Iran Updates, May 2023

This page collects the Iran Updates produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) for May 2023. Full list of Iran Updates are available here.

Iran Update, May 31, 2023

Key Takeaways

1. Iran has bolstered its defensive position in eastern Syria since the end of the escalation cycle that occurred in March, likely to facilitate the transfer of advanced conventional weapons into Syria. The escalation cycle between Iran, Israel and the United States may have prompted Iran to halt transferring advanced conventional weapons through Deir ez Zor.
2. The Raisi administration is reconfiguring personnel to economically benefit from Iranian and Syrian reintegration into the region.
3. Iran is likely attempting to coerce Iraq into complying with Iranian security concerns about Israeli activities in Iraqi Kurdistan.
4. Iran and the Taliban are signaling they seek to avoid further border clashes over water disputes while preparing for further border clashes.
5. The Iranian Parliament approved Reza Morad Sahraei as Iran’s new education minister on May 30, which could lead to intensified government indoctrination efforts and crackdowns on university student protests.

Iran Update, May 30, 2023

Key Takeaways

1. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes on at least two joint Syrian Arab Army-Lebanese Hezbollah positions in southwestern Syria on May 28, which is unlikely to prompt an Iranian-directed attack on US forces in Syria.
2. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is preparing to launch artillery into Iraqi Kurdistan, likely as part of a short-term military conflict against perceived Israeli threats from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
3. Iranian and Afghan border guards engaged in a brief and lethal clash near the Milak-Zaranj border crossing on May 27, which Iran is unlikely to escalate to a larger armed conflict.

Iran Update, May 26, 2023

Key Takeaways

1. Saudi media reported Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) is preparing to target US forces in Syria, which likely misrepresents the threat LH poses.
2. Iran has increasingly engaged in prisoner exchanges with Western countries in recent weeks, likely to signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations. Iran could be signaling its interest in nuclear diplomacy to preempt US or Israeli military action against its nuclear facilities.

Iran Update, May 25, 2023

Key Takeaways

1. Axis of Resistance news sources coordinated a disinformation campaign that claimed the United States will establish a new base in Iraq, likely to reignite domestic US pressure on policymakers to withdraw forces from the Middle East.
2. The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) stands to gain a significant increase in funds from Iraq’s 2023 budget, which very likely would position the group to improve its status as a parallel security institution in Iraq to state security forces.
3. Syrian regime military security coordinated with the IRGC Quds Force in Albu Kamal to monitor civilians, which may advance Iranian efforts to secure the Albu Kamal-Deir ez Zor City land route in eastern Syria.
4. An Iranian-backed militia leader stressed the need for secrecy around headquarters in Deir ez Zor City, likely to secure advanced weapons and IRGC Quds Force commanders from Israeli targeting.

Iran Update, May 24, 2023

Key Takeaways

1. Iran has transferred unsophisticated air defense weapons to Syria, possibly to protect advanced weapons shipments and IRGC Quds Force commanders from Israeli drone strikes.
2. The Raisi administration is pursuing greater economic cooperation with Indonesia, which could help Iran evade sanctions by transporting oil to China via Indonesia.
3. Media reports discussing former Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani may reflect an intra-regime struggle over Shamkhani’s future political trajectory.

Iran Update, May 23, 2023

Key Takeaways

1. Iran and Iranian-backed militias facilitated the travel of Iranian religious pilgrims into Syria, possibly to expand Iranian influence in Syria.
2. Anti-regime protests organized by Iranian university students have increased in recent weeks, demonstrating the regime’s failure to suppress a key demographic of the Mahsa Amini movement.

Iran Update, May 22, 2023

Key Takeaways

1. Iran condemned the Arab League’s resolution about arming militias in Syria and is very unlikely to stop supporting its proxies in Syria.
2. Iran is establishing a military base in eastern Syria, likely advancing efforts to secure permanent access to critical transportation routes across the country.
3. Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian replaced Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani as the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary on May 22, and is unlikely to change the regime’s national security policy.

Iran Update, May 19, 2023

Key Takeaways

1. The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are consolidating their footprint in northern Iraq, which will likely increase the risk of sectarian conflict there. A PMF footprint could help Iran secure a new arms shipment route into Syria.
2. The IRGC Navy conducted unprofessional and unsafe maneuvers near a US naval ship in the Persian Gulf, which risks accidental collisions and miscalculations.
3. Anti-regime protests have flared up in Iran in response to increased state executions, demonstrating that many protesters remain undeterred from further protest despite the brutal regime crackdown during the Mahsa Amini movement.

Iran Update, May 18, 2023

Key Takeaways

1. The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are consolidating their footprint in northern Iraq, which will likely increase the risk of sectarian conflict there. A PMF footprint could help Iran secure a new arms shipment route into Syria.
2. The IRGC Navy conducted unprofessional and unsafe maneuvers near a US naval ship in the Persian Gulf, which risks accidental collisions and miscalculations.
3. Anti-regime protests have flared up in Iran in response to increased state executions, demonstrating that many protesters remain undeterred from further protest despite the brutal regime crackdown during the Mahsa Amini movement.

Key Takeaways

1. Iran is trying to expand its economic cooperation, especially energy ties, with Syria to reinforce Iranian influence over Damascus, as Assad pursues improved ties with the Arab states. Deepening Iranian economic influence in Syria will help Iranian leaders revitalize their own economy, especially if Arab states begin to send investment and reconstruction funds to Syria.
2. The Raisi administration issued veiled threats toward the Afghan Taliban, calling on the group to release more water from the Helmand River from Afghanistan into Iran. The Raisi administration is likely concerned that water shortages in the coming summer months could fuel protests across the country, and especially in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.

Iran Update, May 17, 2023

Key Takeaways

1. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to attack US forces in Iraq, likely elevating the risk of an attack on US or Coalition forces. The militias do not always follow through with their threats to attack US forces, however.
2. Iran is establishing a military base in southern Damascus, likely accelerating efforts to secure its long-term presence in Syria ahead of Arab-Syrian normalization.
3. Iran has reinvigorated efforts to complete a rail line that connects India to Russia through Iran but is unlikely to complete this project within the next four years.

Iran Update, May 16, 2023

Key Takeaways

1. Iran is taking steps to improve operational security for convoys traveling into Syria from Iraq, likely to protect arms transfers from Israeli airstrikes. Iran also is stoking conflict between Israel and Palestinian militias, likely to enable the IRGC to transfer military equipment into Syria with less risk of Israeli interdiction.
2. Russia is pursuing mutually beneficial economic and military programs with Iran, very likely to ensure Iran continues to provide material support for Russian operations in Ukraine. Iran’s acquisition of Russian Su-35s through those deals may enable Tehran to more readily and independently project power in the coming years.

Iran Update, May 15, 2023

Key Takeaways

1. Iranian leaders are stoking conflict between Israel and Palestinian militias, likely to enable the IRGC to transfer military equipment into Syria with a lower risk of Israeli interdiction. Iranian weapon shipments into Syria could trigger a new escalation cycle with Israel that risks entangling US and Coalition forces.
2. Ultra-hardline political factions are mounting a political campaign against pragmatic hardline Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, likely to restrain him from pursuing major political reforms. Ghalibaf has been calling for major political and economic reforms for several months.
3. The Iranian regime is portraying clerics as allies of the Iranian people likely to prevent further acts of violence against them. Unspecified individuals attacked clerics on five separate occasions in April and May 2023, marking a five-fold increase in attacks against religious figures compared to the first three months of 2023.

Iran Update, May 8, 2023

Iran is maneuvering to economically benefit from Syria’s reintegration into the region, which may enable Iran to circumvent US and international sanctions, as well as support Iranian-backed militias operating in Syria.[i] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi signed 15 cooperative agreements with Syria on May 3 in a push to be the primary provider of reconstruction projects in Syria.[ii] CTP previously assessed that Iran may use the Iranian para-statal organization Khatam al Anbia or Iranian-backed proxy companies to oversee such reconstruction projects. Iranian Free Trade, Industrial, and Special Economic Zones Supreme Council Secretary Hojatollah Abdol Maleki stated on May 6 that plans to establish a free trade zone between Iran, Iraq, and Syria have entered a “technical and implementation stage.”[iii] Maleki suggested the free trade zone may extend to the Latakia port and the Al Qaim Iraq-Syria border crossing. A free trade zone through Syria, Iraq, and Iran would allow Iran to move materiel across borders without oversight that would normally enforce sanctions on trade with Syria and Iran. The Arab League voted on May 7 to readmit Syria, after which an unidentified Jordanian official claimed that the Arab League will lobby to lift Western sanctions on Syria if the Assad regime agrees to a political solution to end the crisis.[iv] The end of sanctions on Syria with the establishment of a free trade zone and Iranian reconstruction projects would enable Iran to circumvent Western sanctions on Iran.

Key Takeaways

• Iran is maneuvering to economically benefit from Syria’s reintegration into the region, which may enable Iran to circumvent US and international sanctions, as well as support Iranian-backed militias operating in Syria.
• The Iranian regime is pressuring the relevant parties to resume nuclear negotiations, likely to preempt the reimposition of nuclear sanctions amid a deteriorating internal economic situation.
• Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi met with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Quds Force Commander of Albu Kamal Hajj Askar met in Sayyida Zainab on May 3 and 4, according to a report from Syrian opposition outlet Eye of Euphrates.

Iran Update, May 5, 2023

Attacks on Iranian clerics increased during the past month, which may reflect broader public antipathy to the regime's sociocultural and economic policies. Unidentified individuals have attacked clerics in four separate incidents in April, marking a four-fold increase in violence against religious figures compared to January, February, and March 2023. The recent attacks coincide with the implementation of a new veiling enforcement plan on April 15, which uses advanced surveillance technology to identify unveiled women and punishes the owners of public spaces who fail to enforce veiling. Some Iranian social media users have framed the plan as a symbol of regime oppression, which signals public frustration with repressive sociopolitical policies. An individual who seemingly attempted to run over a cleric in Tehran City, Tehran Province on April 27 expressed frustration with being unable to find work, which indicates the economic problems the regime has failed to fix are motivating violence.

These attacks could create fissures between the clerical establishment and the regime. Some clerics--such as Ayatollah Mustafa Mohaghegh Damad and Ayatollah Asadollah Bayat Zanjani--have previously criticized the regime’s violence against citizens.

Key Takeaways

• Attacks on Iranian clerics increased during the past month, which may reflect broader public antipathy to the regime's sociocultural and economic policies.
• At least one protest occurred on May 5.
• The Iranian regime has increased the pace of state executions, which could reinvigorate anti-regime sentiments in Sistan and Baluchistan Province
• Iranian leadership is signaling greater cohesion among Palestinian resistance factions, likely to support their integration into the Axis of Resistance.
• Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani may replace Popular Mobilization Authority Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh according to Iranian-backed Telegram channel
• IRGC Quds Force Commander of Eastern Syria Hajj Mahdi and IRGC Quds Force Commander of the Albu Kamal rail crossing Hajj Hussein met with a Russian delegation in Albu Kamal City on May 3.

Iran Update, May 4, 2023

The Iranian regime is seeking to take advantage of political and economic developments in Syria and Iraq to improve the Iranian economy and advance its strategic goals in the region. Various Raisi administration ministers met with Syrian officials on May 4. Economic and Financial Affairs Minister Ehsan Khandouzi announced the “removal of obstacles” to Iranian export companies operating in Syria following a meeting with several Syrian economic officials. Information and Communications Technology Minister Issa Zare Pour separately signed a cooperation agreement with his Syrian counterpart, Iyad al Khatib, to facilitate Iranian involvement in modernizing Syria’s telecommunications infrastructure. Zare Pour additionally emphasized Iranian satellites’ ability to produce high-resolution images that Syrian officials can use in agriculture, infrastructure, and construction. Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani and Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash also accompanied Raisi to Damascus. Ashtiani likely sought to secure weapons sales while Bazrpash likely discussed plans with Syrian officials to establish a rail link between Iran and Syria.

The regime may use these economic and political initiatives with the Assad Regime to alleviate Iran’s economic challenges. The Iranian rial reached 556,500 rials to one US dollar on May 1, marking a 10-percent reduction in the value of the rial in the past month, as CTP previously reported. Reformist-affiliated Etemad additionally reported on May 3 that some Iranians have resorted to bartering household items to afford basic goods such as chicken due to rising inflation.

The regime may simultaneously use these initiatives to pay for and increase the Axis of Resistance’s influence in the region. Al Araby reported on May 4 that the Iraqi government awarded the Muhandis Company—a contracting company modeled after the IRGC Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters and operated by the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—infrastructure and development projects across multiple Iraqi provinces. CTP has previously reported that elements of the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework are attempting to modify and capture Iraqi state institutions to enhance their political power. The PMF may similarly use these contracts to amass revenue from the state contracts and reuse them to fund PMF operations in Iraq and potentially Syria. Expanding the PMF’s funding streams may allow it to become more self-sufficient and allow Iran to redirect financial resources previously allocated to the PMF back into the Iranian economy. Iran may also use these contracts to evade sanctions and bring hard currency into the Iranian economy in that way.

Iran may specifically use the Muhandis Company to launder the potential influx in Arab and Gulf state financing that would come with Syrian normalization efforts back into the Iranian economy. CTP previously assessed that Iranian reconstruction and economic agreements with the Assad regime may include contracts for organizations affiliated with Iran’s Axis of Resistance in Syria, which would provide the groups with an alternative source of revenue to fund their military operations. The Muhandis Company could fulfill reconstruction contracts for the Assad regime—with Gulf and Arab state funding—and could use these contracts to facilitate Iranian sanctions evasion.

These economic opportunities will enable the regime to entrench itself further in Syria. The regime’s ability to reap the economic, political, and military benefits of reconstruction depends on Iranian and Syrian officials' implementation of the agreements they have signed.

Iran may respond to renewed Israeli airstrikes on Iranian and Iranian-backed forces in Syria by causing Iranian-backed militias to attack US forces ostensibly in retaliation. Israeli combat aircraft conducted airstrikes on Iranian-backed militants at military airports in Homs and Aleppo Provinces respectively on April 28 and May 1, as CTP previously reported. The three maps below illustrate a shift during the month of April in the areas of Syria in which Israeli airstrikes and artillery barrages have targeted Iranian and Iranian-backed militants. Israeli kinetic activity primarily concentrated in southwest Syria in the period April 1-27. Israeli kinetic activity before and after April 1-27 demonstrate a wider array of target locations. CTP previously reported that Israel refocused its airstrikes on Palestinian and Syrian Arab Army locations in southwest Syria at the beginning of April, away from its previous focus on Iranian convoys transporting weapons, lines of communication, and military production sites. Lebanese Hezbollah-aligned social media accounts accused the US of tacit involvement in the May 1 airstrike—a tactic that Iran and the Axis of Resistance have employed to justify retaliatory attacks against US forces in eastern Syria in the past. This rhetorical condition setting suggests that Iran is preparing to renew retaliatory attacks on the US, which it paused for the month of April possibly in response to the shift in Israeli attack locations.

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian regime is seeking to take advantage of political and economic developments in Syria and Iraq to improve the Iranian economy and advance its strategic goals in the region.
• The regime may use economic and political initiatives with the Assad Regime to pay for and increase the Axis of Resistance’s influence in the region.
• Iran may respond to renewed Israeli airstrikes on Iranian and Iranian-backed forces in Syria by causing Iranian-backed militias to attack US forces ostensibly in retaliation.
• Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs and Chief Nuclear Negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani met with his Irish counterpart, Sonia Hyland, in Tehran on May 4.
• IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with prominent Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani on May 4 to present a report on the Quds Force’s regional activities.
• Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi met with senior Palestinian militia officials in Damascus on May 4, likely to emphasize their increasing integration into the Axis of Resistance.
• Eye of Euphrates reported on May 4 that over 200 local recruits for Iranian-backed militias abandoned their posts in Mayadeen, Deir ez Zor Province.

Iran Update, May 3, 2023

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi signed 15 cooperation agreements with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus, Syria on May 3, which could improve the Iranian economy and increase regime stability.[i] Raisi signed these agreements on the first of his two-day trip to Syria, the first trip an Iranian president has made to Syria since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and Arab Spring.[ii] Raisi and Assad signed several memorandums of understanding covering oil, energy, transportation, reconstruction, and communications technology. Raisi also asserted that Iranian companies are prepared to be the primary providers of reconstruction projects in Syria during an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-run Al Mayadeen on May 2.[iii] The head of the Iran-Syria Joint Economic Commission and Iran’s Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash separately announced on May 3 that the commission established a joint Iranian-Syrian bank to facilitate business transactions between the two countries.[iv] The commissioner’s announcement of the joint bank while Iran and Syria signed economic cooperation agreements suggests the bank will have a role in funding Iranian reconstruction projects in Syria and transferring payments to Iran. These payments would increase capital inflow to Iran, which would help reinvigorate Iran’s deteriorating economy. The role of Iranian para-statal organizations in generating revenue through Syria’s reconstruction would not alleviate Iran’s high inflation and unstable currency, although the regime may attempt to frame it as such to the Iranian people. Such para-statal organizations include the Khatam al Anbia Construction Headquarters, which is the IRGC’s engineering and development firm that oversees large-scale civil-military construction projects and helps the regime circumvent sanctions.

Iran Update, May 2, 2023

Iranian officials and members of the clerical establishment have expressed increased concern over the safety of religious figures in recent days. Former Intelligence and Security Minister and Shia cleric Hojjat ol Eslam Ali Fallahian called on Friday prayer leaders to learn self-defense during an interview with reformist news outlet Entekhab on May 2.[i] The Islamic Propaganda Coordination Council—a regime body responsible for organizing official ceremonies and public events—separately issued a statement on May 2 urging law enforcement and security services to decisively confront “thugs."[ii] The council issued this statement in response to the killing of Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani on April 26. The council chairman—Mohammad Hossein Musa Pour—is a cleric and former governor of Qom City, Qom Province.[iii] Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan additionally discussed Soleimani’s murder with Qom Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah Mohammad Saedi on April 29, possibly to discuss measures to protect clerics.[iv]

Iranian-backed Syrian militias may be setting rhetorical conditions to attack US forces in response to Israeli airstrikes in Aleppo Province on May 1. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes on Aleppo International Airport and a former chemical weapons production and storage site in Safirah, Aleppo Province.[v] The Assad regime produced and stored chemical weapons at the Safirah site for use in barrel bombs throughout Aleppo Province in 2013, but CTP has observed no indications that Iranian-backed forces use the site for the same purpose.[vi] The Aleppo International Airport airstrikes disabled the runway and killed three Syrian Arab Army air defense battalion personnel and possibly a Lebanese Hezbollah field commander.[vii] The airstrikes also triggered a series of secondary explosions, suggesting that the airstrikes targeted munitions stored at the airport.[viii] Iranian-backed militants traveled to the Safirah facility after the airstrikes, likely to secure the area.[ix]

A popular pro-Iranian Twitter account claimed without evidence that the Israeli aircraft traveled through Jordanian and US-controlled airspace in Syria, implying that the US greenlighted the airstrikes.[x] Iranian leaders frequently threaten to hold the US accountable for Israeli actions. Iranian-affiliated social media accounts and militias have furthermore accused the US of tacit involvement in Israeli airstrikes to justify attacks against US forces in eastern Syria in the past.[xi]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian officials and members of the clerical establishment have expressed increased concern over the safety of religious figures in recent days.
• Iranian-backed Syrian militias may be setting rhetorical conditions to attack US forces in response to Israeli airstrikes in Aleppo Province.
• At least 12 protests occurred in 12 cities across 12 provinces.
• Israeli media reported that Saudi and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) officials are considering holding talks to improve relations, citing an unidentified European official.

Iran Update, May 1, 2023

Iranian leadership dismissed several economic officials and emphasized fighting corruption between April 27 and May 1 to improve Iran’s economy, which is very unlikely to precipitate the meaningful economic change necessary to curb inflation and stabilize the Iranian rial. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on parliament and the Raisi administration to fight economic corruption during a meeting with workers, labor organization members, and Raisi administration officials on April 29.[i] President Ebrahim Raisi has engaged in numerous symbolic economic engagements in recent days. Raisi dismissed 15 unspecified managers in Khuzestan Province to demonstrate his administration’s “intolerance” of corruption during a two-day trip to this province on April 27-28.[ii] Raisi additionally ordered the formation of a working group on April 30 to “follow up on the issues” raised by Khamenei in his April 29 meeting with workers without providing further details.[iii] Raisi called on his administration to address the needs of contract workers and retirees—who have organized widespread strikes and protests in recent weeks—during a MAPNA Company event for International Workers’ Day on May 1.[iv]

Parliament separately impeached Industry, Mines, and Trade Minister Reza Fatemi Amin on April 30.[v] Several parliamentarians accused Amin of mismanaging the automobile industry and of involvement in a corruption scandal.[vi] Parliament previously attempted but failed to impeach Amin in November 2022.[vii] President Ebrahim Raisi appointed Mehdi Niazi—who previously served as Industry, Mines, and Trade Deputy Minister—to replace Amin.[viii] Amin’s impeachment follows the dismissal of numerous Raisi administration economic officials--including Program and Budgeting Organization Chief Massoud Mir Kazemi, Agricultural Jihad Minister Javad Sadati Nejad, state-affiliated Innovation and Prosperity Fund President Ali Vahdat, and Central Bank of Iran Chief Ali Salehabadi--in recent months.[ix] Reformist politicians suggested that Fatemi Amin’s impeachment would not improve Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions without meaningful changes to Iran’s economic ecosystem.[x] Former Rouhani administration Spokesperson Ali Rabie wrote an op-ed in reformist-aligned Etemad Online stressing that Iran must address economic corruption through structural reforms and programs on April 30. Parliamentarian Jalil Rahimi Jahan Abadi similarly stated that fundamental issues with Iran’s economic policies had created “victims” of presidential administrations. Former Industry, Mines, and Trade Minister under then-President Ali Khamenei and reformist politician Mostafa Hashemi Taba separately criticized parliament and the Raisi administration of tackling “superficial” problem sets instead of furthering Iran’s strategic priorities.

Increasingly dire economic conditions in Iran require fundamental economic reform, not symbolic and superficial solutions. The Iranian rial depreciated to 556,500 rials to one US dollar on May 1, marking a nearly 10-percent reduction in the value of the rial in the past month.[xi] The Financial Times separately reported on May 1 that the Statistical Center of Iran has withheld publishing national inflation data for two months, possibly to conceal evidence of increasing prices. The Financial Times added that Iran’s inflation rate may have surpassed 49 percent, the highest ever recorded inflation rate in Iran, within the past two months. Raisi’s visit to MAPNA—an industrial conglomerate with links to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)—on May 1 indicates Raisi’s reticence towards such reform. Improving Iran’s economy would require limiting the disproportional and disruptive influence that companies like MAPNA have on Iran’s economy rather than supporting and encouraging these companies’ activities.

The regime’s failure to address workers’ demands will likely fuel further economically motivated strikes and protests, which may in turn exacerbate Iran’s economic situation by disrupting production and economic transactions. Regime officials and employers have responded to workers’ demands for better living conditions with repression instead of empathy. Managers of the Chavar Petrochemical Company in Ilam Province prevented 200 workers who recently participated in economic protests from entering the company’s petrochemical complex on May 1.[xii] Pars Special Economic Energy Zone CEO Sakhavat Asadi separately threatened to dismiss workers who participate in strikes on April 28, as CTP previously reported.[xiii] The Free Union of Iranian Workers announced that Iranian authorities had summoned at least 50 labor activists in Tehran, Kurdistan, and Gilan Provinces ahead of International Workers’ Day.[xiv]

IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami appointed Brigadier General Abdol Reza Abed as Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters Commander on May 1, possibly signaling the IRGC’s efforts to strengthen its role in the Iranian economy.[xv] The Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters is the IRGC’s engineering and development firm. The company oversees large-scale civil-military construction projects. The regime also uses the Headquarters to circumvent international economic sanctions.[xvi] Salami reported during Abed’s introduction ceremony that the Raisi administration had granted 30 major economic projects to the headquarters within the past year and agreed to provide further contracts on a weekly basis.[xvii] Iranian state-media highlighted Abed’s success as the Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters commander from 2005 to 2008 and his ability to combat economic sanctions.[xviii] Abed also has experience as an executive in the oil, gas, and petrochemical industries.

Salami likely considers Abed to be an appropriate leader for the Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters amid recent intra-regime discussions about privatization, as CTP previously reported.[xix] Some regime officials have suggested that parastatal organizations, including the IRGC, should reduce their role in the Iranian economy in favor of privately owned firms.[xx] Abed’s appointment and Salami’s statements indicates the IRGC aims to preserve its involvement in the economy.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian leadership dismissed several economic officials and emphasized fighting corruption between April 27 and May 1 to improve Iran’s economy, which is very unlikely to precipitate the meaningful economic change necessary to curb inflation and stabilize the Iranian rial.
• IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami appointed Brigadier General Abdol Reza Abed as Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters Commander on May 1, possibly signaling the IRGC’s efforts to strengthen its role in the Iranian economy.
• At least one protest occurred on April 29, at least 11 protests occurred in 10 cities across nine provinces on April 30, and at least 12 protests occurred in 12 cities across nine provinces on May 1.
• CTP recorded poisoning incidents in two provinces on April 29, one province on April 30, and three provinces on May 1.
• The New York Times reported that Former Deputy Defense Minister Alireza Akbari, whom Iranian authorities executed for espionage on January 11, 2023, provided the UK with intelligence on Iranian nuclear and military programs for over a decade.
• An unidentified assailant stabbed an unspecified cleric in Qom City, Qom Province on April 29.
• Unidentified assailants shot and killed Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province Law Enforcement Command Criminal Investigation Chief Alireza Shahraki.
• Iranian authorities installed barriers to further segregate men and women in Tehran metros carts on April 30.
• Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval discussed Indian-Iranian economic cooperation with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on May 1.
• Saudi Arabia evacuated Iranian citizens fleeing Sudan on May 1.
• Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike on suspected Iranian-affiliated targets in Homs Province on April 28.
• Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran on April 29.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi proxy Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba released a series of statements echoing rhetoric from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
• Coordination Framework leadership held a meeting on May 1 with Iraqi Prime Minister Sudani and Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohamed al Halbousi.