Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 5, 2026

Assessment as of: 8:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET

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Continued long-range Ukrainian strikes against cities deep in the Russian rear demonstrate Russia’s inability to reliably defend the major cities and infrastructure facilities of European Russia against drone and missile strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff, Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Unmanned Systems Forces reported on May 5 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Kirishinefteorgsintez Oil Refinery near Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast, and the Russian VNIIR-Progress plant near Cheboksary, Republic of Chuvashia, overnight.[i] The VNIIR-Progress plant produces receivers and antennas for Russia's Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), Global Positioning System (GPS), and Galileo systems, and Kometa electronic warfare (EW) resistant navigation components, which Russia uses in a variety of long-range drones and missiles.[ii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces used F-5 Flamingo missiles launched at a distance of over 1,500 kilometers to struck the VNIIR-Progress plants.[iii] Geolocated footage shows six Ukrainian Flamingo missiles and an An-196 ”Lyutyi” drone striking the plant.[iv] Cheboksary is only 300 kilometers from the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ), a major Russian industrial and production zone in the Tatarstan Republic where Russia produces many of the long-range Shahed-type drones it launches at Ukraine.[v] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data for May 5 shows heat anomalies near the Kirishi Oil Refinery.[vi] Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko confirmed that a fire broke out in Kirishi.[vii] Reuters reported that the Kirishi Oil Refinery halted operations after the Ukrainian drone strike damaged three of the four crude distillation units and several secondary units.[viii] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that the Kirishinefteorgsintez oil refinery has an annual refining capacity of 20 to 21 million tons of oil per year and is one of the three largest oil refineries in Russia.[ix]

Ukrainian strikes are inflicting significant damage across a wide array of Russian cities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 5 that Ukrainian strikes against the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai in April 2026 and on May 1 caused over $300 million worth of damage to the refinery and the Tuapse port infrastructure.[x] Satellite imagery published on May 5 shows two damaged workshops at the Sverdlov Plant, a key Russian explosives components manufacturer, in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, following a Ukrainian strike on April 30.[xi] Ukrainian forces have increased their long-range strike campaign in the past several weeks, targeting several major Russian cities, including Moscow and Chelyabinsk cities; Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast; Primorsk and Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast; and Tuapse and Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[xii]

[xiii]

Russia's threat to retaliate against Ukraine for allegedly planned strikes against Moscow during Victory Day reflects Russian President Vladimir Putin's recognition that he cannot reliably defend these deep rear areas, including his capital, from Ukrainian strikes. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) declared on May 4 that it will observe a “Victory Day” ceasefire from May 8 to 9 on unilateral instructions from Putin.[xiv] The MoD published its May 4 statement roughly an hour before Zelensky offered Russia a ceasefire beginning on the night of May 5 to 6, and the Kremlin has not acknowledged Zelensky's statement. The MoD falsely accused Zelensky of threatening to strike Moscow on May 9 during remarks to the European Political Community summit in Yerevan, Armenia, and the MoD threatened to launch ”a massive retaliatory missile strike on the center of Kyiv." Zelensky stated at the European Political Community summit that “Russia has announced a May 9 parade in Moscow...and they fear drones may pass over Red Square.”[xv] Russian and other media sources portrayed Zelensky as saying that Ukraine may strike the May 9 Victory Day parade, but some sources have observed that this is a mischaracterization of his statement.[xvi] ISW has not observed evidence of Zelensky making another statement at the European Political Community that would align with the MoD’s accusation.

Putin's insistence on holding the May 9 Victory Day parade reflects his refusal to accept the reality that Ukraine has brought Putin's war back to Russia. Ukrainian strikes continue to increasingly impact other areas deep within Russia. The Russian Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya) simultaneously closed airports in 15 Russian cities on May 5 and introduced restrictions at all four Moscow City airports.[xvii] The Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug Governor Ruslan Kukharuk announced an airstrike alert for the okrug on May 5 -- the first for the okrug after almost four years of war.[xviii] Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug is over 2,000 kilometers from the international border with Ukraine. ISW has observed no evidence that Ukrainian forces attempted to strike targets in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.

Russians are increasingly feeling the strain of the war effort after over four years of fighting as casualties approach one percent of Russia's total population, Russians increasingly bear the financial cost of the war, and the Kremlin intensifies its censorship and mobile data restrictions.[xix] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, a component of Putin's main constituency of Russian ultranationalists, are increasingly criticizing the Kremlin and even Putin himself for failing to recognize this reality.[xx] A Russian milblogger criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for making its May 4 threat against Kyiv not due to Ukraine's deep strike campaign against Russian military, defense industrial, and oil infrastructure but rather for the alleged threat against the May 9 Victory Day parade, accusing the MoD of prioritizing "vanity."[xxi] The milblogger went on to claim that the Kremlin elected not to include military equipment in the Victory Day parade – the first such instance since 2007 — because the open-air storage lot where the Russian MoD always parks the equipment for the parade would be vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes.[xxii] Another milblogger called for Russia to better allocate its air defense assets and form regional air defense volunteer units amid Ukraine's escalating strike campaign.[xxiii] Ukraine's intensified strike campaign has exploited the large attack surface of Russia's deep rear and the wide footprint of Russia infrastructure, particularly defense industrial and oil infrastructure, forcing the Kremlin to make difficult decisions about how to allocate air defense assets. The Kremlin has largely failed to defend against Ukrainian strikes in recent weeks, however, suggesting that existing Russian mitigation efforts are insufficient to address the problems provoking ire in the Russian information space.[xxiv] Putin is refusing to accept the reality of increasing Ukrainian strikes against major Russian cities in the deep rear, and Russians are increasingly bearing the costs of his war as a result.

Russian forces conducted combined drone and missile strikes during the day on May 4 and overnight on May 4 to 5, killing at least seven civilians and injuring at least 35. The Ukrainian Air force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 88 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other types of strike drones at Ukraine from 0830 to 1830 local time on May 4 and an additional 11 Iskander-Ms and 164 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other drones that night.[xxv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed one missile and 219 drones during the day and overnight, that nine missiles and 28 drones struck at least 14 locations, and that debris fell on 10 locations as of 0900 local time. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Poltava, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kyiv oblasts.[xxvi] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes killed one person and injured four in Kharkiv Oblast; injured three people in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; and killed at least four and injured at least 12 in Zaporizhia Oblast.[xxvii]

Russian forces conducted a double-tap missile strike against first responders in Poltava Oblast, killing two and injuring at least 23. The Ukrainian State Emergency Services (DSNS) reported on May 5 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap missile strike against a gas production facility in Poltava Oblast, using four missiles — likely Iskander-M ballistic missiles — as part of a simultaneous second strike against first responders who were responding to the initial Russian strike.[xxviii] Zelensky stated that the Russian missile strikes in Poltava Oblast killed at least four people in total and injured "dozens."[xxix]

The May 4 and 5 Russian strike series inflicted significant casualties despite the relatively small number of drones and missiles in the package, as Russia continues innovating its strike tactics to inflict maximum damage in ways that disproportionately impact civilians. Russian forces used an unusually large number of ballistic missiles relative to the size of the overall strike package, likely to take advantage of global shortages of Patriot interceptors to inflict maximum damage. Russian forces launched long-range drones – which Ukrainian forces typically intercept at high rates – to exhaust Ukraine’s air defenses before and during strikes with ballistic missiles, which Ukrainian forces can only intercept with Western-provided systems such as Patriots.[xxx] Russian forces leveraged their new tactic of conducting strikes throughout the day and overnight to exhaust and stretch Ukrainian air defenses. Russia is increasing the frequency of combined missile and drone strikes to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure and shape the battlefield for the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[xxxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Continued long-range Ukrainian strikes against cities in deep in the Russian rear demonstrate Russia’s inability to reliably defend the major cities and infrastructure facilities of European Russia against drone and missile strikes.
• Ukrainian strikes are inflicting significant damage across a wide array of Russian cities.
• Russia's threat to retaliate against Ukraine for allegedly planned strikes against Moscow during Victory Day reflects Russian President Vladimir Putin's recognition that he cannot reliably defend these deep rear areas, including his capital, from Ukrainian strikes.
• Putin's insistence on holding the May 9 Victory Day parade reflects his refusal to accept the reality that Ukraine has brought Putin's war back to Russia.
• Russian forces conducted combined drone and missile strikes during the day on May 4 and overnight on May 4 to 5, killed at least seven civilians and injured at least 35.
• Russian forces conducted a double-tap missile strike against first responders in Poltava Oblast, killing two and injuring at least 23.
• The May 4 and 5 Russian strike series inflicted significant casualties despite the relatively small number of drones and missiles in the package as Russia continues innovating its strike tactics to inflict maximum damage in ways that disproportionately impact civilians.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for additional Ukrainian strikes in Russia.

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian air defense systems in border regions of Russia. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system near Skryabino, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 88 kilometers from the border) between May 1 to 5.[xxxii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 4 shows Ukrainian forces raising a flag in central Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[xxxiii] Geolocated footage published on May 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian vehicles in central Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City) and on a road west of the settlement, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in these areas.[xxxiv]

Russian forces recently conducted a platoon-sized motorized assault in Sumy Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade operating in Sumy Oblast reported that Russian forces conducted a roughly platoon-sized motorized assault on May 3 in northern Sumy Oblast, involving at least 18 Russian servicemembers, eight all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and two motorcycles.[xxxv]

Russian forces are intensifying their infiltration attempts in Sumy Oblast. A Ukrainian servicemember operating in Sumy Oblast reported on May 5 that Russian forces are increasing their activity and replenishing losses in northern Sumy Oblast in an attempt to create a defensible buffer zone.[xxxvi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on May 5 as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked northeast of Kharkiv City.[xxxvii]

Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Kharkiv City on a prior date. Geolocated footage posted on May 5 shows a Ukrainian strike against Russian servicemembers in eastern Zemlyanky (northeast of Kharkiv City) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not occur within the last 24 hours.[xxxviii]

Russian forces continued to leverage small infiltration groups and sometimes motorcycles for assault operations northeast of Kharkiv City. A Ukrainian unit operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on May 4 that Russian forces continued attempts to cross the international border from Tishanka and Stary (both in Belgorod Oblast east of Zemlyanky) toward Zemlyanky in the last week (between roughly April 27 and May 4) using small infiltration groups, mostly operating in pairs.[xxxix] The unit reported that Russian forces sometimes leverage motorcycles to increase their mobility in open terrain, and operate with drone, air, artillery, and mortar support. The unit reported that Russian forces have reduced their activity and are currently regrouping, presumably in preparation for future attacks, after Ukrainian forces repelled the cross-border infiltration attempts.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 5 but did not advance.[xl]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 5 but did not advance.[xli]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Borova direction on May 5.

Ukrainian forces continued their mid- to long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants depot and material and technical warehouse near occupied Dovzhansk (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline), a field artillery depot near occupied Novoselivka (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline), and a fuel and lubricant depot near occupied Vedmezhe (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline) between May 3 and 5.[xlii] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a temporary deployment point of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) near occupied Kadiivka (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline), an artillery depot of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) near occupied Kypuche (roughly 69 kilometers from the frontline), warehouses of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) near occupied Dovzhansk, and a train near occupied Raihorodka (roughly 84 kilometers from the frontline) between May 1 and 5.[xliii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[xliv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Staryi Karavan (south of Lyman) and east of Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk).[xlv]

Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on May 5. Geolocated footage published on May 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in western Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not occur in the past 24 hours.[xlvi]

Russian forces are adapting their attack tactics depending on the weather in the Kostyantynivka direction. A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on May 5 that Russian forces use anti-thermal imaging ponchos to attack during the night and conduct larger group advances when the weather does not permit drones to fly.[xlvii]

The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast State Emergency Service reported on May 5 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against emergency responders near Druzhkivka, injuring one.[xlviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on May 5 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Toretske and Vilne and south of Novyi Donbas (all east of Dobropillya) and east and south of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[xlix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 5, infiltrating west and northwest of Pokrovsk, while Ukrainian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk and reportedly counterattacked in the area.[l] Geolocated footage published on May 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in southern Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk).[li]  Geolocated footage published on May 4 and 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers west and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not occur within the last 24 hours.[lii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and south and southwest of Hryshyne.[liii]

Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control post near occupied Novohrodivka (roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline and southeast of Pokrovsk) on May 3 or overnight on May 3 to 4.[liv]

Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Novopavlivka direction on May 5 but did not advance.[lv]

Russian forces have resumed small group infiltration attempts as Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction. A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian company operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on May 5 that Russian forces have shifted back to small group infiltrations after a quad bike and motorized vehicle assault about a week ago (around April 28), while Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks in the direction.[lvi]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics depot on the outskirts of occupied Donetsk City (roughly 41 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on May 4 to 5, and reported on May 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone depot in occupied Donetsk City on May 3 or overnight on May 3 to 4.[lvii] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian field ammunition depot near occupied Vilne (roughly 62 kilometers from the frontline) on May 3.[lviii] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on May 4 that Ukrainian forces confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system near occupied Novyi Svit (roughly 44 kilometers from the frontline) on May 3.[lix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on May 5 but did not advance.[lx]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations and airstrikes in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 5 but did not advance.[lxi]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast between May 3 and 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone depot in occupied Kamyanske (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline) and an ammunition depot in occupied Sofiivka (roughly 78 kilometers from the frontline) on May 3 and overnight on May 3 to 4.[lxii] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on May 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post in occupied Smile (roughly 34 kilometers from the frontline) and a Kasta-2E radar station in occupied Yelyseivka (roughly 64 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on May 4 to 5.[lxiii]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on May 5 but did not advance.[lxiv]

Ukrainian forces confirmed a prior long-range strike against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on May 5 that an April 2026 Ukrainian strike against an unspecified location in occupied Crimea destroyed or disabled a Russian Be-12 Chaika anti-submarine amphibious aircraft, three Project 05060 landing and assault boats, a supply ship, and a storage hangar for landing and assault boats.[lxv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for Russian long-range strikes in Ukraine.

Russian forces significantly increased their usage of glide bombs in March and April 2026. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on May 5 that the Ukrainian General Staff recorded that Russian forces dropped almost 8,000 KAB guided glide bombs in March 2026 and almost 7,000 in April 2026, the largest and second largest figures since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, respectively.[lxvi]

Ukrainian forces’ effective use of interceptor drones has reportedly forced Russian forces to shift to using Shahed drones against frontline rather than long-range targets. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 5 that Russian forces are increasingly using Shahed drones to strike frontline rather than rear-area targets due to the effectiveness of Ukrainian interceptor drones.[lxvii] The milblogger criticized the Russian long-range strike campaign as ineffective due to inconsistent targeting cycles that shift target sets too frequently without completing campaigns and stated that larger numbers of munitions would not improve the situation due to the limitations caused by Russian forces’ insufficient focus on specific target sets.[lxviii]

Elements of the Russian 50th Separate Varyag Unmanned Systems Brigade of the Supreme Command are reportedly participating in Russian long-range strikes in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 5 that drone operators of the Russian 50th Separate Varyag Unmanned Systems Brigade of the Supreme Command struck three Ukrainian radar stations in deep rear areas of Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts.[lxix] ISW observed a report that the Russian military command planned to form the brigade from the Grom-Kaskad drone brigade (reportedly of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) by December 2026 on January 22.[lxx]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.