Congo War Security Review

An in-depth review of activity related to the war in the eastern DRC between M23 and its Rwandan backers and pro-Congolese government forces every week. Map shapefiles are available by request via email at [email protected].

Data Cutoff: November 17, 2026, at 8 A.M. EST*

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Key Takeaway: FRN reportedly continued to consolidate control over the RN3 after conducting an offensive on Bunyakiri town in Kalehe district in South Kivu, despite pro-Congolese government attempts to retake the town and key positions on the RN3. Tensions between the DRC and Rwanda deadlocked the race to lead the International Organisation of La Francophonie at its summit in Cambodia, leading member states to postpone the election by a year. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi signed the referendum law that will allow changes to the Congolese constitution and extend his tenure in power for a third term. The top US diplomat in Rwanda met with representatives of Rwanda’s largest mining company and the firms that market and process its tungsten in mid-November to discuss expanding Rwandan critical mineral exports to the United States.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts

Nothing significant to report.

Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia

Nothing significant to report.

Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie

FRN reportedly continued to consolidate control over the RN3 after conducting an offensive on Bunyakiri town in Kalehe district in South Kivu, despite pro-Congolese government attempts to retake the town and key positions on the RN3. CTP reported previously that FRN conducted a major offensive through the Kahuzi-Biega National Park (PNKB) and on the RN3 to capture Bunyakiri in early November.[1] Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters reportedly abducted as many as 26 people further south in the Kalonge group in Buhavu chiefdom in Kabare district on November 10.[2] FRN reportedly withdrew from Chambombo, Bukumba, and Shanje in the northern Kalehe highlands and redeployed forces toward the Bunyakiri axis around November 10.[3] Independent Congolese journalist Steve Mulindwa reported on social media on November 11 that FRN had advanced within the Katasomwa area east of the RN3 axis front line on the northern tip of the eastern section of the PNKB to around Sanduku, which is close to Cigoma, the administrative center of the Mubuku chiefdom.[4] FRN reportedly retook control of Chambombo, Bukumba, and Shanje in the Kalehe highlands later on November 11 after withdrawing briefly earlier that day.[5] Fighting reportedly took place near Chaminunu village in Kalonge further south in Kabare and was moving closer toward Shabunda district in South Kivu on November 11.[6] Chaminunu is about 10 miles west of Cifunzi in Kalonge on a local road.

Fighting between FRN and pro-Congolese government troops reportedly continued near Kambegeti, which is about five miles north of Bunyakiri on the RN3, and Kambale, which is closer toward Bunyakiri, on November 11, as pro-Congolese government forces continued efforts to try to retake lost positions.[7] Clashes also reportedly took place between a group of Wazalendo fighters and an FARDC unit in Kambageti, resulting in the death of a Congolese army (FARDC) captain on November 11.[8] Congolese intelligence services reportedly arrested an official from Bunyakiri in Hombo suspected of collaborating with FRN around November 11 and transferred him to Kisangani.[9] FRN-aligned media sources circulated videos on November 11 purportedly showing military equipment and armaments that FRN had seized in Bunyakiri.[10] The Congolese government-aligned outlet Tazama RDC denied on November 11 that FRN seized a large military arsenal in Bunyakiri.[11] FRN reportedly took control of Ebisha village, which is about four miles from Bunyakiri on the RN3, on November 11.[12] The FARDC claimed on November 11 that they had halted FRN’s advance on the RN3 axis.[13]

Fighting reportedly continued in Kambale and Ebisha on the RN3 on November 12.[14] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly dislodged FRN from Ebisha on November 12.[15] FRN accused the Congolese government of setting up mobile launch platforms for one-way attack (OWA) drones and deploying large numbers of troops and weapons on several unspecified routes in the eastern DRC on November 12.[16] Fighting reportedly continued in Kambale on November 13, as pro-Congolese government forces continued efforts to retake lost positions.[17] Senior FRN officials reportedly visited Bunyakiri around November 13.[18] Tazama RDC claimed on November 13 and 15 that FRN allowed “road maintenance vehicles” into Bitale and then Fumya along the RN3 to rehabilitate the road to facilitate resupply, mobility, and the movement of mobile air defense systems.[19] Fighting on the RN3 around Kambale reportedly died down, except for FARDC shelling of FRN positions on the RN3 and in Kambale, on November 14, with Kambale remaining under FRN control.[20] Tazama RDC claimed that FRN conducted attacks on FARDC-Wazalendo positions in Ebisha on November 15.[21]

The FARDC then reportedly targeted three FRN positions in Bunyakiri, reportedly in Bulambika, in at least six reported drone strikes on November 15, causing casualties and damaging civilian infrastructure.[22] Clashes reportedly resumed on the Bunyakiri axis on November 15.[23] FRN’s spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, claimed on social media on November 15 that the FARDC air attacks on the RN3 targeted Bulambika and Kambale using OWA-type drones.[24] Fighting reportedly continued in Kambale on November 16 as pro-Congolese government forces continued efforts to recapture lost positions.[25] FRN then reportedly retook Ebisha on November 16 after dislodging FARDC-Wazalendo fighters.[26] FRN also reportedly flanked pro-Congolese government forces and used combat drones to bomb government positions, taking control of Bukondo, which reportedly overlooks Kambale and Kambegeti amid the course of clashes on November 16.[27]

Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly bombed the center of Minembwe town and made minor gains to the south of the town in the South Kivu highlands. The FARDC claimed control of Kabanju and Natulonge villages to the south of Minembwe on November 10.[28] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces repelled attacks from Twirwaneho and RED-Tabara in Malimba locality in Masango village in the Bijimbo group northeast of Minembwe and Mitamba in the Kirungu area in the Bavira chiefdom in the Uvira highlands on November 11.[29] Twirwaneho’s spokesperson, Fidèle Rugabo, claimed in an interview with Radio Umurage, a local Twirwaneho-aligned media outlet, on November 11 that pro-Congolese government forces had continued increasing troop numbers and military equipment, including drones, around Kabanju and Rugezi.[30] Radio Umurage claimed on social media on November 13 that pro-Congolese government forces deployed additional Congolese and Burundian troops and military equipment using helicopters and military vehicles to Kabanju and Rugezi on November 12.[31] Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted air attacks on its positions on the southern front lines and reinforced their ranks with troops in Kabanju and Rugezi using helicopters and military pickup trucks.[32] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted ground attacks on Wihene and nearby areas on the southern front lines on November 15, as clashes reportedly broke out.[33] Rugabo claimed on social media that Twirwaneho repelled the attacks on Wihene on November 15.[34]

FRN denounced a humanitarian blockade imposed by government forces on Minembwe in a statement on November 16.[35] The FARDC then reportedly bombed a school complex in Ilundu and Madegu localities near the center of Minembwe on November 16.[36] The strikes reportedly destroyed nine classrooms and several administrative buildings at the school.[37] Rugabo denounced the attacks on social media on November 16.[38] Moïse Nyarugabo and the Mahoro Peace Association claimed on social media that government forces carried out the attacks using Chinese-made CH-10 drones operated from Kalemie.[39] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media on November 17 that Twirwaneho was using the school to stock munitions and drones.[40] Kanyuka denounced the attacks on social media on November 17.[41]

Wazalendo units attacked FRN in the Kaziba chiefdom in southeastern Walungu in South Kivu. Wazalendo fighters reportedly attacked FRN and clashed with the rebels in at least five villages near Lwanguku, the main trading center in Kaziba in southeastern Walungu, on November 11.[42] Kanyuka denounced the attacks on social media on November 11.[43] Fighting then reportedly broke out between FRN and the FARDC slightly south of Kaziba in Rurambo village in the Uvira midlands on November 17.[44]

FRN reportedly conducted a drone strike on an FARDC position in the Basile chiefdom in Mwenga district in South Kivu. FRN reportedly conducted a targeted drone strike on a FARDC position in Ngando locality in Basile chiefdom around November 11, killing an FARDC lieutenant colonel and five other soldiers.[45] CTP is unable to identify the precise location of Ngando. The Basile chiefdom is formed by the Ulindi River to the north, the Itombwe Sector in Mwenga to the south, and the Luindi and Burhinyi chiefdoms in Walungu to the east.

Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani

Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly repelled an FRN attack on the RP1030 near the Masisi-Walikale border and clashed with FRN separately in a remote area near the RP529 in North Kivu. The Congolese media outlet Actualite.cd reported that pro-Congolese government repelled an FRN attack on the hills of Luola and Chad, which is located in the Banakindi locality in the Kisimba group slightly north of the RP1030, on November 12.[46] Pro-Congolese government forces then reportedly clashed with FRN fighters coming from Kashebere on the RP529 reportedly near Ngenge in a remote area in the Waloa Yungu group on November 15.[47] The Waloa Yungu group is near the border between Masisi and Walikale, its eastern edge touching the Osso Banyungu sector in Masisi. Kashebere is located on the RP529 on the Masisi side of the border with Walikale, about eight miles from Nyabiondo town.

Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu

FRN likely used its positions captured during the Bunyakiri offensive to push into southwestern Kabare district near the district border with Walungu in South Kivu. The group had reportedly advanced on a secondary axis across the eastern section of the PNKB into the Kalonge chiefdom in Kabare in early November.[48] FRN reportedly then captured the entire Nindja chiefdom, situated in southwestern Kabare to the north of the RP503, after clashing with FARDC and Wazalendo units on November 12, although some sources claimed that the rebels encountered little resistance.[49] This included Nindja’s administrative center, Luhago—which has been the location of occasional clashes between FRN and pro-Congolese government forces on the southwest axis—and Cikenge, Ihembe, Muhume, and Irega-Baronyi localites.[50] Nindja has more than 20 villages organized into three village groups. One open-source intelligence analyst noted on social media on November 13 that FRN contingents likely moved south into the chiefdom and the Luhago area after taking Kalonge to the north as part of the Bunyakiri operation.[51]

Major Political Developments

Tensions between the DRC and Rwanda deadlocked the race to lead the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) at its summit in Cambodia, leading member states to postpone the election by a year. OIF heads of state and government decided to postpone the election for the secretary-general for 12 months and keep Rwandan incumbent Louise Mushikiwabo in office during a transitional period at the summit in Cambodia on November 16.[52] Rwanda will not put forward a candidate in the next election in late 2027, while the three other declared candidates—Congolese candidate Juliana Lumumba, Mauritanian candidate Coumba Bâ, and former Romanian Prime Minister Dacian Cioloș—can maintain their candidacies and other member states can submit new ones.[53] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on November 17 that a new ad hoc committee chaired by Cambodia as summit president will revise the appointment rules and is considering options including a two-term limit, a second round of voting, and regional rotation of the post of secretary-general.[54]

The Congolese government campaigned against Mushikiwabo’s bid for a third term in the run-up to the summit and threatened to leave the OIF if she won. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi had threatened to withdraw the DRC from the OIF if Mushikiwabo was re-elected.[55] Congolese Communication Minister Patrick Muyaya told French state media on November 11 that the DRC would “draw the consequences” if Mushikiwabo won reelection.[56] Congolese political analyst Christian Moleka assessed during an interview with Congolese journalist Stanis Bujakera on November 13 that the Congolese government’s strategy was more likely about playing “against Rwanda” more than it was backing its own candidate in Lumumba.[57]

France pressed the DRC, Rwanda, and Mauritania to withdraw their candidates in favor of Cioloș in the weeks and days before the summit. The French delegation reportedly had floated former Senegalese President Macky Sall as a fallback candidate in October, but he turned down the offer.[58] Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe insisted on social media on November 12 that the summit apply the OIF’s 2022 rules of procedure, which provide for electing the secretary-general by consensus, or by a simple-majority vote, which is an option that the OIF had never used.[59] French President Emmanuel Macron reportedly sent separate letters to Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Tshisekedi on the night of November 12 to 13 to ask them to withdraw their respective candidates.[60] The French magazine Jeune Afrique reported on November 13 that Macron’s letter suggested to Kagame that Tshisekedi and Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani had also committed to withdrawing their candidates to make way for Cioloș as a “compromise candidate,” and urged Kagame to announce Mushikiwabo’s withdrawal before the OIF’s ministerial conference on November 14 to avoid a vote.[61] Nduhungirehe confirmed the existence of the letter at the closed-door ministerial conference on November 14 and said that Rwanda would not withdraw its candidate, “even less so under duress,” according to Jeune Afrique.[62] Rwandan authorities denounced the French request as interference.[63] Congolese Foreign Minister Thérèse Wagner responded that the DRC would withdraw Lumumba and consider a “joint approach” in favor of Cioloș to avoid a vote and reiterated that the Congolese government did not rule out withdrawing from the OIF.[64] A Congolese government source told French state media that Lumumba’s withdrawal was tied to Mushikiwabo’s, while Ghazouani reportedly kept Bâ in the race.[65]

The French initiative divided delegations at the summit, and Rwanda characterized it as an attempt to impose a European candidate at Africa’s expense. Jeune Afrique reported on November 15 that the Djiboutian foreign minister told the November 14 ministerial conference that the “best way to maintain the unity of the organization is to respect its rules,” which was a position that the Ivorian, Gabonese, and Cameroonian delegations backed, while Romania, North Macedonia, Andorra, and Monaco defended a consensus appointment.[66] Bujakera reported on November 15 that France, Senegal, and Mauritius were among the states defending the consensus rule, while Mauritania joined Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Djibouti in calling for a vote if no agreement was reached.[67] Several African representatives told Jeune Afrique that Macron’s initiative for a consensus candidate was “deeply disrespectful to Africans.”[68] Nduhungirehe argued on social media on November 14 that a non-African candidate backed by an African state that had withdrawn its own candidate “in flagrant violation” of an African Union decision from earlier this year could not be a “consensus candidate.”[69] Africa Intelligence reported on November 15 that Rwandan diplomats played on “nationalist sentiment” by accusing France of trying to impose a European candidate at the expense of an African one, an argument that the French delegation and some African delegations rejected.[70]

Kagame and Macron reportedly clashed in a face-to-face meeting as the summit opened. Macron met with Kagame on the morning of November 15 and called on the DRC, Rwanda, and Mauritania to “engage in consultations among themselves” to find consensus, according to the French government.[71] Jeune Afrique reported on November 15 that the meeting was tense and that Kagame accused Macron of being “the sole divisive factor” at the summit “because of his own agenda and interests,” and criticized Macron’s “arrogant tone” and his attempt to “impose his views on other member states.”[72] Jeune Afrique reported that the exchange almost caused a personal rift between the two leaders, although France later denied that it had been heated.[73] Macron said the OIF’s expansion “requires us to build consensus to preserve unity,” while Mushikiwabo said the organization’s unity “does not imply uniformity of positions” and urged members to resist the temptation to “bilateralize” the OIF in opening speeches.[74]

African leaders and Macron reportedly made final efforts on the eve of the election to steer the summit toward consensus. Africa Intelligence reported on November 15 that Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye convened a closed-door meeting of heads of state that evening, in which several participants urged Kagame to withdraw Mushikiwabo after her two terms, but Kagame held firm.[75] The outlet reported that Kagame’s refusal angered a majority of member states and that Rwanda was counting on two backers—Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara and Djiboutian President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh—while Senegal, Benin, and Togo moved to rule out a vote and Rwandan diplomats criticized Faye’s meeting as organized under “French influence.”[76] Tshisekedi did not join the talks, but Africa Intelligence reported that he had instructed Muyaya to prepare a statement formalizing the DRC’s withdrawal from the OIF if Mushikiwabo won, which was shown to several African ministers. Muyaya said publicly that a withdrawal was still possible.[77] Macron held meetings into the night of November 15 and 16, staying in contact with his ally Beninese President Romuald Wadagni and Madagascar’s military leader, who agreed to back the consensus push, according to Africa Intelligence.[78]

Member states settled on postponing the election in a tense closed-door session. Africa Intelligence reported on November 17 that heads of state reached the decision after three hours of closed-door talks on November 16.[79] The outlet reported that Wadagni, Faye, and Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé moved for a consensus appointment against Rwanda, while Rwanda’s two main backers, Côte d’Ivoire and Djibouti, kept a low profile and only a handful of states, including Bulgaria, were ready to vote.[80] Diplomatic sources had told Bujakera on November 16 that Mushikiwabo lacked the votes to win, though a diplomatic source had told French state media on November 15 that the race with Cioloș was close.[81] Jeune Afrique reported that the delegates decided to postpone the election as heads of state began leaving the room and that member states approved the arrangement by a show of hands, with Bujakera reporting that 37 countries voted in favor.[82] Africa Intelligence reported that several speakers had called for Mushikiwabo’s term to end at the end of 2026, with a Canadian administrator taking over in the interim, but delegates dropped the option at the request of several African states that argued it would further ostracize Rwanda and sought an “honorable exit” for Mushikiwabo.[83] Mushikiwabo said in her closing remarks on November 16 that she had faced “numerous and strong pressures” to withdraw and that one member state in an apparent reference to France had challenged “at the very last stage” an electoral process that members had defined collectively.[84]

Tshisekedi signed the referendum law that will allow changes to the Congolese constitution and extend his tenure in power for a third presidential term. Tshisekedi officially promulgated the law, which the Congolese parliament had adopted in late October, on November 9.[85] The current constitution, which was finalized in 2006 after a settlement to the Second Congo War and subsequent political transition under former DRC President Joseph Kabila, established democratic institutions and limits Congolese presidents to a maximum of two five-year terms. Article 220 of the constitution lists several “locked” features of the political system that cannot be subject to a constitutional amendment, including the Congolese president’s number and length of terms.[86] Constitutional review also cannot occur during periods of war or martial law, according to Article 219.[87] The new law lays the groundwork for Tshisekedi to seek a third term, as it outlines how a new constitution could be drafted and then put to referendum, as well as how existing constitutional provisions could be changed. Tshisekedi had said in early 2026 that the government could not organize national elections set for 2028 due to the war in the eastern DRC but that he would accept a third term if approved through a national referendum.

The opposition and FRN have repeatedly denounced this process and viewed it as a play for Tshisekedi to stay in power. Proponents of constitutional revision have yet to articulate any governing principles beyond centralized rule and appeals to “popular sovereignty” that would explain how their proposals would achieve the stated goal of stabilizing and modernizing the country, which they claim is hindered by the current constitution. Regime opponents and critics view the proposed reform as a “constitutional coup” that will enable Tshisekedi to entrench his rule and further centralize power under the guise of reform. The Brussels, Belgium-based Egmont Institute assessed previously that the constitution project is tied to ambitions within Tshisekedi’s political party, which was locked out of power under previous regimes, and Tshisekedi’s ethnic community to consolidate power and retain national leadership for decades.[88] FRN had demanded an “official clarification” from the Congolese government regarding the referendum law and Tshisekedi’s recent remarks on the constitution and requested that the issue be included on the agenda for the next round of talks in a November 1 letter to Qatari mediators.[89] FRN has argued that the Doha agreements as based on the current constitutional order and claimed that any challenge to it would erode the trust necessary for their implementation.[90] Martin Fayulu told the French outlet Le Monde on November 12 that the result of a referendum would “inevitably be ‘yes’… because the election results are always what they want.”[91] Several unnamed regional observers and diplomatic sources expressed concern to Jeune Afrique on November 11 that the Congolese government could now equate political dissent for support for FRN, leading to a “wave of arrests” of the regime’s political opponents across the DRC.[92]

The Congolese government now has the full legal pretext to call a referendum. The legislation replaces a previous law from 2005 that was used to secure the approval of the current constitution. The explanatory memorandum for the law describes the current constitutional framework as too “narrow,” with the new law aiming to “broaden the scope of referendums” and give “full effect” to the provisions of Article 5 of the constitution, which states that sovereignty belongs to the people, who exercise it directly through referendums or elections.[93] The law establishes common rules for future referendums, which had already been provided for under the current constitution, but now provides for a procedure to “amend any existing constitutional provision” through referendum or submit a draft of a new constitution to voters in cases of “absolute necessity.”[94] André Mbata, the secretary-general of Tshisekedi’s ruling coalition, told Bujakera on November 11 that the referendum law “paves the way” for a new constitution without requiring one, arguing that the main point of the law was to fill a “legal vacuum.”[95] Religious confessions under the authority of Archbishop Évariste Ejiba Yamapia, who is close to government circles, echoed this argument on November 16 and said that the law “fills a gap” in the DRC’s legal framework, arguing that it “does not amount to a decision” to hold a referendum immediately.[96] The sponsor of the law, Paul-Gaspard Ngondankoy, said that 250,000 Congolese citizens would have to sign a petition to initiate the process of a new constitution that would then be submitted to Tshisekedi.[97] This procedure is separate from the revision procedure outlined in Article 218 of the constitution, which grants the right to several governments actors—Tshisekedi, the government following deliberation by Tshisekedi’s cabinet, or half the members of each of the two chambers of Parliament—or 100,000 citizens to petition one of the two chambers of Parliament to propose a constitutional revision.[98] Tshisekedi would then convene a commission of experts, followed by consultations with political parties and civil society.[99] A constituent assembly composed of members of parliament, senators, and provincial and local elected officials would then examine the draft.[100] Tshisekedi would submit it to a simple referendum vote if the draft were adopted, or the current constitution would remain in effect if rejected.[101]

Tshisekedi met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to discuss bilateral cooperation and the war in the eastern DRC. Tshisekedi met with Erdoğan on the sidelines of a UN conference in Antalya, Turkey on November 12.[102] Tshisekedi’s office said on social media that he and his Turkish counterpart discussed strengthen bilateral relations and the war in the eastern DRC.[103]

The United States selected its next ambassador to the DRC. The Trump administration nominated John Mark Burns to fill the post in mid-November.[104] Burns is a Christian pastor from South Carolina. The previous US ambassador to the DRC, Lucy Tamlyn, had left the post in December 2025.

The UN and the United Kingdom (UK) extended their sanctions regime to FRN. The UN added FRN to its sanctions list on November 11, largely as a formality after the group succeeded M23 and its political branch, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) in mid-October.[105] The UK also updated its DRC sanctions list to add FRN as an alternative name for AFC on November 12.[106]

Significant US-Backed Economic Activity

The top US diplomat in Rwanda met with representatives of Rwanda’s largest mining company and the firms that market and process its tungsten in mid-November to discuss expanding Rwandan critical mineral exports to the United States. The US Embassy in Kigali said on November 16 that Chargé d’Affaires John Armiger had met with representatives of Trinity Metals, US tungsten processor Global Tungsten & Powders (GTP), and commodity trader Traxys to explore ways to boost critical mineral trade from Rwanda to the United States.[107] Neither the US Embassy nor Trinity announced a new agreement or disclosed volumes or terms.[108] Trinity had said in August 2025 that Traxys, which is its offtake partner, had concluded a commercial agreement with GTP—the largest tungsten processor in the United States—to supply tungsten concentrate from Trinity’s Nyakabingo mine directly to the United States.[109] Trinity’s major shareholder, TechMet, is partly owned by the US government through the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).[110]


[1] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/november-11-2026

[2] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120458547901116910; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120432812612342179

[3] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/11/crise-securitaire-le-frn-se-retire-de-chambombo-bukumba-et-shanje-et-redeploie-les; https://x.com/byobemalenga/status/2120522340287099160; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/2120530084859650384; https://x.com/michombero/status/2120533362347495507; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120539213007331548; https://x.com/VolcansLes/status/2120545372401545454; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2120545806180868266; https://x.com/simeonisako13/status/2120547792288395542; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120554882008834476; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2120562804428030374; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/2120574130336702881

[4] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120580453170389302

[5] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120583793710862812; https://x.com/kivuutile/status/2120596469560602774; https://x.com/7uneCd/status/2120599192900870530; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120621404496273469; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120622249203888246; https://x.com/Kivuinfo24/status/2120623219963228354; https://x.com/wakeup243/status/2120625626776211531

[6] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120593826012131697

[7] https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2120423389172990216; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2120432308691878115; https://x.com/michombero/status/2120449370088694079; https://x.com/TheMwamiDRC/status/2120627472899203275; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2120800638665646189; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2120803894687121476; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2120805277419057624; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120843045943808023

[8] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120613133584883863; https://x.com/TheMwamiDRC/status/2120627472899203275; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/12/sud-kivu-le-frn-prend-ebisha-et-progresse-vers-hombo-sur-la-rn3

[9] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120458547901116910; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120468435377570145 

[10] https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/2120461001531314354; https://x.com/byondo99/status/2120476805505159389; https://x.com/Katsuva_R/status/2120496817884234036

[11] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2120582974378827894

[12] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120522689710547353; https://x.com/kivunewstoday/status/2120523700936003651; https://x.com/RutegaBin/status/2120541921651073164; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120549974043942933; https://x.com/byuku_senge/status/2120552076988305875; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/2120557572545479019; https://x.com/wakeup243/status/2120569939992207683; https://x.com/Kivuinfo24/status/2120589057931526648; https://x.com/byondo99/status/2120601757231505772; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/12/sud-kivu-le-frn-prend-ebisha-et-progresse-vers-hombo-sur-la-rn3

[13] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/12/est-de-la-rdc-alors-que-les-combats-sintensifient-sur-differents-fronts-les-fardc; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2120590006477525481; https://x.com/7sur7_cd/status/2120604303610278148; https://x.com/FARDC_Info/status/2120605405369815292 

[14] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2120812052503523714; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2120834138408157677; https://x.com/michombero/status/2120816821360353460; https://x.com/michombero/status/2120816821360353460; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/12/kalehe-larmee-mene-une-offensive-contre-les-rebelles-du-frn-pour-tenter-de-reconquerir; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/12/est-de-la-rdc-alors-que-les-combats-sintensifient-sur-differents-fronts-les-fardc

[15] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2120845078998532452; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2120848734170800182; https://x.com/JulesMNational/status/2120850313984848114; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120850366266748990; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2120850923807232398; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2120857458478371190; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2120858016811512060; https://x.com/michombero/status/2120858832922394693; https://x.com/PatrickLokala_/status/2120961326185071020; https://x.com/DRCNewsToday/status/2120977229865718161; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120902824846311562; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2121111480707801234; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/13/sud-kivu-violents-combats-entre-les-fardc-et-le-frn-a-kambali-sur-laxe-bunyakiri

[16] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120880499094929744; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2121155309443903728

[17] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2121111480707801234; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2121262318621184054; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2121135304954262010; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2121143838605537661; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2121168933143351469; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/13/sud-kivu-deuxieme-journee-des-combats-entre-le-frn-et-les-fardc-kambali-pres-de; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2121241757325090831; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/13/sud-kivu-violents-combats-entre-les-fardc-et-le-frn-a-kambali-sur-laxe-bunyakiri 

[18] https://x.com/byuku_senge/status/2121199559045238826

[19] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2121310488327750036; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2121954708596150395; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2122233382645952991

[20] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2121616275046576459; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2121631785473703973; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/14/kalehe-accalmie-precaire-kambali-apres-deux-jours-de-violents-combats-entre-larmee-et; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2121954708596150395

[21] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2121954708596150395

[22] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2121954708596150395; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2121956464080060799; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2121961465351479636; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2121967131948380252; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2122029611391549592; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2122034220386197729; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2122056166716916048; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2122231747555336413; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2122234395528466784; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2122054760362877272; https://x.com/Newsupdateer/status/2122386241765388686; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2122392328996565405; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2122393019311915329; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/16/kalehe-des-frappes-aeriennes-des-fardc-visent-trois-positions-du-frn-bulambika; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/16/sud-kivu-plusieurs-degats-causes-par-les-frappes-de-drones-des-fardc-a-bunyakiri

[23] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2121969235702206643; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2122047114767225081; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/16/sud-kivu-plusieurs-degats-causes-par-les-frappes-de-drones-des-fardc-a-bunyakiri

[24] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2122082616967131362; https://x.com/kivunewstoday/status/2122189055546843589; https://x.com/KambaleTsongoR/status/2122193180653228336

[25] https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2122261282648682940; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2122276564951781669; https://x.com/ReelActu/status/2122315101743219102; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2122339945293496817; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/16/kalehe-nouveaux-combats-kambali-les-fardc-tentent-de-reprendre-les-zones-perdues; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/17/est-de-la-rdc-dans-le-kalehe-le-frn-sempare-de-la-colline-strategique-de-bukondo-apres; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/16/sud-kivu-violents-combats-entre-le-frn-et-les-fardc-a-bunyakiri

[26] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2122408097503461808; https://x.com/ReynoldsButari/status/2122423295827947949; https://x.com/MeckyKayiranga/status/2122587233655898139; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2122418316149158209

[27] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/17/est-de-la-rdc-dans-le-kalehe-le-frn-sempare-de-la-colline-strategique-de-bukondo-apres

[28] https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2120221650851692855; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2120257313286037582; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2120370332926099865; https://x.com/michombero/status/2120439312835838395; https://x.com/DRCNewsToday/status/2120479831863271732; https://x.com/Newsupdateer/status/2120578130104782915; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120584833780916474; https://x.com/Watch_FARDC/status/2121627572052091086

[29] https://x.com/michombero/status/2120449370088694079; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2120582974378827894

[30] https://x.com/MulengeMediaNet/status/2120757036103164384

[31] https://x.com/ORuhumuriza/status/2121439824351518816

[32] https://x.com/Fidelrugabo/status/2121479092423856512

[33] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2121885061939077595; https://x.com/kivunewstoday/status/2121892430848950534; https://x.com/michombero/status/2121985030989779182; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2122034220386197729

[34] https://x.com/Fidelrugabo/status/2121943204735885713

[35] https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2122351702334423146; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2122382815698497955; https://x.com/RenovatioMarxn/status/2122420308963398027; https://x.com/ORuhumuriza/status/2122513813748527216

[36] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2122404244955582662; https://x.com/TWIRWANEHOMOI/status/2122408200016420975; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2122412702106550350; https://x.com/MoiseNyarugabo/status/2122529163579982226; https://x.com/MulengeMediaNet/status/212257157521174944; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2122572410104758705; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2122587844338499773; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/17/minembwe-des-bombardements-des-fardc-font-des-victimes-civiles 

[37] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/17/frappe-de-drone-minembwe-neuf-salles-de-classe-et-plusieurs-infrastructures; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/17/fizi-des-bombardements-des-fardc-detruisent-les-infrastructures-de-base-minembwe; https://radiomaendeleo dot org/fizi-neuf-salles-de-classe-detruites-par-un-bombardement-au-complexe-scolaire-isoko-a-minembwe; https://www.sosmediasburundi dot org/2026/11/17/rdc-une-ecole-detruite-par-des-bombardements-attribues-aux-fardc-a-minembwe-738-eleves-prives-de-cours 

[38] https://x.com/Fidelrugabo/status/2122403388432290149; https://x.com/Fidelrugabo/status/2122556403537600876

[39] https://x.com/MoiseNyarugabo/status/2122529163579982226; https://x.com/MulengeMediaNet/status/2122571575211749442

[40] https://x.com/congotask/status/2122597568039551467; https://x.com/congotask/status/2122599559285047450; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2122604128706744607; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2122605235369558092; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2122618673454096457; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2122619527468859774; https://x.com/JulesMNational/status/2122621153910911128; https://x.com/congotask/status/2122634039832318457; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2122635818216878214

[41] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2122620457698443709

[42] https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2120381902422958461; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/11/sud-kivu-combats-intenses-entre-le-frn-et-les-fardc-sur-plusieurs-fronts; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/11/sud-kivu-violents-combats-a-kaziba-entre-le-frn-et-les-fardc; https://x.com/michombero/status/2120449370088694079; https://x.com/VolcansLes/status/2120450803227926909; https://x.com/maendeleo_radio/status/2120459719294812485; https://x.com/VolcansLes/status/2120469679940788327; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2120486297361920334; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120491741706858803; https://x.com/byobemalenga/status/2120499366855094595; https://x.com/Newsupdateer/status/2120578238208786625; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2120613343803441539; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2120850923807232398; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2120425140185948505; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/11/sud-kivu-reprise-des-combats-sur-laxe-kaziba-rurambo

[43] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2120511581586927652

[44] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/17/hauts-plateaux-duvira-affrontements-violents-entre-frn-et-fardc-rurambo

[45] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120440359608074401; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2121114521368707187; https://x.com/byondo99/status/2121156972041162807; https://x.com/Kivuinfo24/status/2121159997404901451; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/11/sud-kivu-combats-intenses-entre-le-frn-et-les-fardc-sur-plusieurs-fronts; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/11/sud-kivu-violents-combats-a-kaziba-entre-le-frn-et-les-fardc

[46] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/13/walikale-larmee-repousse-une-nouvelle-attaque-du-frn-sur-les-collines-de-luola-et-tchad; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2121177644842504562

[47] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/16/walikale-une-offensive-du-frn-dejouee-par-larmee-entre-habula-et-ngenge-dans-le; https://x.com/michombero/status/2122317671219744900

[48] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/november-11-2026

[49] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2121227082050982128; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2121231193068716192; https://x.com/Hastalavista364/status/2121235763949895681; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2121236016698736831; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/2121236069387579759; https://x.com/Hastalavista364/status/2121245454885109928; https://x.com/MeckyKayiranga/status/2121250684217774429; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2121256145893343744; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2121256460311011675; https://x.com/RutegaBin/status/2121270330001924332; https://x.com/byondo99/status/2121271254468481456; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2121238955626512513; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2121241757325090831; https://x.com/michombero/status/2121282244559917279; https://x.com/byobemalenga/status/2121343702916645110; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/13/au-sud-kivu-les-rebelles-du-frn-semparent-de-ninja-derniere-chefferie-du-territoire-de

[50] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2121241757325090831

[51] https://x.com/ReynoldsButari/status/2121221081532936340

[52] https://x.com/OIFrancophonie/status/2121775571730600338; https://x.com/OIFrancophonie/status/2121843554561741291; https://x.com/RDC_Minafet/status/2122265734789165261; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2122235999170252845; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2122300847770017794; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861844/politique/oif-louise-mushikiwabo-reconduite-pour-un-an-son-depart-desormais-programme; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2026/11/16/l-election-du-secretaire-general-de-l-organisation-internationale-de-la-francophonie-reportee-d-un-an_6811682_3212.html; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261116-francophonie-faute-de-consensus-l-oif-reporte-d-un-an-l-%C3%A9lection-du-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/17/oif-survives-showdown-but-leadership-battle-is-far-from-over,110931746-art

[53] https://x.com/RDC_Minafet/status/2122265734789165261; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2122235999170252845; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2122247365922853151; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861844/politique/oif-louise-mushikiwabo-reconduite-pour-un-an-son-depart-desormais-programme; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/17/oif-survives-showdown-but-leadership-battle-is-far-from-over,110931746-art

[54] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/17/oif-survives-showdown-but-leadership-battle-is-far-from-over,110931746-art

[55] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861691/politique/exclusif-oif-emmanuel-macron-a-demande-a-paul-kagame-de-retirer-la-candidature-de-louise-mushikiwabo; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261111-oif-conflit-rdc-rwanda-contestation-interne-%C3%A9lection-sous-tension; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/12/denis-sassou-nguesso-brice-clotaire-oligui-nguema-paul-biya,110919119-art

[56] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261111-oif-conflit-rdc-rwanda-contestation-interne-%C3%A9lection-sous-tension

[57] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2121330617245708601

[58] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861691/politique/exclusif-oif-emmanuel-macron-a-demande-a-paul-kagame-de-retirer-la-candidature-de-louise-mushikiwabo; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/17/oif-survives-showdown-but-leadership-battle-is-far-from-over,110931746-art

[59] https://x.com/onduhungirehe/status/2120922940887969855; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261111-oif-conflit-rdc-rwanda-contestation-interne-%C3%A9lection-sous-tension; https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/11/15/somment-de-la-francophonie-emmanuel-macron-appelle-a-l-unite-et-au-consensus-face-aux-tensions-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda_6810995_3210.html; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame

[60] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861691/politique/exclusif-oif-emmanuel-macron-a-demande-a-paul-kagame-de-retirer-la-candidature-de-louise-mushikiwabo; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861844/politique/oif-louise-mushikiwabo-reconduite-pour-un-an-son-depart-desormais-programme; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261115-francophonie-%C3%A0-phnom-penh-derni%C3%A8res-tractations-avant-la-d%C3%A9signation-du-prochain-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/faye-calls-last-ditch-francophonie-talks-to-avert-collapse,110931026-art; https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/11/15/somment-de-la-francophonie-emmanuel-macron-appelle-a-l-unite-et-au-consensus-face-aux-tensions-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda_6810995_3210.html; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2121552836399923489

[61] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861691/politique/exclusif-oif-emmanuel-macron-a-demande-a-paul-kagame-de-retirer-la-candidature-de-louise-mushikiwabo

[62] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame

[63] https://x.com/rbarwanda/status/2121547749728403854; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2121552836399923489; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2121560660605571560; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/faye-calls-last-ditch-francophonie-talks-to-avert-collapse,110931026-art; https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/11/15/somment-de-la-francophonie-emmanuel-macron-appelle-a-l-unite-et-au-consensus-face-aux-tensions-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda_6810995_3210.html

[64] https://x.com/RDC_Minafet/status/2121534821746757934; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2121568860469907836; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame; https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/11/15/somment-de-la-francophonie-emmanuel-macron-appelle-a-l-unite-et-au-consensus-face-aux-tensions-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda_6810995_3210.html; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261115-francophonie-%C3%A0-phnom-penh-derni%C3%A8res-tractations-avant-la-d%C3%A9signation-du-prochain-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral

[65] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261115-francophonie-%C3%A0-phnom-penh-derni%C3%A8res-tractations-avant-la-d%C3%A9signation-du-prochain-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/faye-calls-last-ditch-francophonie-talks-to-avert-collapse,110931026-art

[66] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame

[67] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2122035374775992752

[68] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261115-francophonie-%C3%A0-phnom-penh-derni%C3%A8res-tractations-avant-la-d%C3%A9signation-du-prochain-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral

[69] https://x.com/onduhungirehe/status/2121650954919608403

[70] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/faye-calls-last-ditch-francophonie-talks-to-avert-collapse,110931026-art

[71] https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/11/15/somment-de-la-francophonie-emmanuel-macron-appelle-a-l-unite-et-au-consensus-face-aux-tensions-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda_6810995_3210.html; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261115-francophonie-%C3%A0-phnom-penh-derni%C3%A8res-tractations-avant-la-d%C3%A9signation-du-prochain-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame

[72] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame

[73] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861844/politique/oif-louise-mushikiwabo-reconduite-pour-un-an-son-depart-desormais-programme

[74] https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/11/15/somment-de-la-francophonie-emmanuel-macron-appelle-a-l-unite-et-au-consensus-face-aux-tensions-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda_6810995_3210.html; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2121794933677814069; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2121801713363353722

[75] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/faye-calls-last-ditch-francophonie-talks-to-avert-collapse,110931026-art; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/tense-talks-leave-oif-leadership-race-unresolved,110931137-art

[76] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/faye-calls-last-ditch-francophonie-talks-to-avert-collapse,110931026-art; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/tense-talks-leave-oif-leadership-race-unresolved,110931137-art

[77] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/faye-calls-last-ditch-francophonie-talks-to-avert-collapse,110931026-art; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/tense-talks-leave-oif-leadership-race-unresolved,110931137-art; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261115-francophonie-%C3%A0-phnom-penh-derni%C3%A8res-tractations-avant-la-d%C3%A9signation-du-prochain-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral

[78] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/17/oif-survives-showdown-but-leadership-battle-is-far-from-over,110931746-art

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[81] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2122171774704001285; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261115-francophonie-%C3%A0-phnom-penh-derni%C3%A8res-tractations-avant-la-d%C3%A9signation-du-prochain-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral

[82] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861844/politique/oif-louise-mushikiwabo-reconduite-pour-un-an-son-depart-desormais-programme; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2122247365922853151

[83] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/17/oif-survives-showdown-but-leadership-battle-is-far-from-over,110931746-art

[84] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861844/politique/oif-louise-mushikiwabo-reconduite-pour-un-an-son-depart-desormais-programme; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2026/11/16/l-election-du-secretaire-general-de-l-organisation-internationale-de-la-francophonie-reportee-d-un-an_6811682_3212.html; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261116-francophonie-faute-de-consensus-l-oif-reporte-d-un-an-l-%C3%A9lection-du-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral

[85] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2120271311104577804; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2120394418138104175; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congolese-president-signs-contested-referendum-law-amid-fears-over-third-term-2026-11-11; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261111-rdc-promulgation-de-la-loi-sur-l-organisation-du-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-ce-que-cela-peut-changer; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-11-11/congo-president-enacts-law-that-lays-ground-to-extend-his-tenure; https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/11/12/en-rdc-felix-tshisekedi-promulgue-une-loi-controversee-qui-lui-ouvre-la-voie-a-un-troisieme-mandat_6809048_3210.html; https://x.com/AssembleeNatRDC/status/2113734485015494999; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2113669055106183429

[86] https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/DRC%20-%20Congo%20Constitution.pdf

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[88] https://egmontinstitute.be/app/uploads/2024/12/Erik-Kennes_Paper_128.pdf?type=pdf; https://www.dw.com/fr/rdc-n%C3%A9h%C3%A9mie-mwilanya-f%C3%A9lix-tshisekedi-joseph-kabila/a-77100843

[89] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/06/doha-le-frn-de-joseph-kabila-saisit-la-mediation-qatarie-contre-le-projet-de-changement; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2118635380761079883; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261106-constitution-en-rdc-le-groupe-politico-militaire-frn-veut-une-clarification-du-pouvoir-lors-des-discussions-de-doha

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[92] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1860740/politique/rdc-felix-tshisekedi-promulgue-une-loi-ouvrant-la-voie-a-un-changement-de-constitution 

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[94] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261111-rdc-promulgation-de-la-loi-sur-l-organisation-du-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-ce-que-cela-peut-changer; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2120271311104577804

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[96] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2122318417277362437; https://www.dw.com/fr/rdc-la-loi-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendaire-divise-les-%C3%A9glises-congolaises/a-79926558 

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[108] https://x.com/USAmbRwanda/status/2122328566004363454; https://x.com/Trinity_Metals/status/2122387870887588167

[109] https://contents.trinity-metals.com/historic-agreement-to-supply-tungsten-concentrate-from-trinity-metals-in-rwanda-to-the-united-states; https://www.mining.com/trinity-metals-to-supply-tungsten-concentrate-from-rwanda-to-the-us; https://www.northernminer.com/news/rwanda-sends-first-tungsten-to-us/1003882038

[110] https://www.mining.com/trinity-metals-doubles-us-tungsten-concentrate-supply-to-20; https://www.engineeringnews.co dot za/article/trinity-metals-appoints-new-cfo-2026-08-25

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