Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 25, 2026

Assessment as of: 8:00 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET

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Russia threatened systematic strikes on Kyiv City in violation of the spirit of the Victory Day ceasefire, likely to posture strength after the humiliation of the ceasefire itself. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) warned on May 25 that Russia will launch a “systematic" strike series against Ukrainian defense industrial facilities, including drone design and production sites, decision-making centers, and headquarters in Kyiv City.[1] The Russian MFA called for foreign citizens, diplomats, and international organizations to evacuate Kyiv City and warned Kyiv residents to avoid military and government infrastructure in the city. Russian forces have targeted civilian, government, defense industrial, and military objects in Kyiv City throughout the war, most recently in a May 23 to 24 strike that damaged government buildings and cultural sites.[2] Russia’s warning and continued strikes are an attempt to obfuscate Russia’s weakness, particularly following its May 9 Victory Day parade. Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to recover from his humiliation from having to ask Ukraine for permission to hold the Victory Day parade and to distract from Russia's inability to protect its capital and other deep-rear cities from Ukraine's intensifying long-range drone strikes.[3] Putin is also struggling to shield the Russian population from the strain on the Russian economy as a result of his war, and Russian economic and societal issues are generating domestic discontent with Putin and his government.[4] Russian forces are also failing to make operationally significant advances in their ongoing Spring-Summer 2026 offensive, as Ukrainian counterattacks, overall drone dominance, and mid–range strike campaign are inhibiting Russian advances and increasing the material and personnel cost of its offensive operations.[5]

The Kremlin is claiming that its strikes are retaliatory in response to an alleged Ukrainian strike against civilians to temper any Western urgency to respond to Russia's intensified strikes on Kyiv, but this claimed justification does not align with the Kremlin's historical pattern of behavior. The Russian MFA framed its May 25 threat against Kyiv City as a retaliation for Ukraine's May 21 to 22 strikes against a college in occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, which Russia also used as justification for its May 23 to 24 strike series against Kyiv City.[6] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on May 25 to inform him about the Russian threat against Kyiv City and spread the Kremlin's ongoing information operation falsely portraying Ukraine and its European partners as undermining peace efforts.[7] These justifications are thin, however. Russia has historically launched its largest strike packages immediately before and after prominent bilateral or trilateral peace negotiations, likely to disrupt and prolong the peace process.[8] Russia has not produced dispositive evidence that Ukraine's May 21 to 22 strike against Starobilsk was against an exclusively civilian object, following Ukrainian claims that Russian forces established a military quarter on the grounds of the struck college.[9] Russia has established legitimate military targets in civilian buildings before, likely in an effort to use civilians and civilian infrastructure as human shields.[10] Russia is exploiting the ambiguous situation to allege that Ukraine committed a war crime when there is no clear evidence that it was necessarily so.

Russia began intensifying strikes against Kyiv City on the night of May 12 to 13, less than a day after the Victory Day ceasefire elapsed at midnight on May 11 – over a week before Ukraine's strike against Starobilsk.[11] The Kremlin claimed that its May 23 to 24 missile and drone strikes against Kyiv City, which consisted of over 90 missiles and 600 drones, were in retaliation for the Starobilsk strike despite conducting them only a day later.[12] It is not feasible for Russia to have compiled such an extensive strike package or prepared for these strikes within 24 to 48 hours, however, and more likely spent weeks preparing for such an intensification. The Kremlin is attempting to frame the May 23 to 24 strikes and any strikes within the coming days as in retaliation for Starobilsk to obfuscate the real reason for intensifying these strikes: disguising the Kremlin's embarrassment at needing Ukraine to permit Moscow to hold its May 9 Victory Day parade, at Russia's poor battlefield performance, and at the increasing economic costs and societal tension the Kremlin is enduring as a result of over for years of war.[13] Russia has historically intensified its strikes against Ukraine to distract from Russian failures or Ukrainian successes that have embarrassed the Kremlin, such as Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb in June 2025, which exposed significant failures in Russian border protection and deep rear air defenses.[14] Russia is also likely escalating its strikes against Kyiv City to take advantage of a global Patriot interceptor shortage that is constraining Ukraine's ability to defend against missile strikes, particularly ballistic missiles. The Kremlin is likely attempting to temper the Western, particularly US, response to its intensified strikes against Ukraine and Kyiv City in particular by falsely portraying these intensifications as in response to a single incident rather than as part of a broader pattern of escalating the war and avoiding peace talks.

The Russian government’s accusations that Ukrainian forces violated international law are an attempt to distract from Russian forces’ systematic violations of international law. The Russian MFA accused Ukraine of violating the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child in conducting the Starobilsk strike.[15] Russian forces have systematically abused Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) and conducted battlefield executions of POWs in violation of the Geneva Convention, and the Russian military command is either enabling or directly ordering these war crimes.[16] Russia has also violated the Geneva Convention by forcibly mobilizing civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military and by recruiting imprisoned Ukrainian POWs to fight for Russia.[17] Russian forces continue to systematically abduct and militarize children from occupied Ukraine and have been escalating efforts to temporarily transfer and deport Ukrainian children to Russian-run summer camp programs in Russia and occupied Ukraine in Summer 2026.[18] Legal experts consulted by the New York Times in June 2024 reported that Russia’s ongoing campaign to abduct Ukrainian children and strip them of their Ukrainian identity violates the Convention on the Rights of the Child.[19] Russian forces have systematically used riot control agents in strikes across the frontline in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) have previously acknowledged Russia's usage of these weapons.[20] Russian forces regularly conduct a “human safari” across the frontline – using tactical drones to “hunt” civilians and civilian infrastructure – and publish footage of strikes on civilian targets, including a May 14 strike against a UN vehicle in Kherson Oblast.[21] This non-exhaustive list of Russian forces‘ systematic violations of international law, including the same statutes they accuse Ukrainian forces of violating, demonstrates just some of the crimes from which the Kremlin is trying to distract, as it accuses Ukrainian forces of violations of which the Kremlin has presented no proof. Russian forces’ own actions demonstrate that the Kremlin is not serious about upholding principles of international law, and its justifications for why it has and plans to strike Kyiv are thin.

Russian forces may have launched a second Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which reportedly malfunctioned and struck occupied Donetsk Oblast during the already large and costly May 23 to 24 strike package. Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources reported May 25 that footage from May 24 indicates that Russian forces launched a second Oreshnik and that the missile malfunctioned and struck a location in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[22] The footage appears to show six submunitions striking the ground, and one of the Ukrainian OSINT sources reported that the Oreshnik may have struck Russian military positions near occupied Avdiivka or Yasynuvata (both roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline).[23] If confirmed, these reports would indicate that one of every four Oreshniks that Russian forces have used thus far in the war have malfunctioned. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) news agency ArmyInform estimated that Russia's May 23 to 24 that strike package against Ukraine cost about $361 million dollars, including $50 million for one Oreshnik IRBM.[24] Russian forces’ use of a second Oreshnik missile would increase the cost of the May 23 to 24 strike package to about $411 million.

Russian President Vladimir Putin enacted a law on May 25 allowing him to authorize the use of the Russian Armed Forces overseas to defend “Russian citizens” being prosecuted in international or foreign national courts.[25] The Russian State Duma officially passed this bill on April 14.[26] The law’s text is vague and uses ambiguous terminology. The BBC’s Russia Service interpreted on April 14 that the law applies to Russian citizens who are being prosecuted in international or national courts “vested with powers” by foreign states without Russian participation or by international bodies whose authority does not derive either from Russian international treaties, but it is unclear how Russia would apply the law. The BBC's Russia Service noted that the phrase ”vested with powers” is vague and ambiguous in the Russian legal context.[27] The law also includes an exemption for Russian citizens prosecuted on the basis of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution adopted to implement powers provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter.[28] The text of the law is likely purposefully vague to provide the Kremlin informational flexibility in how it may invoke the law to provide a veneer of legitimacy to Russian expeditionary military operations.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia threatened systematic strikes on Kyiv City in violation of the spirit of the Victory Day ceasefire, likely to posture strength after the humiliation of the ceasefire itself.
• The Kremlin is claiming that its strikes are retaliatory in response to an alleged Ukrainian strike against civilians to temper any Western urgency to respond to Russia's intensified strikes on Kyiv, but this claimed justification does not align with the Kremlin's historical pattern of behavior.
• The Russian government’s accusations that Ukrainian forces violated international law are an attempt to distract from Russian forces’ systematic violations of international law.
• Russian forces may have launched a second Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which reportedly malfunctioned and struck occupied Donetsk Oblast during the already large and costly May 23 to 24 strike package.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin enacted a law on May 25 allowing him to authorize the use of the Russian Armed Forces overseas to defend “Russian citizens” being prosecuted in international or foreign national courts.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas.
• Russian forces launched 262 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against oil infrastructure in Russia on the night of May 24 to 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Belets Oil Depot in Unecha, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 58 kilometers from the international border).[29]

Ukrainian forces have significantly intensified their strike campaign against Russian air defense systems. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on May 25 that Ukrainian forces destroyed almost twice as many Russian air defense and radar systems in April 2026 compared to October 2025.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have struck 81 Russian air defense systems since March 1, 2026, and the Ukrainian MoD noted that Ukrainian forces have struck 12 Pantsir air defense systems in occupied Crimea since the start of 2026. Ukrainian forces have been conducting a coherent campaign to suppress and destroy Russian air defenses since late 2025 in order to destroy or temporarily degrade surface-based air defenses and let friendly aircraft operate safely.[31] This campaign allows Ukrainian forces to conduct subsequent strikes on other valuable assets in the Russian rear, enhancing the reach of Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 24 and 25 but did not advance.[32]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces are intensifying their infiltration missions in northern Kharkiv Oblast as they continued offensive operations in the area on May 24 and 25.[33] A Ukrainian drone operator operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on May 25 that Russian forces are intensifying their infiltrations after spring foliage has appeared and the ground has dried up, allowing infiltrators to more easily cross the ten-kilometer kill zone.[34]

Russian forces are increasingly striking areas within and near northern Kharkiv City. The Ukrainian drone operator stated that Russian forces launched around 100 strike drones, almost all of which were fiber optic drones that threaten Ukrainian logistics and positions, in the past day.[35] The drone operator reported that Russian forces have increased the range of their fiber optic drones from 20 to 30 kilometers in 2025 to 50 kilometers now, allowing Russian forces to reach the eastern and northern parts of Kharkiv City. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported that Russian forces launched a rocket strike against civilian infrastructure in Derhachi (just northwest of Kharkiv City) on the afternoon of May 25, killing two and injuring 19.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 25 but did not make confirmed advances.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces regained control of Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 24 and 25 but did not advance.[39] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain positions east of Podoly and south of Kurylivka (both southeast of Kupyansk) - areas in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[40]

Russian offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction appear to be losing momentum. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on May 25 that Russian forces operating are losing momentum in the Kupyansk direction.[41] Trehubov noted, however, that Russian forces have not completed their spring offensive and still have enough offensive potential to attack. Trehubov assessed that Russian forces will likely have to regroup and restore their combat capability in the near future. Trehubov stated that Russian forces operating in the area have some training but are not highly qualified specialists. ISW recently collected indicators that of elements of the Russian 272th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) operating near Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) were redeploying to the area of responsibility of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division in the Lyman direction - the latest in a series of recent reports that Russia was piecemealing forces of the division and indicating that the Russian command may have abandoned efforts to seize Kupyansk at this time.[42]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 25 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[43]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (assessed to be subordinated to the operational command of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Serednie (southeast of Borova).[44] ISW last observed elements of the 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction as of November 2025.[45]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against military and likely oil infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported, and geolocated footage confirmed, that Ukrainian forces struck the rear base and logistics hub of the Russian 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and the Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in Rovenky (roughly 125 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of May 24 to 25.[46] Geolocated footage published on May 24 shows a fire in southern Luhansk City (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline) after a possible Ukrainian strike against an oil depot in the area.[47] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data for May 24 shows heat anomalies in southern Luhansk City.[48]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 25 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[49]

Ukrainian strikes against Russian military infrastructure in the near and operational rear are likely forcing Russian forces to withdraw equipment from the frontline in the Lyman direction. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are conducting a large-scale withdrawal of ammunition and equipment, including heavy equipment, from frontline areas in the Lyman direction to warehouses further in the rear for protection.[50]

The Russian military command is reportedly replacing the commander of the 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]). The source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command removed 25th CAA Commander Lieutenant General Oleg Moiseyev for unclear reasons and appointed Major General Andrei Shelukhin as the new commander.[51] Shelukhin previously served as the deputy commander of the Russian 20th CAA (Moscow Military District [MMD]).

Ukrainian and Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on May 22 and 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in southern Dovha Balka (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and southwest of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[52] Geolocated footage published on May 24 and 25 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western Berestok, northeast of Berestok, on the western outskirts of Berestok, and west of Ivanopillya (both south of Kostyantynivka).[53]

Russian forces conducted a series of infiltration missions within and near Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on May 16, 22, 24, and 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southwestern and northern Stepanivka; on the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka; and in northern, western, and southwestern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[54] Additional geolocated footage published on May 24 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian forces southwest of Stepanivka after what were likely Russian infiltration missions around existing Ukrainian positions in the area, not Russian advances as ISW previously assessed.[55]

Russian forces are intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Druzhkivka, weaponizing civilian harm as an intentional tool of war. A Ukrainian brigade operating in Druzhkivka reported that Russian forces are increasingly conducting first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against civilian cars, utility workers, and elderly civilians on bicycles in the city.[56] The Kramatorsk City Council reported that Russian forces conducted five FAB-250 glide bomb strikes against Kramatorsk on the morning of May 25, damaging residential and civilian infrastructure, including a school.[57] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have integrated intentional civilian harm into their wider operation BAI template by striking civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area and continued limited offensive operations in the area on May 25.[59] Geolocated footage published on May 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[60]

Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to expand the kill zone in the Pokrovsk direction as Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the area on May 24 and 25.[61] The head of artillery reconnaissance of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on May 25 that the kill zone (an area of elevated drone strike risk) is constantly expanding on both sides to up to 30 to 35 kilometers in some areas.[62] The artillery reconnaissance head reported that Russian forces have deployed drone positions in built-up areas to support infantry attacks.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka and northeast of the settlement on May 24 and 25 but did not advance.[63]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) made unconfirmed claims about the Russian seizure of a settlement just east of Oleksandrivka and roughly 20 kilometers from the assessed forward edge of battle area (FEBA). The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Dobropasove.[64] Geolocated footage published on May 25 purports to show Russian forces holding Russian flags in Dobropasove.[65] ISW cannot verify with high confidence the veracity of the footage and will not make a change to our control of terrain layers at this time.

Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on May 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building on the O-041404 Berezove-Kyrpychne road in eastern Verbove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[66]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300 air defense system launcher near Lazarivka (about 80 kilometers from the frontline); a 9S19 Imbyr radar station in Stritenka (about 80 kilometers from the frontline); railway tanks with fuel and lubricants near Debaltseve (about 50 kilometers from the frontline); a material support warehouse near Dokuchayevsk (about 80 kilometers from the frontline); an temporary deployment point and ammunition, logistics, and technical support warehouses near Novoyanysol (about 80 kilometers from the frontline); an artillery depot of the 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, reportedly subordinated to the 36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) near Kremenivka (about 90 kilometers from the frontline); and a 40th Naval Infantry Brigade temporary deployment point near Mykilske (about 60 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of May 24 to 25.[67] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian communications hub in Ivanivka (one of multiple settlements ranging about 20 to 140 kilometers from the frontline).[68] Geolocated footage published on May 25 confirmed the strikes near Lazarivka, Stritenka, Debaltseve, and Dokuchayevsk.[69] Additional geolocated footage published on May 24 and 25 shows the aftermath of a likely Ukrainian strike against a truck along the M-30 Luhansk City-Donetsk City highway southwest of Debaltseve and west of Pisky (about 45 kilometers from the frontline).[70]

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range drone strike campaign targeting major Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near occupied Mariupol in southern Ukraine. Ukraine's 1st Army Corps reported on May 25 that Ukrainian forces are striking Russian logistics along the M-14 Mariupol-Taganrog and H-20 Mariupol-Volnovakha highways.[71] Geolocated footage published on May 25 shows Ukrainian strikes against Russian vehicles along the M-14 highway northeast and west of Novoazovsk (about 140 kilometers from the frontline), north of Samsonove (about 140 kilometers from the frontline), southeast of Sakhanka (about 130 kilometers from the frontline), and north of Kholodne (about 150 kilometers from the frontline).[72] Geolocated footage published on May 23 confirms a previous Ukrainian strike against a Russian fuel bowser along the M-14 north of Preslav (about 90 kilometers from the frontline).[73]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

The Russian military command reportedly continues to set unrealistic deadlines for Russian forces in the Hulyaipole direction and to use artificial intelligence (AI) to fabricate alleged video evidence of Russian territorial gains. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that the Russian military command has tasked Russian forces in the Hulyaipole direction with approaching Orikhiv by May 30.[74] ISW assesses that Russian forces have only advanced to positions about 20 kilometers west of Orikhiv and infiltrated in positions about 15 kilometers from the town. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are also supposed to seize Verkhnya Tersa (northwest of Hulyaipole) despite previous official Russian claims to have seized the settlement. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces have presented footage showing Russian flags in Verkhnya Tersa as alleged evidence of its seizure, but that Russian authorities created the footage with AI. Voloshyn reported that elements of the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) in the Hulyaipole direction are attacking in waves of infantry after first conducting strikes to cut off Ukrainian logistics, isolate the frontline, and destroy almost all fortifications and shelters near the attack point. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are currently rotating in the area to restore their combat capability – the third Russian rotation in two months.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 24 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position southwest of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[75]

Russian forces are reportedly suffering from drone shortages in western Zaporizhia Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have had to surrender several positions near Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) due to an insufficient number of Russian drones.[76] The milblogger claimed that the number of Russian drones and drone operators in the area are unable to prevent waves of Ukrainian attacks.

Russian forces continue glide bomb strikes to shape the battlefield north and northwest of Orikhiv. Geolocated footage published on May 24 shows Russian forces conducting a FAB-3000 strike against Ukrainian forces in Preobrazhenka (just north of Orikhiv) and a FAB-500 strike against a dam in Komyshuvkha (northwest of Orikhiv).[77]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian artillery control platoon near Troitske (either about 50 or 80 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of May 24 to 25.[78]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on May 24 and 25 but did not advance.[79] The Kherson Oblast Military Administration reported on May 25 that Russian forces shelled a hospital in Bilozerka (west of Kherson City) two times consecutively, injuring three hospital workers.[80]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on the night of May 24 to 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition storage depot in occupied Mizhhirya (roughly 212 kilometers from the frontline).[81]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 262 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and Parodiya drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[82] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 246 drones, that 10 drones struck nine locations, and that debris fell on seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes struck Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[83]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Demchenko stated on May 24 that Belarusian forces are not moving or accumulating troops, weapons, or equipment near the Ukrainian-Belarusian international border.[84] Demchenko repeated recent official Ukrainian statements that Russia is pressuring Belarus to enter the war on a larger scale, stating that Russia wants Belarus to either launch an attack on Ukraine from Belarusian territory with Belarusian forces or allow Russian forces to launch such an attack.[85] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated on May 21 that Belarus does not intend to enter the war.[86]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.