Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 26, 2025

September 26, 2025, 7:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on September 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NATO jets recently scrambled in response to another Russian flight close to NATO airspace as European states struggle with unidentified, likely Russian, drone activity in border areas and near infrastructure. NATO Air Command reported on September 25 that it scrambled two Hungarian Gripen fighter jets in response to one Russian Su-30 fighter jet, one Su-35 fighter jet, and three MiG-31 interceptor jets that flew close to, but did not enter, Latvian airspace.[1] German authorities identified several unknown drones flying near the Danish border in the northern German state Schleswig-Holstein overnight on September 25 to 26.[2] Schleswig-Holstein Interior Minister Sabine Sütterlin-Waack stated that German authorities are investigating the incursion as the origin of the drones remains unclear. AFP reported on September 25, citing the French Military Department Delegation, that unidentified drones flew over Murmelon-le-Grand military base in Marne, France, but noted that there is currently no evidence of foreign involvement.[3] The Danish National Police reported on September 25 that it briefly closed the Aalborg Airport on the northern tip of Denmark's Zealand Island, which the Danish military also uses, due to unidentified drone activity.[4] Danish Security Intelligence Service Director General Finn Borch Andersen stated on September 25 that Denmark cannot yet name a specific actor behind the drone activity, but that these incidents resemble a model of hybrid warfare seen elsewhere in Europe and that Denmark assesses a high risk of Russian sabotage in Denmark.[5] Swedish authorities confirmed on September 25 multiple drone sightings near a Swedish naval base in Karlstrona, Sweden.[6] European officials have not directly accused Russia of violating European airspace in these specific instances — but the recent uptick in hostile drone activity while Russia continues aerial incursions and posturing against NATO states is notable and strongly suggests that Russia is also behind the unidentified drone incidents.[7] ISW continues to assess that Russia is pursuing a campaign to test NATO air defenses and political will as part of a broader effort to collect actionable intelligence that Russia may then apply to a potential future conflict against NATO.[8]

Ukraine's European allies continue to respond to increasing Russian aggression against Europe. European defense ministers met on September 26 to discuss the establishment of a "drone" wall along the European border with Russia in Ukraine in order to detect, track, and intercept drones that violate European airspace and agreed to an approach that covers air, sea, and land.[9] The EU Commissioner for Defense and Space Andrius Kubilius stated that Russia is testing the EU and NATO and that the response must be "firm, united, and immediate" and that the EU's immediate priorities are to improve the EU's drone detection, tracking, and interception capabilities.[10] Kubilius stated that attendees included the defense ministers of Denmark, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania; Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal; EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas; representatives from Hungary and Slovakia; and unspecified NATO officials.

 Russian officials continue efforts to undermine Western support for Ukraine and defensive measures against Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke at the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting on September 25 and claimed that the collective West provoked the war in Ukraine and that NATO and the European Union (EU) declared a "real war" on Russia through Ukraine and are "directly participating in" this war.[11] Russian officials have repeatedly portrayed the West as the aggressor in the war in Ukraine in order to avoid blame and justify further rhetorical and kinetic provocations against its European neighbors.[12] Russian Ambassador to France Alexei Meshkov claimed on September 26 that Russia would consider it war if NATO countries shot down Russian aircraft "allegedly" violating the airspace of member countries and accused Europe of failing to provide evidence that Russia has been involved in the recent drone incursions in Europe.[13] Meshkov did not mention that Russian penetrations of NATO airspace with military drones and aircraft are themselves Russian acts of war against NATO to which NATO has so far chosen not to respond by shooting down Russian aircraft. Russian officials have also repeatedly sought to deter European officials from taking defensive military actions against Russian provocations as part of Russia's ongoing effort to push the limit of what provocations NATO is willing to absorb as an “acceptable” escalation.[14] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova also continued to downplay US President Donald Trump's September 23, 2025, statement in support of Ukraine and Ukraine's ability to retake occupied areas by force.[15]

The United States is reportedly considering lifting existing restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-produced weapons to strike legitimate military targets located in Russian territory. A Ukrainian official and a senior US official told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on September 26 that Ukrainian President Zelensky asked US President Trump during their September 23 meeting for additional unspecified long-range missiles and approval to use these missiles against military targets in Russian territory.[16] Trump reportedly replied that he does not oppose this idea but did not commit to lifting these restrictions. Zelensky recently confirmed reports that he also asked Trump for US-produced Tomahawk cruise missiles during the September 23 meeting.[17]

Ukraine created a new Unmanned Air Defense Systems service. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi announced the new service on September 26 and stated that the service is subordinate to the Ukrainian Air Force and will deploy units equipped with interceptor drones to combat Russian Shahed-type drones.[18] The command-and-control relationships between these Air Force drone interceptor units and tactical Ground Forces units who also have organic tactical air defenses remain unclear. 

Key Takeaways:

• NATO jets recently scrambled in response to another Russian flight close to NATO airspace as European states struggle with unidentified, likely Russian, drone activity in border areas and near infrastructure.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to respond to increasing Russian aggression against Europe.
• Russian officials continue efforts to undermine Western support for Ukraine and defensive measures against Russia.
• The United States is reportedly considering lifting existing restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-produced weapons to strike legitimate military targets located in Russian territory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight on September 25 to 26.[19] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian drones struck one of the main crude oil processing units, which has a processing capacity of three million tons of crude oil per year — roughly half the Afipsky Oil Refinery's total processing capacity of 6.25 million tons per year.[20] Geolocated footage published on September 25 shows a fire at the Afipsky refinery.[21] The Krasnodar Krai Emergency Headquarters claimed that drone debris caused the fire.[22]

The Ukrainian General Staff updated on September 26 the battlefield damage assessment of a Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) strike on August 9, 2025, against the Russian 448th Missile Brigade's hangars in Kursk Oblast.[23] The General Staff reported that the SSO destroyed one Iskander missile launcher, five 9T250 transport-loading vehicles, a Pantsir-S1 air defense system, warehouses, and automotive equipment.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk and northern Sumy Oblasts on September 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on September 26 that Russian forces seized Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[24] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces rejected the MoD's claim and stated that Ukrainian forces remain in southern Yunakivka, however.[25]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including near Yunakivka, on September 25 and 26.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy City), Yunakivka, and Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[27]

Order of Battle: Fiber optic drone operators of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border area.[28]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on September 25 and 26.[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[30]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dovhenke, Milove, and Khatnie; and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on September 25 and 26.[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Kupyansk.[32]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Tabaivka, and Kurylivka on September 25 and 26.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the southern flank of Kupyansk.[34]

A Ukrainian officer operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces infiltrating into Kupyansk are avoiding firefights with Ukrainian soldiers, instead seeking to establish positions in multi-story buildings where civilians still reside to protect themselves from Ukrainian fires.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

 Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) and west of Novovodyane (southeast of Borova).[36]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Cherneshchyna, and Druzhelyubivka on September 25 and 26.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Lyman direction on September 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Derylove and advanced north of and into Novoselivka, into northern Drobysheve (all northwest of Lyman), and northeast of Stavky (north of Lyman).[38]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Karpivka, Derylove, Korovyii Yar, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on September 25 and 26.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Dronivka (northwest of Siversk) and to the northeastern outskirts of Siversk.[40]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, and south of Siversk near Fedorivka and Pereizne on September 25 and 26.[41]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment coordinated a FAB-3000 strike against Reznikivka (west of Siversk).[42] Elements of the 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Slovyansk direction.[43]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on September 26 that Russian forces retreated from Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces have likely liberated Pleshchiivka.[44]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Katerynivka and Kleban-Byk (both southeast of Kostyantynivka) and advanced north of Kleban-Byk and near Predtechyne and Oleksandro-Shultyne (both east of Kostyantynivka).[45]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Katerynivka, Kleban-Byk, Nelipivka, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 25 and 26.[46]

Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast officials reported on September 26 that Russian forces dropped two FAB-500 guided glide bombs on Kostyantynivka and one FAB-250 guided glide bomb on Druzhkivka, injuring five civilians and damaging residential infrastructure.[47]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kleban-Byk.[48] Drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], reportedly under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) and of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[49] Drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) and reconnaissance elements of the 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly cooperating to strike Ukrainian positions near Volodymyrivka.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Novotoretske (southeast of Dobropillya) and advanced east of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and west of Nove Shakhove.[51]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Boikivka and Zapovidne (both southeast of Dobropillya) are contested “gray zones.”[52]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and toward Dorozhnie on September 25 and 26.[53]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on September 26 that Ukrainian forces seized 168.8 square kilometers in the Dobropillya direction since August 2025 and have cleared another 187.7 square kilometers of Russian sabotage groups in the area.[54] ISW has observed geolocated footage and reporting to assess that Ukrainian forces have recaptured 68.6 square kilometers in the Dobropillya tactical area since August 15. Ukrainian forces have likely seized more territory in the Dobropillya area than available evidence currently indicates, and ISW will continue to update its maps in the Dobropillya area based on available evidence of Ukrainian advances

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Shakhove.[55] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Kopchenoy detachment of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones in the Dobropillya tactical area.[56]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the southeastern outskirts of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[57]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk) and advanced into southern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), east of Myrnohrad and Balahan (both east of Pokrovsk), and southeast of and in western Pokrovsk.[58]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, Krasnyi Lyman, and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and toward Mynrohrad and Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Novomykolaivka, and Molodetske on September 25 and 26.[59]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are concentrating tactical reserves in Novoekonomichne and Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) in preparation for renewed assaults toward Myrnohrad.[60] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have significantly increased artillery and airstrikes on Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Udachne and that Russian drone operators are targeting Ukrainian logistics and equipment near Pokrovsk.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[61] FPV drone operators of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Dachne (south of Novopavlivka) and in eastern Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[63]

Russian forces continued ground assaults southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta, Filya, and Dachne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka and Tovste on September 25 and 26.[64]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces operating in the Novopavlivka direction only aim to plant flags in settlements to inflate claims of advance and that Russian forces lack the necessary forces and means to conduct a "decisive" offensive operation in this direction.[65] Russian forces are conducting offensive operations elsewhere on the frontline, particularly in the Kupyansk, Kostyantynivka, Dobropillya, and Pokrovsk areas, and lack the forces necessary to sustain several offensive operations across the theater at once.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove, Piddubne, and Myrne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve, Voskresenka, Novoselivka, and Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha; south of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Kalynivske, Stepove, and Berezove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka toward Verbove on September 25 and 26.[67]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east and northeast of Novohryhorivka, southwest of Novoivanivka,(both northeast of Hulyaipole), and east of Poltavka (east of Hulyaipole).[68]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka and toward Uspenivka, Novomykolaivka, and Novovasylivske and east of Hulyaipole toward Poltavka on September 25 and 26.[69]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating airstrikes near Pryvilne (northeast of Hulyaipole).[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Kamyanske, and Stepnohirsk on September 25 and 26.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 3rd Assault Company of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[72]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 26.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

 Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 154 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type and other types of drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[73] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 128 Shahed type, Gerbera type and other types of drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 26 Russian strikes hit 9 locations. Ukrainian officials reported on September 26 that Russian strikes hit residential areas and transport and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv and Odesa oblasts.[74] Chernihiv Oblast officials reported that the strikes caused power outages that delayed trains and shut down water in Chernihiv City and Oblast.[75] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Mariano Grossi stated on September 26 that a downed Russian drone fell 800 meters from the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and damaged a nearby power line but did not threaten the NPP.[76] Grossi stated that the IAEA team at the South Ukrainian NPP detected 22 drones in its monitoring area on the night of September 25 to 26.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 26 that Ukrainian forces recently tracked reconnaissance drones that entered Ukrainian airspace from Hungary.[77] Zelensky stated that the drones were "probably" Hungarian drones but did not provide further details.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met in Moscow on September 26 and discussed cooperation between Belarus and Russian state atomic energy corporation Rosatom to construct nuclear power plants in third countries.[78] Lukashenko proposed that Belarus construct a nuclear power plant in eastern Belarus that could supply electricity to Russian-occupied Ukraine.[79]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.