1/2025?single ; https://t.me/Smedia1/2026?single

[xxxviii] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’) NM

[xxxix] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’) NM

[xl] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-18-2026/ ; https://t.me/AbumujahidAlasaf/15 ; https://t.me/Smedia1/2025?single ; https://t.me/Smedia1/2026?single

[xli] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c985lw7lywlo

[xlii] https://firatnews dot com/kurdIstan/pkk-12-kongresi-basariyla-yapildi-212451; https://www.hurriyet dot com.tr/yazarlar/nedim-sener/silahlarin-tesliminde-ankara-bagdat-erbil-suleymaniye-mekanizmasi-43290592

[xliii] https://x.com/filak001/status/1805709438256333184 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-july-5-2024/ ; https://x.com/aboalaa_alwalae/status/1912619122908856435 ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5307254-تغييرات-الزيدي-الأمنية-تطول-قائد-المنطقة-الخضراء

[xliv] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’

[xlv] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’

[xlvi] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’

[xlvii] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%B6%D8%AE%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7

[xlviii] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/خاص-الزيدي-يقترح-مقايضة-سلاح-الفصا-ل-بمشاريع-ميركية ;https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/خاص-الزيدي-يقر-خطة-دمج-الفصا-ل-35-لف-فرصة-عمل-مقابل-تسليم-السلاح

[xlix] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’

[l] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5318393-arsenal-iraqi-armed-factions-‘remaining-until-2028’

[li] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609167981

[lii] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/what-happened-to-mahsa-zhina-amini/

[liii] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609167981

[liv] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-7-2026

[lv] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-15-2026

[lvi] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/346207; https://www.irna dot ir/news/86263298; https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1394141; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6944016/; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6939840/; https://www.irib-news dot ir/fa/news/5902004; https://x.com/Iran_in_India/status/2098944866776645875?s=20; https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/530096/Iran-has-agreements-with-BRICS-members-for-cooperation-in-various; https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/en/news/2026/09/01/3685601/iran-proposes-initiatives-to-boost-sco-financial-energy-cooperation

[lvii]

https://www.tasnimnews dot ir/en/news/2026/09/14/3696559/cbi-chief-meets-turkish-tunisian-counterparts-in-istanbul/amp

[lviii] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0622/

[lix] https://www.mediaoffice dot abudhabi/en/crown-prince-news/crown-prince-of-abu-dhabi-meets-iranian-president-on-sidelines-of-brics-summit-in-new-delhi/

[lx] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2089760687291777203?s=20 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trumps-plan-to-squeeze-irans-economy-will-live-or-die-in-dubai-8f9f561e?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2

[lxi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-19-2026/ ; https://x.com/miadmaleki/status/2090021891389980677?s=20 ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6662719

[lxii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/862846 ; http://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/wjbzhd/202609/t20260916_12023687.shtml

[lxiii] http://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/wjbzhd/202609/t20260916_12023687.shtml

[lxiv] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/862846

[lxv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-21-2026/;

https://www.irna dot ir/news/86240378/

[lxvi] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/discounts-iranian-oil-widen-china-record-stocks-even-sanctions-curb-shipments-2025-09-16/; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-billion-dollar-sanctions-dodge-kept-chinese-goods-flowing-iran-2026-09-10/; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/15/technology/binance-iran-china.html

[lxvii] https://t.me/army21ye/3728

[lxviii] https://t.me/army21ye/3728

[lxix] https://t.me/army21ye/3728

[lxx] https://x.com/osintwarfare/status/2100242223929389422 ; https://x.com/Osint613/status/2100243527158366358