Iran Update, January 16, 2026

Non-Protest Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Protest Data Cutoff: 3:30 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Click here to see CTP-ISW’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. CTP-ISW will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP-ISW's indicators of Iranian regime instability.  

The regime will likely tighten security around possible upcoming protest dates due to its fears of renewed unrest. IranWire reported on January 15 that Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani told media activists that the regime does not plan to restore domestic access to the international internet until the end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed in the recent protests.[i] The 40th day of mourning marks the end of the initial mourning period and is often observed with public commemorations and gatherings in Shia Islam. The 40th day could bring many Iranians out in the streets as they commemorate those killed during the protests. The regime has historically tried to block funeral and commemoration ceremonies because they often turn into anti-regime protests. Protests and clashes with security forces erupted at a gathering to mark the end of the 40-day mourning period for Hadis Najafi, a protester killed during the Mahsa Amini movement.[ii] The regime also feared unrest after the end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed in November 2019 and briefly blocked mobile services on December 25 in anticipation.[iii] Protest activity peaked on January 8 and 9, which is also when the regime expanded its use of lethal force and killed a significant number of protesters.[iv] The end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed on January 8 is February 17.

The regime likely also fears public gatherings for Nowruz, the Iranian new year, could evolve into anti-regime protests. Nowruz will take place on March 20, 2026. Nowruz will bring many Iranians out into public spaces, which increases the likelihood of protests. Iranian security forces arrested dozens of people across at least three provinces during Nowruz in 2025 to suppress public gatherings and dissent.[v] The recent unprecedented protests have likely heightened regime paranoia that any public gathering could escalate into mass unrest.

It remains unclear whether the regime will securitize in targeted pulses around February 17 and Nowruz or sustain its current securitization for more than two months. Prolonged securitization would likely severely strain Iran’s economy. NetBlocks estimates that country-wide internet shutdowns cost over $1.5 million per hour, which means that the shutdown losses would exceed $1 billion USD by February 17 and $2 billion USD by Nowruz if maintained continuously.[vi] Extended security force mobilizations also risk exhausting security forces, potentially diminishing their willingness and ability to continue to suppress protesters. Exhaustion in the security forces could be more pronounced if Iran needs to use units for both protest suppression and border security. The regime still faces uncertainty about how the population will respond once some security measures are lifted.

The Iranian regime appears to be concerned about Kurdish militancy in northwestern Iran, which may cause the regime to divert personnel and resources toward border security and constrain its protest-suppression capacity. IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Karami inspected the IRGC Ground Forces 3rd Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Special Forces Division in Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province, on January 16.[vii] Karami stated that the Iranian armed forces are ”ready to respond to any attack.”[viii] Karami's inspection comes after Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated outlet Defa Press praised on January 12 the IRGC Ground Forces’ ability, including the IRGC Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base and the Saberin Special Forces Brigade, to “confront terrorists in any situation.[ix] Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base oversees IRGC Ground Force units in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces and is considered to be the IRGC’s most important guard against political opposition in Kurdish-populated areas.[x] The Saberin Special Forces Brigade is a specialized counterterrorism brigade that fought to defend the Assad regime in Syria in 2015 and suppressed protesters in Tehran and other major cities during the Mahsa Amini movement in 2022.[xi] The regime recently deployed the IRGC Ground Forces 29th Nabi Akram Division to Kermanshah Province on January 8, which indicates that the Iranian regime is treating the Kurdish-populated areas of western and northwestern Iran as priority theaters, where it must simultaneously manage cross-border militancy risks and domestic dissent.[xii] Turkey’s intelligence service warned the IRGC that armed Kurdish separatist groups have been attempting to cross the Iranian “in recent days,” according to three unspecified sources familiar with the matter speaking to Reuters on January 14.[xiii] Iranian efforts to ensure border security will further stretch the bandwidth of its security forces, even without protests, due to the intense securitization the regime has imposed nationwide.

There are reports of a new protest in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 16. Protest activity in Zahedan is unique and may not reflect a resurgence in protest activity across Iran, however. A small group of protesters reportedly chanted anti-regime slogans, such as “Khamenei is a murderer” and “his rule is invalid.”[xiv] The protest reportedly occurred after prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid’s Friday sermon, during which Abdol Hamid condemned the regime’s brutality and suppression of protests.[xv] The regime generally treats Abdol Hamid carefully due to his ability to energize protesters in Zahedan against the regime. Zahedan saw protests long after the end of Mahsa Amini protests in the rest of Iran, even after the violent regime crackdown in September 2022, known as ”Bloody Friday.”[xvi] Footage circulated on social media on January 16 shows security forces increasing their presence around Maki Mosque in Zahedan, which is where Abdol Hamid gives his sermons.[xvii] Security forces’ on-the-ground presence but continued inaction against Abdol Hamid indicates that the regime still does not seek to confront Abdol Hamid or Zahedan residents. The regime may also be exercising caution in engaging protesters in southeastern Iran due to the presence of Baloch, Salafi-jihadi groups that have consistently attacked Iranian security forces.[xviii] A violent crackdown could give those groups an opportunity to expand recruitment. The regime has not attempted to prevent Abdol Hamid from delivering his sermons and has also been either unwilling or unable to shut down his website at the time of this writing, despite the country-wide internet blackout.[xix]

There are additional reports that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deployed to Iran within the “past few weeks” to support the regime’s crackdown on protests.[xx] Anti-regime media sources have cited similar reports during previous waves of protests in Iran.[xxi] An Iraqi security source told CNN on January 15 that nearly 5,000 Iraqi militia fighters have entered Iran from the Shaib border crossing in Maysan Province and the Zurbatiya border crossing in Wasit Province.[xxii] A European military source corroborated the report that militiamen entered Iran, but told CNN on January 15 that only 800 militia fighters had crossed into Iran from Diyala, Maysan, and Basra provinces in Iraq under the pretense of religious pilgrimages.[xxiii] CNN also cited an unspecified “European military assessment“ that assessed that Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Badr Organization militiamen entered Iran from Iraq.[xxiv] This assessment stated that the militia fighters have helped the Iranian regime suppress protests in multiple areas of Iran, including in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[xxv]

The details cited by both the European military source and the European military assessment are consistent with recent anti-regime media reports about Iraqi militia deployments to Iran.[xxvi] Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported on January 6 that unspecified Iraqi government officials were ”aware” of the fighters’ deployments, which have occurred under the guise of pilgrimage trips to the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, Iran.[xxvii] Several social media users also claimed on January 1 and 2 that members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi security service that contains militias backed by Iran, are suppressing protests in Iran, including in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[xxviii]  CTP-ISW observed 13 protests in Hamedan City between December 29 and January 8, five of which were medium-sized and eight of which were small.[xxix] The militias’ deployments, if true, could bolster the regime’s efforts to contain the protests and ongoing nationwide securitization and could provide additional support if protests begin again. Iraqi militias may be more willing than Iranian security forces to use violence and lethal force against protesters, given that they are Iraqis, not Iranians, and lack personal connections to the Iranian communities that were protesting. Anti-regime media have circulated reports about the deployment of Iranian proxy forces to Iran to suppress protests during periods of unrest, including during the Masha Amini protests.[xxx] Iranian security forces notably helped the PMF violently suppress protests in Iraq in 2019.[xxxi]

The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to have begun its assault to capture Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-held territory in the Deir Hafer salient in eastern Aleppo Province on January 16 amid recent US de-escalation attempts.[xxxii] The Syrian MoD began a limited offensive operation against the SDF in a salient east of Aleppo City and west of the Euphrates River on January 13.[xxxiii] A US convoy arrived in Deir Hafer to meet with local SDF commanders, which reportedly included Mazloum Abdi’s deputy, the commander of the Women's Protection Unity (YPJ), and the SDF commander of the Deir Hafer front, on January 16, before departing prior to the MoD launching its assault.[xxxiv] The MoD closed the Deir Hafer humanitarian corridor after US forces withdrew from Deir Hafer on January 16.[xxxv] The MoD has previously closed humanitarian corridors before conducting assaults on SDF positions, as in Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud, Aleppo City, on January 8 and January 9, respectively.[xxxvi] The MoD issued evacuation orders for four locations in Deir Hafer that it identified as SDF drone bases that MoD forces intended to strike on January 16.[xxxvii] The SDF reported that MoD artillery ”instense[ly]” shelled Deir Hafer after the MoD issued the evacuation orders.[xxxviii]  The MoD claimed that the SDF deployed a Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK) commander and a former Assad-era militia commander to Tabqa, Raqqa Province, on January 16 and cited this deployment to justify its January 16 assault on Deir Hafer.[xxxix] SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced on January 16 that SDF forces will withdraw from their positions in Deir Hafer on January 17 at 7 AM local time ”based on calls from mediators.”[xl]

This ground operation will likely remain limited to eastern Aleppo Province. The MoD launched this offensive to remove SDF commanders and personnel whom the MoD believed were operating as part of the PKK, not the SDF.[xli] Turkey has assumed a similar policy position in recent days by taking care to differentiate between the SDF and the PKK, which it has not historically done.[xlii] The United States was also reportedly unhappy about the substantial influence the PKK had over the SDF in Aleppo and the decision to stand and fight in Aleppo City.[xliii] US officials alleged that the PKK, not the SDF, ordered the Kurdish forces in Aleppo to stand and fight.[xliv] Other sources speaking to Reuters on January 16 warned that the SDF-MoD fighting “could” escalate into a broader conflict, but there are no indications at this time that a broader conflict over eastern Syria is likely.[xlv] One unspecified MoD official said that up to five Syrian divisions could take part in an offensive against the SDF in Deir ez Zor Province, but there have been no large-scale troop movements towards eastern Syria.[xlvi] The MoD also represents an extremely diverse set of political actors, and it's unclear for whom or on what authority the unspecified MoD official was speaking. Five divisions may be required in theory, and the Syrian government has presumably created plans to attack the SDF if Shara orders the army to do so.[xlvii] But a war plan does not necessarily constitute an imminent threat. There have been several smaller deployments, but these are not indicative of an offensive because they lack the combat power and necessary equipment to cross the Euphrates.[xlviii] The Syrian government also called on tribal leaders to refrain from attacking the SDF in Deir ez Zor in a statement on January 10.[xlix] The Syrian government would surely want support from tribal fighters against the SDF in order to weaken the SDF and make it defend from multiple directions.

The Syrian government likely seeks to resume negotiations after the SDF withdraws from eastern Aleppo.[l] Shara issued a decree on January 16 that affirmed that Syrian Kurds are an ”integral” and ”authentic” part of the Syrian people.[li] Shara’s decree provided key rights, such as declaring Nowruz, the Kurdish New Year, a national holiday in Syria and considering Kurdish a national language that is permitted in public and private schools located in Kurdish-majority areas.[lii] Shara issued the decree practically simultaneously with the MoD‘s assault on the Deir Hafer salient, likely to coerce the SDF to resume integration negotiations with the Syrian government.[liii] A Kurdish activist noted on January 16 that Shara’s decree falls short of several key SDF demands because it lacks constitutional guarantees for Kurdish rights and fails to address decentralization and power-sharing with SDF leadership.[liv] The decree could serve as a useful trust-building mechanism and undermine the position of some Kurdish hardliners within the SDF, however. Shara’s presidential decree precedes US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack‘s reported meeting with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi that is expected to take place in Erbil, Iraq, on January 17 as part of an intensified US effort to prevent a broader conflict between the MoD and the SDF.[lv]

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian Regime’s Securitization: The regime will likely tighten security around possible upcoming protest dates due to its fears of renewed unrest. It remains unclear whether the regime will securitize in targeted pulses around February 17 and Nowruz or sustain its current securitization for more than two months. Prolonged securitization would likely severely strain Iran’s economy and could risk exhausting security forces.
• Anti-Regime Kurdish Militant Group Activity: The Iranian regime appears to be concerned about Kurdish militancy in northwestern Iran, which may cause the regime to divert personnel and resources toward border security and constrain its protest-suppression capacity.
• Iranian Protests: There are reports of a new protest in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 16. Protest activity in Zahedan is unique and may not reflect a resurgence in protest activity across Iran, however.
• Rumored Iraqi Militia Deployments: There are additional reports that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deployed to Iran within the “past few weeks” to support the regime’s crackdown on protests. Anti-regime media sources have cited similar reports during previous waves of protests in Iran.
• Syrian Military Operations in Aleppo Province: The Syrian Ministry of Defense appears to have begun its assault to capture Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-held territory in the Deir Hafer salient in eastern Aleppo Province on January 16 amid recent US de-escalation attempts. This ground operation will likely remain limited to eastern Aleppo Province.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.