Iran Update, September 3, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The  Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press.[i] The Associated Press reported on September 3 that Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 32.5 kilograms between May 17 and June 13, citing the unreleased IAEA report.[ii] Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile is equivalent to approximately 10.5 significant quantities, which refers to the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[iii] Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however. The IAEA report added that Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium is 9,874.9 kilograms.[iv] This amount marks a 627.3 kilogram increase in Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium since May 17.[v] The IAEA reported that the IAEA has not inspected any Iranian nuclear site except the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant since the Israel-Iran War.[vi] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA, and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed on September 3 that Iran has provided the IAEA with no information on the status of Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile since June 13.[vii]  CIA Director John Ratcliffe stated in July 2025 that the US and Israeli strikes during the war buried the "vast majority" of Iran’s enriched uranium at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) and Fordow and that it would be "extremely difficult" for Iran to extract the material.[viii] The IAEA reported on August 27 that there is no evidence that Iran has moved its stockpile of highly enriched uranium from the ENTC since the US strikes on June 21, citing satellite imagery.[ix] Grossi said that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, including those that Israel and the United States struck during the war.[x]

Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28.[xi] The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3’s activation of the snapback mechanism.[xii] The directive advised media outlets to frame potential sanctions as a sign of European dependence on the United States, emphasize Iran’s ability to withstand economic pressure, and avoid portraying Iran’s future negatively.[xiii] Iranian Judiciary Spokesperson Asghar Jahangir stated on September 3 that the E3’s decision to trigger the snapback mechanism was “a propaganda and psychological tool to target the people’s morale through psychological warfare.”[xiv] Jahangir urged Iranian media outlets to act “intelligently” and "maintain national cohesion and unity.”[xv] Iranian media outlet Nour News separately published an op-ed on September 2 that encouraged Iranian civilians and officials to maintain “national self-confidence" and avoid “simplistic and exaggerated rhetoric” regarding the E3’s snapback decision.[xvi]  The Iranian regime likely seeks to control the media narrative about potential snapback sanctions to prevent reports about the negative economic impacts of sanctions from further increasing public frustration about Iran’s poor economic conditions and potentially driving economic-related unrest. The regime’s efforts to control the Iranian media space come as the Iranian rial has depreciated to near record-low levels in recent days and the Iranian economy faces exorbitant inflation.[xvii]

Hezbollah is continuing to discuss a variety of tactics to delay and ultimately reverse the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Lebanese media reported on September 2 that likely Hezbollah officials discussed various tactics that Hezbollah could employ to bypass the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah.[xviii] Hezbollah officials reportedly discussed compelling the Lebanese government to delay Hezbollah’s disarmament until Israel and Syria commit to the US disarmament proposal.[xix] The Lebanese media report did not specify how Hezbollah may attempt to compel the Lebanese government. The US proposal includes an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days and Hezbollah’s complete disarmament by the end of 2025.[xx] The Israeli government reportedly will not discuss the US proposal and has no intention of responding to it.[xxi] Hezbollah officials also reportedly proposed that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) could exempt Hezbollah from being disarmed due to the LAF’s “lack of readiness.”[xxii] Lebanese media noted that all options for “escalation” are on the table if Hezbollah cannot find a “suitable formula” to bypass the government’s decision.[xxiii] Hezbollah reportedly threatened on September 2 to halt its cooperation with the LAF by refusing to hand over its weapons south of the Litani River if the Lebanese government approves and implements the LAF’s disarmament plan.[xxiv] A Lebanese source previously told Saudi media on August 28 that the LAF has confiscated various types of weapons in southern Lebanon without any objection from Hezbollah.[xxv] The LAF and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have continued to discover Hezbollah weapons depots that Hezbollah did not disclose to the LAF, however.[xxvi]

Hezbollah’s proposed tactics to delay and ultimately prevent its disarmament appear to be highly attuned to Lebanese officials’ concerns about possible future internal conflict in Lebanon, Israeli compliance with the US proposal, and the LAF’s capabilities. LAF and Lebanese officials have previously raised concerns about conflict breaking out between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah during the disarmament process.[xxvii] Hezbollah officials, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, have continuously threatened potential confrontation and anti-government protests if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah.[xxviii]  Lebanese, US, and UNIFIL officials have also expressed concerns about the LAF’s capability to disarm Hezbollah.[xxix] Hezbollah and Hezbollah-aligned media channels have amplified reports about Lebanese security forces’ alleged unwillingness to disarm Hezbollah.[xxx] Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri separately criticized recent US efforts to Saudi media on August 27, stating that the United States gave Lebanon “the opposite” of what it promised.[xxxi] Berri’s statement came amid Lebanese authorities’ concern that Israel will not withdraw from Lebanon until Hezbollah is fully disarmed.[xxxii]

Some of Hezbollah’s tactics may have produced favorable results for Hezbollah. The Lebanese cabinet announced on September 3 that it would add four items to the agenda for its cabinet session on August 5 after Hezbollah threatened to boycott the session if the cabinet did not add items other than Hezbollah’s disarmament to the agenda.[xxxiii] Hezbollah has reportedly agreed to the updated agenda, which represents an example of the state acceding to Hezbollah’s demands.[xxxiv]  

Key Takeaways

• Iran’s Enriched Uranium: Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press. Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however.
• Iranian Domestic Censorship: Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3’s activation of the snapback mechanism.
• Hezbollah’s Anti-Disarmament Campaign: Hezbollah is continuing to discuss a variety of tactics to delay and ultimately reverse the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Many of Hezbollah’s proposed tactics appear to be highly attuned to Lebanese officials’ concerns about possible future internal conflict in Lebanon and the LAF’s capability to disarm Hezbollah.

Iran

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-run media highlighted in an op-ed on September 3 that the IRGC Navy could confront the United States in the Strait of Hormuz.[xxxv] The outlet argued that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz by sinking vessels or deploying fast attack craft to harass ships in the strait. Some Iranian officials have suggested after the Israel-Iran War that Iran should disrupt international shipping to deter future US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[xxxvi] The Iranian parliament approved a measure on June 22 to close the Strait of Hormuz.[xxxvii] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council has not yet approved the measure, however.[xxxviii] Around 20 percent of global oil exports flow through the Strait of Hormuz.[xxxix] Iran has previously used fast attack craft to harass vessels in the Persian Gulf.[xl]   Iran may have jammed the global positioning systems (GPS) of several vessels in the Strait of Hormuz in May 2025 to create conditions to seize vessels that inadvertently drifted into Iranian territorial waters as a result of the navigation disruption.[xli] Iran similarly used GPS jamming in the Strait of Hormuz in 2019 amid tensions with the United States over US President Donald Trump’s ”maximum pressure” campaign.[xlii]

Iraq

Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji said on September 3 that the Council of Ministers requested that parliament postpone voting on the Popular Mobilization Authority bill until after the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xliii] Araji stated that the law may need “internal and external marketing” before parliament votes on it.[xliv] The Popular Mobilization Authority bill would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xlv] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that is comprised of many militias, some of which answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[xlvi] Dawa Party parliamentarian Aref al Hamimi told Kurdish media on September 3 that the Council of Ministers withdrew the law with the “consent of all parties” due to time constraints rather than political pressure.[xlvii] The Dawa Party is led by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki. Araji and Hamimi’s statements follow Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s withdrawal of the Popular Mobilization Authority bill from parliament on August 27, reportedly due to US threats to sanction Iraq if he did not withdraw the bill.[xlviii] The Council of Ministers, which Sudani leads, approved the bill and submitted it to parliament in February 2025.[xlix] The Iraqi parliament completed its first and second readings of the draft bill but has not yet voted on it.[l] The Council of Ministers can reintroduce the bill to parliament at a later date, despite Sudani’s withdrawal of the bill at this time.[li]

Syria

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reconnaissance efforts along the al Buhamad-Ghanem Ali axis in Raqqa Province likely caused an exchange of fire between the SDF and Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces on September 2.[lii] A pro-government northern Syria-based source reported on September 3 that the MoD engaged a likely SDF reconnaissance team that attempted to infiltrate MoD positions in al Buhamad, southern Raqqa Province.[liii] MoD forces in al Buhamad fired on and reportedly killed five SDF fighters and forced the SDF reconnaissance team to retreat to Ghanem Ali.[liv] The SDF reportedly reinforced its positions in Ghanem Ali after the engagement.[lv] The SDF likely tried to reconnoiter MoD positions in al Buhamad to gain tactical intelligence of the frontline, similar to an SDF reconnaissance attempt on MoD positions in Tal Maaz, Aleppo Province, on August 31.[lvi] The SDF has not commented on the engagement at the time of this writing. It is unclear why the SDF attempted to reconnoiter MoD positions in al Buhamad, as the area appears to hold less strategic importance than the Deir Hafer axis.

Pro-Erdogan Turkish politicians have continued to threaten military action against the SDF by Ankara and Damascus to pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state. Erdogan-allied Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli told Turkish media on September 3 that the SDF must comply with the March 10 agreement to integrate into the Syrian MoD or face joint military intervention.[lvii] Bahceli stated that SDF proposals for federalism in Syria pose an “extreme security threat” to both Syria and Turkey.[lviii] Bahceli accused the SDF of aligning itself with the United States and Israel, which Bahceli accused of “targeting Syria’s political and territorial integrity.”[lix] The March 10 agreement outlines a framework to bring SDF-controlled territory under Syrian government authority, but neither Damascus nor the SDF has negotiated the framework’s exact terms.[lx] Turkey recently pressured the Syrian transitional government to withdraw from the US- and French-brokered integration negotiations in Paris, which SDF negotiators claimed has stalled any further integration negotiations.[lxi] Turkish media have repeatedly warned that a joint Turkish-Syrian military intervention is imminent, likely in an attempt to coerce the SDF to surrender to the transitional government.[lxii]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched two ballistic missiles targeting “sensitive” sites in Tel Aviv, Israel, on September 3.[lxiii] The Houthis claimed that they used a ”Palestine 2” missile that contained a cluster warhead in the attack. This attack marks the first time that the Houthis have claimed to launch a cluster munition at Israel. The IDF Air Force successfully intercepted a Houthi missile on September 3 but did not specify whether the missile contained a cluster warhead.[lxiv] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic “blockade” on Israel in October 2023.[lxv] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned on August 28 that Israel will continue to respond to Houthi attacks on Israel.[lxvi]

The Houthis detained at least 19 United Nations (UN) employees during a Houthi raid on the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) and Children’s Fund (UNICEF) offices in Sanaa and Hudaydah governorates on August 31, according to the UN Secretary General's spokesperson.[lxvii] One of the detained employees is reportedly the UNICEF Deputy Representative in Yemen and a Jordanian national, according to local sources.[lxviii] The Houthis frequently arrest UN and aid workers under the false pretext of espionage.[lxix] UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg confirmed that the Houthis have detained 23 UN staff since 2021.[lxx]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

UNIFIL reported that Israeli drones dropped four grenades near UNIFIL peacekeepers in southern Lebanon on September 2.[lxxi] UNIFIL stated that the peacekeepers were clearing roadblocks that hindered access to a nearby UN position near Marwahin, southern Lebanon.[lxxii] UNIFIL reported that UNIFIL had informed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) of its road clearance work in advance.[lxxiii] An IDF spokesperson stated that the IDF identified suspicious activity in the area and used several stun grenades to “disrupt and remove the potential threat.”[lxxiv] The IDF spokesperson added that several nearby UNIFIL workers simultaneously reported being subject to direct fire.[lxxv] The IDF spokesperson stated that the IDF and UNIFIL clarified the incident via the military liaison channel and emphasized that the IDF did not intentionally fire at UNIFIL personnel.[lxxvi]