Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28, 2026

Assessment as of: 9:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:00 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has likely developed a false perception of the Russian military's successes in Ukraine based on heavily exaggerated maps from the Russian high military command. A Ukrainian open-source cartographer and frequent geolocator published on X (formerly Twitter) on May 28 a reported leaked Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) map dated April 9 of the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast - the area of responsibility (AoR) of the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces.[1] ISW has reason to believe that the leaked Russian MoD map may be authentic. The map alleges that Russian forces seized Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, Richne, Veselyanka, Zaporozhets, Zapasne, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky (all west of Orikhiv); southwestern Orikhiv up to the railway; and Novodanylivka, Mala Tokmachka, and Bilohiriya (all southeast of Orikhiv). Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on April 21 that Russian forces seized Veselyanka and entered Zaporozhets, and these claims are consistent with the leaked MoD map and show the Russian military command's pattern of exaggerating advances in this area of the front.[2]

ISW had not observed evidence that Russian forces had infiltrated or advanced into Orikhiv, Richne, Veselyanka, Zaporozhets, or Zapasne as of April 9.[3] ISW observed evidence that Russian forces had entered (either through infiltrations or advances) but not seized Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, Novodanylivka, Mala Tokmachka, and Bilohirya as of April 9. ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces maintain a presence in Richne, Veselyanka, or Zapasne as of May 28. ISW has also observed no evidence that Russian forces have infiltrated or advanced into Orikhiv — the Russian operational objective in this direction since 2022. ISW observed Russian forces at closest infiltrating or advancing to positions about three kilometers from Orikhiv.

The Russian military command's exaggerated claims about the Kupyansk area since late Summer 2025 show a larger pattern within the Russian military of misrepresenting the battlefield geometry at the highest levels. Gerasimov and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly presented inaccurate situation reports about the Kupyansk direction. Gerasimov claimed in late August 2025 that Russian forces had seized approximately half of Kupyansk.[4] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in early October 2025 that Russian forces seized two-thirds of Kupyansk, and Gerasimov claimed in late October 2025 that Russian forces had surrounded 5,000 Ukrainian troops in Kupyansk and on the eastern (left) bank of the Oskil River east of the town.[5] Gerasimov subsequently claimed in late November 2025 that Russian forces had fully seized Kupyansk, and Putin claimed at that time that 3,500 Ukrainian troops remained trapped on the eastern bank of the Oskil River.[6] Gerasimov and Russian Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev claimed in December 2025 and January 2026 that Russian forces had seized Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk), Podoly (southeast of Kupyansk), Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk), and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[7] Gerasimov claimed on April 21 that Russian forces eliminated the purportedly surrounded Ukrainian troops on the eastern bank of the Oskil River, almost six months after Russian forces allegedly surrounded the troops.[8]

Russian milbloggers have repeatedly criticized the Kremlin and the Russian military command for lying about the battlefield situation in the Kupyansk area.[9] ISW observed evidence as of late December 2025 to assess that Ukrainian forces had largely liberated the town and were eliminating the remaining Russian infiltrators.[10] The Russian military command has nonetheless continued its exaggerated claims about Kupyansk in May 2026. Gerasimov claimed on May 16 that Russian forces were advancing toward Shevchenkove (approximately 28 kilometers west of Kupyansk), implying that Russian forces had seized Kupyansk and were advancing westward.[11]  Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov ordered on May 28 the Russian Western Grouping of Forces to increase the pace of advances in the grouping's entire AoR — the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions.[12] Russian milbloggers have widely complained that inaccurate reports of Russian advances moving up the chain of command lead to senseless assaults that aim to capture the areas that the reports already alleged as seized.[13] Belousov's order may aim for Russian forces near Kupyansk to increase their tempo of attacks in order to make the actual battlefield reality match that on the higher military command's exaggerated maps.

The Russian military command's exaggerations are likely leading Putin to believe his forces can achieve his battlefield goals in the near to medium term, despite the fact that Russia's battlefield performance has steadily declined in 2026. The Financial Times (FT) reported on May 28 that sources who talk to Putin stated that Putin believes Russian forces can capture all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by Fall 2026, after which he intends to escalate his territorial demands.[14] ISW assessed on May 13 that Russian forces have advanced at a rate of 2.63 square kilometers per day in Donetsk Oblast since the start of 2026, however, and that it is unclear when — if at all — Russian forces would be able to seize the rest of the region at this slow rate of advance.[15]

Russia's rate of advance has significantly slowed so far in 2026 compared to 2025. ISW observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced and seized 104 square kilometers in Ukraine between the start of 2026 and May 26 – compared with 1,619 square kilometers seized during the same time period in 2025. (These calculations do not include areas in which Russian forces may have infiltrated in 2026.) Russia's net gains in 2026 are significantly lower than those in 2025 even when including areas in which Russian forces have infiltrated in 2026 but have not seized, which total 628 square kilometers. The Russian military command may be attempting to paint a better picture of Russian advances to conceal the true declining rate of advance. The Russian military command likely regularly shows such exaggerated maps to Putin, shaping his false perception of the frontline and the extent of Russian advances and likely leading him to make increasingly unrealistic demands.

Russian forces are reinforcing air defenses in Moscow City in response to Ukraine's growing long-range drone campaign against the Russian deep rear. A Russian insider source claimed on May 28 that sources in the Moscow City government confirmed that the Kremlin has shifted the burden of funding new air defenses, including those in Moscow City, to regional governments.[16] The source claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) installed new air defense systems in Moscow City, but that the Moscow City government financed the project through contracts with Russian state defense conglomerate Almaz-Antey. Geolocated footage published on May 28 shows a Russian Mi-26 helicopter installing a Pantsir-SMD air defense system on the roof of the Nordstar Tower in Moscow City.[17] The system features up to 48 short-range TKB-1055 mini-missiles designed to intercept small drones.[18] Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii reported on May 28 that the Nordstar Tower is situated within three kilometers of the Sukhoi Design Bureau headquarters, the Moscow Garrison Military Court, the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) headquarters, and the Russian MoD's 6th Central Research Institute.[19] Russian forces are reinforcing Moscow City air defenses following successful Ukrainian strikes on Moscow City and Moscow Oblast on May 16 to 17 and Russian restrictions in the Moscow air zone, demonstrating the increasing vulnerability of one of Russia’s densest air defense networks to Ukrainian long-range drone campaign.[20]

Russia continues to struggle to defend against Ukraine's mid-range strike campaign and is reportedly resorting to war crimes to protect Russian military vehicles in the rear. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 28 that Ukrainian drone strikes against southern Ukraine are having far-reaching consequences on Russian logistics beyond just causing shortages of gasoline and goods in occupied Crimea.[21]  The milblogger added that Russia needs to find a way to protect its logistics but that Russian forces do not have enough personnel to erect anti-drone tunnels over their ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and machine gun nests. Another Russian milblogger added that Ukrainian mid-range strikes are targeting GLOCs 50 to 100 kilometers from the frontline that Russian forces use to redeploy forces and that these strikes could increase the successes of future Ukrainian counterattacks on the front.[22] The milblogger noted that roadside defenses are insufficient. The milblogger called on Russian forces to significantly increase the number of mobile fire teams and interceptor crews in southern Ukraine and to find ways to strike Ukrainian drone operators. Russian opposition source Astra reported on May 27 that Russian milbloggers are discussing an alleged order from the Russian military command to combat Ukrainian drone strikes in the operational rear by repainting and disguising military vehicles as civilian ones - an act of perfidy under the Geneva Convention.[23]

Sweden pledged a total of 36 Gripen fighter aircraft to Ukraine in a large military support package on May 28. Sweden announced on May 28 that Ukraine will allocate 2.5 billion euros (about $2.9 billion) from the EU’s Ukraine Support Loan to procure up to 20 Gripen E/F fighter aircraft from Sweden and that Sweden will additionally donate 16 Gripen C/D aircraft to Ukraine.[24] Sweden also announced a military support package including unspecified long-range capabilities, ammunition, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that the Swedish aid package is worth $2.7 billion, of which almost $400 million will go towards drone production.[25] Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson stated that Sweden should deliver the 16 Gripen C/D fighter aircraft in early 2027 and aims to begin the delivery of the 20 Gripen E/F aircraft in 2030.[26] Kristersson stated that Ukraine has already started aircraft maintenance and pilot training.

Zelensky stated that the Gripens will help Ukraine defend against Russian guided glide bombs.[27] Zelensky stated that the Gripen’s Meteor air-to-air missiles with a range of 200 kilometers will help to displace Russian aircraft and hinder Russia's ability to launch massive glide bomb strikes.[28] Russian forces have leveraged their sanctuary in Russian airspace where Ukrainian forces cannot intercept Russian aircraft in order to safely launch massive glide bomb strikes from a distance.[29] Ukrainian forces will likely use the Gripen fighter aircraft to deny Russian forces this sanctuary and force Russian aircraft further into the Russian rear, potentially far enough back that Russia's glide bombs cannot strike frontline targets. Ukraine has also been building out its own glide bomb strike capabilities. Ukraine has developed its own domestically produced guided glide bomb, which will likely allow Ukrainian forces to expand their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Russia’s near and operational rear, including against hardened targets.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin has likely developed a false perception of the Russian military's successes in Ukraine based on heavily exaggerated maps from the Russian high military command.
• The Russian military command's exaggerated claims about the Kupyansk area since late Summer 2025 show a larger pattern within the Russian military of misrepresenting the battlefield geometry at the highest levels.
• The Russian military command's exaggerations are likely leading Putin to believe his forces can achieve his battlefield goals in the near to medium term, despite the fact that Russia's battlefield performance has steadily declined in 2026.
• Russian forces are reinforcing air defenses in Moscow City in response to Ukraine's growing long-range drone campaign against the Russian deep rear.
• Russia continues to struggle to defend against Ukraine's mid-range strike campaign and is reportedly resorting to war crimes to protect Russian military vehicles in the rear.
• Sweden pledged a total of 36 Gripen fighter aircraft to Ukraine in a large military support package on May 28.
• Zelensky stated that the Gripens will help Ukraine defend against Russian guided glide bombs.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern in the Velykyi Burluk and Oleksandrivka directions. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.
• Russian forces launched one Kinzhal aeroballistic missile and 147 long-range drones at Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian forces conducted multiple Storm Shadow missile strikes on the night of May 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces used Storm Shadow missiles to strike hardware and software systems of the Russian Aerospace Forces' (VKS) reconnaissance automation equipment near Voronezh City and Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.[31] Geolocated footage published on May 27 showed smoke and fires near the Taganrog Air Base and the Baltimore Air Base in Voronezh City.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck and observed a fire at the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai on the night of May 26 to 27.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the refinery has an annual refining capacity of about 12 million tons of oil.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces recently advanced and conducted infiltration missions in northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 16 and 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces west of Popivka (southwest of Sumy City) and in northern Novodmytrivka (west of Popivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized Popivka and Vysoke (just south of Popivka) and conducted an infiltration mission in northern Novodymytrivka.[34] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 28 that small Russian infantry groups have likely consolidated positions north of Taratutyne (southwest of Popivka) and south of Ryasne, and infiltrated in the northeastern part of Ryasne.[35]

[Tetkino Direction map]

Russian forces have not recently achieved tactically significant advances in the Sumy direction.[36] Mashovets stated on May 28 that Ukrainian forces continue to control most of Ryasne. Mashovets stated that Russian infiltration missions from the Myropilske-Prokhudy line (west of Sumy City along the international border) toward Turya and Petrushivka (both south of Myropilske) have been unsuccessful. A Russian milblogger acknowledged that intense Ukrainian drone activity is hindering Russian advance near Zapsillya (northwest of Sumy City).[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast as Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the area. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces have penetrated about 3.5 to 3.7 kilometers east of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) along the line between Marino, Belgorod Oblast and Zybyne, Kharkiv Oblast but have not seized Zybyne.[38] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces likely continue to hold positions northwest of Zybyne and in southeastern Vovchansk. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces also continue to hold at least half of Vilcha (south of Vovchansk) and areas near Lyman and Prylipka (both southeast of Vovchansk). Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Neskuchne and Zelene (both north of Kharkiv City) - areas in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[39] Mashovets stated that small Russian infantry groups have been operating north of Symynivka (south of Lyman) and in northern Hrafske (southeast of Lyman) for one month (likely since late April 2026) but have not made additional gains since.[40] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command is equipping Russian forces in the Vovchansk direction with light motorized vehicles in order to increase advances.

Ukrainian forces likely maintain control over Hraniv (north of Kharkiv City). Geolocated footage published on May 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied buildings in Hraniv and Shevchenka (north of Kharkiv City).[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 27 that Russian forces seized the settlement, but the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces refuted the Russian MoD’s claim on the same day.[42] The geolocated footage likely shows previous Russian infiltration attempts into Hraniv before the Ukrainian refutation.

Ukrainian counterattacks reportedly recently liberated Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk) and nearby areas. Mashovets stated on May 28 that Ukrainian forces liberated Odradne and advanced about three kilometers deep and about seven kilometers wide in the area after counterattacking in the Hryhorivka-Odradne direction.[43] Mashovets stated that Russian forces do not maintain stable control over Dvorichanske (south of Odradne). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 28 that Russian forces cleared Odradne after Ukrainian forces previously infiltrated into the settlement.[44] The Russian MoD claimed on May 28 that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Novovasylivka (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 28 but did not advance.[46]

Ukrainian forces continue to interdict Russian frontline logistics in the Kupyansk direction. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 28 that Russian forces will need to overcome Petro-Ivanivka (north of Kupyansk) to secure Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) on the western (right) bank of the Oskil River, implying that Ukrainian forces are successfully interdicting Russian logistics near the Oskil River.[47] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported May 28 that it discovered and destroyed a Russian UAZ-452 van, Zala drone, a motorcycle, generators, and manpower concentrations in the Kupyansk direction.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 28 but did not advance.[49]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported, and geolocated footage confirmed, that Ukrainian forces struck two Buk-M2 air defense system in occupied Kadiivka (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline), a Nebo-SV radar in occupied Kamyanka (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline), a logistics and support depot of the Russian 39th Separate Railways Brigade (Russian Railway Troops) in occupied Sorokyne (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline), and a logistics depot and temporary deployment site of the Russian 330th Separate Radio-Technical Regiment (4th Air and Air Defense Forces Army) in occupied Tsvitni Pisky (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of May 26 to 27.[50] Geolocated footage posted May 27 shows damaged vehicles after a likely Ukrainian drone strike on a Russian artillery convoy along the Debaltseve-Luhansk M-30 highway near Debaltseve (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline).[51] A Russian milblogger posted video May 28 of an overturned truck blocking the M-30 highway and claimed that aftermath of the strike blocked the path to Luhansk City.[52]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 28 as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in the area.[53] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported on May 28 that the most intense fighting in the Slovyansk direction is near Riznykivka and Kalenyky (both east of Slovyansk).[54]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continue targeting each others' ground lines of communication (GLOCS) in the Slovyansk direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 28 that the Ukrainian brigade is targeting Russian GLOCs and drone operator positions, inhibiting Russian forces' ability to supply forward infantry positions.[55] The Ukrainian spokesperson noted that Russian infantry sometimes emerge from their forward positions in search of food, allowing Ukrainian drones or infantry to eliminate the Russian infantry. The spokesperson noted that drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems continue efforts to interdict Ukrainian logistics. The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on May 28 that Ukrainian drone operators are interdicting Russian GLOCs and striking Russian personnel shelters, fortifications, and weapons including artillery at distances up to 50 to 60 kilometers from the frontline.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are interdicting the H-20 Slovyansk-Kostyantynivka highway, which connects the cities of Ukraine's Fortress Belt.[57]

Russian forces continued infiltration missions within and near Kostyantynivka on May 28 but did not advance, as Russian and Ukrainian positions remain co-located within the city.[58] Geolocated footage published on May 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-held buildings in central Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[59] Geolocated footage published on May 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces retain positions in southern Kostyantynivka, contrary to Russian claims.[60] A Russian milblogger published claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Kostyantynivka seized Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[61]

Russian forces continue offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on May 28 but did not advance.[62]

Russian forces continue offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions on May 28 but did not advance.[63]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on May 28 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in Tovste (northeast of Oleksandrivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the settlement.[64] A Russian milblogger published a map May 28 that acknowledges Ukrainian presence in Zelenyi Hai, Novokhatske, Andrivka-Klevtsove, Piddubne, Hrushivka, northwest of Filiya (all northeast of Oleksandrivka), and north of Oleksandrohrad (east of Oleksandrivka).[65] Russian milbloggers previously acknowledged a Ukrainian presence around and toward Piddubne on May 5, 8, 12, 13, and 26.[66] The Ukrainian General Staff reported fighting in Novokhatske on May 26 and May 27, further indicating that Russian forces do not control the Novokhatske and the cluster of settlements north of Piddubne.[67]

A Russian milblogger admitted that Ukrainian strikes are hindering Russian forces’ ground lines of communication (GLOCs). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 28 that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces are struggling to concentrate forces in their wide area of responsibility (AoR) in the Oleksandrivka direction due to Ukrainian strikes on Russian GLOCs.[68]

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF)  Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a semi-truck of a Russian S-350 air defense system near Kamyanuvate (about 120 kilometers from the frontline), a deployment point of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) near occupied Bezymenne (about 136 kilometers from the frontline on the Sea of Azov coast), and unspecified Russian logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[69] Geolocated footage published on May 28 confirms the Bezymenne strike.[70] A Ukrainian USF brigade reported on May 28 that Russian forces had set up a military base at the Zirkona children's camp in occupied Bezymenne.[71]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued infiltration missions northwest to southwest of Hulyaipole on May 28 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[72] Geolocated footage published on May 26 shows a Russian soldier operating north of Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[73]

A Ukrainian drone battalion officer operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on May 28 that the Russian military command has deployed the most combat-effective elements of the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) to the Hulyaipole direction and regularly reinforces these units.[74]

Russian forces attacked northwest, west, and southeast of Orikhiv on May 28 but did not advance.[75]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone production facility in occupied Azovskyi Raion, Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of May 26 to 27.[76]

Ukrainian forces continue interdicting Russian logistics and striking Russian fuel infrastructure at the near- and mid-ranges in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 26 shows a destroyed Russian fuel truck near occupied Melitopol (about 76 kilometers from the frontline) on the M-14 Rostov Oblast-occupied Crimea highway after what was likely a Ukrainian drone strike.[77] Additional geolocated footage published on May 27 shows a Ukrainian drone striking a Russian vehicle on the M-18 Zaporizhzhia City-Mykhailivka highway north of Vasylivka (about 15 kilometers from the frontline).[78] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on May 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a gas station in occupied Velyka Bilozerka (about 28 kilometers from the frontline).[79]

Russian forces limited offensive operations southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on May 28 but did not advance.[80]

Russian forces are committing personnel to escorting rear-area logistics to defend against Ukraine's mid-range strike campaign. Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo claimed on May 28 that engineer detachments of the Russian 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) clear Russian logistics routes daily and operate motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to provide cover for Russian logistics convoys, presumably in occupied Kherson Oblast.[81] Ukraine's mid-range strike campaign against occupied southern Ukraine, particularly against Russian GLOCs connecting Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea, appears to be forcing Russian forces to commit personnel to counter-drone operations in rear areas rather than allocate the manpower to offensive operations.[82]

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on May 28 Ukraine's May 26 to 27 Storm Shadow missile strike against Russian military assets near occupied Sevastopol.[83] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) reconnaissance equipment near occupied Sevastopol.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces continued a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kinzhal aeroballistic missile from Lipetsk Oblast and 147 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other drones, including jet-powered Shaheds, from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[84] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian force downed 138 drones, that nine drones and the Kinzhal missile struck seven locations, and that debris fell on six locations. Ukrainian officials and Ukrainian media reported that Russian strikes damaged agricultural, residential, energy, and educational infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Odesa oblasts.[85] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[86]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russia's oil refineries is forcing Russia to import gasoline from Belarus. Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on May 28 that traders on the St. Petersburg Exchange purchased 17,340 tons of Belarusian gasoline from May 1 to May 22, up from 300 tons during the same period in 2025.[87] Kommersant reported that traders purchased 8,880 tons of Belarusian fuel from May 18 to May 22, almost four times higher than the previous week (May 11 to 15). Kommersant reported that the Russian market is experiencing a supply shortage of gasoline due to claimed” seasonal and unscheduled refinery repairs.” Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure since March 2026.[88] Kommersant noted that Russian buyers are increasingly turning to Belarusian fuel despite higher prices, demonstrating close cooperation between the Russian and Belarusian economies as Belarusian refineries provide Russian buyers with relatively stable gasoline supplies to compensate for Russian shortages and market instability.[89]

Russia and Belarus are continuing government integration efforts by coordinating statistical standards. The press service of the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus (Belstat) reported on May 28 that Belstat and the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) signed a plan to coordinate statistical methodology from 2027 until 2029.[90]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.