Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2, 2026

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russian forces in April 2026 suffered a net loss of territory controlled in the Ukrainian theater for the first time since Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces lost control of 116 square kilometers in April 2026, not counting areas into which Russian troops may have infiltrated. The Russian rate of advance across the battlefield has been steadily declining since November 2025 as continued Ukrainian ground counterattacks, Ukrainian mid-range strikes, the February 2026 block on Russia's use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine, and the Kremlin's throttling of Telegram have exacerbated existing problems within the Russian military.

The relative decline in the rate of Russian advances may be related in part to annual seasonal patterns. Weather data indicates that average temperatures in eastern Ukraine were about three degrees Fahrenheit colder in Winter 2025 to 2026 (December to February) than in Winter 2024 to 2025, and that Winter 2025 to 2026 was significantly wetter than Winter 2024 to 2025.[1] ISW has previously observed relative declines in the rate of Russian advances during March and April due to seasonal weather effects, namely the muddy rasputitsa season, the period in which melting frozen winter ground and spring rains degrade conditions for mechanized movement.[2] Russian forces have previously increased their advances in May and June as ground dries, and it remains to be seen whether such trends will repeat in 2026.[3] ISW has observed less commentary in 2026 than in previous years regarding the effects of weather conditions on Russian advances, however.

The rate of Russian advances has slowed in 2026 compared to 2025, but the changing character of the war, particularly Russia's increased use of infiltration tactics over the course of 2025, makes year-on-year comparisons difficult. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 1,443.35 square kilometers in the past six months (November 2025 to April 2026) compared with 2,368.38 square kilometers seized during the same time period in 2024-2025. Russian forces seized an average of 2.9 square kilometers per day in the first four months of 2026 compared to 9.76 square kilometers per day in the first four months of 2025. Russian forces have been increasingly using infiltration tactics since Fall 2025, however, and ISW created its assessed Russian infiltration layer to depict these infiltration areas as distinct from areas in which Russian forces have advanced and seized territory. Comparisons of Russian gains this year with those of previous years when infiltration tactics were rarer thus are not straightforward, as Russian forces exert a significantly lower degree of control over infiltration areas than they do over seized areas.

The Kremlin uses Russian infiltration tactics in part to exaggerate Russian control of terrain. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized or infiltrated into a net of 28.28 square kilometers in April 2026 and a total of 1716.42 square kilometers from November 2025 to April 2026. Russian forces seized only 1443.35 square kilometers in the same time period, however. Russian forces have been using infiltration tactics in part to create the perception of continuous Russian advances across the front and to support Kremlin cognitive warfare efforts to exaggerate Russian successes. Russian forces, however, do not control these infiltration areas, which are often collocated among Ukrainian positions in contested "gray zones."

ISW's mapping methodology for infiltration areas is more generous to Russian forces than ISW’s methodology for mapping Russian advances or controlled terrain, moreover. ISW’s methodology requires a lower evidentiary threshold for expanding the assessed Russian infiltration layer than the evidentiary threshold needed to subsequently recode these Russian infiltration areas as Ukrainian-held. It will often be the case, for example, that Russian forces lost the positions they gained during an initial infiltration mission but that ISW did not observe evidence to support an assessment that Ukrainian forces regained this position. The evidence that a Russian infiltration mission has occurred, such as video of a Ukrainian strike against a small group of Russian infiltrators, can also be evidence that the infiltration failed if all the infiltrators were eliminated. ISW will still code the area as infiltrated in the absence of evidence that Ukrainian forces reoccupied the ground.

ISW has reviewed and refined its mapping data and methodology, identifying and rectifying some data artifacts that did not affect the visible map geometry but did affect some calculations of area. These changes have not affected ISW's previously assessed trendlines of the Russian rate of advance. ISW is now assessing monthly advances using the last day of the previous month to the last day of the month in question (e.g. comparing data from December 31 to that from January 31 in order to calculate Russian advances in January). ISW previously calculated Russia's monthly rate of advance using data from the first day of the month in the question to the first day of the next month (e.g. comparing data from January 1 to that from February 1 in order to calculate Russian advances in January, which inappropriately included Russian advances from February 1 in the January calculation). ISW has also removed backend data artifacts in our mapping layer data that created errors in some of our area calculations. These errors did not affect the geometry of the layer shapes or the maps themselves. We apologize for these errors.

Russian milbloggers identified problems with the Russian air campaign and assessed that Russian forces may not be able to take advantage of reported increased bombing capabilities. A Russian milblogger published a photograph on May 1 showing the wing and fuselage of an Su-34 fighter-bomber with two glide bombs equipped with unified planning and correction modules (UMPKs) on the wing and two universal joint glide munitions (UMPBs) under the fuselage.[4] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces started equipping the aircraft with a mix of both bombs. The milblogger also published footage on May 1 of an Su-34 dropping at least four glide bombs with UMPKs and one UMPB bomb.[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are now able to launch up to six glide bombs per Su-34 sortie.[6] A Russian milblogger associated with the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) claimed that Russian forces could potentially increase the number of glide bomb strikes from 10,000 a month to 15,000-16,000 a month.[7] The milblogger claimed, however, that Russian forces may be unable to do so as there is an insufficient number of aircraft and maintenance personnel. The milblogger claimed that many Russian pilots have graduated from schools but that an insufficient number of training aircraft and support personnel are limiting their further training. The milblogger also claimed that Russian authorities have mismanaged the deployment of maintenance personnel including by sending engineers to infantry units and using them to guard airfields. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger argued that Russian forces will struggle to take advantage of this additional bombing capability because they are not effectively prioritizing strikes and are wasting munitions on lower-value targets such as basements housing single infantrymen.[8] The milblogger complained that Russian forces are also frequently switching target sets without accomplishing their initial objectives.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces in April 2026 suffered a net loss of territory controlled in the Ukrainian theater for the first time since Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• The relative decline in the rate of Russian advances may be related in part to annual seasonal patterns.
• The rate of Russian advances has slowed in 2026 compared to 2025, but the changing character of the war, particularly Russia's increased use of infiltration tactics over the course of 2025, makes year-on-year comparisons difficult.
• The Kremlin uses Russian infiltration tactics in part to exaggerate Russian control of terrain.
• ISW has reviewed and refined its mapping data and methodology, identifying and rectifying some data artifacts that did not affect the visible map geometry but did affect some calculations of area. These changes have not affected ISW's previously assessed trendlines of the Russian rate of advance.
• Russian milbloggers identified problems with the Russian air campaign and assessed that Russian forces may not be able to take advantage of reported increased bombing capabilities.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian air defense system during their April 30 to May 1 overnight strike against Krasnodar Krai.
• Russian forces launched 163 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian air defense system during their April 30 to May 1 overnight strike against Krasnodar Krai. Russian opposition source Astra stated on May 1 that the Ukrainian strike against the Tuapse Oil Refinery, Krasnodar Krai, likely also struck a Russian air defense system, possibly a Pantsir system, in Tuapse.[9] Astra reported that footage shows the launch of Russian air defense missiles followed by an explosion at the launch site. Astra assessed that the strike likely damaged the air defense system but did not completely destroy it, as Russian forces subsequently launched two more missiles from the site.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian officials continue to claim the seizure of small border villages as part of the Kremlin's efforts to present these alleged seizures as evidence of extensive Russian successes across the entire front. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 2 that Russian forces seized Myropillya (northwest of Sumy City).[10] Russian milbloggers noted that Russian forces began fighting for Myropillya in April 2026.[11]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces do not hold a firm presence in Mala Korchakivka or Korchakivka (both north of Sumy City) despite the Russian MoD's April 30 claim that Russian forces had seized Korchakivka.[12]

The Russian military command reportedly continues to reverse previously planned redeployments from the Sumy direction. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command failed to replace elements of the Russian 51st and 119th Airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 106th VDV Division) near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City) with elements of the 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) in mid-April 2026.[13] The source claimed that elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) began withdrawing from the area at an earlier unspecified date. The source claimed that elements of the 51st, 119th, and 137th regiments currently remain in the Sumy direction, however. The source claimed on April 1 that the Russian military command had planned to redeploy elements of the 119th and 51st VDV regiments from Sumy Oblast to Kherson Oblast by mid-April 2026.[14]

Ukrainian forces gathered intelligence from a Chechen Akhmat command post in the Sumy direction over several months to provide targeting information for Ukrainian strikes. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on May 1 that Ukrainian forces conducted successful strikes against Chechen Akhmat elements operating in the Sumy direction after cooperating in February-April 2026 with an Akhmat servicemember who installed a listening device in the unit's meeting room.[15] The GUR reported that Ukrainian forces killed 41 Akhmat soldiers and wounded 87 and struck more than 160 armored and motor vehicles, more than 25 drones, and an unspecified number of communications, electronic warfare (EW) systems, engineering equipment and machinery, and weapons and fuel depots. Geolocated footage confirms a strike against an Akhmat concentration point in southern Nekislitsa, Bryansk Oblast (along the international border northwest of Sumy City).[16]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City on May 1 and 2 but did not advance.[17]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unable to sustain a high offensive tempo in the Velykyi Burluk direction due to the large number of Ukrainian drones and Russian tactics that rely on small groups attacks.[18]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 1 that Russian forces advanced east of Novoosynove (southeast of Kupyansk).[20]

Russian forces continue attempts to advance on the left (east) bank of the Oskil River and maintain a limited presence within Kupyansk. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade reported on May 2 that Russian forces continue attempts to expand their foothold on the left bank of the Oskil River as encircled Russian servicemembers continue to hide in basements in Kupyansk on the right (west) bank of the Oskil River.[21] The commander added that encircled Russian servicemembers in Kupyansk are disguising themselves as civilians in acts of perfidy while awaiting relief from main Russian forces.

Order of Battle: An Uragan multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) crew of the 273rd Artillery Brigade (34th Artillery Division, Moscow Military District [MMD] under the operational control of the Western Grouping of Forces) is reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction, the first time ISW has observed evidence of this brigade operating on the battlefield.[22] ISW previously observed evidence of Russian forces forming the 273rd Artillery Brigade on January 8, 2026.[23]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on May 2.

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast overnight on May 1 and 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair unit near occupied Kadiivka (roughly 57 kilometers from the frontline).[24]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 2, concentrating attacks northwest of Lyman and east of Slovyansk, but did not advance.[25]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 189th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD] are striking Ukrainian forces west of Lyman, the first evidence ISW has observed of the existence of this battalion.[26]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced as Russian forces conducted infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on May 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Dovha Balka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[27] Geolocated footage published on April 29 and May 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northeastern and eastern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[28] Geolocated footage published on May 1 indicates that Russian forces also conducted an infiltration mission in southern Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[29]

Russian forces continue to intensify attacks in the Kostyantynivka direction. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on May 2 that Russian forces intensified activity in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area in April 2026, attacking 83 times in the Kostyantynivka direction in the last week (between roughly April 25 and May 2).[30]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks east of Dobropillya on May 2 but did not advance.[31]

ISW continues to observe evidence of Ukrainian forces operating in Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk). Geolocated footage published on May 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions in southern Rodynske.[32] ISW assesses that previous Russian presence in southern and southwestern Rodynske was likely the result of Russian infiltrations missions, given ISW’s observation of Ukrainian positions in the area.[33] Geolocated footage published on May 2 indicates that Russian forces also recently marginally advanced in western Rodynske.[34]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Novopavlivka direction. Geolocated footage published on May 2 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced in northwestern Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on May 2 but did not advance.[36]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

ISW continues evidence to observe evidence of Ukrainian forces operating in settlements northwest and north of Hulyaipole. Geolocated footage published on April 28, 29, and May 1 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in northern and central Varvarivka and in southern Zelene (both north of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces likely infiltrated around Ukrainian positions in Zelene and Varvarivka rather than seizing them as previously assessed.[37] Geolocated footage published on April 29, reportedly archival footage from late March or early April 2026, shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in central Varvarivka, indicating that Russian forces likely infiltrated around Ukrainian positions in Varvarivka, Pryluky (north of Varvarivka), and Olenokostyantynivka (west of Varvarivka) rather than seizing them as previously assessed.[38]

Russian forces are reportedly committing drone operators in the Hulyaipole direction to infantry assaults in some cases. A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces observed two instances of Russian forces committing drone operators, drivers, and rear support personnel to operate as assault infantry when suffering from personnel shortages.[39] The commander stated that Russian forces take such measures out of a need to satisfy exaggerated claims of advances to the Russian military command.

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 1 shows Ukrainian forces conducting an airstrike on Russian-occupied buildings south of Stepnohirsk (northwest of Orikhiv), indicating that there are likely no Ukrainian positions in the vicinity of the Russian positions south of Stepnohirsk.[40]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Zhnets Detachment (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Orikhiv direction, the first evidence ISW has observed of the existence of this unit.[41]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on April 30, including toward islands in the Dnipro River Delta, but did not advance.[42]

Russian forces continue to employ pervasive human safari tactics targeting civilians in the Kherson direction. Ukrainian officials reported on May 2 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a bus in Dniprovskyi Raion of Kherson City killed two civilians and wounded seven others.[43]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast overnight on May 1 to 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Ivanivka (roughly 73 kilometers from the frontline).[44]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea overnight on May 1 to 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Iskander ballistic missile system tactical group deployment point near occupied Druzhne (roughly 222 kilometers from the frontline); a Mys-M1 coastal radar station near occupied Mayak (roughly 135 kilometers from the frontline); and a Podlyot radar station near occupied Yevpatoriya (roughly 167 kilometers from the frontline).[45] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that an April 29 Ukrainian strike against the occupied Kacha airfield (roughly 223 kilometers from the frontline) destroyed an ammunition depot.[46]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 163 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other drones - of which roughly 142 were Shaheds, including jet-powered Shaheds - from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[47] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 142 drones, that 17 drones struck 12 locations, and that downed debris fell on two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast and port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[48] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck an energy facility in Mykolaiv Oblast and other targets in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts, and Kharkiv City.[49]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces destroyed over 57,000 Russian air targets in April 2026, including 69 Kh-101 cruise missiles; seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; eight Kaliber cruise missiles; four Kh-59/69 guided aircraft missiles; five Iskander-K cruise missiles; 4,861 Shahed drones; 1,065 reconnaissance drones; and 51,110 other types of drones.[50]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.