April 01, 2024

Iran Update, April 1, 2024

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

The Axis of Resistance is the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction while others are militias over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

Israel killed one of Iran’s senior-most military commanders in Syria in an airstrike on April 1.[i] Israel struck a building directly adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, killing Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi and some of his top subordinates.[ii] Zahedi was a highly influential and well-connected individual within the Iranian security establishment, having held several key positions throughout his career.[iii] Zahedi most recently commanded the IRGC Quds Force unit responsible for overseeing operations in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories.[iv] Zahedi almost certainly therefore played a prominent role in managing how Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” have escalated against the United States and Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began. Zahedi beforehand commanded the IRGC’s ground and air services and served as the operations deputy at the IRGC’s joint staff.[v] He was also part of an extraordinarily influential and tightly knit circle of senior IRGC officers who met one another during the Iran-Iraq War and have periodically come together in the intervening decades to interfere in Iranian domestic politics.[vi] Other members of this informal fraternity include Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who the United States killed in January 2020, and his successor and current Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani.

Israel targeted Zahedi as part of an air campaign that it has conducted to disrupt the Iranian transfer of military materiel to its proxies and partners in Lebanon and Syria.[vii] Israel has conducted several strikes targeting Iranian and Iranian-backed positions in Syria in recent months to this end, including killing IRGC Brig. Gen. Razi Mousavi outside Damascus in December 2023.[viii] Mousavi was one of Zahedi’s subordinates and responsible for moving military assets and equipment through Syria. Zahedi is now the senior-most Iranian officer that Israel has killed in its air campaign.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance may attack US and/or Israeli targets in the coming weeks in retaliation for the killing of Zahedi. The Iranian regime has vowed publicly to avenge Zahedi and is creating a domestic expectation that it will take some dramatic action.[ix] Iranian state media celebrated Zahedi’s prominence in the Axis of Resistance, publishing photos of him standing next to Qassem Soleimani and Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.[x] Iranian state media also emphasized that the April 1 Israeli airstrike hit a building that was part of the Iranian embassy and argued that the airstrike thus constitutes an attack on Iranian territory.[xi] Iranian and Iranian-backed forces could time part of their retaliation around Quds Day, which is the annual anti-Israel holiday that Iran and its Axis of Resistance promote, on April 5.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a two-week long operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on April 1. Israeli forces returned to re-clear the area on March 18 after receiving intelligence that Palestinian militias were using the hospital compound as a command-and-control center.[xii] Israeli forces killed a total of over 200 Palestinian fighters, some of whom had barricaded themselves inside the hospital.[xiii] The IDF also detained over 500 Palestinian fighters from near the hospital and seized intelligence documents and weapons.[xiv] The IDF said on April 1 that it “completed” the mission and that Israeli forces left the hospital area.[xv] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on April 1 that “the terrorist base in Shifa has been eliminated.”[xvi] The IDF confirmed that Israeli forces will continue to operate in the northern Gaza Strip and "wherever terrorism rears its head."[xvii] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, confirmed that the IDF withdrew from al Shifa Hospital on April 1.[xviii]

The IDF captured several senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad commanders in al Shifa, suggesting that the Palestinian militias were using the hospital compound as a command-and control node. The IDF raid sought to disrupt this node. Hamas and other Palestinian militias condemned the IDF for destroying buildings near the hospital complex during the operation.[xix] Palestinian fighters had reoccupied the hospital between November 2023—when Israeli forces initially cleared it—and March 2024. The hospital treated patients during this period, meaning that Palestinian militias reoccupied positions at the hospital while the hospital was operating.[xx] Palestinian fighters also conducted at least 85 attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital over a two-week period. Many of the 85 attacks were indirect mortar and rocket-propelled grenades aimed at areas near the complex, including its front gate.[xxi] Three Palestinian militias continued to target Israeli forces at the hospital before the IDF concluded operations there on the morning of April 1.[xxii] Palestinian fighters also targeted Israeli forces from inside the hospital wards.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran in the Region: An Israeli airstrike targeted a building directly adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, killing senior IRGC Quds Force commander Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi and some of his top subordinates.
  • Israel targeted Zahedi as part of an air campaign that it has conducted to disrupt the Iranian transfer of military materiel to its proxies and partners in Lebanon and Syria.
  • Iran and its Axis of Resistance may attack US and/or Israeli targets in the coming weeks in retaliation for the killing of Zahedi.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a two-week long operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on April 1. The IDF captured several senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad commanders in al Shifa, suggesting that the Palestinian militias were using the hospital compound as a command-and control node.
  • Palestinian fighters had reoccupied the hospital between November 2023—when Israeli forces initially cleared it—and March 2024. The hospital treated patients during this period, meaning that Palestinian militias reoccupied positions at the hospital while the hospital was operating.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Hamas said that its fighters conducted a complex multi-stage ambush targeting an Israeli armored personnel carrier, seven dismounted infantrymen, and a quick reaction force.
  • Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted a drone attack that damaged an IDF naval base in Eilat, southern Israel, on March 31.
  • Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah on March 30 in Tehran.

 

 

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Hamas reported that its fighters mortared an Israeli command-and-control center west of Tal al Hawa in southwestern Gaza City on March 31.[xxiv] Hamas has claimed almost daily attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tal al Hawa since March 24.[xxv]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on April 1. The Nahal Brigade directed an airstrike targeting a Hamas military structure filled with explosives and a Palestinian militia observation post in the central Gaza Strip.[xxvi]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on April 1. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) and Givati Brigade (162nd Division) are operating in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.[xxvii] The brigades engaged Palestinian fighters and raided militia infrastructure.[xxviii] The forces also detained Palestinian fighters and seized weapons, including explosives.[xxix] The IDF Air Force struck two vehicles filled with Palestinian fighters approaching Israeli ground forces in Khan Younis.[xxx]

Two Palestinian militias claimed that they ambushed Israeli forces in central Khan Younis City on April 1. Hamas said that its fighters conducted a complex multi-stage ambush targeting an Israeli armored personnel carrier, seven dismounted infantrymen, and a quick reaction force. The Hamas fighters first engaged the APC and dismounts before using unspecified “heavy weapons” targeting the quick reaction force.[xxxi] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed separately that it ambushed Israeli forces in central Khan Younis City.[xxxii] Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that the attacks killed and wounded Israeli forces, but the IDF has not acknowledged casualties from the attacks at the time of writing.

Al Jazeera reported on April 1 that the Israeli negotiating delegation in Cairo amended its stance on the return of displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip.[xxxiii] Israeli negotiators proposed a gradual, month-long return of 60,000 people into the northern Gaza Strip at a rate of 2,000 people per day.[xxxiv] The 60,000 returned Gazans would be housed in tents and not return to their homes.[xxxv] Israel stipulated that fighting aged men are prevented from returning to the northern Gaza Strip.[xxxvi] Hamas has made the return of all displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip a major point in its hostage negotiation demands, along with a comprehensive permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip, and adequate humanitarian relief.[xxxvii] The new Israeli stance reportedly did not lead to a breakthrough in negotiations, but an unspecified Israeli official told Israeli media on April 1 that negotiators are making ”some progress” in Cairo.[xxxviii]

Senior US and Israeli officials held a secure video conference to discuss the Biden administration’s “alternative proposals” to a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah on April 1.[xxxix] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi and Israeli Minster for Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer chaired the meeting.[xl] Hanegbi and Dermer were originally expected to visit Washington in person on March 25, but Tel Aviv rescheduled the meeting.[xli] The joint statement released by the White House said that the meeting on Rafah was constructive and that both parties want to see Hamas defeated in Rafah. Israeli and US officials will hold follow up discussions ”as early as next week.”[xlii]

Hamas’ internal security said on March 31 that Hamas detained ten security officers from the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Gaza Strip.[xliii] Hamas claimed that the PA sent security forces to the Gaza Strip to protect aid trucks and that the PA’s intelligence chief supervised the operation.[xliv] The group added that the individuals had ”coordinated [their] operations entirely with [Israel].”[xlv] An unspecified PA official denied Hamas’ claims.[xlvi] Hamas killed the leader of a local clan in the Gaza Strip on March 13 for stealing humanitarian aid and collaborating with Israel.[xlvii] CTP-ISW has observed no evidence that the individuals Hamas detained are associated with the PA.

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 1.

 

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm in the West Bank on March 31.[xlviii] The al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades fired small arms at Israeli forces and detonated IEDs targeting these forces during an Israeli operation in the area.[xlix]

A Palestinian attacker wounded three Israeli civilians in a stabbing attack in Gan Yavne, east of Ashdod, on March 31. Israeli forces killed the attacker. Israeli media reported that the attacker is from the town of Dura near Hebron and was in Israel without a permit.[l] Hamas and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement praised the attack.[li] Israeli security forces searched the home of the attacker in Dura overnight on March 31 and the IDF said that it will question suspects in the area.[lii]

 

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

 

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 31.[liii]

The head of Israel’s National Emergency Management Authority said on April 1 that Israel has stockpiled fuel, food, and medical supplies in recent months in preparation for a wider conflict with Hezbollah.[liv] Brigadier General Yoram Laredo said that Israel has invested over $500 million to boost these stockpiles to prepare for an ”all-out war” with Hezbollah. An official in an Israeli government-owned electricity company said that a conflict with Hezbollah would cause major disruptions to Israel’s supply of natural gas and electricity.[lv]

 

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

 

Iran and Axis of Resistance

 

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted a drone attack that damaged an IDF naval base in Eilat on March 31.[lvi] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari acknowledged the strike and stated that the drone "was made in Iran” and that the attack was "directed by Iran.”[lvii] An Israeli journalist and western analyst posted videos that showed the drone impacting a hanger next to an Israeli warship.[lviii] Israeli media reported that three attacks have penetrated IDF air defenses around Eilat since October 7: an Islamic Resistance in Iraq drone attack on November 9, 2023, a Houthi cruise missile attack on March 17, 2024, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq attack on March 31.[lix] Hagari stated separately that the IDF was investigating how the March 31 drone was able to penetrate IDF air defenses.[lx] 

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah on March 30 in Tehran.[lxi] Abdollahian praised the unity of the Palestinian resistance groups and said that the arrival of Palestinian militia leaders in Tehran ahead of Quds Day—an annual anti-Israel holiday on April 5—sends an “important message” to the region and the world about the Axis of Resistance.[lxii] Haniyeh and Nakhalah both arrived in Tehran on March 26 and have since met with other senior Iranian officials, including the supreme leader.[lxiii] The simultaneous visits of both Haniyeh and Nakhalah are noteworthy, as Iranian leaders have repeatedly emphasized the need for greater cohesion among Palestinian militias fighting Israel.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi called on unspecified “Muslim countries” to work together to support Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on March 31.[lxiv] Raisi also condemned purported Israeli violations of international law and called for greater economic cooperation between Iran and Turkey. Iranian officials and media have repeatedly pressured Muslim countries, particularly Turkey and Azerbaijan, to sever economic and political ties with Israel since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[lxv] ICTP-ISW has previously assessed that the Iranian regime is exploiting the Israel-Hamas war to try to politically isolate Israel in the Middle East.[lxvi]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that it destroyed two Houthi drones on March 30. CENTCOM destroyed one drone over the Red Sea and a second in Houthi-controlled Yemen.[lxvii]

Houthi-affiliated media also claimed that the US conducted airstrikes against an unspecified target near Hudaydah on April 1.[lxviii] 


 

[i] https://fa.alalam dot ir/news/6837463; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/13/3061796; https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2024/04/01/Syria-intercepts-hostile-targets-in-vicinity-of-Damascus-State-media; https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/استشهاد-قائد-قوة-القدس-في-لبنان-وسوريا-العميد-زاهدي-في-العدو;

[ii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/13/3061796; https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/04/01/722889/Iran-Syria-Damascus-IRGC-Quds-Force-Lebanon-Brigadier-General-Mohammad-Reza-Zahedi-assassinate-Consular-Section-Mezzeh-; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/659130/; https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/169045/; https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4195128/; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85432225/; https://x.com/FarsNews_Agency/status/1774875407881302281?s=20

[iii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/659132

[iv] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/13/3061796; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-794796#google_vignette

 

[v] www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/13/3061796

[vi] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/pdf_uploadanalysisThe_IRGC_Command_Network-1.pdf

[vii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-28-2024 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-25-2024 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-19-2024; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-17-2024 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-15-2024

[viii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-26-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-30-2023

[ix] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/659129; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/659133; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/13/3061816

[x] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/13/3061796; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/659130

[xi] https://twitter.com/MohamadAhwaze/status/1774839560783999202?s=20 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/659148/; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/13/3061796; https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/04/01/722889/Iran-Syria-Damascus-IRGC-Quds-Force-Lebanon-Brigadier-General-Mohammad-Reza-Zahedi-assassinate-Consular-Section-Mezzeh-; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/659130/; https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/169045/; https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4195128/; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85432225/; https://x.com/FarsNews_Agency/status/1774875407881302281?s=20

[xii] www dot idf.il/189155 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-18-2024

[xiii] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1774786788881510832

[xiv] www dot idf.il/189155

[xv] www dot idf.il/189155

[xvi] https://twitter.com/yoavgallant/status/1774734396953629035

[xvii] www dot idf.il/189155

[xviii] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/13992 ; https://t.me/alwya2000/6196 ; https://t.me/hamasps/19902

[xix] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/13992 ; https://t.me/alwya2000/6196 ; https://t.me/hamasps/19902

[xx] https://news.un.org/ar/story/2023/12/1127022

[xxi] https://t.me/sarayaps/17596 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1786 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1788

[xxii] https://t.me/sarayaps/17625 ;

https://t.me/sarayaps/17627 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6179 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1853

[xxiii] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1774319462486786368 ; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1773255968496722311

[xxiv] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1854

[xxv] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1803 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1810 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1823 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1825https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1831 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1832 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1842 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1849 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1854

[xxvi] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1774685200175218938 ; https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1774691698603332000

[xxvii] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1774685207670431961 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1774685212120633696

[xxviii] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1774685207670431961 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1774685212120633696

[xxix] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1774685212120633696 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1774685207670431961

[xxx] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1774685216356917748

[xxxi] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1860

[xxxii] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6192

[xxxiii] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2024/4/1/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85

[xxxiv] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2024/4/1/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85

 

[xxxv] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2024/4/1/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85

 

[xxxvi] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/01/world/middleeast/ceasefire-talks-palestinians.html

[xxxvii] https://t.me/hamasps/19888

[xxxviii] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2024/4/1/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85 ;

https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/israeli-official-some-progress-in-hostage-deal-talks-negotiations-expected-to-intensify/

[xxxix] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/01/joint-statement-on-meeting-of-the-u-s-israel-strategic-consultative-group-2/

[xl] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/01/joint-statement-on-meeting-of-the-u-s-israel-strategic-consultative-group-2/

[xli] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/25/israel-hamas-war-news-gaza-palestine/

[xlii] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/01/joint-statement-on-meeting-of-the-u-s-israel-strategic-consultative-group-2/

[xliii] https://twitter.com/KhalilJeries/status/1774514994798858687

[xliv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-accuses-rival-fatah-faction-sending-security-men-northern-gaza-2024-03-31/

[xlv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-accuses-rival-fatah-faction-sending-security-men-northern-gaza-2024-03-31/

[xlvi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-accuses-rival-fatah-faction-sending-security-men-northern-gaza-2024-03-31/

[xlvii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-14-2024

[xlviii] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6178

[xlix] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6178

[l] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/three-seriously-wounded-in-terror-stabbing-spree-at-gan-yavne-mall/; https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1774546946054615525

[li] https://t.me/c/1407249165/3197 ; https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/4398

[lii] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1774728306853581092

[liii] https://t.me/mmirleb/3003; https://t.me/C_Military1/48076; https://t.me/mmirleb/3009; https://t.me/mmirleb/3011; https://t.me/mmirleb/3012

[liv] https://twitter.com/IsraelRadar_com/status/1774686093385818301; https://www.calcalist dot co.il/local_news/article/r1jsrlwjr

[lv] https://www.calcalist dot co.il/local_news/article/r1jsrlwjr

[lvi] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1774655912151527598 ; https://twitter.com/JoeTruzman/status/1774599619043025229 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1009

[lvii] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1774854813328589243

[lviii] https://twitter.com/JoeTruzman/status/1774603552213885205 ; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1774754170832028110

[lix] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1774697380266254530 ; https://t.me/elamharbi/95 ; https://www dot timesofisrael.com/idf-strikes-syria-in-response-to-drone-attack-on-eilat-school/ ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1770171291393253550 ; https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1774655912151527598

[lx] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1774854813328589243

[lxi] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2024/03/31/3061276

[lxii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2024/03/31/3061276

[lxiii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-28-2024 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-26-2024

[lxiv] https://president dot ir/fa/150889

[lxv] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-10-2023 ;

 https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-11-2023-65502ac81757f ;

 https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-23-2023

[lxvi] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-25-2024 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-26-2024 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-29-2024

[lxvii] https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1774523863503667249

[lxviii] https://twitter.com/alsyasiah/status/1774796025242243557 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/48074

View Citations