Protest Data Cutoff: 3:30 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see ISW-CTP’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. ISW-CTP will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Iranian regime has sustained its nationwide internet shutdown, likely to disrupt protest coordination and obscure the scale of its crackdown.[i]  Reports indicate that Iran’s internet connectivity has remained at approximately one percent of normal levels since 3:00 PM ET on January 8.[ii] The Iranian regime has historically imposed internet blackouts during periods of major unrest, including during the 2019 protests, when the regime killed around 1,500 protesters in less than two weeks.[iii] The internet shutdown reflects the regime’s concerns about the momentum of the protests and international scrutiny on its repression. The regime likely shut down the internet to disrupt protesters’ ability to communicate with one another and organize protests. The regime has also expanded its use of lethal force to crack down on protests beyond western and central Iran, and the internet shutdown is likely meant to hide the extent and brutality of the regime’s crackdown across Iran.[iv] A Norway-based Iranian human rights organization reported on January 9 that Iranian security forces have killed at least 51 protesters, including nine minors, and wounded hundreds of others since December 28.[v] Anti-regime media reported on January 9 that Iranian security forces killed at least 10 protesters during demonstrations in Fardis, Alborz Province.[vi]

Widespread protest activity has continued to take place across Iran amid the internet shutdown. CTP-ISW has recorded 116 protests across 22 provinces since 3:30 PM ET on January 8.[vii] Twenty of these protests were large protests, which CTP-ISW defines as protests with more than 1,000 participants.[viii] CTP-ISW's protest data since its last data cutoff likely reflects only part of the protest activity that has taken place in Iran since that time given that the internet shutdown restricts protesters’ ability to publish and share videos of the protests. Some protesters have reportedly used Starlink, which is a satellite-based internet service, to send reports of protests to foreign media.[ix]

The protests in Iran may have expanded to such an extent that they are challenging Iranian security forces’ ability to suppress them. Regime security forces in Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province, retreated during intense clashes with protesters and were unable to receive reinforcements due to a shortage of security forces, according to a Kurdish human rights organization.[x] This report suggests that some Iranian security forces may be facing bandwidth constraints. CTP-ISW has not observed reports of security forces redeploying to other provinces, which could indicate that there is not a surplus of forces to reinforce areas with significant protest activity. The current scale of the protests and their distribution across wide swaths of Iran further complicate the regime’s efforts to contain the protests. The New York Times reported on January 8 that security forces fled a protest in Bushehr City in southern Iran due to the large size of the protest, which highlights the challenge that large-scale protests pose to the regime’s ability to impose control.[xi]

The Iranian regime may increasingly rely on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to suppress the protests as local Law Enforcement Command (LEC) forces reportedly face bandwidth constraints. An unspecified senior Iranian government official told the New York Times on January 8 that the Iranian regime is struggling to find a way to contain the “avalanche” of protests.[xii] The official added that the IRGC would likely take over suppression efforts.[xiii] Anti-regime media reported on January 9 that clashes between protesters and security forces in Kermanshah Province killed at least 10 IRGC Ground Forces Nabi Akram Unit members.[xiv] The Nabi Akram Unit is headquartered in Kermanshah City and is subordinate to the Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base, which oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Kermanshah, Hamedan, and Ilam provinces.[xv] The deaths of IRGC soldiers are notable because these individuals are from a military force, not the police, and should be more capable in violent situations. Social media users have also reported that the regime has deployed the IRGC in Ilam Province, although the regime has not confirmed this deployment at the time of this writing.[xvi]

Protesters damaged regime institutions in multiple cities across Iran on January 8 and 9.[xvii] Anti-regime media reported that protesters set fire to an Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) building in Esfahan on January 8.[xviii] Anti-regime media has also circulated videos of protesters burning the Iranian flag and images of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[xix] Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani acknowledged damage to economic and public infrastructure on January 9.[xx] Iranian officials have historically used protesters’ destruction of regime property to crack down on protests and frame protesters as rioters.[xxi]

Anti-regime media reported on January 9 that Iranians are unable to withdraw cash from Iran’s largest bank. This banking disruption, if true, could exacerbate the current unrest in Iran. Anti-regime media reported that Iran’s largest bank, Bank Melli, experienced a bank run and has suspended cash withdrawals.[xxii] Bank Melli’s suspension of cash withdrawals could exacerbate the current protests, which began on December 28 in response to Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions.

Senior Iranian regime officials reaffirmed their hardline stance on the protests and willingness to sustain the regime’s violent crackdown on the protests. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned on January 9 that the regime will “not back down" against “saboteurs.”[xxiii] Khamenei noticeably used more aggressive rhetoric in his January 9 speech compared to his January 4 speech, where he distinguished between acceptable economic protests and “useless” anti-regime demonstrations.[xxiv] Iran’s highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body, the Supreme National Security Council, released a statement on January 9 echoing Khamenei's comments. The council warned that “security forces and the judiciary will not make any concessions to the saboteurs.”[xxv] The IRGC Intelligence Organization similarly justified the suppression of protests as a way to halt “the spread of insecurity” in a statement on January 9.[xxvi] A Tehran prosecutor announced on January 9 that the Iranian judiciary will not be lenient toward “armed terrorists" and will charge protesters who use firearms or bladed weapons with moharebeh (enmity against God), which is a charge that is punishable by death.[xxvii] The Iranian regime previously used the charge of moharebeh to sentence individuals who participated in the Mahsa Amini protest movement to death.[xxviii]

Prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid may be reemerging as a catalyst for protests in southeastern Iran, which would compound the bandwidth constraints that Iranian security forces are reportedly facing. Abdol Hamid stated during his Friday sermon that Iranians believe that Iran is at an “impasse” and are seeking major, peaceful changes to ensure capable and inclusive governance and build positive relations with the world.[xxix] Abdol Hamid also urged security forces not to confront protesters, to avoid escalating tensions, and respect citizens’ right to peaceful protest.[xxx] A medium-sized anti-regime protest, which CTP-ISW defines as a protest with 100-1,000 participants, broke out in Zahedan after Abdol Hamid’s January 9 sermon.[xxxi] Security forces used live fire, plastic pellets, and tear gas to try to disperse the protesters.[xxxii] Smaller protests separately took place in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, for the first time on January 9.[xxxiii] Abdol Hamid was a catalyst for protests in Zahedan during and after the Mahsa Amini movement. Zahedan residents began holding weekly protests after Friday prayers in late September 2022, after security forces violently suppressed protesters in an event that became known as “Bloody Friday."[xxxiv] Zahedan residents continued to hold weekly Friday protests even after the Mahsa Amini protest movement culminated in other parts of the country.[xxxv] The resumption of protest activity in southeastern Iran during the current wave of protests could further constrain Iranian security forces as security forces also contend with unrest in other parts of the country.

Israel’s January 9 airstrikes may indicate that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has had moderate success in disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted at least 32 airstrikes targeting Hezbollah weapons production sites, weapons depots, artillery launch sites and launchers, and other military sites across Lebanon on January 9.[xxxvi] These strikes mark the third wave of Israeli strikes in recent weeks, following strikes on at least 14 Hezbollah targets on December 18 and 17 targets on January 2.[xxxvii] Israel’s January 2 and 9 strikes focused on Hezbollah targets north of the Litani River, in contrast to the December 18 strikes that primarily focused on targets along the Litani River. Israel’s January 9 strikes notably came a day after the LAF announced that it had mostly disarmed Hezbollah south of the Litani River and will begin preparations for the next disarmament phase.[xxxviii] The recent shift in the location of large waves of Israeli airstrikes from south of the Litani to north of the Litani suggests that Israel perceives a reduced threat south of the Litani. Israel’s January 2 and 9 airstrikes targeted areas between the Litani and Awali rivers, which is where the LAF’s next disarmament phase is expected to take place.[xxxix]  The shift in the IDF’s targeting pattern suggests that the LAF’s success in disarming Hezbollah and reducing the threat the group poses to Israel influences Israel’s military activities in Lebanon. The IDF occasionally conducts one-off airstrikes targeting Hezbollah reconstitution activities in southern Lebanon when it identifies threats.[xl]

The concentration of Israeli strikes north of the Litani River is consistent with Hezbollah’s reported weapons movements. Lebanese security and military sources told Emirati media in December 2025 that Hezbollah is deploying its full combat capabilities to north of the Litani River.[xli] Israeli security sources similarly noted that Hezbollah has pushed the bulk of its “power” north of the Litani River and that Hezbollah maintains a significant number of underground sites in mountainous areas north of the Litani River.[xlii] Lebanese security sources told Emirati media on January 6 that Hezbollah has moved fighters and weapons to mountainous areas north of the Litani River, including the Iqlim al Tuffah region, al Rihan, and Jezzine District.[xliii] Israel’s January 9 airstrikes targeted Hezbollah sites in all three of these mountainous areas.[xliv]

Syrian army and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-affiliated fighters resumed fighting in Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo City on January 9 after some SDF-affiliated fighters and a local Kurdish council rejected the January 8 US-mediated ceasefire. Syrian government forces and SDF-affiliated internal security forces, known as the Asayish, began fighting in the historically Kurdish Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods of Aleppo City on January 6.[xlv] Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces reportedly advanced and secured the majority of Ashrafiyeh and Bani Zaid neighborhoods on the evening of January 8.[xlvi] The MoD announced a US-mediated ceasefire with the SDF on January 8, which took effect on the morning of January 9.[xlvii] The ceasefire required SDF-affiliated Asayish forces to withdraw from Aleppo City to northeast Syria between 3:00 and 9:00 AM local time.[xlviii] MoI forces arranged the Asayish forces’ evacuation via buses and cleared roadblocks near Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood to allow the Asayish withdrawal on January 9 but were reportedly attacked by a group of Asayish forces that reportedly rejected the ceasefire.[xlix] A separate group of Asayish forces, as well as the Kurdish Neighborhood Council of Aleppo, also rejected the ceasefire and vowed to continue fighting on January 9.[l] The MoD then designated Sheikh Maqsoud a military zone and opened a humanitarian corridor for civilians in the al Wared area on January 9.[li] The MoD issued evacuation orders for at least five locations that it identified as Asayish positions in Sheikh Maqsoud that it intended to strike.[lii] A Syrian source said the MoD launched ground operations to advance and secure Sheikh Maqsoud on January 9.[liii] SDF-MoD fighting since January 6 has killed at least nine civilians, according to Reuters.[liv] The Kurdish Neighborhood Council’s rejection of the ceasefire agreement will likely negatively impact future relations between the council and the Aleppo government.

Key Takeaways

• Internet Shutdown in Iran: The Iranian regime has sustained its nationwide internet shutdown, likely to disrupt protest coordination and obscure the scale of its repression. Widespread protest activity has continued to take place across Iran amid the internet shutdown.
• Protests in Iran: The protests in Iran may have expanded to such an extent that they are challenging Iranian security forces’ ability to suppress them. Protesters damaged regime institutions in multiple cities across Iran on January 8 and 9. The Iranian regime may increasingly rely on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to suppress the protests as local Law Enforcement Command forces reportedly face bandwidth constraints.
• Iranian Regime’s Crackdown on Protests: Senior Iranian regime officials reaffirmed their hardline stance on the protests and willingness to sustain the regime’s violent crackdown on the protests. The regime has expanded its use of lethal force to crack down on protests beyond western and central Iran.
• Israeli Airstrikes in Lebanon: Israel’s January 9 airstrikes may indicate that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has had moderate success in disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River. The pattern of Israel’s major strike waves suggests that Israel conducts airstrikes only where it perceives a threat and refrains from large-scale strikes in locations where it deems the LAF has effectively reduced Hezbollah’s threat to Israel.
• Syrian Government-SDF Fighting in Aleppo City: Syrian army and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-affiliated fighters resumed fighting in Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo City on January 9 after some SDF-affiliated fighters and a local Kurdish council rejected the January 8 US-mediated ceasefire.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister Fuad Hussein received a letter from Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi on January 6 in which Araghchi emphasized that Iraqi government formation should “support stability and strengthen the [Iraqi] political process.”[lv]  Hussein is the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) candidate for the Iraqi presidency. Parliament must elect a president via a simple majority with a two-thirds quorum requirement by January 28, in accordance with the Iraqi constitution.[lvi] The new Iraqi president will then name the candidate of the largest parliamentary bloc as prime minister designate. The prime minister designate will attempt to form a government.[lvii] The KDP and its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), continue to negotiate over which party will hold the presidency. Iran has historically had closer relations with the PUK.[lviii] Araghchi may have written the letter to Hussein in an attempt to accelerate the presidential selection, and in turn, the selection of the prime minister and formation of the government. Disputes between the KDP and the PUK over the presidency partly contributed to delays in government formation following the 2021 elections.[lix]

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW has temporarily suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of the protests in Iran.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.