Iran Update, December 1, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Israeli and Arab media have reported that Iran is prepared to expand an Israel-Hezbollah conflict regionally if Israel launches operations against Hezbollah. Iran and its partners may be preparing a contingency plan for this scenario. An Israeli security source told Israeli media on November 30 that Iran is attempting to rearm its regional partners, including the Houthis, Hezbollah, and unspecified groups in the West Bank and Syria, for potential action against Israel.[i] The source added that Iran is in “an arms race” because Iran understands that Israel will launch an operation in Lebanon if the Lebanese government fails to meet the United States’ December 31 deadline to disarm Hezbollah.[ii] A political council member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba told Iranian media on December 1 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have worked to develop an “advanced security plan” to improve organizational structure, enhance drone and missile capabilities, and fortify militia headquarters in preparation for “any upcoming military operation“ against Israel.[iii] Israeli and Arab media reported on December 1 that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack told Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al Sudani that Israel intends to carry out an operation against Hezbollah soon, ”that will continue until [the group] is disarmed.”[iv] Barrack reportedly warned Sudani that Israel would strike Iraq if any Iranian-backed Iraqi militias intervene in a potential Israeli operation against Hezbollah and urged Sudani to stop any militia activities to ”support Hezbollah... financially or militarily.”[v] US officials have previously warned Iraqi officials that they must deter Iranian-backed Iraqi militia from targeting Israel or the United States. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi on November 4 that the United States would act against any Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that interfered with US operations in the region, particularly in Syria.[vi]

Iran’s reported preparations for a potential Israel-Hezbollah conflict suggest that Iran could push its Axis of Resistance partners to proactively fight Israel, despite the major defeats that multiple Axis partners and Iran have sustained in the past two years.  Iran largely restrained itself and the rest of the Axis from fully engaging Israel and the United States at various points throughout the Israel-Hamas War. Iran only partially activated its Axis partners following the Hamas October 7 attack. Iran did not activate pre-existing plans for Hezbollah to launch ground attacks into northern Israel after the October 7 attacks, for example. Some Iranian officials have recently called for Iranian partners to remove this ”restraint,” which may suggest that Iran views its previous approach against Israel as a mistake. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Mohsen Rezaei, for example, urged Hezbollah on November 25 to abandon its ”restraint” and strike Israel for its killing of Hezbollah’s ”de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai on November 23.[vii]

Iran is facing several internal issues and is in the process of rebuilding its diminished military capabilities, which may make the regime hesitant to become directly involved in a renewed Israel-Hezbollah conflict, however. Iran is reportedly facing increased “turmoil” and infighting within the regime due to paranoia over widespread Israeli infiltration.[viii] Iran has also undertaken efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program and its weapons stockpiles and reshuffle senior military leadership after Israel destroyed key weaponry and killed a significant number of senior Iranian military officials during the Israel-Iran War.[ix] Iran’s need to rebuild and re-focus domestically will limit Iran’s ability to meaningfully rebuild some of its partner forces on a short timeline, however.

Some of Iran's other partners, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, may also be hesitant to conduct kinetic operations against Israel in a renewed Israel-Lebanon conflict. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may hesitate to get involved in a renewed Israel-Lebanon conflict because the militias’ participation could have repercussions for their domestic political efforts. The ongoing Iraqi government formation process is significant for the Iraqi militias because it determines the ability of Iranian-backed actors to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests within the country.[x] Iraqi militias could face political repercussions for engaging in a conflict. Some Iraqi parties could decide against aligning with Iranian-backed parties if the parties’ affiliated militias dragged Iraq into a war with Israel, for example. Iran’s partners in Iraq conducted attacks targeting Israel and US military positions in Iraq during the Israel-Iran War, but did not claim the attacks to avoid dragging Iraq into the war and causing negative political repercussions ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xi] The militias’ inaction during the war highlights that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may not be willing to engage in activities that could disrupt their political efforts. External militia operations that trigger US or Israeli action in Iraq are generally unpopular in Iraq.

Hezbollah is also likely hesitant to pursue any direct action against Israel that could trigger a full-scale conflict and disrupt the group’s reconstitution efforts. An Israeli media outlet reported on December 1 that Hezbollah is pursuing the “dual objective” of indirectly retaliating for Tabatabai’s death while ensuring that its retaliation will not warrant an Israeli response that could lead to a “full-scale war” in Lebanon.[xii] The Israeli outlet added that Hezbollah may request that the Houthis launch a retaliatory strike targeting Israel on Hezbollah’s behalf.[xiii] The Houthis may be willing to act on Hezbollah’s behalf in this specific situation due to Tabatabai’s role in training Houthi fighters.[xiv] The Houthis may not be willing to engage in a broader escalation, however. The Houthis did not support Hezbollah kinetically during or after the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024, despite Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stating that there is “complete solidarity” between the Houthis and Hezbollah.[xv] The Houthis instead have linked their campaign against Israel to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xvi] Hezbollah’s continued hesitancy to act directly against Israel, nonetheless, suggests that the group fears escalation because of its weaker position and the inherent unpredictability of military escalation, which could rapidly spiral out of Hezbollah’s control. Any Hezbollah retaliatory attack directly targeting Israel or Israeli forces would presumably prompt a large Israeli response, because Israel has promised to respond to any direct threats or plans to attack Israel with force.[xvii] Such an Israeli response would possibly disrupt Hezbollah’s current efforts to regenerate its forces and replenish its weapons stocks by targeting Hezbollah fighters, military infrastructure, and supply lines.[xviii]

Jaish al Adl announced on November 29 that the group has merged with other Baloch militia groups and will continue its activities in Iran.[xix] Jaish al Adl has posed one of the largest internal security threats to the Iranian regime, particularly since the Mahsa Amini protests. Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.[xx] The group‘s attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan Province have demonstrated sophisticated operational and organizational capabilities. Likely Jaish al Adl fighters killed an IRGC Ground Forces officer along the Bampur-Delgan road and separately killed two Basij members along the Khash-Zahedan road in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 1, though Jaish al Adl has not claimed either attack or any others since October 2025.[xxi] Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, have recently visited Pakistan to discuss bilateral economic, border security, and counterterrorism cooperation.[xxii] Larijani traveled to Pakistan on November 24 and met with multiple Pakistani officials, including Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Pakistani PM Shahbaz Sharif.[xxiii] Larijani called for enhanced Iran-Pakistan intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation.[xxiv]

The Iranian Artesh Navy unveiled new naval vessels on November 29 as part of a broader naval modernization effort.[xxv] The Artesh Navy unveiled the Kurdistan “floating base” vessel and showcased the renovated Sahand destroyer in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[xxvi] The Sahand capsized in Bandar Abbas Port on the Persian Gulf in July 2024.[xxvii] The Kurdistan reportedly carries eight Ghadr and Ghadir anti-ship missiles with a 200-kilometer to 300-kilometer range, vertical-launch Navab air-defense missiles with a 25-kilometer range for low-altitude threats, and Kian one-way attack drones with a roughly 2,000-kilometer range.[xxviii] Iran has constructed several forward base ships and other offensive vessels since 2021 to execute expeditionary and out-of-area operations.[xxix] Iran has sometimes built these vessels by converting old commercial tankers. The Iranian Artesh has also developed a variety of forward-base and long-range surface ships, including the Makran, which was the first Artesh Navy’s forward base ship.[xxx] The Makran carries drones, helicopters, and anti-ship missiles, which enable months-long deployments for out-of-area missions.[xxxi]

These Iranian ships are not likely to survive conventional naval engagements with the United States, but they can support attacks on international commercial traffic. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz.[xxxii] Iran would have to deploy naval mines and fast attack crafts to close the Strait. Iran also sees its naval capabilities as another form of deterrence. Senior Iranian military commanders claim that Iran did not use its naval capabilities during the Israel-Iran War because Iran deliberately held those capabilities in reserve and saw no reason to expand the conflict.[xxxiii] Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani also announced on November 29 that the Artesh Navy will name its next "floating base" Khuzestan, which indicates that the Iranian Artesh is institutionalizing this class of long-endurance support ships as a core element of its future naval force.[xxxiv]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Plans for a Potential Israel-Hezbollah Conflict: Israeli and Arab media have reported that Iran is prepared to expand an Israel-Hezbollah conflict regionally if Israel launches operations against Hezbollah. Iran and its partners may be preparing a contingency plan for this scenario, but Iran and many of its key partners have strong incentives not to threaten Israel at this time if it can be avoided.
• Jaish al Adl Militancy: Jaish al Adl announced on November 29 that the group has merged with other Baloch militia groups and will continue its activities in Iran. Jaish al Adl has posed one of the largest internal security threats to the Iranian regime, particularly since the Mahsa Amini protests.
• Iranian Navy Modernization: The Iranian Artesh Navy unveiled new naval vessels on November 29 as part of a broader naval modernization effort. The Artesh Navy unveiled the Kurdistan “floating base” vessel and showcased the renovated Sahand destroyer in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.

Iran

Senior Turkish and Saudi officials separately discussed the future of Iran-Syria relations with Iranian officials in Tehran on November 30.[xxxv] Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi.[xxxvi] Fidan discussed Turkey’s concerns about Israeli involvement in southern Syria and called on Iran to redefine its relationship with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s government to ensure Syrian security.[xxxvii] Iranian officials have continued to critique the Syrian government since Shara overthrew the Iranian-aligned Assad regime in December 2024.[xxxviii] Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Saud al Sati separately met with Araghchi and Iranian Foreign Minister Special Representative for Syrian Affairs Mohammad Reza Raouf Sheibani.[xxxix] Araghchi told Iranian media after his meetings with the Turkish and Saudi officials that Israel’s activities in southern Syria warrant a new ”regional security structure” opposed to Israel.[xl] Iranian media proposed on December 1 that Iran create a security bloc with Turkey and Saudi Arabia to cooperate on mutual regional security interests, likely but not exclusively referring to countering Israeli activities in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and southern Syria.[xli] A political analyst close to the Iranian regime claimed on November 30 that Turkey and Saudi Arabia believe that limiting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s confrontational approach to Iran is a key factor in de-escalating tensions between Iran and the United States.[xlii] The analyst confirmed that both Turkey and Saudi Arabia also want Iran to reconcile with the Syrian government.[xliii] The analyst noted how Saudi Arabia has taken an active role in managing Iran’s diplomacy with the West.[xliv] The analyst suggested that Turkey views Iran as an effective “counterbalance” to Israel and Saudi involvement in Syria, but still wants Iran to play a “minimal role” in Syria.[xlv]

Iran is expanding trade with Turkey as part of Iran's broader strategy of prioritizing regional trade to mitigate the impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy. Araghchi announced that Iran and Turkey have agreed to build the 200-kilometer Marand–Cheshmeh Soraya railway between Iran’s East Azerbaijan Province and Turkey’s eastern Aralik border area in the next three to four years.[xlvi] Iran has announced several new trade ventures with neighboring states in recent months.[xlvii] Iran has repeatedly failed to meet its transportation infrastructure completion forecasts, however.[xlviii] Araghchi announced that Iran will open a consulate in Turkey’s eastern city of Van in the ”near future” to facilitate bilateral trade and border cooperation.[xlix] Araghchi also stated that Iran and Turkey are prepared to extend their existing agreement on Iranian gas exports to Turkey and that the two states are pursuing unspecified cooperation in electricity production.[l] Iranian media highlighted that Iran should capitalize on its engagements with Turkey and Saudi Arabia to form trade mechanisms that circumvent the use of the US dollar and, therefore, international sanctions on Iran.[li]

Iran’s water crisis is affecting the Iranian regime’s ability to provide electricity to its citizens, which could eventually lead to domestic unrest. Iranian authorities stopped electricity production at Karkheh Dam in southwestern Iran on November 29 because of a decrease in the reservoir's water levels.[lii] The dam’s director stated that the reservoir’s water level was too low for electricity production.[liii] The Karkheh Dam’s shutdown comes amid Iran’s ongoing energy crisis due to overconsumption, Israeli strikes on energy infrastructure during the Israel-Iran War, and government mismanagement.[liv] Energy shortages have triggered repeated unrest in 2025, including a strike by iron market traders in Tehran in May and a large July demonstration in Gilan Province over water and electricity outages.[lv]

Iraq

Iraqi political parties have continued negotiations regarding government formation, including the selection of the prime minister and parliament speaker. An informed political source told Iraqi media on November 30 that the Shia Coordination Framework is seeking a “consensus candidate” for prime minister who does not face objections from framework parties or “regional and international powers,” which likely refers to the United States and Iran.[lvi] The United States and Iran have historically exerted major influence in Iraqi government formation, particularly in the selection of prime ministers.[lvii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A framework source separately told Iraqi media on November 30 that the framework will meet on December 1 to finalize contenders and criteria for the selection of the next prime minister.[lviii] Iraqi media has noted that multiple names have been mentioned for consideration, including Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, and Iraqi National Intelligence Service head Hamid al Shatri.[lix] The framework is also reportedly negotiating ministerial appointments and the appointment of unspecified political leaders to other positions within the Iraqi federal government.[lx]

Sunni political parties are similarly continuing intra-ethnic negotiations regarding the parliament speaker position. A Sovereignty Alliance spokesperson told Iraqi media on November 29 that the Sunni National Political Council recently met to discuss nominations for the position.[lxi] The major Sunni political parties announced the formation of the Sunni National Political Council on November 23 to unify their political efforts and plans on key issues.[lxii] Multiple Sunni leaders, including Progress Party head and former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi and Azm Alliance head Muthaana al Samarrai, are reportedly under consideration for parliament speaker.[lxiii]

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee denied that it was involved in the drone attack on the Khor Mor Gas Field in Iraqi Kurdistan on November 26, but CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have conducted the attack.[lxiv] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxv] A drone attack targeting the Emirati-operated Khor Mor Gas Field in Chamchamal District, Sulaymaniyah Province, Iraq, on November 26 caused material damage and sparked a fire, but did not cause any casualties.[lxvi] CTP-ISW assessed on November 28 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have conducted the attack to deter Iraqi Kurdish political parties from working against Iranian-backed Iraqi parties in the government formation process.[lxvii] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba led a drone strike campaign targeting oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan following the 2021 elections to deter the Kurdistan Democratic Party from allying with Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr.[lxviii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have consistently conducted attacks that they have not claimed, including those targeting both Israel and US military positions in Iraq during the Israel-Iran War.[lxix] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias also have a long history of obfuscating their responsibility for attacks by using facade groups.[lxx] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee’s denial is thus not proof that Iranian-backed militias did not attack the Khor Mor Gas Field. Lower-ranking fighters could have independently launched the drone, or militia leadership could have allowed fighters to conduct the attack without publicly sanctioning it. An investigative committee formed by Sudani and led by the Iraqi Interior Ministry will reportedly announce the results of its investigation within the next several days.[lxxi]

Syria

The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) renewed its attacks in Syrian government territory, likely in response to Syria joining the Global Coalition Against ISIS on November 10. ISIS claimed responsibility for three attacks across Syrian government territory on November 27 and November 28, having not claimed attacks in Syrian government territory since May 2025.[lxxii] ISIS fighters killed a Shia Assad regime militia fighter in Mazraah, Homs Province, on November 27.[lxxiii] ISIS fighters then killed an Assad regime-affiliated political candidate and wounded a likely General Security Services (GSS) member in Hama City on November 28.[lxxiv] ISIS fighters separately killed one Ministry of Defense (MoD) soldier and wounded another soldier in Saraqib, Idlib Province, on November 28.[lxxv]  ISIS rarely claimed attacks that its fighters likely conducted in Syrian government territory after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[lxxvi] ISIS’s renewed attack claims in government territory are likely a response to the Syrian transitional government’s November 10 decision to join the Global Coalition Against ISIS. Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) spokesperson Noureddine al Baba warned on November 8 that the MoI expected increased ISIS activity after Syria joined the coalition, as part of an effort to boost recruitment.[lxxvii] ISIS’s decision to publicly claim these attacks, especially those that targeted former Assad regime members, is likely an attempt by ISIS to portray itself to prospective recruits as a ”true” Salafi-jihadi organization by comparing itself to the government, which most Salafi-jihadis see as heretical because the government aligned itself with the Global Coalition.

The Global Coalition Against ISIS and the Syrian GSS have conducted multiple counter-ISIS operations across Syrian government territory amid renewed ISIS activity. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on November 30 that its forces destroyed over 15 ISIS weapon caches in Rif Dimashq Province from November 24 to November 27 in collaboration with the Syrian MoI.[lxxviii] CENTCOM said that US and MoI forces worked together to identify and destroy the ISIS weapon caches via multiple airstrikes and controlled ground detonations.[lxxix] The GSS also killed two ISIS fighters and arrested several others during two separate raids on ISIS safe houses in Dana, Idlib Province, and Idlib City on December 1.[lxxx] The GSS seized small arms, improvised explosive devices, and suicide vests during the raids.[lxxxi] It is unclear if the GSS conducted the two raids in Idlib in response to the ISIS attack on the MoD in Saqarib on November 28.[lxxxii]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis have repaired some of the damage at Hudaydah Port from the Israeli strikes on September 16. Commercial satellite imagery from December 1 shows that the Houthis filled impact craters at berths three, four, five, six, and seven. Commercially available maritime data confirmed that only berths five, six, and a new berth formed from the remaining sections of berths three and four are operational. At least 33 vessels have docked at these berths since September 16. Israeli strikes on September 16 damaged berths four, five, six, seven, and eight, though berth six remained operational. The Houthis have only made limited repairs to berths one, two, and eight. Comoros-flagged cargo ship Bella A, which Israel likely struck on September 16, is still anchored at damaged berth eight. Satellite imagery from September 20 showed that Bella A was leaking oil or fuel into the port’s waters. Israel has repeatedly targeted the port to disrupt Houthi imports and reduce Houthi oil revenue. The Houthis have repaired each round of damage quickly since June 2025 because the port is Yemen’s largest.[lxxxiii] Iranian ships have increasingly bypassed international inspections since 2023 and offloaded uninspected cargo at Hudaydah Port, according to two UK representatives to the United Nations.[lxxxiv]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.