Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 12, 2025

September 12, 2025, 9:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on September 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian and Belarusian forces began joint Zapad-2025 military exercises on September 12 for the first time since Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Belarusian and Russian officials reported that the Zapad-2025 exercise will occur in Russia and Belarus, including Belarus' Vitebsk, Minsk, and Grodno oblasts, and in the Baltic and Barents seas from September 12 to September 16.[i] Belarusian military officials indicated that Russian and Belarusian forces are using the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground in Barysaw, Minsk Oblast for the Zapad-2025 exercises.[ii] Belarusian Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister Major General Pavel Muraveiko stated on September 12 that the Zapad-2025 exercises consist of two stages: the first stage consists of air and ground defense operations, and the second stage consists of clearing territory of enemy forces and conducting counteroffensive operations.[iii] Belarusian and Russian officials have not publicly confirmed how many troops are participating in Zapad-2025. Lithuanian Second Operational Services Department Head Colonel Mindaugas Mazonas reported on August 25 that 30,000 total Russian and Belarusian troops will participate in the Zapad-2025 exercises, but noted that only 8,000 of these troops will actually be within Belarus.[iv] Mazonas stated that of these 8,000 troops exercising in Belarus, 2,000 will be Russian and 6,000 will be Belarusian soldiers.

Elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), including its 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD), and the 71st Motorized Rifle Division (reportedly formerly the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly arrived in Belarus in May 2025 and August 2025 to participate in Zapad-2025.[v] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division recently participated in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) joint military exercises in northern Belarus in early September 2025, and it is unclear if these units remained in Belarus for Zapad-2025.[vi] ISW has observed elements of the 98th VDV Division operating largely near Chasiv Yar and Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast since at least April 2023.[vii] Elements of the Belarusian 19th Mechanized Brigade, 120th Mechanized Brigade, 336th Rocket Artillery Brigade, and 116th Assault Air Base, along with other unspecified elements of the Northwestern and Western operational commands and Air Force and Air Defense Forces, are reportedly participating in the Zapad-2025 exercises.[viii] Russia and Belarus have historically conducted Zapad joint exercises biannually but canceled the Zapad-2023 exercises, very likely due to Russia's equipment and manpower requirements for its war in Ukraine.[ix] The Zapad-2025 exercises are notably much smaller than the Zapad-2021 exercises, which involved roughly 200,000 total Russian and Belarusian personnel.[x]

Russia and Belarus may have walked back efforts to use Zapad-2025 to support nuclear saber-rattling operations against the West, at least temporarily. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin claimed in early August 2025 that the Zapad-2025 exercises would focus on the use of nuclear weapons and Oreshnik missiles in response to militarization on Belarus's western and northern borders and as part of strategic deterrence.[xi] Belarusian officials have significantly softened their rhetoric in recent days, however, potentially in response to increased tension with NATO due to the September 9-10 Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace. Belarusian Security Council Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich claimed on September 12 that the Zapad-2025 exercises are “purely defensive in nature” and that their goal is “to work out issues related to ensuring the military security of the Union State.”[xii] Volfovich claimed that Russia and Belarus moved the exercises "deep inside" Belarus, "far from the state borders," and claimed that the Belarusian military communicated their plans for the exercises with the West. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 11 that the Zapad-2025 exercises "are not aimed against anyone," but that Russia and Belarus need to practice force integration.[xiii] These statements are a notable walking back of prior comments ahead of the Zapad-2025 exercises. ISW continues to assess that Russia does not seek nuclear escalation and that Russia’s use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely.[xiv] Russia and Belarus may assess that nuclear saber-rattling efforts would be unwise due to NATO's developing response to the September 9-10 drone incursion.

Belarusian and Russian officials blamed Poland for overreacting to the threat of Russian aggression in response to Poland's decision to close its border with Belarus due to Zapad-2025. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced the border closure on September 9, citing security concerns related to the Zapad-2025 exercises, and the border closed indefinitely on September 12.[xv] A Belarusian customs official told Belarusian state news agency Belta on September 12 that the border between Belarus and Poland experienced significantly higher traffic than normal ahead of the border closure.[xvi] Belta published images purportedly of Polish authorities installing barbed wire along the border following the border closure.[xvii] The Belarusian State Border Committee claimed that Belarus is ready to increase traffic through checkpoints on the Latvian and Lithuanian borders in response to the Polish border closure.[xviii] The Belarusian State Border Committee also claimed that Belarus does not plan to close its border checkpoints with Poland.[xix] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Poland of ignoring the fact that Russia and Belarus moved maneuver exercises away from the border with Poland and reduced the number of personnel and military equipment in the exercise as signs of goodwill, and the fact that Belarus invited representatives from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including Poland, to observe the exercises. Belarusian and Russian officials are downplaying aggressive posturing against NATO in order to claim that NATO does not need to prepare defenses against Russia or Belarus. Belarus has previously weaponized its border with Poland to instigate crises within the EU, most notably in November 2021 when Belarus attempted to force thousands of migrants across the Polish border as part of the Kremlin-backed effort to pressure the EU.[xx]

NATO announced the Eastern Sentry operation on September 12 in response to the Russian drones that violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and US Commander of European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Alexus Grynkewich announced that NATO is launching the Eastern Sentry operation to bolster NATO's eastern flank and that it will involve assets from Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other NATO allies.[xxi] Grynkewich stated that the immediate focus of this operation is Poland, but that "this situation transcends the borders of one nation" as "what affects one Ally affects us all." Grynkewich stated that the operation will integrate air and ground-based defenses, increase information sharing among NATO allies, incorporate unspecified enhanced capabilities, and strengthen NATO posturing to protect the Alliance. Grynkewich also stated that NATO will rapidly test and field new technologies, including counter-drone sensors and systems, during Eastern Sentry. Rutte stated that NATO is a defensive Alliance and reiterated that Russia's behavior toward Poland was "reckless" and "deeply dangerous."[xxii] Rutte stated that NATO must make clear its resolve and ability to defend its territory in response to Russia's violation of NATO airspace. ISW assessed that Russia likely launched the drones into Polish airspace in part to gauge NATO's capabilities and reactions in order to apply lessons learned to potential conflict scenarios with NATO.[xxiii]

The Russian Central Bank likely prematurely lowered its key interest rate for the third time since June 2025 in an attempt to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability. The lowering of the key interest rate will likely continue to exacerbate Russia’s economic instability. The Russian Central Bank announced on September 12 that it lowered its key interest rate from 18 to 17 percent.[xxiv] The Central Bank previously lowered its key interest rate from a record 22-year high of 21 percent to 20 percent in June 2025 and lowered it again to 18 percent in July 2025.[xxv] The Central Bank claimed that officials measured annual inflation at 8.2 percent as of September 8 and forecasted that annual inflation in Russia will decline to between six and seven percent for the remainder of 2025 and four percent for 2026. The Central Bank acknowledged that the Russian economy is still highly susceptible to pro-inflationary rises associated with high inflation expectations and deteriorating Russian foreign trade. The Central Bank’s decision to lower the key interest rate will likely adversely affect the Russian economy and raise inflation by weakening consumer purchasing power, devaluing the ruble in the medium-to long-term and creating deeper macroeconomic instability.[xxvi]

Ukraine’s partners continue to sanction Russia. The United Kingdom announced on September 12 that it introduced 100 new sanctions targeting the Russian military sector and illicit shadow fleet.[xxvii] The UK sanctions targeted 30 entities and individuals that supply key equipment to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB), including electronics, chemicals, and explosives that Russia uses to manufacture missiles and other weapons systems. The United Kingdom sanctioned 70 additional ships connected to Russia's shadow fleet. Japan announced on September 12 that it expanded sanctions against Russia, freezing the assets of 14 individuals and 51 organizations, including Russian officials, company executives, and pro-Russian fighters in Ukraine.[xxviii] Japan lowered the current oil price cap from $60 to $47.60 per barrel in alignment with the recent EU price cap on Russian crude oil. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters reported on September 12 that New Zealand is also lowering the price cap on Russian crude oil from $60 to $47.60 per barrel and sanctioned Russian actors involved in cyber-attacks against Ukraine.[xxix] EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas reported on September 12 that the EU extended its sanctions on Russia.[xxx] Additional Western sanctions targeting Russian oil revenues will likely exacerbate greater economic challenges that can degrade Russia’s long-term ability to continue its war in Ukraine.

Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Leningrad and Smolensk oblasts on the night of September 11 to 12. A source within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on September 12 that the SBU conducted drone strikes against the port of Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, Russia’s largest Baltic Sea oil port, starting fires on a ship in the port and at the pumping station that forced port authorities to suspend oil shipments.[xxxi] The SBU source assessed that Russia transports roughly 60 million tons of oil worth $15 billion through the port per year. The source stated that the SBU also struck the NPS-3, NPS Andreapol, and NPS-7 oil pumping stations of the Transneft Baltic Pipeline System-2 that supply crude oil to the port of Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast. Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed on September 12 that Russian air defenses downed over 30 Ukrainian drones over Leningrad Oblast overnight and that authorities extinguished fires on a ship in the port of Primorsk and at a pumping station.[xxxii] Geolocated footage published on September 11 shows fires after a drone strike on a Lukoil oil depot in Kardymovo, Smolensk Oblast.[xxxiii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 42 drones over Smolensk Oblast overnight.[xxxiv]

US senators Lindsey Graham, Richard Blumenthal, Katie Britt, and Amy Klobuchar introduced a bill to the US Senate on September 11 to facilitate the return of Ukrainian children that Russia deported. The bill proposes that the United States label Russia and Belarus as state sponsors of terrorism if they refuse to return the more than 19,000 Ukrainian children that Russia illegally deported during the war.[xxxv] The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab notably believes that Russia has illegally deported upwards of 35,000 Ukrainian children, however.[xxxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and Belarusian forces began the joint Zapad-2025 military exercises on September 12 for the first time since Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Russia and Belarus may have walked back efforts to use Zapad-2025 to support nuclear saber-rattling operations against the West, at least temporarily.
• Belarusian and Russian officials blamed Poland for overreacting to the threat of Russian aggression in response to Poland's decision to close its border with Belarus due to Zapad-2025.
• NATO announced the Eastern Sentry operation on September 12 in response to the Russian drones that violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10.
• The Russian Central Bank likely prematurely lowered its key interest rate for the third time since June 2025 in an attempt to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability. The lowering of the key interest rate will likely continue to exacerbate Russia’s economic instability.
• Ukraine’s partners continue to sanction Russia.
• Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Leningrad and Smolensk oblasts on the night of September 11 to 12.
• US senators Lindsey Graham, Richard Blumenthal, Katie Britt, and Amy Klobuchar introduced a bill to the US Senate on September 11 to facilitate the return of Ukrainian children that Russia deported.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Velykomykhailivka, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in northern Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne, Yablunivka, and Yunakivka on September 11 and 12.[xxxvii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and Varachyne.[xxxviii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction reported that Russian offensive activity has decreased in Sumy Oblast due to successful Ukrainian defensive operations.[xxxix] The spokesperson stated that an unspecified Russian motorized rifle regiment and two airborne (VDV) regiments are currently conducting assaults within the Ukrainian brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) using small fire teams of four infantrymen without armored vehicles. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have recently started using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to conduct logistics to support ground assaults.

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that new Northern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov is no better than his predecessor Colonel General Alexander Lapin and that Nikiforov’s main ambition is to receive the Hero of Russia honorary title.[xl] The milblogger claimed that the only qualifications to receive this title are to be a ”mediocre” general and to send Russian servicemen into highly attritional assaults without care for casualties. The milblogger claimed that the situation for Russian forces near Kindrativka and Yunakivka is deteriorating and that the Russian military command denied a request from elements of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) to withdraw to more favorable positions north of the reservoir that is north of Kindrativka and Yunakivka.[xli] The milblogger claimed that these Russian forces are already retreating but are unable to prepare new defensive positions in the area because of the unorganized retreat.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[xlii] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) and the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division), are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[xliii] Drone operators of the Russian 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast with Molniya-2 drones.[xliv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xlv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on September 11 and 12.[xlvi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[xlvii] Drone operators of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion and 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vovchansk.[xlviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and east of Velykyi Burluk toward Odradne on September 11 and 12.[xlix] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ambarne.[l]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Kurylivka and Pishchane on September 11 and 12.[li] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[lii]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Ukrainian forces maintain full control of Kupyansk but that Russian forces frequently assault the area.[liii] The commander stated that Russian forces are attempting to enter Kupyansk by crossing the Oskil River on makeshift watercraft and cannot use pontoon crossings. The commander stated that Russian forces continue efforts to infiltrate Kupyansk dressed in civilian clothes to take propaganda pictures and artificially inflate Russian advances into Kupyansk. ISW uses the US Army doctrinal definition of control - “a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations,” and the commander’s reports are consistent with ISW observations.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on September 11 and 12.[liv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage posted on September 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Stavky (north of Lyman).[lv]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Derylove, and Serednie and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and the Serebryanske forest area on September 11 and 12.[lvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kolodyazi.[lvii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are using infiltration tactics and hiding in basements to wait for reinforcements.[lviii] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces use drones to supply these Russian forces. The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian and Russian forces are fighting to hang their respective flags on the church in Zarichne. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are increasingly attempting to infiltrate into the Ukrainian near rear and bypass Ukrainian forward positions.[lix] The NCO reported that Russian forces aim to reach the positions of Ukrainian mortar and drone crews to engage these crews with small arms and neutralize them.

Order of Battle: Elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[lx]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; and southeast of Serebryanka near Vyimka on September 11 and 12.[lxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serebryanka.[lxii]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on September 11 that Ukrainian forces repelled a roughly reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in the Siversk direction consisting of two tanks, three armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 11 motorcycles on September 10.[lxiii] Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces are more active north of Siversk in the Serebryanske forest area because they are trying to bypass Siversk as opposed to assaulting it head-on. Zaporozhets reported on September 12 that Russian forces are intensifying activity to establish a foothold near Siversk before the rainy season.[lxiv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Sofiivka and east of Volodymyrivka (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxv]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Mayske (north of Kostyantynivka); north of Oleksandro-Shultyne and Nelipivka (both southeast of Kostyantynivka); and further east of Volodymyrivka than what available geolocated footage indicates.[lxvi]

Russian forces attacked north of Kostyantynivka near Mayske; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka, Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 11 and 12.[lxvii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk (southeast of Kostyantynivka) direction stated that drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are attempting to interdict the logistics of Ukrainian brigades defending in the area.[lxviii]

A Russian milblogger claimed on September 12 that Russian forces used a first-person view (FPV) drone to strike central Kramatorsk (northwest of Kostyantynivka) for the first time and that Russian forces can strike targets within 20 to 30 kilometers of the frontline.[lxix] ISW assesses that the current furthest confirmed point of Russian advance is roughly 21 kilometers from central Kramatorsk.

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 217th VDV Regiment, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chervone and using Molniya-2 drones for strikes near Mykolaivka (both northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxx] Drone operators of the Russian 68th Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Rayske (south of Druzhkivka) and Rusyn Yar.[lxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized half of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[lxxii] ISW assesses that Russian forces do not currently hold positions within Zolotyi Kolodyaz.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Mayak on September 11 and 12.[lxxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zapovidne.[lxxiv]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to break through to Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya), suggesting that Russian forces likely do not hold parts or all of the settlement.[lxxv] ISW assesses that Russian forces had recaptured Kucheriv Yar as of August 17.[lxxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked within and near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, Mykolaivka, Kozatske, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka and Novoukrainka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Leontovychi, Zvirove, Kotlyne, Molodetske, and Udachne and toward Novopidhorodne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on September 11 and 12.[lxxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Udachne and Leontovychi.[lxxviii]

A Ukrainian air assault corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on September 12 that Russian forces are increasing pressure south of Pokrovsk and are increasingly using civilian vehicles to conduct troop rotations in this area.[lxxix] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces aim to seize Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk) to encircle Myrnohrad and begin assaulting the northern outskirts of the town.[lxxx]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Udachne, and drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Myrnohrad.[lxxxi]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[lxxxii] ISW assessed that Russian forces advanced to central Filiya as of August 25.[lxxxiii]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai, Ivanivka, and Tovste on September 11 and 12.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Ternove (southeast of Velykomykhailivka), which coheres with Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets' reporting from September 11 and indicates that Russian forces have likely seized both Ternove and Komyshuvakha (east of Ternove).[lxxxv] Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Ternove.[lxxxvi]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on September 12 that Russian forces advanced west of the Ternove after seizing it.[lxxxvii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka), northwest of Khoroshe, and southeast of Berezove (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[lxxxviii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Vorone, Maliivka, Komyshuvakha, and Novomykolaivka on September 11 and 12.[lxxxix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the Solona Ravine north of Olhivske (northeast of Hulyaipole).[xc]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Hulyaipole near Poltavka and Olhivske and toward Novoivanivka on September 11 and 12.[xci]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Prymorske, and Kamyanske on September 11 and 12.[xcii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Plavni (west of Orihkiv).[xciii]

Russian milbloggers claimed that the area between Prymorske and Stepnohirsk is a contested "gray zone," and that elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are clearing the Kollektivni Sady area in southern Prymorske.[xciv]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed a road bridge in western Stepnohirsk with a first-person view (FPV) drone strike.[xcv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Stepnohirsk.[xcvi] Drone operators of the 108th VDV Regiment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kollektivni Sady area in southern Prymorske.[xcvii] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones in the Tokmak direction (south of Orikhiv).[xcviii] Elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[xcix]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on September 11 and 12 but did not advance.[c]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 40 Shahed, Gerbera, and other unspecified drones, including over 20 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[ci] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed or suppressed 33 drones and that six drones struck three locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drone and missile strikes killed three civilians and injured five, and damaged civilian and residential infrastructure in Sumy City and Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts.[cii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.