Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 14, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on September 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A Russian drone entered Romanian airspace on the night of September 13, days after a Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10. Romanian Defense Minister Ionuț Moșteanu reported on September 13 that Romanian forces scrambled two F-16 fighter jets from the 86th Air Base near Fetești after a Romanian radar detected a Russian drone in Romanian airspace at 1823 local time.[1] Moșteanu stated that Romania faces “provocations from Russia” nearly every week. Romanian Foreign Minister Oana-Silvia Țoiu stated that the F-16s tracked the drone until it left Romanian airspace without causing any damage or casualties 50 minutes after the moment of entry.[2] Toiu noted that two allied German Eurofighter jets were ready to aid Romanian forces, condemned the attack as “unacceptable and reckless,” and stated that Romania will take the necessary measures to protect Romanian sovereignty and security. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Russian drone flight paths are ”always calculated” and that the drone did not accidentally enter the Romanian airspace due to a mistake or actions of lower-level commanders.[3] This is Russia’s second incursion into NATO airspace over the course of four days. The Romanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided data to ABC News on September 14 indicating that Russian drones have penetrated Romanian airspace 11 times since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, inclusive of the September 13 incursion.”[4] The Romanian MoD noted that Russian drones have conducted about 50 drone strikes near the Ukrainian-Romanian border since February 2022, including 30 strikes in which drone debris fell on Romanian territory.

Poland authorized NATO reinforcements to deploy to Poland for Operation Eastern Sentry in response to the September 9 to 10 Russian drone incursion into Polish territory. Polish President Karol Nawrocki signed a decree on September 14 authorizing NATO to deploy another foreign contingent to Poland as reinforcements, specifically in support of the Operation Eastern Sentry.[5] NATO announced the start of Operation Eastern Sentry on September 12, and NATO officials noted that the intent of the operation is to reinforce NATO's eastern flank, including Poland, following the Russian drone incursion and violation of NATO airspace.[6] Polish and NATO allied aircraft scrambled, and Poland's ground-based air defense systems were activated to the highest possible readiness again in response to Russian drone strikes against Ukrainian border regions overnight on September 13 to 14.[7] NATO and member state officials have continued denouncing the Russian drone incursion into Poland and reiterated that the drone incursion was likely intentional, as ISW continues to assess.[8] Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources have continued deflecting blame for the drone incursion and downplaying NATO states reactions to the drone incursion.[9] ISW continues to assess that Russia is likely attempting to gauge NATO's capabilities and reactions to the drone incursion in hopes of applying lessons learned to possible future conflicts against the NATO alliance.[10]

Russian and Belarusian forces continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 14 that Russian and Belarusian forces conducted several naval exercises as part of Zapad-2025, including training to use Bal coastal missile systems and Uran cruise missiles to strike simulated enemies and ships in the Barents Sea, and launch a Ka-27 naval helicopter from the Udaloy-class anti-submarine destroyer Severomorsk.[11] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Baltic Fleet practiced emergency rescue assistance to surface ships.[12] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces conducted several joint aviation exercises, including training to conduct long-range Il-76 military transport aircraft flights behind enemy lines, use Ka-52M and Mi-28NM combat helicopters to provide fire support for air assault landings, and fly MiG-31 interceptor aircraft with Kinzhal ballistic missiles to strike enemy targets.[13] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Su-34 fighter-bomber crews practiced conducting air strikes.[14] The Belarusian MoD claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces practiced conducting reconnaissance; counter-sabotage operations; relocating a command post; recapturing a defense infrastructure facility from a hostile formation; defending against forces crossing a river; operating drones, including quadcopter and first-person view (FPV) drones; operating the Kvadrat and Sprint satellite communications systems; and coordinating with military command.[15] Footage published on September 14 purportedly shows a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile system deployed in Kaliningrad Oblast as part of the Zapad-2025 exercises.[16] Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno geolocated the footage to the E28 Kaliningrad-Elblag highway about 35 kilometers from the Polish border.[17] Russia permanently deployed Iskander-M systems to Kaliningrad Oblast in 2018.[18]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the Zapad-2025 exercises are training exercises to prepare for war against NATO.[19] The milblogger claimed that Russia is one of the only countries with experience in modern warfare and that Russia should share its lessons learned in Ukraine with other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies, or "at least" to Belarus. Russia previously used the September 2021 Zapad-2021 exercises to prepare and secure logistics that were crucial for Russia's initial offensives into northern Ukraine at the start of the invasion.[20]

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike and sabotage campaign against Russian oil, gas, railway, and military infrastructure in Russia and occupied Crimea on the night of September 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 14 that elements of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck the Kirishi Oil Refinery in Leningrad Oblast on the night of September 13 to 14.[21] The Ukrainian USF stated that the refinery is the second largest in Russia after the Omsk Oil Refinery, with an annual capacity of over 20 million tons of oil.[22] The Ukrainian USF stated that the refinery produces about 80 varieties of petroleum products and supplies the Russian Armed Forces. Geolocated footage published on September 14 shows a fire at the refinery’s primary oil distillation unit.[23] A source within Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on September 13 that GUR drone units conducted the September 13 strike against the Bashneft-Novoil Oil Refinery in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, and that preliminary data indicates that explosions at the refinery caused significant damage to a vacuum column essential for primary oil processing.[24] GUR sources told Suspilne on September 14 that GUR units conducted an overnight drone strike against the Metafrax Chemical Plant in Gubakha, Perm Krai — a producer of chemicals that Russian defense industrial facilities use to manufacture explosives — and that preliminary data indicates that the strike damaged urea production equipment.[25] Geolocated footage published on September 13 shows a fire at the Metafrac Chemical Plant.[26] Perm Krai Head Dmitry Makhonin claimed on September 14 that a Ukrainian drone struck an industrial facility in Gubakha.[27]

Ukrainian intelligence sources told Suspilne on September 14 that GUR and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) units planted an explosive device on a section of the Kursk City-Oryol City railway between Maloarkhangelsk and Glazunovka, Oryol Oblast.[28] Oryol Oblast Governor Andrey Klychkov claimed on September 14 that Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) servicemen attempted to defuse the device on September 13 when it detonated, killing three servicemen.[29] The intelligence sources stated that the explosion destroyed the railway roadbed and fuel tanks.[30] Russian Railways claimed on September 14 that the explosion delayed 17 trains.[31] The intelligence sources stated that GUR and SSO units also detonated a section of the St. Petersburg-Pskov railway between Stroganovo and Mshinskaya in Leningrad Oblast overnight, derailing a train and destroying 15 fuel tanks.[32] The sources added that both railway sections are crucial logistical routes for Russian forces fighting in the Kharkiv and Sumy directions. Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko claimed on September 14 that a train with 15 cars derailed in Luzhsky Raion, Leningrad Oblast.[33]

The Ukrainian Navy reported on September 14 that unspecified naval units struck the Russian Black Sea Fleet communications center at the 184th Scientific and Research Experimental Base in Sevastopol, occupied Crimea, on the night of September 10 to 11.[34] Geolocated satellite imagery taken on September 14 shows damage to two buildings at the communications center.[35]

The Kremlin is facing a massive budget deficit and may increase consumer taxes to compensate for the deficit rather than decreasing funding for its war machine, passing the economic costs off as a sacrifice that the Russian population must accept to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. Several Russian government sources told Russian opposition outlet The Bell on September 11 that the Russian government is considering increasing the Value-Added Tax (VAT), a federal tax imposed on most Russian goods and services domestically, from 20 to 22 percent in the near future due to large federal budget deficits.[36] The Russian government could generate an additional one trillion rubles annually (roughly $11.9 billion), or 0.5 percent of Russia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), by increasing the VAT to 22 percent. This tax increase would functionally remove money from the Russian population as businesses pass most tax increases onto consumers by raising the costs of goods and services. The Russian Ministry of Finance reported on September 9 that the Russian federal budget deficit for January to August 2025 amounted to 4.2 trillion rubles (roughly $50 billion), well exceeding its planned 3.8 trillion-ruble (roughly $45 billion) deficit for all of 2025.[37] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously claimed that Russia’s military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $160 billion), much of which is likely contributing to the Russian federal budget deficit.[38] This 6.3 percent of GDP notably does not include Russia's investments in its defense industrial base (DIB) production. The Kremlin, on the contrary, offered Russian small drone producers a zero VAT rate in late July 2025.[39]

Increasing the VAT could reverse any progress the Russian Central Bank may have made against inflation while also failing to address any of the issues that will likely arise from prematurely lowering the key interest rate. A Kremlin source claimed to Reuters in late August 2025 that increasing the VAT is the only way for the Russian government to address the federal budget deficit.[40] The Russian government last increased the VAT in 2019 from 18 to 20 percent, which the Russian Central Bank reported caused inflation to rise by 0.55 to 0.7 percentage points.[41] The Russian Central Bank has been combating inflation for the last year and has lowered its key interest rate from 21 percent to 18 percent gradually since June 2025, likely a reaction to the opinion that the Russian Central Bank's counter-inflationary measures were succeeding.[42] An increase in VAT will likely cause inflation to rise while simultaneously lowering cash flow in the Russian economy, weakening consumer purchasing power and further stagnating Russian economic growth.[43] Putin has unintentionally created an economic situation from which Russia will struggle to escape by adopting policies aimed at increasing Russian society's reliance on military spending by heavily investing in Russia’s DIB, all while Russian society faces labor and gasoline shortages, broader demographic issues, and declining savings.

Key Takeaways:

• A Russian drone entered Romanian airspace on the night of September 13, days after a Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10.
• Poland authorized NATO reinforcements to deploy to Poland for Operation Eastern Sentry in response to the September 9 to 10 Russian drone incursion into Polish territory.
• Russian and Belarusian forces continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises.
• Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike and sabotage campaign against Russian oil, gas, railway, and military infrastructure in Russia and occupied Crimea on the night of September 13 to 14.
• The Kremlin is facing a massive budget deficit and may increase consumer taxes to compensate for the deficit rather than decreasing funding for its war machine, passing the economic costs off as a sacrifice that the Russian population must accept to support Russia’s war in Ukraine.
• Increasing the VAT could reverse any progress the Russian Central Bank may have made against inflation while also failing to address any of the issues that will likely arise from prematurely lowering the key interest rate.
• Russian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for reports about Ukrainian strikes in Russia and occupied Ukraine.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on September 13 and 14.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka.[45]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are able to relieve elements of the 237th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) in Yunakivka but that the Russian military command refuses to transfer out forces operating within the settlement until Russian forces seize Yunakivka.[46] The milblogger noted that the Russian military command needs more manpower to seize Yunakivka. The milblogger claimed that Russian military command committed an unspecified battalion of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) to Yunakivka to help seize the settlement. The milblogger noted that the 51st VDV Regiment's area of responsibility is near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City) but that elements of the regiment are unable to advance near Sadky because Ukrainian forces firmly control nearby forested areas. The milblogger criticized the Russian military command’s decision to redeploy the most combat-capable Russian forces — referring to VDV and naval infantry forces — from Kursk and Belgorod oblasts to eastern Ukraine.[47]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Yunakivka area.[48]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on September 13 and 14 but did not advance.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Ambarne and east of Velykyi Burluk toward Odradne on September 13 and 14 but did not advance.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the northeastern outskirts of Kupyansk and in western and central Kupyansk.[51]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove and Kindrativka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka and toward Petro-Ivanivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kindrativka and toward Podoly; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on September 13 and 14.[52]

The Ukrainian 10th Army Corps reported on September 14 that Ukrainian forces continue counter-sabotage operations in and near Kupyansk following recent Russian attempts to infiltrate into Kupyansk using an underground pipeline.[53] The Ukrainian 10th Army Corps reported that Ukrainian forces exercise fire control over the pipeline's exit that Russian forces used to advance and that three out of four pipelines in the Kupyansk area are damaged or flooded, suggesting that Russian forces will only be able to use a single pipeline for such operations. Ukrainian sources reported on September 12 that Russian forces attempted to advance behind Ukrainian positions in Kupyansk using a pipeline with an entrance near Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk) and exit near Radkivka (immediately north of Kupyansk) and that Ukrainian drone strikes have since rendered this pipeline impassable.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 14.[55]

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on September 13 that Russian forces struck Borova with guided glide bombs and multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) that damaged residential infrastructure, injured two people, and killed one person.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[57]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Derylove; north of Lyman toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and the Serebryanske forest area on September 13 and 14.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Stavky toward Zarichne and Kolodyazi and near Novomykhailivka (north of Lyman).[59]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[60] Drone elements of the 59th Tank Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Regiment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Karpivka (northwest of Lyman).[61]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on September 13 and 14.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serebryanka.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 79th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and of a reconnaissance company of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, near Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka), and west of Oleksandro-Shultyne (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[65] A Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces seized Kleban Byk and claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions east and south of the settlement.[66]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Mayske, Chervone, and Mykolaivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne, Bila Hora, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka, Nelipivka, Shcherbynivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Kleban Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 13 and 14.[67] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kostyantynivka.[68]

The Ukrainian National Police reported on September 14 that Russian forces conducted 21 strikes in Kostyantynivka in the last day, including with glide bombs, multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRSs), artillery, and drones, and killed four civilians and wounded 10.[69]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Mykolaivka and Chervone.[70] Reconnaissance elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], SMD) are coordinating strikes against Ukrainian positions near Nelipivka with the 238th Artillery Brigade and drone operators of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (both of the 8th CAA).[71] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar.[72] Elements of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly coordinating strikes against Ukrainian positions near Stepanivka with elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade.[73] Drone operators of the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Druzhkivka.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Fedorivka on September 13 and 14 but did not advance.[75]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 14 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the fields east of Kozatske (east of Pokrovsk).[76]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novoekonomichne, east of Myrnohrad (both east of Pokrovsk), and east and southeast of Troyanda (south of Pokrovsk).[77]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Fedorivka and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Mykolaivka, Promin, Novoekonomichne, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novopavlivka; south of Novoukrainka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Molodetske, Kotlyne, and Leontovychi and toward Novopidhorodne on September 13 and 14.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Udachne.[79]

The Ukrainian 7th Air Assault Corps reported on September 14 that Ukrainian drones disabled a Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system six kilometers behind the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction and published footage of the strike.[80] The 7th Air Assault Corps reported that Russian forces withdrew the system for repair.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste and toward Ivanivka on September 13 and 14.[81]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne, east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka, and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Maliivka, Berezove, Ternove, and Komyshuvakha on September 13 and 14.[82]

Geolocated footage published on September 14 shows two Russian soldiers tearing down a Ukrainian flag in southern Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka), likely as part of an infiltration mission into Andriivka-Klevtsove.[83] ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have established enduring positions within Andriivka-Klevtsove or that Russian forces have changed the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Novomykolaivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[84]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Obratne and east of and into eastern Novoivanivka (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[85]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske and Temyrivka and toward Poltavka and Novoivanivka on September 13 and 14.[86]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 35th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological, and Chemical Defense Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly targeting Ukrainian vehicles on ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and struck six cars in Zaporizhia Oblast.[87]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within eastern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[88]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and toward Stepnohirsk on September 14.[89]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 14 that GUR Special Forces destroyed a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system near occupied Oleksandrivka (southeast of Orikhiv).[90]

A Russian detachment commander operating in the Zaporizhia direction rejected Ukrainian reports of a Russian troop buildup in Zaporizhia Oblast.[91] The commander claimed that Russian forces are conducting an active defense rather than a large-scale offensive due to a limited number of Russian troops in this direction.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Chechen 270th Akhmat-Kavkaz Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[92] Drone operators of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction.[93]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on September 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on September 13 and 14.[94]

Russian milbloggers published footage on September 13 and 14 reportedly showing Russian forces in the Kherson direction using a Molniya-2 drone with fiber optic cables and claimed that the drone has a range of up to 20 kilometers.[95]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 127th Reconnaissance Brigade (reportedly of the 18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near the Antonivskyi railway bridge (east of Kherson City).[96]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 13 and 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile, and 58 Shahed, Gerbera, and other unspecified drones from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[97] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed and suppressed 52 drones and that six drones and one missile struck three locations in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on September 14 that Russian forces conducted a "double tap" first-person view (FPV) drone strike against emergency workers in Synelnykivskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[98]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.