Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 24, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on September 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is using nuclear threats to influence US President Donald Trump to stop his efforts to secure peace in Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account on September 23 to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent announcement that Russia is prepared to continue to adhere to the nuclear arms limitations in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for one year after it expires on February 5, 2026.[1] Medvedev stated that the Trump administration must now decide whether it will follow suit. Medvedev claimed that US adherence to the letter of the treaty “is not enough,” however, and that the United States “must give up on weakening Russia with sanctions and tariffs” or else “the risk of direct conflict remains high.” Medvedev’s veiled nuclear threats directly tie US agreement to stop all its economic measures targeting Russia—the main tool that the Trump administration is using to try to bring Putin to the negotiating table to end the war in Ukraine—to Russia's continued adherence to New START or readiness to agree to any future arms control treaties. Medvedev's threats are part of wider Kremlin efforts to delay peace negotiations, use threats to secure Russia’s desired demands in Ukraine, secure concessions that benefit Russia, and deter the United States from supporting Ukraine.

Russia launched a multipronged informational campaign intended to mask Russia's economic weakness that US President Donald Trump recently correctly identified. Kremlin officials responded on September 24 directly and indirectly to Trump's September 23 statement outlining Russia's military shortcomings and economic turmoil.[2] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Trump's statement about how Russia's poor economic situation makes Russia look like a “paper tiger,” claiming that Russia is “more closely associated with a bear” and that “there are no paper bears.”[3] Peskov also explicitly rejected Trump's assertion that Ukraine could retake territory with assistance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).[4] Peskov claimed that Ukraine's military position is significantly worse than in Spring 2022 and that US efforts to “encourage” Ukraine to continue military operations are “misguided.”[5] The Kremlin aims to convince Trump and the West that continuing to support Ukraine and oppose Russia is not viable and that the United States should instead allow Russia to continue its war unimpeded.

The Kremlin launched three distinct narratives in response to Trump's September 23 statement: statements about the Kremlin's continued commitment to its original war aims; claims that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable; and claims that the United States should focus on bilateral US-Russian economic relations. Peskov claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is open to the settlement process to end the war in Ukraine and that Trump “cannot help but see Putin’s openness to this process.”[6] Peskov claimed that the “war is not aimless” but is meant to ensure Russia's security and Russian interests and to eliminate the war's “root causes.”[7] The Kremlin has repeatedly defined the alleged root causes as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers. The Kremlin often uses claims about the root causes to call for Ukraine and the West to give in to Russia's original war aims.[8] Peskov also provided excuses for Putin's disinterest in participating in a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, claiming that a meeting without significant preparation would be a “public relations stunt doomed to fail.”[9] Putin remains uninterested in good faith negotiations that require compromises and is instead making the same demands of Ukraine and the West as he did in late 2021 and February 2022.[10]

Peskov claimed that there is an influx of volunteers joining the Russian military, allowing the Russian military command to fully staff all its units, and that the Russian economy is fully meeting the Russian military's needs.[11] Peskov claimed that Ukraine must “not forget” that its position only worsens with every day that Ukraine refuses to negotiate and that the situation on the frontline is evidence of Ukraine's deteriorating situation.[12] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that Trump's September 23 statements show that Trump is living in an “alternate reality.”[13] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev claimed that Russia’s economy is outperforming those of the EU, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[14] The Kremlin is attempting to frame Russian battlefield victory as inevitable to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate and agree to all of the Kremlin's demands out of fear that Russia has the capacity to sustain and even worsen its aggression.

Peskov claimed that there are a “huge number” of mutually beneficial areas for cooperation between American and Russian businesses and that the Trump administration is “generally business oriented.”[15] Peskov claimed that the Trump administration “cannot help but understand” the benefits of US-Russian trade and economic cooperation and that Russia remains open to the resumption of trade. Peskov stated that US-Russia relations are proceeding much more slowly than Russia would like.[16] The Kremlin has for months been trying to use economic carrots to influence the Trump administration into normalizing US-Russian bilateral relations without concluding the war in Ukraine.[17] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is dangling the prospect of business incentives unrelated to the war to extract concessions from the United States about the war.[18]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated his commitment to engaging in peace negotiations and holding elections in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law. Zelensky stated on September 24 in an interview with Fox News that Ukraine is ready to end the war as soon as possible.[19] Zelensky also reiterated that he is ready to hold elections once a ceasefire is in place and Ukraine has received security guarantees. The Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law explicitly prohibit the government from holding elections during times of martial law, which Ukrainian authorities cannot lift during times of external aggression, such as Russia's full-scale invasion.[20]

Former Ukrainian Command-in-Chief and current Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Kingdom General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on September 24 that Russian forces are adapting technological innovations and ground tactics in an attempt to restore maneuver to the battlefield. Zaluzhnyi stated that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in positional warfare, even as Russian forces continue to make what Zaluzhnyi characterized as “grinding” advances.[21] Zaluzhnyi assessed that Russian drone strikes and innovations have forced Ukrainian forces to disperse their defenses on the frontline, with scattered small infantry groups that must act autonomously. Zaluzhnyi stated that this dispersion is blurring the frontline and that the “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) extends 20 kilometers from the frontline. Zaluzhnyi stated that the dominance of drones is dispersing the battlefield by preventing both sides from concentrating in their near rear and rear areas. Zaluzhnyi noted that Russian forces have developed infiltration tactics to take advantage of the resulting gaps in Ukrainian defenses, most notably near Dobropillya and Kupyansk. Zaluzhnyi also assessed that drones with artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities present a new threat on the battlefield.

ISW recently assessed that Russian forces are integrating drone tactics and adaptations to achieve some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI).[22] ISW assesses that Russian forces are actively targeting Ukrainian training grounds in the near rear with precise missile strikes enabled by improved reconnaissance and are developing drones that are more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and capable of operating at longer distances, higher speeds, and in challenging environments.[23] The Ukrainian Ground Forces reported on September 24 that Russian forces struck a training ground with Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, in line with Zaluzhnyi's and ISW's assessment that Russia's technological innovations are preventing Ukrainian forces from being able to safely concentrate in the rear.[24] Russia is continuing to adapt its drones to be resistant to Ukrainian EW. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on September 24 that some Russian drones do not have any communication channels and are able to navigate and strike targets autonomously.[25] Beskrestnov noted that Ukrainian forces cannot suppress such drones because these drones do not rely on radio frequencies.

Russian jamming originating from Kaliningrad Oblast likely disrupted the GPS on Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles' plane flying to Lithuania on September 24. Spanish news outlet El Mundo reported on September 24 that a plane carrying Robles experienced GPS disruptions while flying in the airspace near Kaliningrad Oblast.[26] El Mundo reported that the plane was flying to Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania and that the pilot was still able to receive military satellite signals during the flight despite the GPS disruptions. An anonymous defense source told Reuters that they did not think that the disruption was targeted and that such disruptions are common on the route.[27] El Mundo reported that a Spanish commander on board similarly downplayed the disruption as a common occurrence. Robles stated that it is essential to defend the right to freely move throughout European territory without experiencing such disruptions.[28] Russia has likely previously jammed the satellite signal of other planes carrying high-ranking European officials, including a jet transporting then-UK Defense Secretary Grant Shapps in March 2024 and a plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on September 1.[29]

Russia is likely using Kaliningrad Oblast for jamming operations due to its proximity to European states. A pro-Ukrainian investigative outlet previously found that Russia was constructing a Circularly Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA), a military grade antenna array designed for radio intelligence or communication, just south of Chernyakhovsk, Kaliningrad Oblast.[30] The CDAA may allow Russia to monitor NATO communications in Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea, communicate with submarines operating in the Baltic Sea or northern Atlantic Ocean, and support passive intelligence gathering.

Ukrainian forces recently conducted a series of aerial and naval drone strikes against Russia and occupied Crimea, including against Russian oil infrastructure and drone production facilities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Gazprom Neftekhim-Salavat petrochemical plant in Salavat, Republic of Bashkortostan on the night of September 23 to 24, hitting the primary oil processing unit and starting a fire.[31] The enterprise reportedly processes up to 10 million tons of oil per year and is a key producer of liquid rocket fuel in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck two oil pumping stations in Volgograd Oblast: Kuzmychi-1 oil pumping station, which transports crude oil to southern Russia, and Zenzevatka oil pumping station, which transports oil through the Kuibyshev-Tikhoretsk main oil pipeline that Russia uses for oil exports through the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.

Geolocated footage published on September 24 shows a likely Ukrainian naval drone exploding at the port of Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai (southeast of Novorossiysk).[32] Additional geolocated footage published on September 24 shows a smoke plume in central Novorossiysk.[33] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed that Ukrainian drones hit central Novorossiysk on the afternoon of September 24.[34] The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) confirmed on September 24 that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged a CPC office in central Novorossiysk, temporarily suspending operations.[35] Bloomberg reported on September 24, citing an unnamed source, that the Sheskharis oil port facility in Novorossiysk also stopped operations.[36] Bloomberg noted that Sheskharis and CPC together export over two million barrels a day of Russian and Kazakh oil to global markets. The Kazakhstan Energy Ministry reported that oil shipments and transportation through Novorossiysk are proceeding as usual.[37]

Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that USF elements conducted a drone strike against drone production facilities near the railway station in Valuyki, Belgorod Oblast on the evening of September 23, causing a large fire.[38] NASA's Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies at Valuyki.[39] A Russian source also claimed that there was an explosion near Belbek and Kacha air bases in occupied Crimea on the morning of September 24, likely due to a Ukrainian drone strike.[40] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on September 24 that Russian air defenses and elements of the Black Sea Fleet shot down 16 Ukrainian drones targeting occupied Sevastopol.[41]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is using nuclear threats to influence US President Donald Trump to stop his efforts to secure peace in Ukraine.
• Russia launched a multipronged informational campaign intended to mask Russia's economic weakness that US President Donald Trump recently correctly identified.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated his commitment to engaging in peace negotiations and holding elections in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law.
• Former Ukrainian Command-in-Chief and current Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Kingdom General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on September 24 that Russian forces are adapting technological innovations and ground tactics in an attempt to restore maneuver to the battlefield.
• Russian jamming originating from Kaliningrad Oblast likely disrupted the GPS on Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles' plane flying to Lithuania on September 24.
• Ukrainian forces recently conducted a series of aerial and naval drone strikes against Russia and occupied Crimea, including against Russian oil infrastructure and drone production facilities.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Pokrovsk and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Pokrovsk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts on September 24 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and near Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[42]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne and Yunakivka, on September 23 and 24.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yunakivka and Kindrativka.[44]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) from Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) to assault on Kindrativka.[45] The milblogger observed that the Russian military command deployed elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to relieve the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade in Oleksiivka a few days prior. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command did not provide the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade with sufficient time to rest and recuperate prior to the redeployment to Kindrativka.[46] The milblogger amplified a refutation of claims that commanders of the first battalion of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) drink heavily and cautioned against relying on reports from Russian infantry.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[47] Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly operating in southern Oleksiivka.[48]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Tykhe on September 23 and 24.[49]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Bati Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove, Khatnie, and Ambarne and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on September 23 and 24.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced and consolidated positions in northwestern Kupyansk.[52]

Russian forces continued ground assaults near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Doroshivka, Kindrashivka, and Zapadne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kotlyarivka on September 23 and 24.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova toward Kolisnykivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 24 but did not advance.[54]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Torske (east of Lyman).[55]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of and into eastern Novoselivka, to the outskirts of Drobysheve (both northwest of Lyman), north of Stavky (north of Lyman), west of Zarichne (east of Lyman), and near Yampil.[56]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Serednie, and Novoselivka and toward Derylove and Drobysheve; north of Lyman toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on September 23 and 24.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shandryholove.[58]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on September 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Novoselivka (east of Siversk).[59]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized a mine north of Siversk and advanced near Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[60]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk near Pereizne on September 23 and 24.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Siversk.[62]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on September 23 that Russian forces in the Siversk direction did not conduct ground assaults or active reconnaissance on September 22 to focus on strengthening logistics, including replenishing ammunition and rotating troops using motorcycles.[63] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces in the Siversk direction try to assault Ukrainian drone launch points with small group infiltration tactics, attack on motorcycles, and wear anti-thermal imaging cloaks to hide from Ukrainian drone strikes.[64] The spokesperson added that Russian forces in this direction use first-person view (FPV), hexacopter, and fiberoptic drones as well as unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to support infantry assaults. A Ukrainian drone operator operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian efforts to accumulate forces in the summer of 2025 failed due to Ukrainian drone interdiction, and that the intensity of fighting in the direction will likely increase into the fall and winter of 2025 due to falling temperatures, which the drone operator stated may also allow drone batteries to last longer.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces northwest of Vyimka.[66] Drone operators of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces near Novoselivka.[67] Drone operators of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces in Dronivka.[68]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[69]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces enveloped a tactical Ukrainian pocket near the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (southeast of Kostyantynivka) and are clearing the area.[70]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka, Kleban-Byk, Shcherbynivka, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 23 and 24.[71]

Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces are focusing on improving logistics in the Kramatorsk direction (northeast of Kostyantynivka) in Chasiv Yar and Stupochky and are rotating in elements of the 70th Naval Infantry Brigade (possibly referring to a newly formed unit).[72] The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian battalion reported that Russian forces have shifted their tactics from prioritizing small group reconnaissance and infiltration tactics in early August 2025 to more actively attacking in small assault groups with heavy drone and artillery support.[73] The chief sergeant reported that Russian forces have significantly increased their use of reconnaissance and strike first-person view (FPV) drones. The chief sergeant reported that Russian forces are concentrating manpower to attack along roads, which allows Russian forces to more easily transport ammunition and provisions in poor weather because they rely on wheeled vehicles.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions near Ivanopillya.[74] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[75] Drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) and reconnaissance elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces near Volodymyrivka.[76]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advance: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces withdrew from Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya).[77]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of and to central Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[78] Russian milbloggers claimed that Boikivka (southeast of Dobropillya) is a contested “gray zone.”[79]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and toward Dorozhnie on September 23 and 24.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Boikivka and Mayak (southeast of Dobropillya).[81]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company and reconnaissance elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment are striking Ukrainian forces near Shakhove.[82]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 23 and 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Kozatske (east of Pokrovsk) and into eastern Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk) and that Russian forces likely do not hold positions within Novopavlivka.[83]

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on September 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within western Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[84]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, Krasnyi Lyman, Sukhetske, and Myrolyubivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Promin, and Kozatske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne and Shevchenko and toward Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on September 23 and 24.[85] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne.[86]

An intelligence officer of a Ukrainian Special Forces (SSO) unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue attritional assaults and attempt to infiltrate Ukrainian positions on foot in small groups of one to two infantrymen at night.[87] The officer added that Russian forces rarely attack during the day and wear anti-thermal imaging cloaks to hide from Ukrainian strikes at night.

A Russian milblogger accused another milblogger of exaggerating Russian claims in and around Pokrovsk.[88]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Novokhatske and Horikhove and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne on September 23 and 24.[89]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka, Sichneve, Novoselivka, and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Ternove, Vorone, Komyshuvakha, Novomykolaivka, and Novoheorhiivka on September 23 and 24.[90]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are conducting thermobaric strikes against Ukrainian forces near Berezove (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[91]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novoivanivka, Olhivske, and Novomykhailivka and toward Uspenivka, Novovasylivske, and Novohryhorivka and east of Hulyaipole near Poltavka on September 23 and 24.[92]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on September 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southwestern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[93]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Prymorske (west of Orikhiv) and along the M-18 Zaporizhzhia City-Melitopol highway between Prymorske (west of Orikhiv).[94]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and Prymorske on September 23 and 24.[95]

Geolocated Russian footage published on September 23 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces northeast of Kamyanske, indicating that Russian forces no longer claim to have advances in the fields northeast of Kamyanske.[96]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are striking Ukrainian forces northeast of Kamyanske.[97] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mala Tokmachka.[98] Elements of the 108th and 247th VDV regiments (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske.[99] Drone operators of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Zaporizhia Oblast.[100]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on September 24 but did not advance.[101]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are accumulating and regrouping in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast between the Konka River, occupied Oleshky, and the Antonivsky road bridge (all east of Kherson City) to attack toward the Antonivsky road bridge.[102] Voloshyn added that Russian forces are fortifying positions in east bank Kherson Oblast.

A local Kherson Telegram channel reported on September 24 that Russian forces used North Korean-supplied cluster munitions to shell Tsentralnyi and Korabelnyi raions in Kherson City.[103]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 23 to 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 152 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other types of drones—of which about 80 were Shahed-type drones—from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[104] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck energy and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City, causing a power outage affecting at least 80,000 energy customers in Kharkiv City.[105]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.