9 hours ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26, 2026

Nikolai Sundstrom, Alexander Neuman, Grace Mappes and George Barros

Assessment as of: 5:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:00 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated his willingness for a complete or partial ceasefire, including moratoriums on strikes against energy infrastructure or the Black Sea, but the Kremlin continues to reject a ceasefire. Zelensky reiterated on October 25 that Ukraine remains committed to securing an energy ceasefire or a ceasefire in the Black Sea at the trilateral talks among the United States, Ukraine, and Russia scheduled for November 10, 2026, in Abu Dhabi.[i] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 2026 that the decision to continue the trilateral talks “does not imply restrictions on military operations” and that Russian forces will continue operations against Ukraine.[ii] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on October 25 that the upcoming trilateral talks ”will not resolve much” and will probably be ”a trial run.”[iii] Kremlin officials have consistently rejected ceasefire proposals — both for a partial and complete ceasefire that the US and Ukraine have proposed — while Ukrainian officials have consistently reiterated their willingness for such a ceasefire.[iv] Peskov’s and Ushakov's recent statements indicate that the Kremlin’s position heading into the upcoming trilateral talks remains to reject ceasefire proposals.[v]

 

The Kremlin's current negotiating position on the war in Ukraine continues to include Moscow’s longstanding demand from before the full-scale invasion that NATO change its charter and roll back its membership to NATO’s former 1997 borders. The Telegraph reported on October 25, citing diplomatic sources, that Russia's intent to include Europe in peace negotiations on Ukraine is to "win concessions" over NATO expansion.[vi] Peskov stated on October 23 that European security architecture is one of the most important components of achieving peace in Ukraine and that resolving the war is “impossible” without European participation.[vii] The Telegraph’s report corroborates ISW‘s previous assessment that the Kremlin remains committed to its long-standing December 2021 ultimata that includes halting the deployment of military forces and weapons systems to NATO states that joined the alliance after 1997, granting Russia a veto over a large number of internal NATO affairs.[viii] Senior Kremlin officials have reiterated these ultimata several times in the months and years since the start of the full-scale invasion and have given no indication of compromising on this goal.[ix] The Kremlin will likely reiterate these demands at the upcoming November 10 US-Ukrainian-Russian trilateral negotiations and may seek to leverage its recent concessions from the United States to push for additional concessions concerning NATO and the post-Cold War European security architecture. Putin’s December 2021 demands are notably incompatible with US President Donald Trump’s commitment to maintaining a US military presence in Poland and the US troop deployments in the Baltic States.

 

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign is forcing Russia to relocate its data infrastructure and augment protection measures for data centers. Russian internet and telecommunications company Yandex told Russian business outlet RBK on October 26 that it relocated its Lyapunov, Galushkin, and Chervonenkis supercomputers — responsible for Yandex service infrastructure and large language model training —following Ukrainian strikes against Yandex data processing centers.[x] Ukrainian forces struck at least three Yandex data centers in October 2026, including the site of two of three Yandex supercomputers in Sasovo, Ryazan Oblast.[xi] Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on October 26, citing two sources in the infrastructure sector and a third familiar source, that the Russian Ministry of Digital Development distributed a plan to protect data centers by organizing them into three categories, depending on the potential impact an outage could have on government operations in the event of a strike.[xii] The plan assigns security measures — including physical fortifications, air defenses, and electronic warfare countermeasures — by category, with plans to locate the most critical data centers underground and to create multiple layers of defenses around facilities. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has prompted Russia to concentrate point defense towers in certain areas, but these towers alone are insufficient to defend Russia's vast territory from the threat of Ukrainian strikes.[xiii] Russia’s air defense posture primarily focuses on protecting the immediate areas near the active theater of operations in and around Ukraine, and Russia does not have sufficient air defense assets to cover the vast Russian interior beyond the active area of operations near the Russian-Ukrainian international border.

 

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated his willingness for a complete or partial ceasefire, including moratoriums on strikes against energy infrastructure or the Black Sea, but the Kremlin continues to reject a ceasefire.
  • The Kremlin's current negotiating position on the war in Ukraine continues to include Moscow’s longstanding demand from before the full-scale invasion that NATO change its charter and roll back its membership to NATO’s former 1997 borders.
  • Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign is forcing Russia to relocate its data infrastructure and augment protection measures for data centers.
  • Russia launched one Kh-31P anti-radiation missile, three Kh-59 or Kh-69 cruise missiles, and 140 drones (including 70 jet-powered ones) against Ukraine overnight on October 25 to 26.
  • Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian industrial facilities and logistics infrastructure overnight on October 25 and 26.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
  • Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

 

 

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

 

See topline text for the impacts of Ukrainian strikes against Russian data centers.

 

Ukrainian forces struck Russian industrial facilities and logistics infrastructure in Voronezh City overnight on October 25 to 26.  Ukrainian forces struck the Voronezh Joint-Stock Aircraft Manufacturing Company (roughly 189 kilometers from the international border), which produces Ilyushin Il-96s and other aircraft, and the Voronezhsintezkauchuk chemical plant (roughly 186 kilometers from the international border), which produces components relevant for defense production including synthetic rubbers, synthetic polymers, and thermoplastic elastomers.[xiv] Ukrainian forces reportedly also struck the Severny (Northern) Bridge, a two-tiered road and railway bridge in Voronezh City (roughly 190 kilometers from the international border).[xv] Footage published on October 26 shows Ukrainian strikes against Voronezh City and fires in the aftermath.[xvi] Russian authorities acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck unspecified industrial facilities in Voronezh City and claimed that Ukrainian forces also struck a train at the Somovo railway station in Voronezh Oblast.[xvii]

The Ukrainian General Staff provided updated battle damage assessments for strikes against Russian facilities involved in missile production on October 24 and 25. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on October 26 that Ukrainian strikes against the Energiya Plant in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast — which produces components for Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and glide bombs — destroyed the main microchip production center.[xviii] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed that Ukrainian strikes damaged the main microcircuit production workshop and servers of the Proton-Electrotex Plant in Oryol City, which supports production of semiconductor components and microchips for Russian weapons systems.[xix] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed damage to a process pipeline, two butyl rubber production units, and one rectification unit of the Tolyattikauchuk petrochemical plant in Samara Oblast.[xx]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 25 and 26 but did not advance.[xxi]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 25 and 26 but did not advance.[xxii]

 

Several Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 25 and 26, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[xxiii]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 26, likely as a result of Ukraine's control over a gas pipeline that previously enabled Russian infiltration missions.[xxiv] A commander within a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on October 26 that Ukrainian clearing operations during Ukraine’s Operation Veles deprived Russian forces of the underground pipeline that enabled them to conduct infiltration missions into Kupyansk and surrounding areas.[xxv]

 

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Borova on October 25 and 26 but did not advance.[xxvi]

 

Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against an Oskil River crossing amid continued attempts to disrupt Ukrainian logistics. Russian forces conducted a FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against a crossing on the Oskil River east of Oskil (southwest of Borova), according to geolocated footage published on October 25.[xxvii]

 

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) NB: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and southeast of Lyman on October 25 and 26 but did not advance.[xxviii]

 

ISW continues to observe evidence that the Russian military command redeployed additional unmanned systems elements to the Lyman direction in order to stabilize the frontline amid and after Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi.[xxix] The Russian 50th Varyag Brigade (Unmanned Systems Forces [USF]) claimed on October 26 that its first-person view (FPV) drone operators were striking Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[xxx] ISW continues to assess that the 50th Varyag Brigade’s redeployment to the Lyman direction indicates that the Russian military command may be looking for alternate ways to stabilize the situation in the Lyman direction, particularly after the Russian military command reportedly withdrew elite Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems drone operators after sustaining heavy losses.

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

 

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Kramatorsk near Malynivka on October 25 and 26 but did not advance.[xxxi]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

 

Ukrainian forces maintain at least some positions in southern Kostyantynivka as Russian forces continue infiltrating elsewhere in the city. Ukrainian forces hold at least one position in the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on October 26, indicating that Russian forces likely do not exercise firm control over the area near the Ukrainian position.[xxxii] Russian forces continue infiltration missions into northern and northeastern Kostyantynivka, according to additional footage published on October 19 and geolocated on October 26.[xxxiii] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Kostyantynivka, seized Rozkishne (west of Kostyantynivka), and advanced south of Mykolaipillya (northwest of Rozkishne).[xxxiv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective:  Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast to southwest of Dobropillya on October 25 and 26 but did not advance.[xxxv] An officer of a Ukrainian unmanned systems detachment operating in the Dobropillya direction reported on October 26 that Russian forces are intensifying assault operations in the Dobropillya direction and are interdicting Ukrainian logistics within and into Dobropillya.[xxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

 

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on October 26.

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 25 and 26 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[xxxvii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 26 that the Russian Eastern Group of Forces (GoF) seized Obshche.[xxxviii] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the claimed seizure of Obshche.[xxxix] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced only roughly 17 kilometers east of Obshche.

 

Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 26, but ISW has not observed evidence that they advanced.[xl]

 

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 26 that Ukrainian forces struck a communications hub in occupied Melitopol (approximately 120 kilometers from the frontline).[xli] Geolocated footage posted on October 26 shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike against a former Ukrtelecom office building, which Russian forces reportedly used as a command and data center.[xlii]

 

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 26.

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

 

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[xliii]

 

Russian forces launched one Kh-31P anti-radiation missile, three Kh-59 or Kh-69 missiles, and 140 drones (including 70 jet-powered ones) against Ukraine overnight on October 25 to 26.[xliv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus appointed new leadership of its Western Operational Command. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on October 26 that Colonel Alexander Ilyukevich took command of the Western Operational Command and that Major General Andrey Kravchenko is the Western Operational Command’s chief of staff and first deputy commander.[xlv]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.  

[i]

https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21524 ; https://suspilne dot media/1436647-metou-tristoronnih-peremovin-mae-buti-energeticne-peremira-abo-pripinenna-vognu-u-cornomu-mori-zelenskij/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eqWOzae3bvc
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[ii] https://www dot rbc.ru/politics/26/10/2026/6adf22f9197cc1a652c88a89?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F ; https://tass dot ru/politika/28253717

[iii] https://www dot rbc.ru/politics/25/10/2026/6addc95bb83d921252922b11

[iv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2026/

[v] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2026/

[vi] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/10/25/russia-weaken-nato-ukraine-peace-talks-europe-america-putin/

[vii] https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/1124507

[viii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_26-10/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://tass dot ru/politika/13380415; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/

[ix] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_2-21/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_12-16/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2026/

[x] https://www.rbc dot ru/technology_and_media/26/10/2026/6adf3a4a7d19f4969af052b5

[xi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2026/

[xii] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/9060109

[xiii] https://x.com/jembobineuse/status/2114297092831433121?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2114297092831433121%7Ctwgr%5Ec9e5baa696ce4daccc2ac091dfe30d97447cc52a%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fmeduza.io%2Fnews%2F2026%2F10%2F25%2Fradio-svoboda-vokrug-rezidentsii-putina-na-valdae-poyavilos-esche-16-bashen-pvo-vsego-ih-uzhe-okolo-50-pochti-polovina-ot-moskvy-i-okrestnostey ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/

[xiv] https://t.me/supernova_plus/62037 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/62035; https://suspilne dot media/1436765-droni-atakuvali-voronez-jmovirno-urazeno-mist-aviazavod-i-naftohimicne-pidpriemstvo/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-atakuvaly-voronezh-jmovirno-udaryly-po-voronezhsyntezkauchuk/;

[xv] https://t.me/supernova_plus/62043; https://t.me/supernova_plus/62039; https://suspilne dot media/1436765-droni-atakuvali-voronez-jmovirno-urazeno-mist-aviazavod-i-naftohimicne-pidpriemstvo/

[xvi] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/33469; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2114564399113408823?s=20; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2114582212632817758?s=20

[xvii] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/10/26/futbolisty-lokomotiva-ehali-v-poezde-popavshem-pod-udar-vsu; https://t.me/gusev_36/7666; https://t.me/telerzd/8914

[xviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42692; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2026/

[xix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42692; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2026/

[xx] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42692; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2026/

[xxi]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42689 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37895 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9728 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49209 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/101022

[xxii]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42687 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42689 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37895 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/101022 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9728 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49209 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37895

[xxiii] https://t.me/wargonzo/37895 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9728 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/101022 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/101022

[xxiv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42687 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42689 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37895

[xxv] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1436945-ci-vplinula-operacia-veles-na-mozlivist-rosian-nastupati-na-kupanskomu-napramku-komentar-vijskovogo-hartii/

[xxvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42689 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20194

[xxvii] https://x.com/klinger66/status/2114511243797217472?s=20 ; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/31752

[xxviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42687 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42689 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37895 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20194

[xxix] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2026/

[xxx] https://t.me/Brigada_VARYAG/375

[xxxi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42689; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42687;

[xxxii] https://bsky.app/profile/scaratlas.bsky.social/post/3myr4inraak2l ; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/2966

[xxxiii] https://t.me/BBpS_28/1191; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2114674406547202090  

[xxxiv] https://t.me/rybar/84191

[xxxv]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42689; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42687; https://t.me/wargonzo/37895; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/125728

[xxxvi] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1437037-armia-rf-narosue-intensivnist-sturmiv-poblizu-dobropilla-oficer-pidrozdilu-feniks/

[xxxvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42687 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42689 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37895 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21764

[xxxviii] https://t.me/mod_russia/68553

[xxxix] https://t.me/voin_dv/21763

[xl] https://t.me/wargonzo/37895 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49233

[xli] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42694

[xlii] https://t.me/riamelitopolua/97256 ;  https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2114708531173630173?s=20

[xliii] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[xliv] https://t.me/kpszsu/90605

[xlv] https://t.me/modmilby/59747