Special: Syrian Government Offensive Forces Syrian Kurdish Group to Capitulate

The US-backed, Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) capitulated to the Syrian government in a ceasefire agreement on January 18.[i] The government compelled the SDF to agree after a combination of government operations and tribal uprisings caused the SDF to withdraw from nearly half of its territory and most of the heavily Arab areas.[ii] The ceasefire agreement cedes all of Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces to the government, effective immediately.[iii] Hasakah Province will integrate into the Syrian state over time.[iv] The government will control the ISIS detention facilities and al Hol internally-displaced persons (IDP) camp, which holds many ISIS supporters.[v] The SDF will integrate its military forces into the Syrian Ministry of Defense as individuals--a major concession that SDF leaders have been refusing because it leaves Kurdish areas without a reliable defense force of their own.[vi] Kobani will have a security force that is formed from the city's residents.[vii] This ceasefire represents a capitulation by the SDF, which has resisted these long-standing demands of the Syrian government.[viii] This is a significant defeat for SDF moderates such as SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and civilian leader Ilham Ahmed, both of whom supported prior ceasefires in Aleppo but were thwarted by hardliners who were close to the PKK.

The government and the SDF have held conflicting visions for the future of the Syrian state since the fall of the Assad regime. President Ahmed al Shara’s government seeks a unitary, centralized state that is very similar to the structure of the Assad regime only led by Syria's majority Sunni Arabs. The government pays lip service to decentralization, but in doing so it usually cites Law 107, which is an Assad-era law that devolves important economic and community support authorities to local leaders but places them under a centrally-appointed governor.[ix] This system, as implemented under Assad, gave significant authority to the governor and comparatively less to local leaders.[x] The Kurdish population’s well-founded fears of the Syrian central government after years of oppression under Assad and extreme violence at the hands of the figures who now form the government has caused the SDF to be very hesitant to cede power back to Damascus unless more devolution of power occurs.[xi] The SDF, therefore, sought a decentralized federal system that made no substantial changes to the present SDF governance model for the areas under SDF control.[xii] This system would feature ostensibly representative local leaders, though in practice, many would have probably been drawn from the ranks of the SDF.[xiii] The Syrian government saw the SDF’s vision as a separatist concept that sought to divide Syria, while the SDF saw the Syrian government as an authoritarian regime in the making.[xiv] These views could only be reconciled if one side compelled the other to agree by force or if both or one side moderated their views significantly.

Hardliners on both sides likely prevented any moderation. Top SDF officials verbally agreed to integrate into the Syrian army with three divisions and several independent battalions in October 2025, but the SDF later reneged and introduced new conditions.[xv] Unspecified US officials reported that hardliners within the SDF undermined Abdi and frequently blocked agreements between the government and SDF because the SDF needed to ensure the acquiescence of leaders within its coalition, including PKK-aligned leaders, before approving the agreements.[xvi] PKK-aligned hardliners reportedly prevented more pragmatic leaders, such as Abdi and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) official Ilham Ahmed, from making progress in negotiations by insisting on new concessions from the government or ordering SDF-affiliated units to stay and fight even after Abdi committed to several ceasefires in Aleppo City.[xvii]  Senior Syrian government officials have long discussed Syrian or Turkish military action against the SDF as an undesirable but possible outcome should talks with the SDF fail completely.[xviii] Syrian officials indicated a willingness to continue negotiations with the SDF even after the expiration of the state-mandated integration deadline at the end of 2025, but the Syrian government appears to have calculated that military action could achieve more results than further rounds of talks alone.[xix] The Syrian government also maintains close contact with the Turkish government on SDF-related talks, and Ankara has historically pushed for the Syrian government to use force against the SDF.[xx]

The Syrian government seized an opportunity to begin its offensive after SDF fighters launched two first-person view (FPV) drones targeting Syrian Defense Ministry vehicles in Aleppo on January 5.[xxi] The government, in response, launched an offensive on January 6 to reduce the SDF-controlled exclave of Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo City.[xxii] The SDF and government reached an initial ceasefire after a few days of fighting, but SDF hardliners who were reportedly in contact with the PKK in Qandil refused SDF commander Mazloum Abdi’s orders and did not honor the ceasefire.[xxiii] The government finished reducing the exclave and then began to prepare for operations against the SDF positions in eastern Aleppo Province, southeast of Lake Assad.[xxiv] 

The renewed offensive in eastern Aleppo rapidly expanded into an operation to collapse the SDF. The government’s operation likely employed the same combination of political engagement and military action that helped it collapse the Assad regime and destroy other opposition in southwestern Syria in Spring 2025.[xxv] The government first undermined the SDF by building and expanding relationships with local Arab tribes under SDF control.[xxvi] Many of these tribes have long chafed under SDF control due in part to the SDF’s ineffective counterinsurgency strategy, which empowered abusive Arab commanders.[xxvii] The tribes have repeatedly rebelled against the SDF but, prior to the fall of Assad, viewed the SDF as the lesser of two evils and were unwilling to risk falling back under Assad’s control.[xxviii] The fall of Assad removed this constraint, and when the government launched its offensive, the government was able to rely on the tribes to rise up. The uprisings forced the SDF to abandon positions near the Euphrates River and in Raqqa and Deir ez Zor cities and retreat into the Kurdish-majority areas.[xxix]

The collapse of the SDF and its retreat into Kurdish-majority areas will require the United States to rethink its counter-ISIS posture in Syria fundamentally. The SDF was long the only viable US counter-ISIS partner in Syria, though the United States has begun to coordinate operations with the Syrian government in recent months.[xxx] The Syrian government is in principle both able and willing to defeat ISIS, but the composition of Syrian security forces makes Damascus a much less safe partner than the SDF. The rapid expansion of Syrian security forces and its reliance on a motley organization of unprofessional and untrained jihadist militias means that there is a significant risk that ISIS sympathizers exist in the rank-and-file.[xxxi] The United States also cannot contribute funds or other resources to many units, given their background and the sanctions on those units. ISIS remains a significant threat in Syria, and the instability that will ensue as the Syrian Defense Ministry replaces SDF forces on the ground will create an opportunity that ISIS can and likely will exploit. The United States must be ready to support all of its counter-ISIS partners during this period.