7 hours ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 12, 2026

Arielle Sher, Grace Mappes, Alexander Neuman and George Barros

Assessment as of: 5:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:00 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russia and Ukraine have not agreed to a ceasefire against energy infrastructure as of October 12, as Russian forces continued to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on October 11 to 12. Russian and Ukrainian sources acknowledged that Russian forces struck a combined heat and power plant west of Kharkiv City, gas production infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast, and an oil depot in Sarny, Rivne Oblast overnight on October 11 to 12.[1] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck six Ukrainian energy facilities just on October 12.[2]  Ukrainian forces notably did not strike Russian energy infrastructure overnight. Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine is ready to engage in a full energy ceasefire and continue refraining from striking Russian energy infrastructure if Russia reciprocates and formalizes an agreement.[3] An unnamed White House official told Axios on October 11 that US President Donald Trump’s October 11 statement about an energy ceasefire on Truth Social referred to a ”potential deal,” not an agreement or established ceasefire, indicating that neither Russia nor Ukraine agreed to any ceasefire.[4] The White House official added that Trump’s ceasefire proposal specifically refers to a moratorium for strikes against oil refineries, which could expand to protect other types of energy infrastructure later. This ceasefire proposal in its current form would grant Russia a major concession without granting Ukraine anything in exchange, as Russia has scores of operational oil refineries, whereas Ukraine only has one. The ceasefire as proposed would also allow Russia to freely continue its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign against Ukrainian electrical stations, as such stations are not protected. Such an arrangement would prohibit Ukraine from striking Russia’s most sensitive energy facilities while allowing Russia to continue striking Ukraine’s.

Senior Russian officials confirmed that there is no ceasefire agreement as of October 12 and outright rejected any ceasefire proposal that would allow Ukraine to hold elections. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on October 12 that Zelensky is trying to secure a ceasefire to reconstitute the Ukrainian military and stated that he does not believe Zelensky has "earned a respite" from the war.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 12 that the Kremlin has no interest in Zelensky's October 11 proposal for a 60-day ceasefire that would enable Ukraine to organize and hold elections.[6] Peskov claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is prepared to order a one-day pause in strikes for Ukraine to hold elections but reiterated the consistent Kremlin rejection of a broader ceasefire. A one-day ceasefire is an unserious proposal and serves as the Kremlin's effective rejection of any ceasefire that would allow Ukraine to organize and hold legitimate elections.[7] The Kremlin’s statements in conjunction with an overnight strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on October 11-12 confirm that no ceasefire exists and that Moscow has so far rejected the terms of the proposed ceasefire that Trump announced on October 11. The Kremlin regularly rejects compromise proposals that do not unilaterally benefit Russia, and Russia likely will refuse to agree to halt its strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of winter.

A Russian State Duma deputy and a Russian ultranationalist mouthpiece supported the Kremlin's rejection of an energy ceasefire proposal and openly stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russian refineries are not the primary driver of global diesel shortages. Russian State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov claimed on October 10 that "everyone understands perfectly" that the war in the Middle East is the primary cause of global diesel shortages.[8] Zhuravlyov celebrated Trump partially lifting sanctions on Russian diesel exports and described efforts to present Ukrainian strikes as the driver of the global diesel shortage when it in fact is not, as a significant win for Russia.  A Russian milblogger also expressed how it is not in Russia’s interest to accept an energy ceasefire, as agreeing to refrain from striking Ukrainian electrical stations would ”deprive [Russia] of one of the main levers of pressure which we have achieved through protracted strikes,” and that Russian strikes against Ukrainian airfields and factories are not nearly as effective as against Ukrainian energy facilities.[9]  This lower Russian official and a milblogger are openly explaining Russia’s strategic rationale for rejecting any meaningful ceasefire agreement that does not allow Russia to maximize the damage it inflicts against Ukraine. This discourse is reflective of how the Kremlin expects nothing less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine and to make zero compromises from this objective.

Key Takeaways:

  • Russia and Ukraine have not agreed to a ceasefire against energy infrastructure as of October 12, as Russian forces continued to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on October 11 to 12.
  • Senior Russian officials confirmed that there is no ceasefire agreement as of October 12 and outright rejected any ceasefire proposal that would allow Ukraine to hold elections.
  • A Russian State Duma deputy and a Russian ultranationalist mouthpiece supported the Kremlin's rejection of an energy ceasefire proposal and openly stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russian refineries are not the primary driver of global diesel shortages.
  • Ukrainian forces delayed a Russian strike package by striking Russian ballistic missile launchers located in Russia.
  • Ukrainian forces did not strike Russian oil refineries on October 11 to 12 due to President Trump’s energy ceasefire announcement on October 11. Russian forces launched 121 drones against Ukraine overnight.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
  • Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazenyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces delayed a Russian strike package by striking Russian ballistic missile launchers located in Russia. Ukrainian Minister of Defense Yevheniy Khmara stated on October 11 that Ukrainian forces struck eight Russian ballistic missile launchers for Iskander tactical and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems in September 2026, significantly damaging five launchers and causing Russian forces to postpone planned massive strikes against Ukraine.[10] Extending Ukraine’s access to Starlink technology in Russia likely will augment Ukraine’s ability to strike Russian ballistic missile launchers and alleviate pressure on Ukraine’s air defenders.

Ukraine’s strike campaign against Yandex (Russia’s closest analogue to Google) data centers is imposing cascading effects on Russian consumer transactions, as Yandex executives and Russian officials are attempting to mitigate negative effects from Ukrainian strikes. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on October 12 that Yandex Pay (a mobile digital wallet and payment service) users are complaining to the Russian Central Bank as they are unable to withdraw funds from their bank cards following Ukrainian strikes.[11] The Yandex Press Service reported on October 11 that Yandex services are gradually returning to normal operations following four days of Ukrainian strikes but noted that some features remain unavailable.[12] The Yandex Press Service stated that it decided to limit some Yandex 360 features, including Yandex Disk Cloud Storage, in order to reduce the operational load and preserve the functionality of its services.[13] The Yandex Press Service stated that Yandex reached an agreement with other Russian cloud providers VK Cloud, Selectel, and K2Cloud to expedite the hosting of customer data and services.[14] Russian Minister of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media Maksut Shadayev stated that his ministry and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are working on protecting Russian data centers following Ukrainian strikes against Yandex data center facilities.[15]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions northwest and southeast of Sumy City. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position northwest of Kharkivka (northwest of Sumy City) and in southwestern Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on October 11 and 12, after what ISW assesses were both Russian infiltration missions.[16]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 11 and 12 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north and east of Kharkiv City.[17]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces concentrated attacks north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka, Radkivka, and Kindrashivka on October 11 and 12 but did not advance.[18] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Radkivka.[19] ISW has observed increasing reports over the last week regarding Ukrainian counterattacks near Radkivka.[20]

A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova on October 12, but ISW has not observed evidence to indicate that Russian forces advanced.[21]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman tactical area on October 11 and 12 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north and south of Lyman.[22]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continue to decrease the intensity of attacks in the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directions amid ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks. The Ukrainian General Staff notably did not report any ground activity in the Slovyansk or Kramatorsk directions on October 11 or 12.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff did report limited fighting near Yampil (southeast of Lyman), which ISW assesses to be part of a separate operational effort on the north of the Siverskyi Donets River and under the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) area of responsibility (AoR). The Russian Southern GoF is separately responsible for offensive operations on the south of the Siverskyi Donets River, attacking directly toward Slovyansk. The Ukrainian General Staff notably did not report any attacks in the Fortress belt areas of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk south of the  Siverskyi Donets River. Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces averaged around 14 attacks per day in the Slovyansk direction (which, in the General Staff’s reporting convention, includes settlements on both sides of the Siverskyi Donets River) in August 2026, five in September 2026, and three per day thus far in October 2026. Russian forces averaged around three attacks per day in the Kramatorsk direction in August 2026, one in September 2026, and only an average of 0.3 thus far in October 2026. The reporting pattern indicates a significant decrease in Russian offensive operations near the Fortress Belt’s immediate eastern and northeastern environs. Ukrainian forces have increased counterattacks along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River and near Rai-Oleksandrivka east of Slovyansk in recent weeks and further south near Vasyutynske, Tykhonivka, and Malynivka.[24] A Russian milblogger most recently claimed on October 12 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vasyutynske and Minkivka (both east of Kramatorsk).[25] Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking in the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk directions for several weeks, likely building off of months of battlefield shaping efforts to degrade Russian forces’ offensive capabilities, likely contributing to the decrease in Russian offensive tempo over the last few weeks.[26] The slowing of Russia's offensive tempo in the area is likely also in part due to Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction, which is having cascading effects on neighboring sectors.[27] Ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks in the area, alongside the defeat of Russian forces north of the Siverskyi Donets River, could disrupt the Russian offensive from the east toward Slovyansk entirely. Russian forces may have also reduced their operational tempo ahead of resuming offensive operations as part of Russia’s Fall 2026 offensive.

Ukrainian forces maintain positions south of Pyskunivka (northeast of Slovyansk), according to geolocated footage published on October 11, in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[28]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces concentrated offensive operations near Kostyantynivka itself and southwest of Druzhkivka along the Kazenyi Torets River on October 11 and 12 but did not advance.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective:  Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck one Russian servicemember in southern Dobropillya, according to geolocated footage published on October 12, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[30]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to peddle false claims of advance around Dobropillya to further their cognitive warfare effort exaggerating Russian battlefield successes and portray Ukrainian defenses as collapsing, particularly as Ukrainian counterattacks have thwarted the Russian effort around Lyman aimed at encircling the Fortress Belt. The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces (GoF) seized Lidyne (northeast of Dobropillya and roughly 13.5 kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian advances).[31] This is the third settlement northeast of Dobropillya that the Russian MoD has claimed to have seized since October 11.[32] ISW has not observed any evidence to indicate that these claims are true. These claims are part of both a Russian cognitive warfare effort to portray Ukrainian forces’ defense as collapsing and to reinforce lies within the Russian military itself.[33] The Russian MoD is likely reporting false claims due to the Russian military‘s systemic problems concerning dishonest reporting about tactical progress, and to create the false appearance that Russian forces are rapidly advancing across the theater.

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions as Russian infiltrators retain limited positions in Novopavlivka itself. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 12 that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks on both banks of the Mokryi Yaly River and recently advanced east of Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka) and from Shevchenko (southeast of Oleksandrivka) to the outskirts of Burlatske (southeast of Shevchenko) and Vilne Pole (south of Shevchenko).[34] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces have advanced to the Mokryi Yaly River in several places and continue counterattacks along the river. Mashovets noted that the pace of Ukrainian counterattacks remains slow, giving Russian forces time to fortify their positions, however. Mashovets stated that one Russian infiltration group retains positions in northern Novopavlivka.

 

 

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 11 and 12 but did not make confirmed advances.[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (GoF) seized Mykilske (northwest of Hulyaipole and roughly 18 kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian advances).[36] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, under the operational command of the Eastern GoF) with the claimed seizure of Mykilske.[37]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest and west of Orikhiv on October 11 and 12 but did not advance.[38] A Russian milblogger reiterated claims that Russian forces are fighting in central Orikhiv.[39]

 

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 12.

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

 

Note:  The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[40]

 

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine overnight on October 11 to 12, including striking energy facilities. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-59 air-launched missile from over the Black Sea and 121 Shahed-type (including 76 jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea overnight.[41] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 89 drones (including 55 jet-powered), drones and missiles struck 15 locations, and debris fell on four locations. Russian forces struck enterprises and commercial facilities in Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and a shopping center in Ivano-Frankivsk City.[42] Russian forces also struck a Naftogas production facility, a thermal power plant, an agricultural facility, and residential facilities in Kharkiv City and Oblast, injuring at least 22 and killing at least three civilians.[43] Russian forces also struck residential areas in Kyiv City and Nova Poshta post office terminals in Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.[44] Russian sources admitted that Russian forces also hit a Ukrainian oil depot in Rivne Oblast.[45]

 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to prioritize strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck four Ukrainian locomotives near Odesa City, Odesa Oblast, and Kryvyi Rih and Pyatykhatky, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[46] Russian strikes against Ukrainian locomotives have caused significant shortages in Ukraine, likely in part due to Russian drone adaptations that have improved speed and maneuverability.[47]

 

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

 

Nothing significant to report.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1]https://t.me/sashakots/65045; https://t.me/notes_veterans/30316; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/229300; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48686; https://t.me/NaftogazUA/2991

[2] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2109634603065528450

[3] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21316

[4] https://www.axios.com/2026/10/11/russia-ukraine-oil-energy-ceasefire-trump-putin-zelensky

[5] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2153937/ ; https://t.me/SolovievLive/388527 ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2153970/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/399897

[6] https://vz dot ru/news/2026/10/12/1461991.html ; https://tass dot ru/politika/28205795; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/10/12/v-kremle-otvergli-ideyu-o-60-dnevnom-peremirii-dlya-provedeniya-vyborov-v-ukraine-no-dopustili-chto-mogli-by-ne-nanosit-udary-imenno-v-den-vyborov ; https://tass dot ru/politika/28205795 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/399896 ; https://suspilne dot media/1425527-peskov-putin-gotovij-viddati-nakaz-ne-zavdavati-udariv-po-ukraini-v-den-viboriv/ ; https://abcnews.com/Politics/week-transcript-10-11-26-ukrainian-president-volodymyr/story?id=137165082 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/10/11/zelenskiy-ukraina-provedet-vybory-esli-putin-soglasitsya-na-60-dnevnoe-peremirie ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/

 

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-west-shouldnt-play-russias-game-with-ukrainian-elections/

[8] https://news dot ru/vlast/8-v-gd-obyasnili-kak-toplivnoe-soglashenie-rf-i-ssha-otrazitsya-na-ukraine ; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/16569

[9] https://t.me/bomber_fighter/26820

[10] https://suspilne dot media/1424935-sili-oboroni-urazili-za-veresen-visim-rosijskih-puskovih-ustanovok-dla-balistiki-hmara/

[11] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/9751

[12] https://t.me/yandex/5902 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/

[13] https://www dot rbc.ru/society/11/10/2026/6acbb470b603d0e16d9a1cb0

[14] https://t.me/tass_agency/399846

[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/399863 ; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/28204925

[16] https://t.me/shadow_strike_27/1865 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13198 ; https://t.me/tro119ua/154 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13206   

[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/100353 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9588 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42568 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42566 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37551

[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42566; https://t.me/wargonzo/37551; https://t.me/grvZapad/20062

[19] https://t.me/grvZapad/20062

[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/

[21] https://t.me/grvZapad/20062

[22]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42566; https://t.me/wargonzo/37551; https://t.me/tass_agency/399849; https://t.me/dva_majors/100353; https://t.me/grvZapad/20062; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48691

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42568 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42566

[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=UkraineDisruptsOffensive

[25] https://t.me/wargonzo/37551

[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2026/

[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=UkraineDisruptsOffensive ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/

[28] https://t.me/specnazahmat/2435; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13204

[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42568 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42566 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37551

[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13211; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DeZACzEu8Hy/?exln=OHc5bm51bXB5cGY3

[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/68133

[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/

[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraine-disrupts-russias-donetsk-offensive/?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=UkraineDisruptsOffensive

[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3642 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3643

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42566 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42568 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37551 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/100353 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21547

[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/68134

[37] https://t.me/voin_dv/21548

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42568; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42566; https://t.me/wargonzo/37551; https://t.me/dva_majors/100353

[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/37551

[40] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[41] https://t.me/kpszsu/85472

[42] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/32282; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1425245-vijska-rf-vdarili-po-dnipru-zaginula-ludina/; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/29142 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32546 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32570 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32573; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32556 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32555 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32574 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32554 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/29147; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32566 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32569 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/29147; https://t.me/martsinkiv_ONLINE/15479 ; https://t.me/martsinkiv_ONLINE/15466 ; https://suspilne dot media/ivano-frankivsk/1424003-rf-atakuvala-ivano-frankivsk-reaktivnim-bpla-pracuvali-pidrozdili-ppo/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/10/12/udar-vorozhyh-bezpilotnykiv-po-ivano-frankivsku-troye-zagyblyh/; https://t.me/onyshchuksvitlana/34940 ;

[43] https://t.me/synegubov/26565 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26556; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1425071-rf-vdarila-dronom-po-bagatopoverhivci-u-harkovi-terehov/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/26565 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26551 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26541 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26540 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26539 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26538 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26537 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26536 ; https://t.me/synegubov/26534 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4757 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4758 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4759 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4760 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4761 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4762 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4763 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1425115-vnoci-rf-atakuvala-pidpriemstvo-u-kupanskomu-rajoni-zajnalasa-pozeza-foto/; https://t.me/NaftogazUA/2991 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1425315-rf-reaktivnim-dronom-atakuvala-obekt-gazovidoburnoi-infrastrukturi-na-harkivsini-aki-naslidki/

[44] https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1425027-poraneno-zinku-poskodzeno-budinki-armia-rf-atakuvala-portovu-ta-civilnu-infrastrukturu-mikolaivsini/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/21731; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7839 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7838 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7836

[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48686 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/229350

[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/68122  

[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/