Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 3, 2026

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Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure, exploiting vulnerabilities in Russian air defenses. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on May 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Karakurt-class small missile ship, a Russian patrol boat, and a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker near the port of Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, and that the strikes also significantly damaged the oil loading infrastructure at the port.[1] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) noted that the Karakurt-class small missile ship was equipped with an unspecified launcher (presumably a Kalibr cruise missile launcher) and eight Kalibr cruise missiles with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers and a sea-based Pantsir-M naval air defense system at the time of the Ukrainian strike.[2] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data for May 3 shows heat anomalies at the port of Primorsk.[3] Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko claimed on May 3 that Russian air defenses downed over 60 Ukrainian drones on the night of May 2 to 3 and acknowledged that Ukrainian drones caused fires near the port of Primorsk.[4] Zelensky reported on May 3 that Ukrainian forces also struck two Russian shadow fleet ships at the entrance to the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, with unmanned surface vessels (USVs).[5] Satellite imagery captured on May 3 indicates that Ukraine's April 28 to 29 and April 30 to May 1 strikes against the Transeft Perm Linear Production Dispatch Station, Perm Krai, burned roughly 70 percent of the station, destroyed all the tanks with a 50,000 cubic meter capacity, and halted operations at the station for an unspecified time period.[6] Ukrainian forces have been steadily increasing the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Ukraine’s territories since mid-March 2026, heavily targeting port and oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast and Krasnodar Krai.[7] Ukrainian forces are using Ukraine’s intensified domestic air and naval drone production to intensify strikes against Russia.[8] Ukrainian forces are exploiting the large attack surface of Russia’s deep rear and the wide footprint of Russian oil infrastructure and military assets.[9] Continued Ukrainian drone strikes are degrading Russia’s ability to store and transport oil and are impacting Russian oil export revenues, which may partially offset the elevated Russian revenues from global spikes in oil prices.[10]

Russia’s additional revenues from rising oil prices are likely insufficient to fundamentally change the course of Russia’s growing economic issues. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on May 3 that the Russian federal budget expects to receive an additional 200 billion rubles in revenue due to rising oil prices over an unspecified period, but that Russia's income revenue and expenditures over the past two months (since about March 2026) have remained at similar levels.[11] Russian military recruiters notably increased sign-up bonuses for contract soldiers in mid-February 2026 after previously decreasing sign-up bonuses in 2025.[12] The Associated Press (AP) reported on May 2 that the economic impact of Ukraine’s intensifying long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in the Russian rear remains unclear, as rising oil prices driven by the Iran war and the easing of US sanctions may help the Kremlin replenish revenues.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure have caused Russia to lose at least $7 billion in revenue since the start of 2026, and that Ukrainian strikes have left several of Russia’s key oil ports, such as Ust-Luga and Primorsk in Leningrad Oblast, operating below capacity.[14] The International Energy Agency's (IEA) April 14 Oil Market Report found that Russian crude and oil product exports rose by 320,000 barrels per day month-on-month, hitting 7.1 million in March 2026 and almost doubling Russian oil export revenues to $19 billion from $9.7 billion due to the rising prices.[15] The IEA noted that it remains unclear whether Ukraine’s strikes in April 2026 will disrupt this trend.

Senior Russian bankers continue to express worries over economic issues that will continue to mature throughout the 2026 fiscal year, despite increased Russian oil revenues. Sberbank CFO and Management Board Deputy Chair Taras Skvortsov stated on April 29 that Russia expects the ruble to weaken in the second half of 2026 with forecasted exchange rates of 80 to 90 rubles per $1 US dollar compared to current exchange rates at around 75 rubles per $1 US dollar.[16] Skvortsov noted that the ruble will likely weaken more in the fourth quarter than in the third quarter. Skvortsov stated that new Russian tax laws intended to replenish the budget have led Russian businesses and consumers to use cash payments more often, which Skvortsov warned could worsen the economic situation in Russia by increasing the size of Russia‘s grey economy, which increases the costs of goods and services without generating desired tax revenues.[17] The Kremlin has enacted a series of economically sub-optimal policies, such as increasing the value-added tax (VAT) and lowering the key interest rate despite high Russian inflation, while also steadily depleting its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves to buttress federal budget deficits from unsustainably high defense spending, which Russia's economy will struggle to overcome despite temporary cash influxes from global oil price spikes.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure, exploiting vulnerabilities in Russian air defenses.
• Russia’s additional revenues from rising oil prices are likely insufficient to fundamentally change the course of Russia’s growing economic issues.
• Senior Russian bankers continue to express worries over economic issues that will continue to mature throughout the 2026 fiscal year, despite increased Russian oil revenues.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Orikhiv.
• Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 268 long-range drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for Ukrainian strikes in Russia.

Russian forces may be redeploying air defense assets to Moscow ahead of the May 9 Victory Day parade. A Russian Telegram channel published images on May 3 that reportedly show a Russian air defense system driving through Moscow City and assessed that the system will likely protect the May 9 Victory Day parade.[19] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi assessed that the system is likely an S-400 but noted that Russia has already deployed S-400s near Moscow City.[20] The Kremlin previously announced on April 29 that the May 9 parade in Moscow City would exclude military equipment and the participation of students from military schools due to security concerns amid increasingly large and deep Ukrainian aerial drone strikes.[21] Ukraine's campaign against Russian air defense assets (SEAD / DEAD) and strikes against Russian deep rear areas have stretched thin Russia's traditional air defenses and forced Russia to make difficult decisions about where to allocate air defense assets, particularly as Ukrainian strikes continue to target Russian air defense systems.[22]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 3 but did not advance.[23] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on May 3 that Russian forces are attempting to advance along the Sumy Oblast border and further into Sumy Oblast, especially around Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City) and Myropilske (east of Sumy City).[24]

A Russian milblogger criticized mixed information space reports of the situation in northern Sumy Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 3 that some unspecified Russian milbloggers are only relying on single sources to inform their reporting, particularly of the Sumy direction, and refuted claims that Russian forces had not seized Korchakivka (north of Sumy City).[25] The milblogger claimed that a single pessimistic Russian servicemember will make claims about the battlefield through a pessimistic viewpoint, skewing reporting from other milbloggers.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City on May 3 but did not make confirmed advances.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Karaichne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[27]

A Ukrainian drone unit reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces struck and destroyed a Russian command and staff vehicle and a Zhitel R-330Zh electronic warfare system in Kharkiv Oblast in the second half of April 2026.[28]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 3.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces have intensified operations in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on May 3 that Russian forces have increased pressure on Kupyansk from the north through Holubivka and from the east after a lull in February and March 2026, when Russian forces conducted active rotations.[29] Trehubov noted that Russian forces resumed activity in April because the weather now favors Russian infiltration operations, as there is spring foliage that better conceals Russian positions, and there are poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Podoly (east of Kupyansk).[30]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces attacked south and southwest of Borova on May 3.[31]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid to long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of May 2 to 3. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor air defense system in occupied Markivska (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline), a P-18 radar system in occupied Herasivka (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline), and a Russian repair base in occupied Kadiivka (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline).[32]

Ukrainian partisans reportedly recently sabotaged Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Atesh Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on May 3 that its agents burned a KamAZ truck of the Russian 2nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) conducting logistics in occupied Luhansk City.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces are intensifying attacks against heights northeast of Slovyansk and have recently resumed night assaults in the area, as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the Slovyansk direction.[34] Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on May 3 that Russian forces are intensifying attempts to seize heights near Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk), from which Ukrainian forces are able to conduct drone and artillery strikes against Russian forces in the low-lying terrain to the east of Slovyansk.[35] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces resumed night assaults after the night of April 16 to 17 while employing anti-thermal cloaks, and that Russian forces intend to commit rear-area personnel to infantry assaults due to heavy casualties.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the O0527 Pryshyb-Shandryholove road northwest of Lyman.[36]

Russian forces conducted infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on May 2 and 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in eastern Kostyantynivka, southern Stepanivka, and central Dovha Balka (both southwest of Kostyantynivka) in what ISW assesses as infiltration missions.[37] Geolocated footage published on April 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember on the Donetska railroad in southeastern Kostyantynivka in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not occur within the last 24 hours.[38]

Russian forces continued ground assaults east and southeast of Dobropillya and northwest, southwest, and west of Pokrovsk on May 3 but did not advance.[39]

Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Novopavlivka direction on May 3 but did not make confirmed advances.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized eastern Novopavlivka up to the east (left) bank of the Solena River.[41]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults southeast of Oleksandrivka on May 3 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the area.[42]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight on May 2 to 3. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system near occupied Novyi Svit (roughly 44 kilometers from the frontline) on May 3, the bases of the Russian “Shtorm” detachment near occupied Kamyanuvate (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline) and a Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies unit near occupied Mariupol (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline) on May 1, and a telecommunications center in occupied Mariupol on May 3.[43] Geolocated footage published on May 3 shows Ukrainian drone operators striking a Russian-occupied building in occupied Kamyanuvate, a Russian military building in northeastern occupied Mariupol, and a TV tower in southern occupied Mariupol.[44]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued infiltration missions northwest and southwest of Hulyaipole on May 3.[45] Geolocated footage published on April 30 shows a Ukrainian strike against a Russian servicemember in a windbreak west of Dobropillya (northwest of Hulyaipole) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not occur within the last 24 hours.[46]

A Russian source claimed that a Russian barrier detachment is operating in Zaporizhia Oblast, likely referring to the Hulyaipole direction. A Russian milblogger, who frequently reports on order of battle details for the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces and Hulyaipole area, claimed that drone operators of the Krystal Special Barrier Detachment (Eastern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.[47] Barrier detachments are specialized units that shoot at their own personnel who retreat or refuse to attack. ISW has observed disparate reports throughout the war that Russian forces have been utilizing barrier detachments to compel Russian forces to fight, and a Russian milblogger identifying a named barrier detachment operating on the frontline is notable.[48] It is unclear from the Russian milblogger's reporting whether the Krystal Special Barrier Detachment is conducting operations typical of barrier forces in addition to drone operations against Ukrainian forces.

Russian milbloggers are increasingly acknowledging that Ukrainian forces are advancing in counterattacks northwest of Orikhiv. Geolocated footage published on May 3 shows Ukrainian forces advanced south of Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv), and Russian milbloggers claimed on May 3 that Ukrainian forces seized and advanced southwest of Lukyanivske, and advanced north of Stepove (west of Orikhiv).[49] The milbloggers' reporting indicates that Russian forces likely do not hold positions in Pavlivka, Novoboikivske, or southern Mahdanylivka or in fields south of Lukyanivske or east of Stepnohirsk (all northwest of Orikhiv), contrary to Russian claims. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are showing no signs of correcting the situation in the area.[50] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces no longer fully control the Lukyanivske-Novoyakovlivka area (northwest of Orikhiv) but that the area is now roughly equally interspersed with Ukrainian and Russian positions.[51] These milblogger reports support an April 29 report from Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets that Ukrainian forces advanced south of Prymorske and that Russian forces only maintained limited positions in southern Prymorske.[52] ISW has expanded the Ukrainian counteroffensives polygon on its control of terrain main in accordance with the Russian-provided maps and Mashovets’ reporting.

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on May 2 to 3. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian P-18 radar system in occupied Sofiivka (roughly 78 kilometers from the frontline) on May 3 and a command and observation post in occupied Stepok (roughly 145 kilometers from the frontline) on May 2.[53]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kherson City on May 3 but did not advance.[54]

Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against first responders responding to a Russian drone strike in Kherson City. The Kherson Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on May 3 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against first responders responding to an initial Russian drone strike against a civilian vehicle that killed one civilian and wounded five others.[55]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a missile strike and a large-scale drone strike against Ukraine on the night of May 2 to 3, inflicting high civilian casualties in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Kursk Oblast and 268 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other drones – of which roughly 160 were Shaheds – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[56] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed the Iskander-M ballistic missile and 249 drones, that 19 drones struck 15 locations, and that debris fell on one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential buildings, transportation, and civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[57] Ukrainian officials reported on May 3 that Russian forces struck a dormitory in Dnipro City, killing at least one civilian and injuring at least 11, and an apartment building in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, injuring at least five civilians.[58] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Handzha reported on May 3 that a Russian strike against a gas station in Krynychanskya Hromada damaged a bus that was transporting 36 children at the time, injuring at least one child and five adults.[59]

Russian forces continue to use new types of decoy drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on May 3 that Russian forces used Parodiya decoy drones during Russia’s strike against Kyiv Oblast on May 2, reportedly the first time that Russian forces have fielded Parodiya decoys in several months.[60] Beskrestnov published an image of a Parodiya's looping flight path, likely in a border area, and noted that Russian forces fielded "dozens" of these drones.

Russian forces continued to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 3 shows burning vehicles on the M-30 Dnipro City-Kryvyi Rih highway southeast of Odarivka (about 89 kilometers behind the frontline) following a reported Russian drone strike.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 2 and 3 that Russian forces launched a Geran strike on a diesel locomotive in Kryvyi Rih.[62]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian forces reportedly flew a drone repeater over Belarus to support Russian long-range strikes against Ukraine. Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko reported that a balloon carrying a signal repeater for strike drones flew into Ukrainian airspace from Belarusian airspace on May 2.[63] Russian forces are increasingly using Belarusian telecommunications infrastructure to facilitate their long-range strike campaign against Ukraine.[64]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.