Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 7, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on September 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine of the war to date on the night of September 6 to 7 with 823 total projectiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 810 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched nine Iskander-from Kursk Oblast and four Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed or suppressed 747 drones and four Iskander-K cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that nine missiles and 54 strike drones struck 33 locations throughout Ukraine and that drone and missile debris fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian and residential infrastructure in Kyiv, Sumy, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia cities; Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast; Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast; and Chernihiv and Cherkasy oblasts.[ii]  Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian strikes injured 44 civilians across Ukraine, primarily targeted Kyiv City, and lasted over 7.5 hours.yiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko reported that Russian strikes killed two civilians and injured 20 others in Kyiv City.[iv]  Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko reported and published footage showing that Russian forces struck Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City for the .[v] ISW continues to assess that Russia's ongoing large-scale strikes underscore Ukraine's need for continued Western support for Ukraine's interceptor drone program and for the continued supply of Western air defense systems, especially US-provided Patriot systems.[vi]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to deny that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure across Ukraine or the Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City. The Russian MoD claimed on September 7 that Russian forces struck drone facilities and airbases in Ukraine.[vii] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck two industrial enterprises on the outskirts of Kyiv City but did not conduct any strikes against any other objects within Kyiv City. Several Russian milbloggers amplified the MoD's narrative that Russian forces did not strike the Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City.[viii] Tat Russian forces hit civilian targets in Ukraine despite ample footage, imagery, and Ukrainian official reports to the contrary.[ix] ISW coonths.[x]

Russian drone strike packages against Ukraine will likely continue to expand as long as Russia is able to increase its long-range strike drone production. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Yusov stated on September 5 that Russia can currently produce 2,700 Shahed-type strike drones per month and an unspecified "significant" number of decoy drones.[xi] The GUR indicated in June 2025 that Russia could produce an average of 170 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones per day (about 5,100 per month) and planned to increase production to 190 drones per day (about 5,700 per month) by the end of 2025.[xii] Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russia intends to increase its strike packages to include over 1,000 drones per day in Fall 2025, and Russia's use of over 800 drones in the September 6 to 7 strike package is a significant increase toward this goal.[xiii] Russia's strike packages against Ukraine will only continue to increase in size as long as Russia is able to continue expanding its Shahed-type drone production unimpeded. More frequent larger-scale Russian strikes will threaten to devastate Ukraine's electrical grid and energy infrastructure ahead of and during the coming winter season.

Russia is continuing to expand its long-range strike drone production in part due to support from the People's Republic of China (PRC). Russia has significantly scaled up its domestic production of Shahed-type drones, including Gerans (Russian Shahed analogues), Garpiyas (Shahed analogues with PRC components), and Gerberas (decoy Shahed varian.[xiv] Russia primarily produces Shahed-type drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan and recently opened a at the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant where Russia already produces Garpiya drones.[xv] Russia has recently significantly invested in developing the ASEZ's drone factory; supporting the plant's infrastructure; and recruiting women, children, and foreigners to work at the ASEZ.[xvi] Russia is increasingly relying on the PRC for its drone components and would not be able to sustain the pace or mass of its Shahed-type drone production without these components. A recent investigation by the Ukraine-based, open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight found that the ASEZ alone depends on the PRC for at least 41 components to produce its long-range strike drones, including engines, electronic and mechanical components, batteries, antennas, radios, carbon fire, carburetors, and telecommunications components.[xvii] Frontelligence Insight assessed that many of the drones that Russia claims to have produced domestically are only assembled domestically given the high number of PRC-produced parts in these drones. Russia also opened a dedicated logistics center at the ASEZ to receive and process cargo trains directly from the PRC, likely in an effort to streamline the delivery of PRC-produced components for drone production at the ASEZ.[xviii]

Russia's latest strikes against Ukraine further demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin . Russia has consistently intensified its strike packages and capabilities since the beginning of its full-scale invasion in 2022 and has notably accelerated its strikes campaign following the Ukraine-Russia bilateral talks in Istanbul on May 15, 2025, launching 16 combined strikes consisting of over 400 air targets since the talks.[xix] Russia's September 6 to 7 strike is the fifth combined strike of over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. Putin has repeatedly rejected Ukrainian and US efforts to establish ceasefires on the battlefield and continues to insist that Russia cannot agree to a ceasefire until there is a peace agreement.[xx] Putin has also made no effort to prepare Russian society or the Russian information space for an end to the war that results in less than Ukrainian capitulation to all of Russia's original war demands.[xxi] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 7 that the size of the latest overnight strike demonstrates Russia's "unyielding will" and shows that Russia continues to "politely ignor[e]" US President Donald Trump's repeated condemnation of Russian strikes.[xxii] The milblogger claimed that negotiations are entering a period of "empty talk."[xxiii]

Ukraine contimilitary and oil infrastructure in Russia on the night of September 6 to 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), struck an near Naitopovichi, Bryansk .[xxiv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that this oil production station is part of the Steel Horse oil pipeline, which has a pumping capacity of . Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert “r” Brovdi reported that the facility is important for the transport of petroleum products to Russia from Belarusian refineries, especially the Mozyr and Novopolatsk refinerie The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on September 7 that the SSO and a pro-Ukrainian resistance group conducted an unspecified attack against the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ilsky Oil Refinery processes 6.42 million tons of oil annually.[xxvii] The Ukrainian SSO reported that the attack destroyed the ELOU-AT-6 oil complex, which is the Refinery's primary oil refining complex.[xxviii] Geolocated footage published on September 7 shows a smoke plume rising from the Ilsky Oil Refinery.[xxix] The Krasnodar Krai operational headquarters claimed on September 7 that drone debris fell on the Ilsky Oil Refinery and caused a fire at one of the processing units.[xxx] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck Russian military warehouses in Kursk Oblast but are clarifying the damage.[xxxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine of the war to date on the night of September 6 to 7 with 823 total projectiles.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to deny that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure across Ukraine or the Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City.
• Russian drone strike packages against Ukraine will likely continue to expand as long as Russia is able to increase its long-range strike drone production.
• support from the People's Republic of China (PRC).
• Russia's latest strikes against Ukraine further demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is disinterested in ending his war in Ukraine and stopping the killing.
• Ukraine continued its attacks against military and oil infrastructure in Russia on the night of September 6 to 7.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for reports of Ukrainian strikes against Russia.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xxxii] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the southern part of Yunakivka and that positions in the settlement have changed hands frequently recently.[xxxiii]

Russian forces attacked within Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Varachyne and Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on September 6 and 7.[xxxiv] Russ claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and Yunakivka.[xxxv]

The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that North Korean forces arrived to the area near Guyevo, Kursk Oblast, to strengthen Russian border defenses alongside Russian forces.[xxxvi] The milblogger claimed that the command of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces is planning to relieve Russian conscripts who have been protecting the international border and transfer them to rear areas and to Russian military bases.he milblogger claimed that the command plans to replace the conscripts at the border with soldiers 55 years and older who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The milblogger claimed that the 6t (both of the LMD) are currently training these replacement servicemembers before committing them to border defense.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Varachyne.[xxxviii] Elements of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[xxxix] Drone operators of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces along the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border.[xl]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the Vovchansk Oil Extraction Plant in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xli]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 200 meters in the forest west of Synelnyko.[xlii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and toward Synelnykove on September 6 and 7.[xliii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk.[xliv]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on September 6 and 7 but did not advance.[xlv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Novovasylivka, and west of Kupyansk near Myrove on September 6 and 7.[xlvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka, northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Lozova, east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 6 and 7.[xlvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Serebryanske forest area toward Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[xlviii]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Derylove, and Shandryholove and toward Drobysheve, north of Lyman near Karpivka, northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne, and east of Lyman near Torske on September 6 and 7.[xlix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Derylove and Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[l]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 423nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD), and elements of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[li]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, south of Siversk near Pereizne and Fedorivka, and southwest of Siversk toward Bondarne on September 6 and 7.[lii]

Slovyansk City Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported on September 7 that Russian forces are conducting first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against a portion of the E40 Slovyansk-Izyum highway just east and northeast of Slovyansk and warned civilians that Ukrainian officials temporarily restricted traffic on this sector of the road.[liii] Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Belskyi responded to Lyakh's announcement, stating that Russian strikes on a civilian highway are a violation of international humanitarian law and that the E40 is the not the only Ukrainian ground line of communication (GLOC) supplying Slovyansk.[liv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian de (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Serebryanka.[lv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Popiv Yar (south of Druzhkivka).[lvi]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kostyantynivka toward Virolyubivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Bila Hora; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, and Katerynivka; south of Druzhkivka near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka on September 6 and 7.[lvii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka), Volodymyrivka, and Sofiivka.[lviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lix] Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksandro-Shultyne (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[lx]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assekrainian 1st Army Corps reported on September 5 that Ukrainian forces liberated Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz (all northeast of Dobropillya) in August 2025, and a Russian milblogger posted a map September 7 showing that Ukrainian forces have liberated Hruzke, Vesele, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Rubizhne, and Stepy (formerly Kutuzovka, east of Dobropillya).[lxi]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Shakhove and near Nove Shakhove (both east of Dobropillya).[lxii]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions in southern Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Kucheriv Yar (east of Dobropillya), and Nove Shakhove.[lxiii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Vilne, Ivanivka, Pankivka, and Shakhove on September 6 and 7.[lxiv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kucheriv Yar and Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[lxv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Nove Shakhove.[lxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Promin, and Myrolyubivka and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Zvirove, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on September 6 and 7.[lxvii]

Belskyi stated on September 7 that elements of the Russian 76th VDV Division, 11th Separate VDV Brigade, 4ade (both of the Pacific Fleet) have already redeployed to the Pokrovsk direction and that some of these forces have already entered combat.[lxviii] operating in the Pokrovsk direction also stated on September 7 that there are reports of Russian naval infantry units entering combat and posted footage of Ukrainian drone strikes against alleged Russian naval infantry personnel in the area.[lxix] ISW recently observed reports that Russian naval infantry and airborne elements had redeployed from Sumy and Kherson oblasts to Donetsk Oblast, likely to support the main Russian Fall 2025 campaign to advance in the Kostyantynivka, Dobropillya, and Pokrovsk areas.[lxx]

Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on September 7 that Russian forces only seized five square kilometers of territory in the Pokrovsk direction in August 2025 whereas Ukrainian forces recaptured about 26 square kilometers of territory in this direction.[lxxi] Syrskyi stated that Russian and Ukrainian gains in the Dobropillya tactical area in August 2025 have a similar ratio to those in the Pokrovsk direction.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Myrnohrad.[lxxii] Elements of the Russian Somali Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[lxxiv]

Russian forces attacked south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Tovste on September 6 and 7.[lxxv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelenyi Hai and Filiya.[lxxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

nd south of Velykomykhailivka toward Novomykolaivka on September 6 and 7.[lxxx] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[lxxxi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 7.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Stepnohirsk and Prymorske (both west of Orikhiv) and near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[lxxxii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk on September 6 and 7.[lxxxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[lxxxiv]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using a new tactic that has allowed them to conduct first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Zaporizhzhia City recently.[lxxxv] The milblogger claimed that a mothership drone with attached first-person view (FPV) drones flies to the Ukrainian rear and then the drone operator switches to controlling the FPV drones via a SIM card once the FPV losses signal and enters the coverage area of a mobile operator.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxxvi]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 7.

Russian sources claimed that Russian drone operators have isolated the coastal zone of right (west) bank Kherson Oblast.[lxxxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are again conducting artillery strikes against power supply nodes in central Kherson City after Ukrainian authorities repaired the facilities following recent Russian strikes.[lxxxviii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 31st Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[lxxxix]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for Russian strikes in Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.