Iran Update, January 8, 2026

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see ISW-CTP’s new interactive map showing the locations of daily protests in Iran since December 28, 2025. ISW-CTP will continue to publish daily static maps depicting the Iranian protests in forthcoming Iran Updates.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

NOTE: CTP-ISW will temporarily suspend its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9 to prioritize coverage of protests in Iran.

Protest activity in Iran has expanded dramatically in both rate and magnitude since January 7, including in major cities like Tehran and in northwestern Iran. Protesters demonstrated in at least 156 instances across 27 provinces on January 8, which almost doubles the number of protests recorded on January 7.[i] The individual protests are also much larger than those prior to January 8 and include 60 medium-sized protests (over 100 participants) throughout the country.[ii]

Protests and strikes have expanded to the Kurdish-populated Kurdistan Province in northwestern Iran. CTP-ISW has recorded six protests in Kurdistan Province.[iii] The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-linked Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), among others, called for a nationwide “general strike” on January 8 in response to the regime’s violent crackdown on protests in Kermanshah, Ilam, and Lorestan provinces.[iv] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News denounced the Kurdish groups’ call for a general strike, accusing them of attempting to incite riots.[v] The regime previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in Kurdish areas during the Mahsa Amini movement.[vi]

Iranian leaders have long-standing concerns about Kurdish separatism and militancy in the western and northwestern provinces.[vii] Iranian leaders have historically accused Kurdish militias in Iraq of operating in the border provinces and inciting social unrest. Those concerns grew particularly acute during the 2022-23 Mahsa Amini protests, which were partly concentrated among Kurdish communities that the regime worried the Kurdish militias could try to co-opt.[viii] The regime appeared especially prepared to use extreme force to suppress protests in the western and northwestern provinces during the Mahsa Amini protests, at one point deploying the IRGC Ground Forces to conduct what the regime described as clearing operations across several towns and villages.[ix] The expansion of the ongoing protests to northwestern Iran will reignite regime anxieties about Kurdish separatism and militancy there. That could in turn drive the regime to adopt an especially brutal crackdown in those areas, which may already happening in Kermanshah and Ilam provinces.

The regime has likely determined that these protests represent an extremely dire security threat and has intensified its crackdown accordingly, including by taking the rare step of using the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces to suppress protests in at least one province.[x] The regime used the IRGC Ground Forces to suppress protests in at least Kermanshah Province and possibly other provinces on January 8.[xi] This is a rare step; the regime only deployed the IRGC Ground Forces once during the Mahsa Amini protests, but it did so in Kurdish-populated areas. Kermanshah Province, where there are reports of IRGC Ground Forces activity, has a large Kurdish population.[xii] The regime tends to rely most heavily on the LEC and paramilitary Basij to manage social unrest and suppress protests.[xiii] The regime maintains elite Basij units that specialize in crowd control and repression and activates them when protests escalate meaningfully. The regime relies on the IRGC Ground Forces in the most extreme circumstances, during which the regime tends to approach protests as an insurgency rather than gatherings of aggrieved citizens. The IRGC Ground Forces is the final regime defense against civil upheaval and thus uses extreme levels of force to quell demonstrations.[xiv]

The use of the IRGC Ground Forces in Kermanshah and the reports of casualties there suggest that the regime is approaching the protests there as an insurgency rather than riots or protests. Norway-based human rights organization Hengaw claimed that two IRGC Ground Forces members were killed during the protests in Kermanshah City on January 8, citing Iranian state media outlets.[xv] The deaths of the IRGC soldiers are notable because these individuals are from a military force, not the police, and should be more capable of protecting themselves. It is unclear what caused their deaths, though the deaths of two soldiers during protests indicate that the clashes between protesters and security forces have become particularly intense in Kermanshah City. Hengaw also claimed that forces from the Nabi Akram Operational Division fired live rounds at protesters in Kermanshah City, where the unit is based, on January 8.[xvi]

The use of the IRGC Ground Forces could indicate bandwidth constraints among security forces in addition to a shift in how the regime perceives the protests, however. The rapid expansion of the protests in space and magnitude may have outstripped the ability of the LEC and Basij to cover every protest. The lack of LEC and Basij manpower would require the regime to use the IRGC Ground Forces to continue to suppress ongoing protests.[xvii]

The regime arrested several security forces members on January 8 who reportedly refused orders to fire at protesters, according to a Norway-based human rights organization.[xviii] This is the only instance CTP-ISW has observed of security forces refusing orders at this time. Should this trend expand, however, it could cause major bandwidth constraints that would further limit the regime’s ability to suppress protests.

IRGC-affiliated media reported on January 8 that a Law Enforcement Command (LEC) member died of a stabbing injury he sustained on duty while attempting to contain protesters in Malard.[xix] Protesters killed two LEC officers during protests in Lordegan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Provinces, as well as an unspecified security force member in Malekshahi, Ilam Province.[xx] The Iranian regime could use the deaths of security personnel as justification to intensify its suppression of Iranian protesters and contribute to the regime’s perception that it is suppressing insurgents rather than protesters or rioters.

The regime has also responded with sweeping internet shutdowns.[xxi] The regime has spent years developing its ability to impose localized internet shutdowns.[xxii] The regime has elected for a countrywide shutdown is dramatic and reflects how dire Iranian leaders perceive the situation. Countrywide internet shutdowns precede bloody crackdowns, as was the case during the Aban protests in November 2019. Reuters reported that the regime killed around 1,500 protesters during this period.[xxiii]

The internet shutdown across Iran could severely limit the open-source information available to CTP-ISW. Our updates during the shutdown will likely reflect only some of the protest activity on a given day. Nevertheless, the continuation of the internet shutdown is an indicator in itself that a meaningful amount of protest activity is still occurring.

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly urged unity among unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders on the issue of disarmament during a visit to Baghdad between January 6 and 8. Ghaani’s visit and his urgings demonstrate the continued divisions among Iraqi militias over disarmament.[xxiv] “Informed” Iraqi sources told Asharq al Awsat that Ghaani emphasized the prevention of “internal differences or escalation” regarding disarmament during a meeting with unspecified Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad.[xxv] Multiple prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia members have expressed varying positions on disarmament in recent weeks, even as the militias’ official coordinating body has attempted to maintain a unified face.[xxvi] Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad follows a statement by the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee on January 4 that rejected calls for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm due to the continued presence of US and Turkish forces in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxvii] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxviii] Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, and Asaib Ahl al Haq signed the statement.[xxix] CTP-ISW previously noted the inconsistencies between the committee’s statement and the positions that some of the militias that signed it have expressed about disarmament.[xxx] There may also be splits within as well as among the militias. A senior member of Asaib Ahl al Haq’s rejection of the statement on January 5 indicates that there may even be splinters within Asaib Ahl al Haq on the topic.[xxxi] The United States has continuously pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including throughout 2025.[xxxii]

Ghaani may have attempted to increase militia support for disarmament in line with Iran’s reported efforts to push its larger partner militias in Iraq into politics. Iraqi political insiders told UK-based Amwaj media in November 2025 that Iran has encouraged unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to focus on political engagement instead of armed resistance, possibly to discourage US sanctions enforcement that would prevent Iran from using the Iraqi economy to evade sanctions.[xxxiii] Some prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, have refused to disarm.[xxxiv] Other militias, such as Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, have attempted to obfuscate the relationship between the militias and the Iraqi state.[xxxv] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Spokesperson Kazem al Fartousi claimed on December 20 that weapons are already restricted to the Iraqi state, and the militias therefore do not need to disarm.[xxxvi] Fartousi’s comments ignore the reality that many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, such as Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, possess weapons and are neither integrated into the Iraqi security forces nor answer to the Iraqi prime minister.[xxxvii]

Ghaani probably also discussed anti-regime Kurdish groups operating in Iraqi Kurdistan with Iraqi officials during his reported visit to Baghdad. Ghaani has reportedly discussed anti-regime Kurdish group activity with Iraqi officials during previous protest waves in Iran.[xxxviii] Unidentified Iraqi and Kurdish officials told AP in November 2022 that Ghaani threatened that Iran would conduct a ground operation into Iraqi Kurdistan if Iraq did not secure the Iran-Iraq border against anti-regime Kurdish groups.[xxxix] Iran has historically accused Kurdish opposition groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations in Iran.[xl]  Iran views Iraqi Kurdistan as a rear area from which anti-regime Kurdish groups can foment instability against the regime.[xli] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news called on officials in Iraqi Kurdistan to prevent anti-regime groups from threatening Iranian national security after seven Kurdish groups, including anti-regime groups, called for a general strike across Iran on January 8.[xlii] Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji also discussed border security with Iranian Military Attache to Iraq Majid Gholipour in Baghdad on January 7.[xliii]

The Syrian government secured areas of Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City on January 8 as fighting between the Syrian army and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-affiliated fighters continued for a third day. Initial fighting between the Syrian government and SDF-affiliated internal security forces, known as the Asayish, began on the city’s western outskirts on January 6 and spread to Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh.[xliv] Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud are two historically Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City that the SDF agreed to integrate into the Aleppo City municipality and under Syrian state control on April 1. The Asayish has maintained de facto security control over these neighborhoods since April 1, however.[xlv] The fighting ceased for two or three hours in the morning of January 8 to allow for the government and the SDF to attempt to negotiate—with Turkish and US mediation—a permanent end to the fighting.[xlvi] Syrian sources reported that the talks did not produce any results, however, and the Syrian army announced the launch of a “limited military operation” in the area.[xlvii] Three divisions, including an armored division, deployed to the area under the “Aleppo Operations Authority,” a command room supervised by Syrian Chief of the General Staff Major General Ali al Nassan.[xlviii] The 60th and 72nd divisions—which consist of a mix of Hayat Tahrir al Sham fighters, Syrian National Army fighters, and new recruits—have both been involved in fighting the SDF along frontlines in eastern Aleppo Province.[xlix]

Syrian forces attempted to suppress Asayish mortars and snipers in Aleppo City before advancing into and securing parts of the Ashrafiyeh neighborhood.[l] SDF mortar shelling and gunfire have continued to target government positions and impact civilian sites across Aleppo City since January 6.[li] The Syrian Ministry of Defense issued evacuation orders for at least nine specific buildings or blocks that it claimed were Asayish positions in Sheikh Maqsoud and Bani Zaid, a neighborhood that lies between government-controlled territory and the two historically Kurdish neighborhoods.[lii] The Syrian army reportedly struck several Asayish positions with drones and artillery a few hours later, according to Syrian and SDF media.[liii] Syrian army armor then advanced into southern Ashrafiyeh and engaged Asayish fighters, who either surrendered or withdrew to Sheikh Maqsoud.[liv] Syrian state-owned media claimed that residents and notables of Ashrafiyeh and Bani Zaid requested that Syrian government forces enter the neighborhood and facilitated their entry.[lv] Interior Ministry forces deployed to Ashrafiyeh to secure the area.[lvi]

The recent fighting in Aleppo indicates that the previous SDF-government agreement has been largely insufficient in its current form to integrate Kurdish forces into the Syrian state and prevent new rounds of conflict. The April 1 agreement is a 14-point agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF that stipulates the integration of Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud into the city's municipality, as well as the integration of the Asayish into local police forces.[lvii] The agreement has never been fully implemented, and several significant episodes of fighting have broken out between government forces and the Asayish since April 2025.[lviii] The Syrian government, SDF, and the United States will need to update previous agreements and possibly develop new frameworks to integrate SDF-affiliated forces into the state. The government has now seized parts of Ashrafiyeh and may advance into Sheikh Maqsoud in the coming hours or days, which would complete the reduction of the SDF exclave.[lix] Any new agreement would need to specify the role that now-detained Asayish fighters would play in a new Syrian state, for example. The government demanded the “withdrawal of militia groups” and an end to the fighting, but affirmed that Kurds are the government’s ”integral” and ”full partners.”[lx] The demand that militia groups withdraw suggests that the Syrian government will force the Asayish fighters to leave Aleppo rather than allow them to join local forces, as per the old agreement. US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack and senior US military leaders have continued to work with the Syrian government and the SDF to de-escalate fighting, according to Western and Syrian media on January 8.[lxi]

The Lebanese cabinet reviewed on January 8 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s progress in disarming Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and tasked the LAF to develop a plan to disarm the group north of the Litani River.[lxii] The LAF told the Lebanese cabinet on January 8 that it has entered an “advanced stage” of its Hezbollah disarmament plan and is now focused on expanding and securing its presence in southern Lebanon.[lxiii] The LAF noted that it is still working to address unexploded ordnance and Hezbollah tunnels in the area.[lxiv] The Lebanese cabinet emphasized that the LAF needs to implement all of the plan’s phases and develop a plan to disarm Hezbollah north of the Litani River, which the LAF is to present to the cabinet in February 2026.[lxv] The timeline is unclear for both the implementation and completion of the next phase of the LAF’s plan. Hezbollah officials rejected the cabinet‘s request and emphasized that Israel must halt its operations and withdraw from Lebanese territory.[lxvi] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed this sentiment on January 8, noting that the first goal of his ongoing visit to Beirut is to discuss Israel’s presence in Lebanon with senior Lebanese officials.[lxvii]

Israeli officials are calling into question the LAF’s ability to disarm Hezbollah faster than Hezbollah can rearm itself, irrespective of the LAF’s ongoing efforts. The Israeli Foreign Ministry stated on January 8 that the LAF’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah have been “limited” and added that Hezbollah is rearming faster than it is being disarmed.[lxviii] Israeli officials and sources similarly stated that the LAF’s progress statement contradicts the “reality” on the ground as Hezbollah has not been disarmed and is still present in southern Lebanon.[lxix] Israeli media reported on January 8 that Israel views the LAF’s statement as a signal for Israel to step in to disarm Hezbollah.[lxx] Several Israeli media outlets have indicated that an Israeli operation in Lebanon is not a question of if but rather a question of when, noting that Israel will be required to launch a major operation in Lebanon.[lxxi] These Israeli outlets reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s operational plans are ready and that the decision now lies with the Israeli political echelon.[lxxii]

Lebanese security and military sources’ recent leaks to Emirati media about Hezbollah’s military readiness suggest that these sources may be attempting to discourage Israel from launching an operation in Lebanon by portraying Hezbollah as capable of withstanding an Israeli operation and imposing costs on Israel. Lebanese security sources told Emirati media on January 6 that Hezbollah has begun secretly repositioning combat units and “strategic” weapons north of the Litani River to “absorb” Israeli strikes and maintain its ability to respond.[lxxiii] ”Informed” Lebanese security sources told Emirati media on January 7 that Hezbollah is replacing its overt military and security leaders with ”unknown” officials and adopting a stricter communications policy to make it harder for Israel to target its leadership.[lxxiv] The sources stated that Israel would confront unfamiliar Hezbollah leaders in a new conflict and noted that Hezbollah’s preemptive steps would help the group minimize the effects of an Israeli operation.[lxxv] Lebanese security and military sources told Emirati media on January 8 that Hezbollah is in the advanced stage of ”maximum readiness” as the group has raised its missile readiness, minimized its footprint to avoid detection, and moved fighters to non-fixed positions.[lxxvi] These leaks coincided with reported internal Israeli deliberations over the timing of a potential Israeli operation in Lebanon. Israeli media reported on January 6 that Israeli officials are increasingly hesitant about executing the IDF’s attack plan in Lebanon at this time and are weighing several external factors into a decision regarding conflict with Hezbollah.[lxxvii] These external factors are presumably related to international politics and not Hezbollah’s preparations, however. Hezbollah may be taking some steps to prepare for an Israeli operation, but these leaks nevertheless support Hezbollah’s objective by attempting to insert uncertainty into the calculus of the Israeli government.

Key Takeaways

• Protests in Iran: Protest activity in Iran has expanded dramatically in both rate and magnitude since January 7, including in major cities like Tehran and in northwestern Iran. Protesters demonstrated in at least 156 instances across 27 provinces on January 8, which almost doubles the number of protests recorded on January 7.
• Protests in Kurdish-Populated Provinces: Protests and strikes have expanded to the Kurdish-populated province of Kurdistan in northwestern Iran. CTP-ISW has recorded six protests in Kurdistan Province.
• Iranian Regime Security Perceptions: The regime has likely determined that these protests represent an extremely dire security threat and has intensified its crackdown accordingly, including by taking the rare step of using the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces to suppress protests in at least one province. The use of the IRGC Ground Forces could indicate bandwidth constraints among security forces in addition to a shift in how the regime perceives the protests, however.
• IRGC Quds Force Commander Visit to Iraq: IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly urged unity among unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders on the issue of disarmament during a visit to Baghdad between January 6 and 8. Ghaani’s visit and his urgings demonstrate the continued divisions among Iraqi militias over disarmament.
• Syrian Government-SDF Fighting in Aleppo City: The Syrian government secured areas of Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City on January 8 as fighting between the Syrian army and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-affiliated fighters continued for a third day. The recent fighting in Aleppo indicates that the previous SDF-government agreement has been largely insufficient in its current form to integrate Kurdish forces into the Syrian state and prevent new rounds of conflict.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese cabinet reviewed on January 8 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s progress in disarming Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and tasked the LAF to develop a plan to disarm the group north of the Litani River. Israeli officials are calling into question the LAF’s ability to disarm Hezbollah faster than Hezbollah can rearm itself, irrespective of the LAF’s ongoing efforts.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s reported involvement in Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) President and former Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi’s escape from Yemen will likely increase the growing rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-led military coalition spokesman, Major General Turki al Malki, announced on January 8 that Zubaidi and other STC-affiliated individuals fled Aden on a boat to Berbera, Somaliland, on January 7.[lxxviii] Malki said that Zubaidi contacted Emirati Joint Operations Commander Major General Awad al Ahbadi for assistance.[lxxix] The UAE reportedly sent an aircraft to Somaliland, which ultimately flew Zubaidi and the STC officials to al Rif military base in Abu Dhabi, UAE.[lxxx] Exclusive sources told Saudi media on January 8 that former Aden Governor Ahmed Lamlas and former Yemeni Transport Minister Abdul Salam Hamid Hadi also fled with Zubaidi.[lxxxi] PLC President Rashad al Alimi fired Lamlas and Hadi and placed them under investigation on January 7.[lxxxii] The PLC expelled Zubaidi from the council on January 7 and referred him to the attorney general for prosecution on charges including “high treason.”[lxxxiii] Zubaidi, who recently announced the STC’s intent to form an independent state in southern Yemen, refused to board a Riyadh-bound flight in Aden on January 6 after Saudi Arabia and Saudi-backed Yemeni actors, including Alimi, pressured him to travel to Riyadh to meet with the PLC.[lxxxiv]

Saudi Arabia and Alimi are continuing to discuss the future of the anti-Houthi coalition with STC leadership to sideline Zubaidi and other hardline secessionists and reassert Saudi influence over the anti-Houthi coalition. Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Mohammad al Jaber met with an STC delegation in Riyadh on January 8 to discuss Zubaidi’s actions.[lxxxv] Jaber stated that Zubaidi harmed the ”southern cause” by damaging the anti-Houthi coalition’s unity.[lxxxvi] PLC Reconciliation and Consultation Chairman and STC member Mohammad al Ghaithi affirmed on January 8 the STC delegation‘s support of Saudi Arabian leadership and the delegation’s rejection of anything that harms the anti-Houthi coalition’s unity.[lxxxvii] Alimi, Republic of Yemen government officials, and STC officials also met with UN Special Envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg on January 8 and affirmed their commitment to the Saudi-sponsored southern Yemen dialogue conference.[lxxxviii] Yemeni media reported that Alimi called on the international community to sanction “those obstructing the political process” during his meeting with Grundberg, almost certainly referring to Zubaidi and other hardline secessionists.[lxxxix] STC-affiliated Yemeni media reported that STC Vice President and PLC Vice President Abu Zaraa al Muharrami thanked Saudi Arabia for organizing the upcoming dialogue conference in Riyadh during his meeting with Grundberg and stated that a “just solution” for the “southern issue” is necessary to strengthen national efforts to defeat the Houthis.[xc] The Saudi-backed National Shield Forces announced on January 8 that its units seized Aden, the STC’s de facto capital and the capital of the former southern Yemeni state.[xci] A Yemen analyst reported on January 8 that Saudi-backed forces seized military and government buildings in Aden, including the al Mashiq Presidential Palace.[xcii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See the topline section.