Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 25, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on September 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to artificially inflate its claims of advance in Ukraine to support the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized at least 4,714 square kilometers across the theater between January 1 and September 25, 2025: 205 square kilometers in Luhansk Oblast; 3,308 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast; 261 square kilometers in Zaporizhia Oblast; 175 square kilometers in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 542 square kilometers in Kharkiv Oblast; and 223 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast.[1] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized 205 settlements in Ukraine during this time period. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized only 3,434 square kilometers since January 1: 151 square kilometers in Luhansk Oblast; 2,481 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast; 248 square kilometers in Zaporizhia Oblast; 96 square kilometers in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 255 square kilometers in Kharkiv Oblast; and 210 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast. ISW assesses that the Russian MoD is inflating its claimed advances by 36 percent in Luhansk Oblast; 33 percent in Donetsk Oblast; five percent in Zaporizhia Oblast; 83 percent in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 112 percent in Kharkiv Oblast; and six percent in Sumy Oblast.

The Russian MoD often inflates its territorial claims in order to shape Western thinking about Russia's military capabilities and prospects for victory. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces had seized 3,500 square kilometers of territory and 149 settlements since March 2025, whereas ISW assessed at the time that Russian forces had gained only roughly 2,346 square kilometers since March 1.[2] The Russian MoD's September 25 claims are a continuation of these wider efforts to use large amounts of false quantitative data to create the impression that Russian forces are advancing at a fast rate on the battlefield, even though Russian forces continue to advance at a slow foot pace. ISW also assesses that the Russian MoD has been leveraging footage showing Russian soldiers holding flags within specific settlements to claim that Russian forces had seized entire settlements.[3] The Russian footage only shows small group infiltration missions into areas where Russian forces are unable to secure enduring positions, however.[4] The Kremlin is attempting to convince the West that Russia will inevitably achieve its original war goals on the battlefield in order to force Ukraine and its partners into conceding to Russian demands.

Russian forces are reportedly rearranging forces to prepare for offensive operations across several sectors of the frontline but lack the forces and means required to sustain these operations simultaneously. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 24 that the Russian military command is rearranging forces in order to conduct several operational-level efforts across the frontline, including offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Zaporizhia directions, as part of Russia's wider strategic-level plan for 2025.[5] Many of these Russian efforts are not mutually supportive in that forces assigned to one sector of the front are not conducting offensive operations in a way that supports the offensive operations of another sector. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command began in August 2025 to redeploy some forces from deprioritized sectors of the front, including Sumy and Kherson oblasts, to higher priority sectors in eastern Ukraine — some of which Mashovets characterized as "odd."[6] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division from Sumy Oblast to the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) in the south Donetsk direction (likely referring to the Novopavlivka and Velykomykhailivka directions) and to the AoR of the 35th CAA (EMD) in the Hulyaipole direction.[7] Russian VDV are among Russia's relatively more combat capable forces, and Russia tends to redeploy these forces to their most prioritized areas of the front, including the Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya areas.[8] Mashovets reported that unspecified sources expected Russia to redeploy elements of the 76th VDV Division to western Zaporizhia Oblast to participate in offensive operations south of Zaporizhzhia City.[9] Mashovets reported that Russia is establishing operational reserves in the 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) operating in the deprioritized Kherson direction from the 25th CAA (Central Miliary District [CMD]) that is currently operating in the Lyman direction, rather than from units and formations of the 58th CAA itself.[10] Mashovets reported that the Russian command is similarly establishing operational reserves in the 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps, SMD), which is currently operating in the Lyman direction, from elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) in the Kherson direction.

Russia's decision to reorganize forces from the Lyman direction to the operational reserve in the Kherson direction and from the Kherson direction to the operational reserve in the Lyman direction is unusual given Russia's current focus on operations in Donetsk Oblast, particularly between Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently redeployed VDV and the relatively elite naval infantry elements to this area, and some of these forces have since reportedly entered combat. Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and of the 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both Pacific Fleet) recently entered combat near Poltavka after redeploying from northern Sumy Oblast, and elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are reportedly fighting near Nove Shakhove after redeploying from the Novopavlivka direction.[11] The Russian military command is reportedly holding elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) in reserve in the near rear of the Dobropillya area after redeploying from the Kherson direction, though ISW continues to observe reports that elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade are operating in the Kherson direction, indicating that elements of the brigade are likely split across the front.[12]

The Russian offensive in Kupyansk is reportedly vulnerable due to the lack of sufficient forces to sustain simultaneous offensive operations against Kupyansk and several other areas along the frontline. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 6th CAA (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) fighting within and on the northwestern outskirts of Kupyansk are "fragile" and would be vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks should Russian forces stop attacks within Kupyansk and from the Russian foothold north of Kupyansk on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River.[13] Mashovets noted that Russia must simultaneously allocate forces and means to offensive operations within and north of Kupyansk  to protect the flanks and logistics of the Russian forces assaulting Kupyansk. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces will need to allocate one to two additional divisions' worth of forces to offensive operations to actually seize Kupyansk. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is aware that it needs to reinforce, break through Ukrainian defensive positions, and consolidate in the Kupyansk direction, and that these efforts are in tension with the Russian strategic objective of maintaining several simultaneous offensive operations across the frontline — an objective that Russian forces have struggled with since Summer 2022.[14] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces would have to redistribute resources in order to stabilize the situation in the Kupyansk direction.[15] Russian forces will likely continue to struggle to maintain simultaneous offensive operations across discrete areas of the frontline, particularly in areas that are not receiving redeployments of relatively combat-effective units from deprioritized sectors of the frontline. Russian forces may also struggle to advance in their prioritized sectors — chiefly in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas and the Pokrovsk direction in Donetsk Oblast — if the Russian military command sends reinforcements to other areas that could be more effective in Donetsk Oblast.

Russian officials privately admitted that Russia is responsible for the September 19 incursion of three MiG-31 interceptor jets into Estonian airspace. Unnamed officials told Bloomberg in an article published on September 24 that Russian, British, French, and German envoys met in Moscow to address concerns about the incursion of three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets into Estonian airspace on September 19.[16] The officials reportedly concluded that Russian commanders deliberately ordered the jets into Estonian airspace. A Russian diplomat reportedly told the European diplomats that the incursions — likely referring to the Estonia incursion as well as several other recent Russian violations of NATO state airspace — were a response to Ukrainian strikes on occupied Crimea. Bloomberg noted that the Russian official claimed that NATO support enabled the Ukrainian strikes and stated that Russia considers itself to be already engaged in a confrontation, including against European states. Russia has publicly denied its involvement in the incursion into Estonia, claiming that the three Russian jets were completing a “scheduled flight” from an airfield in Karelia.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russia is deliberately gauging NATO’s capabilities and reactions to various air incursions.[18]

Polish Border Guards reported on September 19 that two Russian fighter jets performed a low altitude pass over the Polish Lotos Petrobaltic oil and gas drilling platform in Poland's exclusive economic zone in the Baltic Sea, violating the platform's safety zone.[19] Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen stated on September 25 that unidentified drones flew over at least four airports in Denmark on the night of September 23 to 24 and that the near-simultaneous deployment of drones in multiple locations indicates that a "professional actor" was involved in a "systematic operation" and "hybrid attack."[20] Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže reported to Reuters on September 25 that Denmark told NATO allies that unspecified "state actors" conducted the drone incursion over Denmark overnight on September 24 to 25, though unspecified other Danish officials told Reuters that the actor behind the incidents is unclear.[21] Danish and European officials have not directly accused Russia of violating Danish airspace as of this writing — as Polish and Romanian officials did after Russian drones violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10 and Romanian airspace on September 13.[22] North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) reported on September 25 that NORAD detected and tracked two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two Su-35 fighter jets operating in the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on September 24.[23] NORAD scrambled an E-3 airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft, four F-16 fighter jets, and four KC-135 tankers to identify and intercept the Russian aircraft. NORAD clarified that Russian activity in the Alaskan ADIZ is normal and nonthreatening and that the Russian aircraft did not enter US or Canadian airspace.

Russian officials continued attempts to convince the Trump administration to allow Russia to continue its war against Ukraine unimpeded in the wake of US President Donald Trump’s September 23 comments emphasizing that Ukraine has the ability to retake all of its territory. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on September 24, during which Rubio reiterated Trump’s call for the Kremlin to take meaningful steps toward a durable resolution of the war in Ukraine.[24] Lavrov stated that he and Rubio “exchanged views" on resolving the war and claimed that Russia is ready to coordinate with the United States to address the "root causes" of the war.[25] The Kremlin has repeatedly defined the "root causes" as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[26] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account on September 25 to claim that Russia can use weapons that "a bomb shelter will not protect against” and threatened Americans to "keep this in mind.”[27] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 25 that Russia assumes that Trump “maintains the political will" to resolve the war and that Russia remains open to entering peace talks.[28] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev amplified an opinion piece in the Telegraph claiming that Trump is washing his hands of the war in Ukraine.[29] Russian officials have launched several different information operations in recent days trying to dissuade Trump and the West from continuing to support Ukraine, including using narratives decrying the Kremlin’s continued commitment to its original war aims, claims that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, and claims that the United States should focus on bilateral US-Russian economic relations.[30]

The Kremlin reportedly plans to allocate less to national defense spending in 2026 than in 2025 but acknowledged that it is increasing some taxes to fund "defense and security." Reuters reported on September 24 that it viewed documents from the Russian Finance Ministry stating that Russia plans to allocate 12.6 trillion rubles (about $150 billion) to "National Defense" spending in 2026 — down from 13.5 trillion (about $160 billion) in 2025.[31] The Russian Finance Ministry stated on September 24 that the key priorities in the 2026-2028 draft budget include the fulfillment of social obligations to citizens, support for Russia's defense and security needs, and social support for families of Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine.[32] The Finance Ministry stated that the budget allocates funding to ensure that Russia can equip the military, pay military personnel and their families, and modernize the defense industrial base (DIB), including through the allocation of 87.9 billion rubles (about $1 billion) toward the Unmanned Aircraft Systems project over three years. The Finance Ministry also announced an increase in value-added tax (VAT) from 20 percent to 22 percent starting January 2026 and a decrease in the annual revenue threshold for businesses that must pay VAT from 60 million rubles (about $714 thousand) to 10 million rubles (about $119 thousand). The Finance Ministry noted that the VAT changes are primarily meant to fund defense and security. Reuters reported that unpublished documents from the Russian Finance Ministry estimated that the VAT increase would generate about 1.2 trillion rubles (about $14.2 billion) in additional revenue in 2026. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov claimed on September 18 that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia's revenues from oil and gas sales funding the Russian federal budget to be about 20 to 22 percent in 2026, which Siluanov noted is a decrease from about 50 percent previously.[33] The Kremlin is likely seeking other revenue streams as oil and gas revenues, on which Russia has relied to fund its war in Ukraine, are decreasing in the face of impending Western sanctions and Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure.

The Kremlin is likely looking for different avenues to raise funding for defense and national security spending without aggravating existing socio-economic tensions. Recent Kremlin state media coverage and social media campaigns following the announcement of the VAT increase suggest that the Kremlin is aware of the possibility of social discontent due to the resulting increase in prices of everyday goods. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on September 24 that Russia's main state television channels reported on the VAT increase "discreetly," only mentioning the change at the end of broadcasts after reports about the war in Ukraine, US President Donald Trump's speech at the United Nations, and the upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova.[34] Meduza noted that Russian state outlets Pervyi Kanal, Rossiya 1, and NTV each mentioned the VAT change in only one sentence. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on September 25 that pro-Russian government bots have written nearly one thousand comments on Kremlin-controlled social media outlet VKontakte (VK) in support of the VAT rise.[35] The bots reportedly focused on how the VAT revenue will go "to defense" and help those involved in the war in Ukraine, how tax raises are better than cuts to social programs, and how Russian citizens "will not really notice" the two percent difference.

Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina attempted to downplay the effect that the VAT increase could have on inflation but acknowledged that VAT hikes have worsened inflation in the past. Nabiullina claimed on September 25 that the VAT increase is a "very positive factor" and that a balanced budget is better than an increasing deficit.[36] Nabiullina claimed that the Central Bank would have had to significantly raise its rate forecasts for 2026 had the government increased the deficit to finance necessary expenditures. Nabiullina stated that the Central Bank sees "certainty" in the federal budget and will take this into account when making a decision about possibly cutting the key interest rate further in October 2025. Nabiullina claimed that the 2026 draft budget is disinflationary but that the experience of 2019 — when a two percent rise in VAT increased inflation by 0.6 to 0.7 percent — suggests that prices will likely rise in the short-term. ISW continues to assess that the Russian Central Bank's efforts to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability by pursuing economic policies will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability.[37]

Russia continues to suffer from gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.[38] Kremlin officials are attempting to downplay the gasoline shortages to domestic audiences as a result of reduced production at refineries, however.[39] Several milbloggers from Russia's ultranationalist community — one of Russian President Vladimir Putin's most important constituencies — complained about the gas shortages and rising taxes on Russian citizens.[40] Continued or worsening gasoline shortages, possibly coupled with rising inflation due to the VAT increase, may fuel additional social discontent in the near future.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to artificially inflate its claims of advance in Ukraine to support the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.
• Russian forces are reportedly rearranging forces to prepare for offensive operations across several sectors of the frontline but lack the forces and means required to sustain these operations simultaneously.
• The Russian offensive in Kupyansk is reportedly vulnerable due to the lack of sufficient forces to sustain simultaneous offensive operations against Kupyansk and several other areas along the frontline.
• Russian officials privately admitted that Russia is responsible for the September 19 incursion of three MiG-31 interceptor jets into Estonian airspace.
• Russian officials continued attempts to convince the Trump administration to allow Russia to continue its war against Ukraine unimpeded in the wake of US President Donald Trump’s September 23 comments emphasizing that Ukraine has the ability to retake all of its territory.
• The Kremlin reportedly plans to allocate less to national defense spending in 2026 than in 2025 but acknowledged that it is increasing some taxes to fund "defense and security."
• The Kremlin is likely looking for different avenues to raise funding for defense and national security spending without aggravating existing socio-economic tensions.
• Russia continues to suffer from gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Lyman and within the Dobropillya salient.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Sources in Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed to Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on September 24 that GUR naval drone operators struck the ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai.[41] GUR sources stated that the strikes damaged the Transneft oil tanker complex and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal near Novorossiysk, causing the terminal to temporarily cease operations, and caused unspecified damage to the oil loading terminal in the Tuapse port — one of Russia's largest loading terminals. GUR sources reported that the Novorossiysk and Tuapse oil transshipment ports have an export capacity of two million barrels of crude oil per day.

Geolocated footage published on September 25 shows a likely Ukrainian strike against a Russian EuroChem fertilizer plant near Belorechensk, Krasnodar Krai (east of Novorossiysk).[42] The Krasnodar Krai Emergency Headquarters claimed on September 25 that falling Ukrainian drone debris caused a fire at a major enterprise in Belorechensk.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk and northern Sumy Oblasts on September 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on September 24 and 25.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka, Kindrativka (north of Sumy City), Yunakivka, and Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[45]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the  Russian 44th Army Corps (AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) command is prioritizing providing material comforts, including internet, heat, and other amenities, to two forward command posts of its 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment in forests in Sumy Oblast.[46] The milblogger claimed that the 44th AC command is doing so at the expense of Russian soldiers in other frontline positions, including by forcing Russian soldiers to spend their low salaries on means to stay warm. The milblogger also complained that Russian forward positions are not fortified enough to protect against Ukrainian strikes.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[47] Elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) are reportedly relieving elements of the 1st Specialized Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[48]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk and near Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[49]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking toward Synelnykove in order to cut off Ukrainian forces in Vovchansk off from their supply routes.[50] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted Kh-38 air-to-surface missile strikes against a Ukrainian air defense system in Lyptsi and against Ukrainian drone operators in Velykyi Prokhody (north of Kharkiv City).[51]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating near Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City).[52] Drone operators of the Russian 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk. [53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kolodyazne (southeast of Velykyi Burluk)  and northeast of Novovasylivka (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dovhenke and east of Velykyi Burluk towards Khatnie on September 24 and 25.[55]

Geolocated footage published on September 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southern Odradne.[56] ISW assesses that Russian forces likely conducted an infiltration mission in the area and that this event does not constitute a change in the Russian control of terrain.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground assaults southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Hlushkivka, Kotlyarivka, and Tabaivka on September 24 and 25.[57]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on September 25 that Ukrainian forces halted Russian advances in Kupyansk and prevented Russian forces from advancing beyond the northwestern outskirts of the city.[58] The commander stated that Russian forces do not exercise doctrinal control over any area of Kupyansk but that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance activity remains high in the town. The commander reported that Russian forces continue disguising themselves as civilians or as Ukrainian soldiers — both of which would be considered perfidy under international law — in order to covertly establish observation points. The commander stated that Russian forces intensified efforts to cross to the west (right) bank of the Oskil River after Ukrainian forces destroyed the pipeline that Russian forces used to accumulate on the northern outskirts of Kupyansk in mid-September 2025, inhibiting further infiltration attempts.[59] The commander stated that Russian barrier troops are forcing Russian soldiers to cross the river under threat of shooting them. A Russian milblogger denied reports that Russian forces "practically seized" Kupyansk and claimed that Russian forces are giving false reports to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), consistent with ISW's previous observations about the operational situation in the Kupyansk area.[60]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Lozova and toward Kolisnykivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 24 and 25 but did not advance.[61]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into northeastern Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[62]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces seized Zarichne (east of Lyman) and advanced east of Yampil.[63]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Novoselivka and toward Derylove and Drobysheve; north of Lyman toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil, in the Serebryanske forest area, and toward Druzhelyubivka on September 24 and 25.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shandryholove.[65]

Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Spokesperson Oleksandr Borodin reported on September 25 that Russian forces are still not conducting assaults with heavy equipment in the Lyman direction due to significant equipment losses.[66] Borodin stated that Russian forces primarily assault in small infantry groups comprised of untrained personnel who receive step-by-step orders from their commanders. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces continue to conduct small group assaults using foliage for concealment but that this tactic will not be viable during Fall and Winter 2025 as the foliage thins out.[67] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using tanks in concealed positions to recreate artillery functions.

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on September 25 that Russian infantry is attempting to bypass Ukrainian forward positions and infiltrate the Ukrainian near rear to engage drone operators and mortar crews in firefights.[68] The NCO stated that Russian infantry is using anti-thermal imaging tents and that Russian forces deploy a thermal imaging drone with the assault units in order to alert infantry when their tents become visible to enemy drones so they take steps to lower the temperature inside the tents and remain undetectable.  

Ukrainian forces struck Russian gasoline distribution centers in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on September 25 indicates that Ukrainian drone operators struck a Russian gasoline distribution center north of occupied Siverskodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast.[69] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on September 25 that the distribution center supplies gas for chemical industrial production, including to the Siverskodonetsk Azot Chemical Plant.[70] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Schastya and Novopskov gasoline distribution centers in unspecified areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed that Ukrainian forces struck occupied Shchastia, Novopskov, Khrustalnyi, and Siverskodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast.[71]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kuzmynivka (south of Siversk).[72]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on September 24 and 25.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Siversk.[74]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces have established "fire control" over Siversk.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate in the Slovyansk direction (west of Siversk).[76] Drone operators of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Dronivka.[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger posted a map claiming that Russian forces seized the remaining few blocks of Chasiv Yar and advanced into central Mykolaivka (both northeast of Kostyantynivka) and within the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[78] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces advanced south of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (south of Kostyantynivka).[79]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar, Novomarkove, Stupochky, and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Katerynivka, Kleban-Byk, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 24 and 25.[80]

Geolocated Russian footage published on September 24 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in central Katerynivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka), southwest of Nelipivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), and northwest of Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka), disproving recent Russian claims that Russian forces advanced in these areas. [81]

The Ukrainian National Police reported that Russian forces struck Kostyantynivka 10 times with KAB-1000 and KAB-250 guided glide bombs on September 25, killing four civilians and injuring 11.[82] The Ukrainian National Police stated that Russian forces also struck Slovyansk (north of Druzhkivka) with one KAB-250 glide bomb and that two Russian first-person view (FPV) drones struck a bus in Serhiivka (northwest of Druzhkivka), injuring four civilians.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Sova drone crew of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces in central Katerynivka.[83] Drone operators of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are striking Ukrainian forces northwest of Rusyn Yar.[84] Drone operators of the Gorynych Anti-Terrorist Unit (Federal Security Service [FSB] Presidential Regiment) are striking Ukrainian positions southwest of Nelipivka and in Ivanopillya (south of Kostyantynivka) and northern Toretsk (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[85] Drone operators of the Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly coordinating artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces north of Chasiv Yar.[86] Elements of the 1065th Airborne (VDV) Artillery Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chasiv Yar.[87] Elements of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the suburbs of Kostyantynivka.[88] Reconnaissance elements of the 14th Artillery Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly coordinating strikes with drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) against Ukrainian forces near Mykolaipillya (southwest of Druzhkivka).[89] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[90]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage posted on September 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[91]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka, Zapovidne, and Dorozhnie on September 24 and 25.[92] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Dobropillya near Mayak and Pankivka; and southeast of Dobropillya near Boikivka and Novotoretske.[93]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shakhove.[94] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment are striking Ukrainian forces north of Shakhove.[95]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk) and Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[96]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Krasnyi Lyman, and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Kozatske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on September 24 and 25.[97]

Geolocated Russian footage published on September 25 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in northern Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk), disproving previous Russian claims that Russian forces held these positions.[98]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone interceptor battery operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to launch small infantry group assaults to gain a foothold in southern Pokrovsk.[99] The battery commander stated that Russian forces have become more active in the Pokrovsk direction compared to several weeks ago and have equipped Gerbera strike drones with cameras to operate as a less expensive alternative to more costly Orlan, ZALA, and Supercam reconnaissance drones.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra Rifle Battalion of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in northern Chunyshyne.[100] Elements of the Storm Special Purpose Detachment of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating on the outskirts of Pokrovsk.[101] Drone operators of the Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[102]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, Yalta, and Dachne; southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka and Myrne on September 24 and 25.[103]

Geolocated Russian footage published on September 24 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in central Filiya, disputing previous Russian claims of advances in this area.[104]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 20 and 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced into central Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka).[105]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve, Oleksandrohrad, and Voskresenka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Novomykolaivka, Vorone, Ternove, and Komyshuvakha; and south of Velykomykhailivka near Novomykolaivka on September 24 and 25.[106] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Berezove (south of Velykomykhailivka).[107]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[108] Drone operators of the Vega Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[109]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske and Novohryhorivka and toward Uspenivka and east of Hulyaipole near Poltavka on September 24 and 25.[110]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against Ukrainian forces in Novohryhorivka.[111]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[112]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on September 24 and 25.[113]

A Russian milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Prymorske and Stepnohirsk.[114]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported on September 25 that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Su-34 fighter-bomber in the Zaporizhia direction as it was conducting a guided glide bomb strike against Zaporizhzhia City.[115] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) appeared to confirm Ukrainian Air Force report.[116]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on September 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces maintain control over the islands in the Dnipro River in the Kakhovka direction (east of Kherson City).[117]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas in the Kherson direction on September 24 and 25.[118]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported on September 25 that Russian forces dropped explosives from a drone onto a hospital in Dniprovskyi Raion, Kherson City, injuring three employees.[119] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian VKS used an unspecified new glide bomb to strike Karantynnyi Island on the night of September 24 to 25.[120] Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on September 25 that Russian forces struck conducted a drone strike against a road in Beryslavskyi Raion, Kherson City on September 22, killing two people.[121]

Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on September 25 that Russian authorities have started to use the Kerch Bridge to transfer fuel to occupied Crimea due to Ukrainian strikes against railways in occupied southern Ukraine that have stopped cargo transports.[122] Pletenchuk reported that fuel shortages are affecting both the civilian population in occupied Crimea as well as the Russian military.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[123] Drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in western Prydniprovske (east of Kherson City).[124] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating near the coast of occupied Crimea.[125]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian aircraft and radars in occupied Crimea on September 24. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 25 that Ukrainian forces struck and damaged two Russian An-26 transport aircraft, an unspecified surface radar station, and a MR-10M1 Mys M1 coastal radar station in occupied Crimea on September 24.[126] Geolocated footage published on September 24 confirmed the strike on the two An-26 aircraft east of occupied Kacha.[127]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 176 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other types of drones—of which about 100 were Shahed-type drones—from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[128] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 150 drones and that 13 drones struck eight locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck energy and residential infrastructure in Sumy, Chernihiv, Vinnytsia, and Kirovohrad oblasts, causing a power outage affecting at least 30,000 energy customers in Nizhynska Hromada, Chernihiv Oblast.[129]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko confirmed on September 25 that the Oreshnik ballistic missile system that Russia plans to deploy in Belarus is “on the way.”[130]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.