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The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Some Iranian hardliners are renewing calls to revise Iran's nuclear doctrine as part of a broader effort to restore deterrence after the Israel-Iran War and two years of Israeli military actions that have collectively weakened Iran’s missile program and the Axis of Resistance, both of which were long pillars of Iran’s deterrence.[i] Seventy-one Iranian parliamentarians sent a letter to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the heads of the three branches of government on September 22 and urged a revision of Iran’s defense doctrine.[ii] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa in 2003 that banned the production and use of nuclear weapons.[iii] The SNSC and the three branches of government cannot overturn Khamenei’s fatwa, but they can advise Khamenei to allow Iran to produce a nuclear weapon. The new letter follows a similar effort in October 2024, when thirty-nine parliamentarians wrote to the SNSC and called for the revision of Iran’s “defense doctrine” and to issue permission and provide facilities for the “production of nuclear weapons.”[iv] Paydari (Stability) Front parliamentarian Hassan Ali Akhlaghi Amiri was the lead signatory of both the October 2024 and September 2025 letters. The near doubling of signatories over the past year indicates that calls to weaponize Iran’s nuclear program have become increasingly normalized in regime discourse. An Iranian expert close to the regime stated, without evidence, on September 21 that 90 percent of Iranians support acquiring a nuclear weapon.[v]

Calls to revise Iran’s defense doctrine come as Iran has lost key pillars that it has traditionally used to deter its adversaries, including its missile and drone stockpiles and the Axis of Resistance. Israel has significantly degraded the Axis of Resistance and limited their ability or willingness to support Iran since October 2023. Iran’s proxies did not provide Iran with any meaningful support during the Israel-Iran War.[vi] Only the Houthis attacked Israel at all, and the Houthis‘ actions did not change Israeli behavior. Israel intercepted 80 to 90 percent of Iran’s missiles during the 12-day war and destroyed 35 to 45 percent of Iran’s missile stockpile.[vii]

Iranian parliamentarian Mohsen Zanganeh stated in an interview on September 20 that Iran conducted a missile test on September 18 and said that Iran is “conducting a security test of an intercontinental [ballistic] missile.”[viii] Zanganeh’s phrasing is unclear and may suggest that Iran is taking some prerequisite steps to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile. CTP-ISW reported on September 19 that Iran tested an unidentified ballistic missile at the missile test range in the Semnan Space Center in Semnan Province on September 18, citing Iranian media.[ix] Zanganeh stated on September 20 that Iran had conducted a successful test of ”one of the country’s most advanced missiles” and added that ”even under these circumstances, we are conducting a security test of an intercontinental missile.“[x] It is unclear if Zanganeh is stating that Iran conducted an ICBM missile test on September 18 or plans to conduct one in the future. Zanganeh is a member of parliament’s Economic Commission and previously worked as a representative at the Iranian Central Bank.[xi] It is unclear if Zanganeh would be privy to the details of the missile test.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Some Iranian hardliners are renewing calls to revise Iran's nuclear doctrine as part of a broader effort to restore deterrence after the Israel-Iran War and two years of Israeli military actions that have collectively weakened Iran’s missile program and the Axis of Resistance, both of which were long pillars of Iran’s deterrence.
• Iranian Missile Test: Iranian parliamentarian Mohsen Zanganeh stated in an interview on September 20 that Iran conducted a missile test on September 18 and said that Iran is “conducting a security test of an intercontinental [ballistic] missile.” It is unclear if Zanganeh is stating that Iran conducted an ICBM missile test on September 18 or plans to conduct one in the future.

Iran

The US Department of State reinstated sanctions on Chabahar Port, which is on Iran's southeastern border along the Gulf of Oman.[xii]  The United States exempted Chabahar Port from sanctions in 2018 under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) to ensure Chabahar Port could be used to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction and economic development.[xiii] The port is an important node in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal transportation network that connects Russia to India via Iran’s Chabahar Port.[xiv] The corridor facilitates trade between Iran and regional countries, including Central Asia and South Asia.

Iran is continuing to seek Russia’s help to solve Iran’s energy crisis. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami led an Iranian delegation to Russia on September 22 to discuss nuclear cooperation with Russian officials.[xv] Eslami announced that Iran and Russia will sign an agreement to build eight nuclear power plants in Iran, including four in Bushehr.[xvi] Russia finished the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) in 2010. BNPP supplies approximately 2 percent of Iran’s electrical consumption needs.[xvii] Russia agreed to build units 2 and 3 at BNPP in 2014.[xviii] Nuclear power plants, however, take a long time to construct and will not address Iran‘s energy crisis in the short term.[xix] Eslami’s visit to Russia comes after senior Iranian officials, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad, met with Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilyov in Tehran on September 18 to discuss energy cooperation, likely to address energy shortages in Iran.[xx]

Iraq

Shia Coordination Framework parties are reportedly concerned that voter turnout for the upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections will fall below 20 percent due to Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s continued calls for Sadrists to boycott the elections.[xxi] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Sadr announced in May 2025 that his Shia National Movement would not run in the November 2025 elections and has repeatedly urged his Sadrist movement, which is Iraqi Shia, not to vote.[xxii] Sadr’s alter ego, Saleh Mohammad al Iraqi, implied on September 21 that Sadr would rescind his call to boycott the elections if unspecified Iraqi officials were removed from office and there were unspecified political reforms.[xxiii] Sadr supports limiting the use of weapons to solely the Iraqi state--though he controls his own militia--and cracking down on corruption.[xxiv] A 20 percent voter turnout rate would represent a massive drop from the 41 percent voter turnout rate in the 2021 parliamentary elections.[xxv]

French media reported on September 20 that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with National Security Adviser Qasim al Araji, National Intelligence Service head Hamid al Shatri, and several unspecified Shia Coordination Framework leaders to discuss the Iraqi government’s response to the US State Department’s recent designations of four Iranian-backed Iraqi militias as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).[xxvi] The US State Department designated Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Kataib Imam Ali, and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya as FTOs on September 17.[xxvii] These four militias are part of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed militias that consistently attacked US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[xxviii] Sudani, Shatri, and Araji reportedly proposed closing the sanctioned militias’ ”official offices” during the meeting.[xxix] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government in recent months to limit Iranian influence in Iraq and disarm Iran-backed militias by threatening sanctions.[xxx]

Syria

Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) engaged each other along the northern perimeter of the Deir Hafer salient in Aleppo Province on September 20. Both sides have since blamed each other for initiating the engagements and causing civilian casualties.[xxxi] Northern Syria-based anti-SDF sources reported that the SDF initiated the engagement after the SDF launched rocket artillery on September 20, from the outskirts of Maskana and targeted MoD positions in al Kiyariyah.[xxxii] The MoD then launched an unspecified drone that reportedly struck the SDF rocket position in Maskana.[xxxiii] A local anti-SDF source said the MoD drone struck the SDF rocket artillery position, causing a secondary explosion that killed nine SDF members, while a separate source reported that the attack killed two SDF members.[xxxiv] The SDF confirmed the MoD drone attack occurred but denied that the attack caused “human or material losses.”[xxxv] The MoD likely attacked the SDF with a Syrian ”Shaheen” drone. Shaheen drones are locally-produced one-way attack drones used by the Syrian government and, before that, Hayat Tahrir al Sham and its allies against the Assad regime.[xxxvi]

The MoD told Syrian state media that the SDF later mortared MoD positions in and around the MoD-controlled villages of Tal Maaz, al Asala, and al Kiyariyah, likely in response to the drone strike.[xxxvii] The SDF previously struck the villages on September 10, during which the SDF shelling killed two civilians in al Kiyariyah.[xxxviii] Unidentified artillery then struck the SDF-controlled village of Umm Tina after the mortar fire, which killed between four and seven civilians.[xxxix] The SDF stated that the MoD artillery killed the civilians.[xl] The MoD denied responsibility and claimed that its forces witnessed SDF rocket artillery strike Umm Tina amid mortar fire on nearby MoD-held villages, and a local anti-SDF source confirmed that the SDF hit its own position.[xli] A local anti-SDF source reported that the SDF reinforced its frontline positions near Deir Hafer on September 22 in response to the fighting.[xlii]

Local media reported that the MoD and SDF also engaged each other on September 22 near the Tishreen Dam in Aleppo Province.[xliii] A source told Syrian media that the SDF fired mortars targeting the MoD-controlled villages of Al Saideen, Jabal al Qashla, and al Naimiyah on September 22.[xliv] Neither the SDF nor the MoD has commented on the engagement near the Tishreen Dam, and no casualties have been reported at the time of writing.   

Anti-SDF media reported on September 20 that the SDF offered to hand over several villages in SDF-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor Province to the Syrian transitional government. An anti-SDF, northern Syria-based media outlet reported that an SDF delegation met with Syrian government officials in Deir ez Zor on September 20 and discussed procedures to transfer SDF-controlled territory in Deir ez Zor to the Syrian government in the future.[xlv] The outlet reported that the SDF ”promised” to hand over the ”seven villages” in Deir ez Zor Province in the ”coming days.”[xlvi] The ”seven villages” refers to the villages of Hatla, al Husseiniya, Marat, Mazloum, Khasham, Salhiyah, and Tabiyya along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in northern Deir ez Zor Province.[xlvii] The Assad regime controlled these villages before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. The villages represented the only regime foothold on the eastern side of the river. These villages also act as the entryway from government-controlled territory west of the Euphrates River into eastern Deir ez Zor Province and Hasakah Province. Another anti-SDF, northern Syria-based source claimed that the SDF withdrew from its positions in al Salhiyah.[xlviii] CTP-ISW cannot verify local reporting, but an SDF withdrawal from positions in the seven villages would be a requisite step to cede the territory to the transitional government. The SDF agreed to merge all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria with the transitional government as part of the March 10 agreement.[xlix] The SDF has yet to transfer any of its territory in northeastern Syria to the government as of September 22, with the limited exception of two neighborhoods in Aleppo City that were surrounded by government-held areas.[l]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara arrived in New York on September 21 to participate in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on September 23.[li] Shara’s visit marks the first time that a Syrian president will address the UNGA since 1967.[lii] Several other Syrian officials will also attend the UNGA.[liii] Shara is expected to meet with President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the UNGA.[liv]

Arabian Peninsula

The IDF struck the only remaining fully operational berths at Hudaydah Port on September 16, likely to disrupt Houthi capabilities to import commercial goods or generate oil revenues through the port. The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Houthi shipping infrastructure at Hudaydah Port on September 16.[lv] Commercially available satellite imagery from September 20 showed that Israeli strikes damaged at least four berths: berths 4, berth 5, berth 6, and berth 8. Berths 4, 6, and 8 were the only operational berths at the port prior to the September 16 strikes, according to commercially available maritime data. At least 25 vessels, including cargo ships, entered Hudaydah Port and docked exclusively at berth 4, berth 6, and berth 8 between July 21 and September 16.[lvi] The IDF had previously struck several of the active berths in strikes between May and July 2025, and CTP-ISW observed that the Houthis repaired some of this earlier damage to port berths and facilities in August 2025 during a lull in Israeli strikes after the IDF struck the port on July 21.[lvii] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent, citing an unspecified Israeli security source, confirmed that the strikes targeted the port’s docks in order to prevent Houthi attempts to rebuild the port.[lviii] The Houthis rely on Hudaydah Port to generate revenue and to import commercial goods.[lix] Two UK representatives to the UN also previously warned that there has been a surge in Iranian ships bypassing international inspections and offloading uninspected cargo at Hudaydah Port since 2023.[lx]

IDF strikes have likely failed all berths at the port, inoperable, however. Two of the berths that Israel struck on September 16. Two cargo vessels have arrived at the port after Israel’s September 16 strikes and docked at berths five and six, according to commercially available maritime data between September 16 and September 22. CTP-ISW has also continually observed that the Houthis have quickly repaired damage to the port inflicted by Israeli strikes since June 2025, including by filling in craters.[lxi] The Houthis have still not fully repaired the more significant damage to the port that Israeli strikes inflicted on berths two, three, and seven, however.

The IDF may have also struck two cargo vessels docked at the port. Satellite imagery from September 20 showed that the Comoros-flagged cargo ship Bella A, which is anchored at the visibly damaged berth 8, is leaking oil or fuel into the port’s waters. The ship's location and the presence of fuel or oil in the water suggest that the Bella A sustained damage in the strikes as well. The Bella A arrived in Hudaydah from Djibouti on September 16, according to commercially available maritime data. The Antigua Barbuda-flagged cargo vessel Ak Gary was also docked at the port when the strikes occurred and has not moved since, possibly due to damage sustained to the vessel or to its berth.

The Houthis have reportedly implemented new operational security measures following Israeli strikes in August 2025 that killed numerous senior Houthi officials in Sanaa City.[lxii] The IDF killed Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed Ghalib al Rahwai and several other cabinet ministers and officials in a strike on a conference hall in Sanaa on August 28.[lxiii] Rahwai is the most senior Houthi official that Israel has targeted and killed since October 2023.[lxiv] Saudi-owned, UK-based outlet Asharq al Awsat reported on September 21 that the Houthis have “completely” changed security measures for Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi in the wake of the Israeli strikes, according to unspecified local sources.[lxv] Houthi officials have started to review the group’s operational security measures and recently advised leaders and officials to change residences and mobile numbers and limit time in Houthi offices. The sources also stated that ”official” Houthi meetings have halted since the strikes.[lxvi] Israel has conducted several strikes targeting Houthi personnel since killing the Houthi prime minister on August 28, including striking a Houthi media office in Sanaa on September 10.[lxvii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.