The Days of the Iranian Regime are Numbered | Special Report

The protests in Iran this month were the most recent in a series of popular uprisings that reveal a fundamental reality inside the country: The Islamic Republic in its current form is unsustainable. Since 2017, large-scale demonstrations have swept across Iran on four occasions, with masses of citizens from diverse regions and backgrounds taking to the streets to express frustration with the ruling establishment. They have been motivated by a litany of grievances but invariably call for major political change or outright revolution. In that context, the protests that have dominated recent headlines should be seen as more than social unrest in response to the failing Iranian economy. Rather, they reflect how large segments of the Iranian population can no longer tolerate a brutal regime that mismanages state resources, imposes its rigid ideology on the people, and instigates conflict with its neighbors.

The protest activity suggests that Iran has entered a proto-revolutionary period, in fact. The regime faced large-scale civil upheaval and calls for its overthrow in the Dey protests in 2017-18, the Bloody Aban protests in 2019, the Woman, Life, Freedom protests in 2022-23, and the most recent wave that began in December 2025 and has stretched into 2026. Protest turnout appears to be growing in size and violence with each wave of demonstrations. Iranian authorities have responded to the protests with contempt and treated them more like a military issue than a social one, framing the aggrieved citizens as enemies of the state. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, among other senior officials, have portrayed protesters as foreign agents and terrorists rather than his constituency. Though it is unclear whether the protests will topple the regime any time soon, the widespread public anger toward the regime is evident and seems to be growing.

The public discontent with the regime will continue to manifest and intensify, because Iranian authorities will not solve the underlying issues. They would need to fundamentally restructure their political economy to create serious relief for everyday Iranians. That would involve reducing the control that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and other state-affiliated monopolies have over the economy. The regime would need to address the parastatal entities that propagate corruption and nepotism. The regime would need to strike deals with the United States, accepting limits on its nuclear program and possibly missile development in exchange for sanctions relief. The regime would also need to ease its aggressive enforcement of behavioral standards, such as the mandatory hijab law, which was one of the key drivers of the Woman, Life, Freedom protests. But Supreme Leader Khamenei and his inner circle have refused to make such concessions at every turn and instead reiterated their uncompromising position vis-a-vis the protests.

Rather than reforms, Khamenei and his minions have tried to resolve the popular discontent with more ideology and repression. Khamenei has overseen a propaganda and indoctrination campaign since 2019 to “re-ideologize” the Iranian people, working on the theory that renewing their commitment to the regime’s revolutionary principles would lead them to accept sub-standard governance.[i] Khamenei argues that the United States is waging an economic and psychological war against Iran and is therefore responsible for the poor domestic conditions. He argues that the population must rally behind the regime to prevail against this US aggression. When propaganda is insufficient to keep people off the streets, Khamenei has deployed militarized security units to use extreme violence against protesters.[ii] Current estimates indicate that Iranian security forces have killed thousands—possibly over 30,000—in the most recent protest wave, marking an unprecedentedly violent crackdown on citizens demanding a more responsible government.[iii] This regime approach—combining ideologization with repression—has failed to quell social unrest permanently, however, as large-scale protests have continued to manifest every few years and will very likely reappear in the future. The tone-deaf messaging and violent repression from Iranian authorities only reinforces further to disillusioned Iranians that the regime in its current form has no serious solutions.

Mounting public pressure and protest activity will eventually force the regime to change in some way—though not necessarily for the better. The regime could intensify its repression even further, devolving into a North Korea-like police and surveillance state, and oppress its people so aggressively that they can no longer challenge the ruling establishment. The regime could alternatively moderate its behavior and pursue major economic and social reforms that address citizens’ complaints. Even then, Tehran might pursue a foreign policy contrary to US interests, such as continuing to collaborate with China and Russia to undermine US global influence. The regime could also collapse or fragment, plunging the country into instability. These are only some of the possible trajectories before Iran. Major change of some sort will come, whether it follows 86-year-old Khamenei’s death, a popular uprising, or something else entirely. Although a free and democratic Iran is ideal, the United States must brace for all possible scenarios.

[i] https://www.hudson.org/politics-government/political-transition-post-raisi-

[ii] iran and https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-irans-shift-toward-more-oppressive-governance

[iii] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/jan/27/iran-protests-death-toll-disappeared-bodies-mass-burials-30000-dead