Iran Update, May 30, 2023

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Key Takeaways

1. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes on at least two joint Syrian Arab Army-Lebanese Hezbollah positions in southwestern Syria on May 28, which is unlikely to prompt an Iranian-directed attack on US forces in Syria.
2. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is preparing to launch artillery into Iraqi Kurdistan, likely as part of a short-term military conflict against perceived Israeli threats from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
3. Iranian and Afghan border guards engaged in a brief and lethal clash near the Milak-Zaranj border crossing on May 27, which Iran is unlikely to escalate to a larger armed conflict.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant and especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes on at least two joint Syrian Arab Army-Lebanese Hezbollah positions in southwestern Syria on May 28, which is unlikely to prompt an Iranian-directed attack on US forces in Syria. The IDF targeted an LH-occupied air defense base in Hafir Al-Fawqa and a weapons storage facility in Hamiyeh, Damascus.[i] The Syrian Defense Ministry reported the airstrike targeted some points in the vicinity of Damascus and caused material damage.[ii] Syrian opposition media reported that the IDF also targeted an unspecified location in the vicinity of the Damascus International Airport. Other sources did not report that the airport is out of service.[iii] Iranian-backed militias attacked US forces in March after Israeli airstrikes killed IRGC personnel, which suggests that Iran directs attacks in response to the death Iranian military officers.[iv] The May 28 airstrike did not result in the deaths of Iranian military personnel.

Iranian Activities in Iraq

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout Iraq. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is preparing to launch artillery into Iraqi Kurdistan, likely as part of a short-term military conflict against perceived Israeli threats from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Kurdish human rights organization Hengaw circulated videos of Iranian forces transporting artillery and military equipment to Iran’s northwest border with Iraq from Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province and Javanroud, Kermanshah Province on May 30.[v] The movement of materiel follows threats from senior IRGC Ground Forces commanders and security officials about confronting anti-regime actors and “terrorists” along Iran’s western border with Iraq in recent weeks.[vi] Iranian officials routinely use the term to refer to Kurdish separatist groups in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iranian authorities also claimed to have dismantled “terrorist” cells linked to Israel in northwestern Iran on May 21 and 29, which suggests that Iran is deploying artillery because it perceives a threat from Israel in Iraqi Kurdistan.[vii] Iran is not signaling a willingness to engage in a long-term conflict with Iraq to permanently eradicate these perceived threats, however.

Regime officials have historically accused anti-regime militant groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations into Iran.[viii] For example, Iranian media accused Kurdish opposition groups of helping Israel smuggle military equipment into Iran that Israel used in its January 28 drone attack on a munitions factory in Esfahan.[ix] Iran also previously attacked Iraqi Kurdistan to counter perceived threats in this region.[x] Iran attacked Kurdish opposition groups in November 2022 for allegedly supporting Mahsa Amini protesters.[xi]

Iranian Domestic Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Iranian and Afghan border guards engaged in a brief and lethal clash near the Milak-Zaranj border crossing on May 27, which Iran is unlikely to escalate to a larger armed conflict. The clash was the first violent border incident between the two countries since July 31, 2022 and it resulted in the death of two Iranian border guards and one Taliban fighter.[xii] Social media users reported that Iran was constructing a defensive outpost which Taliban border guards tried to halt, leading to the clash.[xiii]  The May 27 border clash coincides with a rhetorical escalation between Iran and the Taliban over Iran’s water rights to the Helmand River, an Afghan river that flows across the border into Iran.[xiv]  Some Iranian officials have downplayed the incident in recent days, emphasizing that the situation is now under control.[xv] A larger armed conflict would risk destabilizing Afghanistan, likely leading to an influx of Afghan refugees and drugs into Iran.

The Taliban is unlikely to accede to Iran’s demands. Afghanistan is experiencing a drought, which is driving a zero-sum competition with Iran for shared water resources.[xvi] Senior Taliban leaders denied Iran’s request for more water and claimed they cannot release any more water due to drought.[xvii] The Taliban is attempting to increase the amount of water available to local farmers by building a new dam in western Afghanistan.[xviii] Water shortages are one of the drivers of anti-regime protests in Iran.[xix]

In a most dangerous scenario, Iran could escalate against the Taliban by conducting covert action against water infrastructure in Afghanistan, likely exacerbating instability in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. This scenario is plausible because Iran supported attacks on dams in Afghanistan during the Taliban insurgency.[xx] Iran could use the Fatemiyoun Division, its Afghan Shi’a proxy militia, to conduct similar attacks.[xxi] The Taliban possibly would retaliate against Iran-orchestrated attacks by harboring and supporting Balochi rebels which could exacerbate ongoing Balochi insurgencies in both Iran and Pakistan.[xxii] The Taliban foreign minister expressed support for Iranian Balochi dissidents on May 22, which implies a threat toward Iran.[xxiii]