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May 27, 2026
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 27, 2026
Assessment as of: 8:30 PM ET
Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.
The Kremlin’s domestic contract recruitment campaign continues to show signs of strain under the pressure of high battlefield losses. There are likely internal debates within the Kremlin about whether Russia should conduct another round of involuntary reserve call-ups. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 27 that Ukraine is receiving internal Russian information regarding preparations for an additional mobilization in Russia to offset its high losses in Ukraine and to increase the size of the Russian contingent in Ukraine by "tens of thousands" of personnel.[1] Zelensky noted that Ukraine also received intelligence on a further increase in Russian "mobilization efforts," though it is unclear if Zelensky is referring to ongoing Russian voluntary recruitment and crypto-mobilization efforts or efforts to register and process Russian reservists. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to remain committed to the ongoing contract recruitment campaign for now, however. Putin signed a decree on May 25 granting debt relief of up to 10 million rubles to new recruits and the spouses of new recruits who signed a contract for at least one year with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after May 1.[2] These apparent discussions in the Kremlin about a potential involuntary reserve call-up are likely coming from a place of weakness as Russia is increasingly struggling with poor battlefield performance, compounding effects of the war on Russian economy, declining recruitment rates, and societal discontent.[3] The Kremlin appears to remain committed to defining its main advantage over Ukraine as overwhelming numbers, but Ukraine's tactical drone superiority throughout the theater and mid-range strike campaign have neutralized this advantage for now, inflicting disproportionately high personnel and equipment losses on Russian forces.[4] The lack of significant battlefield successes, mounting war sacrifices, and casualty rates are contributing to the domestic Russian perception that the war in Ukraine is not going well for Russia, a perception that is already hindering Russian contract recruitment.[5] Any involuntary mobilization campaign would likely be significantly more unpopular among the Russian population now, while Russia's war effort is generating so much strain and discontent than it might have been in mid- to late 2025 when Russian forces were making tactically-significant advances in multiple sectors using a campaign design that Ukraine has since been able to counter.[6]
The effect of a potential Russian involuntary reserve call-up on the battlefield remains unclear given Russia’s growing requirements for manpower and the fact that Ukrainian drone strikes are inhibiting Russian troop movement towards the frontline. Russia has to not only replace its battlefield casualties but also recruit servicemembers for the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and to defend its operational and deep rear areas from Ukrainian drone strikes.[7] Russia's voluntary recruitment efforts have waned in 2026, forcing Moscow to expand its voluntary recruitment drives to new demographics, including women and students for USF and rear area air defense operations.[8] Russian contract recruitment continues to decline despite these efforts and recent increases to one-time signing bonuses.[9] Russian forces are already suffering from administrative and training bottlenecks for their ground forces and drone operators at their current recruitment rate, and these challenges would likely have a compounding negative effect on the quality of Russian personnel in a possible involuntary call-up.[10] These training bottlenecks likely contributed to the degradation in the effectiveness of Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems drone operators, whose elite operations initially allowed Russian forces to make substantial gains from August 2025 to late 2025.[11]
Ukraine's successful mid-range and frontline drone strike campaigns are limiting Russia's ability to transport personnel to the frontline and to supply and sustain frontline positions. Ukrainian forces began significantly intensifying their intermediate-range strike campaign in Spring 2026 and have already achieved notable operational effects, including degrading Russia’s ability to use the key Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Russia to occupied Crimea, including the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway, and GLOCs connecting occupied southern Ukraine to Donetsk City.[12] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated May 27 that Ukraine is launching a “logistics lockdown” of Russian forces, aiming to scale its intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and supply lines by increasing procurement funding for Ukraine's most effective drone units and launching large-scale competitive tenders for further funding.[13]
Ukrainian forces are also achieving temporary tactical drone overmatch in some frontline sectors.[14] Mid-range strikes are actively inhibiting Russia's ability to transport personnel to the frontlines as well as to supply and hold frontline positions, which would significantly reduce the number of additional reservists who could even get to the frontlines where they could impact Russian ground operations under current conditions. Frontline Ukrainian strikes are also inhibiting Russian infiltration missions. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on May 26 that effective Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and frontline strikes have undermined the success of the infiltration missions on which Russian forces have relied to advance for the past several months.[15] Ukrainian forces have created a deep zone of drone activity from the intermediate range to the frontline, and it is unclear that additional reserve mobilization would materially improve Russian forces’ battlefield performance unless Russian forces can first counter Ukrainian drone operations.
The Russian government is reportedly considering imposing a temporary restriction on Russian diesel and jet fuel exports after several months of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Russian news agency Interfax and Russian outlet RBK reported on May 26, citing oil industry sources and sources familiar with the situation, that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak held a meeting on May 26 where he discussed a possible temporary ban on the export of jet and diesel fuel.[16] The sources indicated that the ban could last for one or two months but that the Russian Ministry of Economic Development must approve the initiative before setting a timeline for the ban. Several sources told Interfax that the Russian government advised Russian oil companies to curb petroleum product exports after the May 26 meeting.[17] One source claimed to Interfax that the Russian government will only ban jet fuel exports but not diesel exports, as there is a sufficient supply of diesel on the market. Novak stated after the meeting on May 26 that the Russian government prioritizes domestic markets for fuel.[18] The potential temporary ban on jet and diesel fuel exports comes as Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure since March 2026, including against refiners that produce diesel and jet fuel.[19] Russia already imposed a temporary ban on gasoline exports from April 1 to July 31, 2026.[20] Bloomberg reported on May 26 that data from analytics firm OilX indicates that the average output of a Russian oil refinery in April 2026 fell to an average of 4.69 million barrels a day, the lowest daily refining average since December 2009.[21] The Russian government’s consideration of further export restrictions on Russian petroleum products indicates that Ukrainian strikes continue imposing costs on Russia’s oil industry and are forcing Russia to make hard choices to balance domestic fuel stability, military logistics requirements, and export revenue.
Key Takeaways:
- The Kremlin’s domestic contract recruitment campaign continues to show signs of strain under the pressure of high battlefield losses.
- The effect of a potential Russian involuntary reserve call-up on the battlefield remains unclear given Russia’s growing requirements for manpower and the fact that Ukrainian drone strikes are inhibiting Russian troop movement towards the frontline.
- Ukraine's successful mid-range and frontline drone strike campaigns are limiting Russia's ability to transport personnel to the frontline and to supply and sustain frontline positions.
- Ukrainian forces have created a deep zone of drone activity from the intermediate range to the frontline, and it is unclear that additional reserve mobilization would materially improve Russian forces’ battlefield performance unless Russian forces can first counter Ukrainian drone operations.
- The Russian government is reportedly considering imposing a temporary restriction on Russian diesel and jet fuel exports after several months of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in Sumy Oblast and in the Kharkiv and Borova directions. Russian forces advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
- Russian forces launched 163 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces likely struck Russian military airfields, an aircraft repair plant, and an oil refinery in Russia overnight on May 26 to 27. Geolocated footage published on May 27 shows an explosion and smoke plume near the Taganrog Airbase in Rostov Oblast, and a Ukrainian source claimed that Ukrainian forces used unspecified missiles – presumably Storm Shadows or SCALPs – in the strikes.[22] Russian opposition source Astra stated on May 27 that locals reported explosions in Taganrog overnight and assessed that there were fires at the Aircraft Repair Plant 325.[23] Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar acknowledged a Ukrainian missile strike against the oblast overnight.[24]
Astra, citing local reports and geolocated footage, stated that there were also explosions and smoke near the Baltimore Air Base in Voronezh City.[25] An open-source channel assessed that geolocated footage shows that the Ukrainian strike hit the part of the air base used for training, repair, and technical maintenance.[26] Astra noted that the Russian 47th Guards Bomber Aviation Regiment (105th Guards Mixed Aviation Division, 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) is stationed at the air base and that Russian forces regularly use the air base for airstrikes against Ukraine. Voronezh Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian forces repelled two unspecified "high-speed targets" over Voronezh City in the morning and that falling debris damaged a tire shop and trailer.[27]
Geolocated footage published on May 27 shows a fire at the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai, and a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) project assessed that the strikes may have struck the refinery's main installation.[28] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who frequently reports on successful Ukrainian strikes, published an image of a smoke plume at the Tuapse Oil Refinery and implied that Ukrainian forces struck the refinery.[29] Krasnodar Krai authorities acknowledged a Ukrainian strike against Tuapse.[30] Ukrainian forces have struck the Tuapse Oil Refinery several times in recent weeks as part of their escalating long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure, most recently on the night of April 30 to May 1.[31]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 26 shows Ukrainian servicemembers raising a flag in eastern Zapsillya (northeast of Sumy City), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently liberated the settlement.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City).[33]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 21 shows Ukrainian forces clearing houses in western Shesterivka (northeast of Kharkiv City), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently liberated the settlement.[34]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) falsely claimed that Russian forces seized Hraniv (north of Kharkiv City).[35] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces refuted the Russian MoD’s claim on May 27 and reported that Ukrainian forces control Hraniv.[36]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 27 but did not advance.[37]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

A very limited number of Russian infiltrators remain in Kupyansk. Geolocated footage published on May 27 shows a single Russian servicemember operating in northern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[38]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.[39] Geolocated footage published on May 26 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions north of Shyikivka (east of Borova), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[40] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that fighting is ongoing within Nove (southeast of Borova), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to the settlement.[41]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Geolocated footage posted on May 26 shows a destroyed Russian truck on the M-30 Luhansk City-Alchevsk highway in Yurivka (roughly 80 kilometers from the front line).[42] Geolocated footage posted on May 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian vehicles along the T-13-06 highway south of Oleksandrivka and in Sievierodonetsk (both roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline).[43]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 27 but did not advance.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on May 27 but did not make confirmed advances.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Kostyantynivka and east of Dovha Balka (southeast of Druzhkivka).[46]

Russian forces have been unable to establish permanent positions in Kostyantynivka despite their attempts to infiltrate into the city. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on May 27 that Russian forces have not been able to establish permanent positions within the urban areas of Kostyantynivka despite maintaining a high intensity of fighting and infiltrations.[47] The chief of staff of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on May 27 that Russian forces continue to conduct small group infiltrations with one to three servicemembers into Kostyantynivka and nearby areas.[48] The chief of staff reported that Russian forces are increasing their use of "sleeper" fiber optic drones to strike Ukrainian logistics.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on May 27 but did not advance.[49]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on May 27 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian vehicle in western Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the settlement.[50]


Russian activity is reportedly slowing in the Pokrovsk direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on May 27 that the movement of Russian infantry and number of attacks near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) has slowed but not stopped.[51] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continue to conduct small group infiltration missions but that few Russian servicemembers survive these missions.
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Novopavlivka direction on May 27 but did not advance.[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast, east, and south of Oleksandrivka on May 26 and 27 but did not advance.[53] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain a drone advantage in the Oleksandrivka direction.[54]
Ukrainian forces continue to disrupt Russian logistics in southern Ukraine along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway. A Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) brigade stated on May 27 that Ukrainian forces are conducting a large-scale strike campaign against Russian logistics along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway).[55] The brigade reported that it has used drones that Ukraine has not publicly revealed yet in the strikes. The brigade stated that Russian forces are trying to use alternative field and dirt roads but that Ukrainian forces are targeting these routes as well. The Atesh Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on May 26 that Ukrainian Hornet drones are increasingly operating along the M-14 road and that Russian authorities are urgently redeploying supplies further in the rear beyond occupied Mariupol to areas that Ukrainian strikes are currently not reaching.
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to infiltrate into Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) to falsely claim its seizure. Geolocated footage and official Ukrainian statements, however, indicate that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement and have cut off this Russian infiltration route. Geolocated footage published on May 27 shows Russian forces raising Russian flags in western Vozdvyzhivka, after what ISW assesses were previous Russian infiltration missions The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 27 that elements of the Russian 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) seized Vozdvyzhivka.[56] Additional geolocated footage published on May 27, however, shows Ukrainian servicemembers operating within Vozdvyzhivka and removing the flags, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely cleared the settlement.[57] Geolocated footage published on May 26 also shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions east of Vozdvyzhivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area after Russian infantry had infiltrated.[58] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on May 27 that Russian claims about the seizure of Vozdvyzhivka are untrue.[59] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces conducted one unsuccessful infiltration into the settlement on the morning of May 27 after not conducting infiltrations in the area "for a long time." Voloshyn stated that Russian forces also recently conducted a guided glide bomb strike against Vozdvyzhivka, demonstrating that Ukrainian forces maintained positions in the settlement. A source affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on May 27 that Russian forces infiltrated the settlement two to three weeks ago (around May 6 or 13) and that Ukrainian forces eliminated or captured the Russian soldiers who had raised the flags.[60] ISW assesses that Russian forces tried to infiltrate into Vozdvyzhivka, but that the geolocated strikes against Ukrainian positions to the east and official Ukrainian confirmation that Russian forces have not seized the settlement indicate that Ukrainian forces have eliminated this Russian infiltration route. Russian forces will likely try to infiltrate into the settlement again in the future.

Russian forces conducted other infiltration missions northwest of Hulyaipole. Geolocated footage published on May 26 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in central Dobropillya (northwest of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[61] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on May 27 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within Dobropillya.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 27 but did not advance.[63]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on May 26 and 27 but did not advance.[64]

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) headquarters in occupied Crimea. Russian opposition source Astra reported on May 27 that eyewitness photos show that a Ukrainian strike started a fire at the BSF Naval Aviation headquarters on Hoholya Street in occupied Sevastopol.[65] Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind stated that locals reported a fire at the BSF headquarters.[66] Geolocated footage published on May 27 shows a fire near the headquarters on Hoholya Street.[67] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev acknowledged Ukrainian strikes against Sevastopol, including against an allegedly unoccupied administrative building near Hoholya Street.[68] Razvozhaev claimed that Ukrainian forces used Storm Shadow missiles.
Geolocated footage published on May 20 confirmed the Ukrainian strike against Belbek Air Base on the night of May 16 to 17.[69] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck several targets at the Belbek Air Base in occupied Sevastopol, including a Pantsir-S2 air defense system, a hangar housing the radar for an S-400 system, an Orion drone control system, a Forpost ground-based UAV control system, a ground-to-air data transmission system, and a control tower and hangar.[70]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces continued long-range drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on May 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 163 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 150 drones, that eight drones struck seven locations, and that debris struck four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, energy, and transport infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[72] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[73]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19250; https://www.facebook.com/zelenskyy.official/posts/pfbid02j4YYncTkPGKAjEgPAQaEb7SY2bSjHAmH3od5gshw6xjA7kHdNGsXctxoMFJxNrvTl
[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/377510; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202605250020?index=2
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2026/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-6/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025/;
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/
[8] https://x.com/tiamat007/status/2058898007009956179; https://nemoskva dot net/2026/05/25/nabor-zhenshhin-v-bespilotnye-vojska-otkryli-v-krasnoyarske/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-september-24-2025/;
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[13] https://x.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/2059608204351267135; https://t.me/zedigital/6805
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[15] https://t.me/rybar_tactical/29
[16] https://www.interfax dot ru/business/1091990; https://www.rbc dot ru/business/26/05/2026/6a15cce99a79473746532d3e
[17] https://www.interfax dot ru/business/1091990
[18] http://government dot ru/news/58829/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36627; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08fzAxCYd6LhXpXHCQx2iWhVRJ44GnmQFd6jDifAM2mm6ieFWMwReR9cY5XNjfoUXl
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2026/; http://government dot ru/news/58203/
[21] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-26/russia-weighs-curbing-diesel-jet-fuel-exports-as-ukraine-attacks-grow; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-1-2026/; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-30/ukraine-strikes-on-russian-oil-assets-climb-to-four-month-high
[22] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2059466146609279122?s=20; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2059466339786400258?s=20; https://x.com/NotWoofers/status/2059464900871602394?s=20; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2059464985726931437?s=20; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2059613898240905233?s=20; https://t.me/supernova_plus/52371
[23] https://t.me/astrapress/113884; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/syly-oborony-atakuvaly-aviaremontnyj-zavod-u-rosijskomu-taganrozi/ ;
[24] https://t.me/tass_agency/377699; https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/5858
[25] https://t.me/astrapress/113888
[26] https://t.me/AMK_Mapping/30513
[27] https://t.me/gusev_36/6285
[28] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13075; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2059597842113601988?s=20; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2059617202815611219?s=20; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2059531908933972248?s=20; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2059613330311168293?s=20; https://t.me/supernova_plus/52377; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2059504648638038196; https://t.me/motopatriot78/52213;
[29] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10786
[30] https://t.me/opershtab23/16127; https://t.me/astrapress/113887 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/dron-vdaryv-po-naftovomu-terminalu-v-rosijskomu-tuapse/;
[31] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/dron-vdaryv-po-naftovomu-terminalu-v-rosijskomu-tuapse/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2026/
[32] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1547690993651135; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12020
[33] https://t.me/rybar/80607
[34] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2059473189693206639?s=20; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2059473235159490809?s=20; https://x.com/Mocca1x/status/2057477263348916520?s=20; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35996
[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/64002; https://t.me/mod_russia/64016
[36] https://t.me/Corpsarmy/1293
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39175; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20764; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39177
[38] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2059595236284694877; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12023?single
[39] https://t.me/grvZapad/18679 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39177 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39175; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20764
[40] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2059478615310668078; https://t.me/Sinkovka_Kupyansk/17620
[41] https://t.me/grvZapad/18695
[42] https://x.com/nekothekyivann/status/2059351744258146809?s=20; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/21272
[43] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2059307542308647029?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2059294634816188534?s=20; https://t.me/PASKUDA_GROUP/129 ; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2059316984685203850; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2059296098246652031; https://t.me/PASKUDA_GROUP/128
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39204; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39177; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39175; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20764; https://t.me/wargonzo/34451; https://t.me/grvZapad/18679
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39204; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39177; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39175; https://t.me/wargonzo/34451; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/115847; https://t.me/epoddubny/27628
[46] https://t.me/motopatriot78/52205 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/115847
[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/27/pro-fazu-miskyh-boyiv-govoryty-zarano-u-kostyantynivczi-poodynokyh-rosiyan-vylovlyuyut-po-pidvalah/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA
[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/27/ne-davaty-yim-spokijno-spaty-i-yisty-u-kostyantynivczi-rosiyan-namagayutsya-vykolupaty-z-ukryttiv/; https://youtu.be/QYopy9Kqrmw?t=1501
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39177; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39175
[50] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2059631132262490194; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2059632065931300977; https://t.me/omegasof/161
[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/27/vidpravlyayut-na-myasni-shturmy-po-odnomu-chy-grupamy-vidsotok-vyzhyvanosti-rosiyan-poblyzu-myrnograda-vkraj-nyzkyj/; https://youtu.be/QYopy9Kqrmw?t=785
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39177 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39175 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/64015
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39204 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14082; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39177; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14078 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39175; https://t.me/dva_majors/93581 ;
[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43540
[55] https://t.me/nemesis_412/1510
[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/64008; https://t.me/mod_russia/64012
[57] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2059660336547119129; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23540;
[58] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2059349461344665774 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19634
[59] https://interfax dot com.ua/news/general/1171509.html
[60] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23540
[61] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2059349461344665774 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19634
[62] https://t.me/rybar/80620
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39204 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14082; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39177; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14078; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39175
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39177; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14078 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39175
[65] https://t.me/astrapress/113929
[66] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/100179; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/100144; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/100135
[67] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2059483956890755332?s=20; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13076
[68] https://t.me/razvozhaev/21069
[69]https://x.com/carse_n/status/2058319090238808412
https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2059544335700348982
https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/755
[70] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2026/
[71] https://t.me/kpszsu/62966
[72] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29416; https://t.me/bryzynskyi/4121; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1316297-cernigiv-pid-masovanou-atakou-rf-nacalnik-mva-brizinskij/; https://t.me/chernihivrada/3795; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1316327-poskodzenna-zafiksovani-na-nizci-lokacij-dacni-budinki-pidpriemstva-naslidki-nicnoi-ataki-rf-na-cernigiv/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16354; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16360; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16351 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1316741-cerez-ataku-bpla-v-odeskomu-rajoni-poskodzeni-budinki-posta-ta-magazin-e-travmovani/; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02vQRdMvQqMqRZ8CfcZSrH33Ydwuevg6KFVhZw9ofn7GSLnAjrejdkLLj27ZBGurbl; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/40691 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/61325 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/05/26/udar-po-zaporizhzhyu-sered-poranenyh-nemovlya-kilkist-postrazhdalyh-zrosla-do-15/; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/10268
[73] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7063; https://suspilne dot media/1316435-cerez-obstrili-i-negodu-e-znestrumlenna-u-pati-oblastah-minenergo/