Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 25, 2026

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Ukrainian forces are making slow but tactically significant gains in the Oleksandrivka direction that may later threaten Russian logistics and efforts in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions over the long term. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 25 that Ukrainian forces liberated Perebudova (east of Oleksandrivka), Komar (south of Perebudova on the opposite bank of the Mokri Yaly River), and Fedorivka (south of Komar).[i] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest of Vesele (southwest of Fedorivka) up to Skudne (southeast of Fedorivka). Mashovets' reporting indicates that Ukrainian forces have likely pushed Russian forces from a salient northwest of the Fedorivka-Burlatske line. Mashovets reported that Russian forces maintain positions in the northeastern outskirts of Perebudova, however. Mashovets reported that persistent Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction forced the Russian military command to redeploy elements of the Russian 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet) and 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to defend in the Oleksandrivka direction instead of supporting offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction.[ii] Russian naval infantry units and formations are relatively elite and more combat-capable than other parts of the Russian military, and the Russian military command usually deploys naval infantry to priority sectors.[iii] Elements of the 120th Naval Infantry Division and 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade had been operating in the Dobropillya direction prior to their redeployment to the Oleksandrivka direction in March 2026.[iv] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command also redeployed elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) to the Oleksandrivka direction, even though they were initially intended to support the Russian offensive drive towards Druzhkivka.[v] Elements of the 90th Tank Division have been split in several different directions in the theater, including northern Ukraine and several areas in Donetsk Oblast, since March 2026.[vi] Ukrainian forces have been conducting counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction since early February 2026, and alongside other tactical counterattacks have contested the Russian theater-wide initiative.[vii] Velyka Novosilka lies at a critical road junction supporting the Russian offensive effort to advance west from Hulyaipole for a double envelopment of Orikhiv, and further Ukrainian advances would threaten the rear of these Russian forces.^[viii]

Ukraine had a slightly lower but still relatively high interception rate of Russian jet-powered drones during the Starshield restrictions in mid-October 2026, but will need innovative jet-powered interceptors to work to sustain and improve these interception rates over the long term. The Ukrainian jet-powered drone interception rate dropped from 77 percent to about 74 percent during the October 14 to 24 period of Starshield service disruptions. Ukrainian forces utilize a wide air defense umbrella to intercept Russian jet-powered drones and have been most successful with interceptor drones, which largely require Starshield to operate at the speeds necessary to intercept fast-moving Russian jet-powered drones.[ix] Ukrainian forces also use other methods, including using F-16 fighter jets to down Russian jet drones with costly and scarce air-to-air missiles, or using the guns of F-16s, which requires a high pilot skill level and increases the risk to the airframe and pilot.[x] Reliance on F-16s to down jet-powered drones increases maintenance requirements for Ukrainian airframes (already suffering from maintenance challenges) and distracts them from other missions they could be performing.[xi] Ukraine has also installed turrets in Kyiv City and Oblast to counter jet-powered drones, but installing these fixed systems across Ukraine at scale takes time and resources and is alone insufficient.[xii] Supplementing the Ukrainian air defense umbrella with interceptor drones is Ukraine's best chance at developing a robust air defense umbrella capable of sustaining high interception rates of Russian jet-powered drones over the long term. A designer from Ukrainian drone manufacturer F-Drones told The New York Times on October 15 that F-Drones is developing an F-Jet 80 interceptor drone that uses an AI-enabled guidance system to intercept Russian Shahed jet-powered drones.[xiii] An F-Jet 80 interceptor drone costs about $7,000 per unit, much cheaper than the average $20,000 to $70,000 per weapon cost for other interceptor drones or the estimated one million dollars per the F-16-fired air-to-air missile.[xiv] The production and deployment of the F-Jet 80 highlight Ukraine’s effort to produce cost-effective jet-powered drone interceptors at a scale sufficient to counter Russia’s increasing use of jet-powered drones in its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine, especially going into Winter 2026-2027.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces are making slow but tactically significant gains in the Oleksandrivka direction that may later threaten Russian logistics and efforts in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions over the long term.
• Ukraine had a slightly lower but still relatively high interception rate of Russian jet-powered drones during the Starshield restrictions in mid-October 2026, but will need innovative jet-powered interceptors to work to sustain and improve these interception rates over the long term.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range strikes against industrial facilities in Russia. Russian forces conducted several high-casualty strikes on October 24 and 25, including in western Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range strikes against Russian industrial facilities. Geolocated footage published on October 25 shows large plumes of smoke rising from the Energiya Plant in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast (roughly 250 kilometers from the international border), following a reported Ukrainian missile strike.[xv] Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov acknowledged on October 25 that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified industrial zone in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast.[xvi]  Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on October 25 that Ukrainian Storm Shadow missiles struck the plant and noted that the plant produces power cells for Iskander-K cruise missiles and Iskander-M ballistic missiles.[xvii] Ukrainian open-source (OSINT) channel reported on October 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the VSMPO-AVISMA plant in Berezniki, Perm Krai (roughly 1,580 kilometers from the international border) and noted that the plant produces titanium that Russian forces use in military aircraft, aircraft engines, and rocket and space technology.[xviii] Perm Krai Governor Dmitry Makhonin acknowledged on October 25 that Ukrainian forces struck an industrial facility in northern Perm Krai.[xix]

Satellite imagery published on October 25 shows significant damage to the Proton-Electrotex plant in Oryol City after a Ukrainian strike on October 24.[xx] A journalist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) published satellite imagery on October 25, confirming that the Ukrainian strike against the Proton-Electrotex plant in Oryol City (roughly 160 kilometers from the international border) damaged two buildings that house production for semiconductor silicon wafers and microchips for Russian weapons systems.[xxi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Several Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 25, but ISW has not observed evidence that they advanced.[xxii]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 25 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian radar stations near Gostishchevo (roughly 50 kilometers from the international border) and Kurganskoye (roughly 27 kilometers from the international border) on October 24 or overnight on October 24 to 25.[xxiii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on October 24 and 25 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[xxiv]

A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 25, but ISW has not observed evidence that they advanced.[xxv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 24 and 25 but did not advance.[xxvi]

Ukraine's Operation Veles is reportedly complicating Russian positions in the Kupyansk and Borova directions. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated on October 24 that Russian forces will likely lose some of their positions in Kupyansk due to Ukraine’s Operation Veles as Russian successes in the area were heavily contingent on one of the pipelines that Ukrainian forces have been clearing as part of the operation.[xxvii] The milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces may exploit Russian forces’ tendency to ignore battlefield problems until the last minute, given Russia’s longstanding challenges near Kupyansk and following Ukrainian successes during Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) stated on October 25 that Operation Veles has complicated Russian logistics across the Oskil River and is forcing Russian forces to reallocate personnel and resources from the Borova direction in order to address the risk of Ukrainian counterattacks and establish fire control over this new Ukrainian effort in the Kupyansk direction, which is reportedly stalling Russian offensive operations near Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova and south of Kupyansk).[xxviii]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on October 25.

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements). NB: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and southeast of Lyman on October 24 and 25 but did not advance.[xxix]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces focused limited offensive operations east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka on October 24 and 25 but did not advance.[xxx]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near and west of Kostyantynivka on October 24 and 25 but did not make confirmed advances.[xxxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and southwest of Raiske (west of Kostyantynivka).[xxxii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective:  Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continue infiltrating within some areas of Dobropillya. Russian forces continue efforts to expand their infiltration zone in central Dobropillya, according to geolocated footage published on October 25.[xxxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Bilytske (south of Dobropillya) and advanced within and south of Dobropillya.[xxxiv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Novopavlivka. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 25 that Russian forces maintain positions southwest of Filiya (southwest of Novopavlivka), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[xxxv]

See topline text for Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on October 24 and 25 but did not advance.[xxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued attacks northwest to southwest of Hulyaipole on October 24 and 25 but did not make confirmed advances.[xxxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in unspecified areas of the Hulyaipole direction.[xxxviii] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole).[xxxix]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Orikhiv direction on October 24 and 25 but did not advance.[xl] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on October 25 that the Russian rate of advance toward Orikhiv has slowed.[xli]

Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets clarified on October 23 that the Oleshky ceasefire will extend to other areas of occupied Ukraine to facilitate humanitarian operations into and out of Oleshky.[xlii] Lubinets explained that, following the beginning of the limited ceasefire, unspecified actors will deliver humanitarian cargo into Oleshky and conduct technical demining to ensure the freedom of movement and departure for civilians from Oleshky. It remains unclear, however, whether Russian forces will provide a legitimate and duress-free choice to the Ukrainian Oleshky residents to evacuate to Ukrainian-held areas or to a Russian-held area.

Russian forces have significantly intensified strikes against commercial vessels in the Black Sea in 2026. Maritime security company Ambrey and the International Maritime Organization told the Financial Times on October 25 that strikes have impacted over 570 vessels in the Black Sea in 2026, including 387 vessels between July and September, killing at least 40 sailors.[xliii] Ambrey stated that Russian forces have significantly intensified their strikes against vessels in Ukrainian ports, while overall Ukrainian strikes have slowed. Ambrey stated that Russian forces account for roughly 90 percent of strikes against civilian shipping since September 10, 2026. Ukraine’s largest private port operator TIS told the Financial Times that the threat of strikes has reduced traffic in Ukrainian ports, with fewer than 10 ships passing through Ukrainian ports in Greater Odesa City in September 2026, compared to roughly 400 in July 2026.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[xliv]

Russian forces launched 153 strike drones (including 92 jet-powered drones) and loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight on October 24 to 25.[xlv]

Russian forces conducted several high-casualty long-range strikes on October 24 and 25. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and commercial infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing four people and injuring 22.[xlvi] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces struck a residential building in Vinnytsia City, injuring six people.[xlvii]

Russian forces conducted a double tap strike in Kharkiv City. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a strike against emergency workers responding to a previous Russian drone strike against a construction site in Kharkiv City on October 25.[xlviii]

Russian forces conducted a devastating series of strikes against the Epicentr-K retail network. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Epicenter shopping centers in Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Vinnytsia, and Poltava cities on October 24 to 25.[xlix] Epicentr-K confirmed that the Russian strikes had completely destroyed its retail network in four cities.[l]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.