Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 19, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:15 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET

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Russia is using unannounced strategic nuclear exercises to posture strength against Ukraine's allies and distract from mounting battlefield weaknesses. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced May 19 that the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Northern and Pacific Fleets, Long Range Aviation Command, and some elements of the Leningrad and Central Military Districts (LMD and CMD, respectively) will conduct an exercise from May 19 to May 21 on preparing and using nuclear force in response to a threat of aggression.[i] The Russian MoD stated that several nuclear units will launch ballistic and cruise missiles at ranges within Russia. The MoD reported that the exercise will involve over 64,000 personnel and over 7,800 pieces of military equipment, including over 200 missile launchers, over 140 aircraft, 73 surface ships, and 13 submarines, including eight strategic missile submarines. The BBC’s Russian Service assessed on May 19, citing data from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, that the exercise will likely involve the majority of Russia’s estimated roughly 320 nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.[ii] The MoD stated that the exercise will also involve joint Russian and Belarusian operations with Russian nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus. The Belarusian MoD stated on May 18 that Russian and Belarusian forces began a joint exercise on the use of nuclear weapons.[iii] Russia did not previously announce the May 19 to 21 nuclear exercise and is conducting it significantly earlier in the year than its typical air, land, and sea nuclear exercises (informally called the Grom exercises), which Russia has conducted annually in October since 2022.[iv] Russian forces last conducted surprise nuclear exercises in Summer 2024, focused on non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, likely to influence Western policy debates about the provision of long-range weapons to Ukraine.[v] The Kremlin is also reiterating longstanding threats against NATO to correspond with these exercises. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on May 19 that Russia and NATO are increasingly likely to engage in a direct clash with catastrophic consequences and accused NATO countries of provoking Russia in the nuclear sphere and escalating rhetoric about the Russian threat.[vi] Ryabkov claimed that Russian military planners will not ignore NATO's nuclear weapons development and claimed that Western countries have not set conditions for substantive dialogue on arms control.[vii]

Russian forces are likely conducting the surprise May 19 to 21 nuclear exercises and amplifying longstanding narratives aimed at influencing NATO decision-making and masking Russia's own weaknesses. Russian forces have so far failed to make meaningful gains in their ongoing spring-summer 2026 offensive, Ukrainian forces have contested the tactical initiative in several areas of the frontline, and Russian forces have failed to defend the Russian deep rear against increasingly devastating Ukrainian strikes.[viii] Russian officials may be accusing NATO countries of escalatory behavior coterminously with the exercise in an attempt to exercise reflexive control, a tactic that relies on shaping an adversary with targeted rhetoric and information operations in such a way that the adversary voluntarily takes actions that are advantageous to Russia, to divide Ukraine from its European partners and diminish support for Ukraine's defensive effort.[ix]

Russia is escalating its efforts to set informational conditions for possible future aggression against the Baltic states. Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on May 18 that Ukrainian forces are preparing to launch drone strikes against Russia’s rear directly from the territory of the Baltic states, particularly Latvia.[x] The SVR claimed that Ukrainian drone operators have already deployed to Latvian military bases. The SVR also heavily implied that Russia intends to strike claimed Ukrainian drone launch points, referring to the Latvian military bases, as well as Latvian decision-making centers in response to claimed Ukrainian strikes from Latvian territory. Latvian officials have repeatedly denied Russian accusations that Latvia allowed Ukraine to use their airspace or territory to launch strikes against Russia.[xi] The Kremlin often uses the SVR to spread extreme and unfounded narratives intended to destabilize other countries and justify potential Russian interference and aggression.[xii] The SVR's threat against Latvia comes amid reports that a Romanian fighter jet intercepted a Ukrainian drone over Estonian airspace on May 19 after Russian electronic warfare (EW) diverted the drone from Russian airspace.[xiii] Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi stated on May 19 that Russia continues to redirect Ukrainian drones into the Baltics with EW systems and apologized to Estonian and other Baltic countries for unintended incidents.[xiv] ISW previously observed reports of Ukrainian drones crashing in Baltic and Finnish territory, possibly as a result of Russian EW efforts.[xv] The SVR’s claim that Ukrainian forces as using Baltic airspace and territory to target Russia is a continuation of Russian officials’ efforts to set conditions to violate Baltic and Finnish airspace or conduct other military operations against the Baltics for allegedly allowing Ukrainian strike drones to use Baltic and Finnish airspace.[xvi]

Russian contract recruitment continues to decline as battlefield casualties rise, despite recent increases to one-time signing bonuses. Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on May 18 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) concluded 70,500 military service contracts in the first quarter of 2026, below the monthly quota of 33,500 to 34,600 contracts signed.[xvii] The SZRU reported that the Russian MoD recruited between 800 and 930 servicemembers on average per day in the first quarter of 2026, compared to an average of 1,200 in the same period in 2025. The SZRU reported that over 40 Russian federal subjects are to increase payments to recruits by 30 to 100 percent, and in some areas by 200 to 500 percent, compared to the end of 2025. Russia has increasingly resorted to alternative methods of recruiting as one-time bonuses have proven insufficient to replenish Russian battlefield casualties.[xviii] The Russian State Duma adopted a law on May 13 that forgives overdue loans for Russian servicemembers and their families for completing a year of service in the Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[xix] The SZRU noted that the number of prisoners in Russia has fallen to its lowest levels since the early 2000s - from around 465,000 at the end of 2021 to around 282,000 as of May 2026 as Russia dips into the federal penitentiary system for wartime recruitment.[xx] Russia is increasingly suffering from recruiting and manpower challenges, including recruiting shortfalls relative to casualties, the commitment of reserves, increased signing bonuses, and expanded covert mobilization efforts.[xxi] ISW has observed reports that at least 24 Russian federal subjects have increased signing bonuses between three and 68 percent since mid-February 2026, and the Russian MoD has intensified its forced covert mobilization effort to businesses and universities as of January 2026.[xxii]

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly trained Russian military personnel in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2025, underscoring how Russia and its allies are using the war in Ukraine for military learning and testing. Reuters reported on May 19, citing three European intelligence agencies and additional documents, that the PLA secretly trained about 200 Russian military personnel in military facilities, including in Beijing, Nanjing, Shijiazhuang, and Zhengzhou in late 2025, focusing on drone operations.[xxiii] Reuters cited internal Russian military reports detailing four of the trainings, which included firing mortars with reconnaissance drone support, using drones and small arms to counter enemy drones, first-person view (FPV) drone operations, and engineering, mine, and mine-clearing operations. Two of the European intelligence agencies stated that many of the Russian military personnel who trained in the PRC had a high enough ranking to be able to transmit lessons learned down the command chain. One of the European intelligence agencies reported that it has confirmed at least a "handful" of Russian military personnel who trained in China and have since deployed to operations in occupied Crimea and Zaporizhia Oblast. Reuters reported that Russia and the PRC previously concluded an agreement wherein about 200 Russian military personnel would train in the PRC, and several hundred PLA personnel would train in Russia, and that both sides agreed not to inform other countries. The PRC may intend for Russia to use PLA tactics and lessons on the battlefield to gauge the effectiveness of these tactics, doctrine, and training in contemporary battlefield conditions like those in Ukraine. The PRC may also intend to benefit from Russian military personnel training with PLA personnel. The PRC and other members of the Adversary Entente will likely continue seeking opportunities to leverage Russia's war in Ukraine as learning opportunities for their militaries and refine battlefield technologies.

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in China on May 19 for an official visit through May 20.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is using unannounced strategic nuclear exercises to posture strength against Ukraine's allies and distract from mounting battlefield weaknesses.
• Russian forces are likely conducting the surprise May 19 to 21 nuclear exercises and amplifying longstanding narratives aimed at influencing NATO decision-making and masking Russia's own weaknesses.
• Russia is escalating its efforts to set informational conditions for possible future aggression against the Baltic states.
• Russian contract recruitment continues to decline as battlefield casualties rise, despite recent increases to one-time signing bonuses.
• The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly trained Russian military personnel in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2025, underscoring how Russia and its allies are using the war in Ukraine for military learning and testing.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in China on May 19 for an official visit through May 20.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Kupyansk and Hulyaipole directions.
• Russian forces launched 209 drones toward Ukraine overnight.  

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on May 18 and 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 19 that Ukrainian forces struck the Yaroslavl-3 oil pumping station near Semibratovo, Yaroslavl Oblast.[xxv] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evrayev acknowledged that drones struck an industrial facility in Yaroslavl Oblast.[xxvi] Russian State Duma Defense Committee member Andrei Kolesnik confirmed the Ukrainian drone strike against the Yaroslavl oil refinery.[xxvii] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from May 19 shows a heat anomaly near the Yaroslavl oil refinery, and footage published on May 19 shows smoke rising from the oil refinery in Yaroslavl City.[xxviii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 19 that Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, on May 18, causing a fire.[xxix] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez refinery is one of the largest in Russia, with a capacity of around 17 million tons of oil per year. The refinery produces gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel for Russian forces.

Satellite imagery provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) and additional information about recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure. Satellite imagery captured on May 18 shows the destruction of four RVS-5000 tanks at the Solnechnogorsk Pumping Station in Solnechnogorsk, Moscow Oblast, after a May 17 Ukrainian strike.[xxx] Satellite imagery taken on May 18 shows several damaged ELOU-AVT-3, ELOU-AVT-6, and AVT-1 technological overpasses, along with one of the tanks at the Ryazan oil refinery in Ryazan City, Ryazan Oblast, after a May 15 Ukrainian strike, which a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst noted is over half of the refinery’s oil refining facilities.[xxxi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border) 

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 19 but did not advance.[xxxii]

Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in the near rear in Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation point near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (along the international border) and drone control points in occupied Bilovody (approximately 4.5 kilometers from the frontline) on May 18.[xxxiii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces continue to operate in areas around Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City). Geolocated footage published on May 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Synelnykove and western Lyman (both northeast of Kharkiv City and south of Vovchansk).[xxxiv] The presence of Ukrainian forces in Synelnykove and Lyman indicates that Russian forces likely infiltrated around Ukrainian positions in southern Synelnykove and western Lyman rather than seizing them.

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 19 shows five Russian servicemembers raising flags in southern Volokhivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxv] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) subsequently claimed that elements of the Russian 126th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized the settlement.[xxxvi] ISW continues to assess that these flag raisings are part of the Kremlin‘s cognitive warfare effort aimed at aggrandizing Russian advances to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing across the theater, contrary to all available evidence.[xxxvii]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported Russian ground attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 19.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on May 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[xxxviii] Geolocated footage published on May 17 and 18 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian servicemember south of Kurylivka, in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[xxxix]

Russian forces are facing difficulties conducting small group assault operations in the Kupyansk direction. The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force reported on May 19 that Russian forces continue launching small infantry group assaults in the Kupyansk direction, trying to break into the town and push Ukrainian forces from the left (east) bank of the Oskil River, but are struggling to advance.[xl]

Russian milbloggers continue to acknowledge the discrepancies between Russian official reporting and the realities of the battlefield in the Borova direction. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on May 19 that footage of Russian forces allegedly operating in Borova from May 18 is fake and that continued misleading informational “evidence” is overshadowing real Russian gains.[xli]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued conducting offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 19 but did not advance.[xlii]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continue targeting each other’s logistics in the Lyman direction. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 19 that Russian forces are intensifying the use of Molniya drones and loitering drone ambushes, which are complicating Ukrainian logistics in the area.[xliii] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 19 that Ukrainian and Russian forces are attempting to destroy each other’s logistics and that Russian forces in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) have a variety of training levels, including well-trained infantry responsible for special tasks, former convicts with minimal equipment, and mules to carry cargo.[xliv]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on May 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northeastern and southern Molocharka (north of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[xlv] Geolocated footage published on May 11 and 16 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in central and western Kostyantynivka in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[xlvi]

Geolocated footage published on May 15 shows Russian forces conducting a FAB-300 strike against a dam near Kostyantynivka.[xlvii]

Russian forces continue to set conditions for future offensive operations northeast of Kostyantynivka. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on May 19 that Russian forces are pulling up reserves at night, accumulating assault groups, and conducting logistics using motor transport near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[xlviii]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dobropillya tactical area on May 19 but did not advance.[xlix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 19 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the area.[l]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on May 19 but did not advance.[li]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on May 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Zelene (northwest of Hulyaipole).[lii] Geolocated footage published on May 18 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions northeast of Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[liii]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 19 did not advance as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the area.[liv]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on May 19 but did not advance.[lv]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Oleksandrivka (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline) on May 18.[lvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 18 to May 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 209 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones, and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk City.[lvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 180 drones, that 27 drones struck 15 locations, and that downed debris fell on five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck port, residential, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[lviii] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces struck a shopping center and residential infrastructure in Pryluky, Chernihiv Oblast, with a ballistic missile, killing at least three and wounding at least 23 others.[lix]

Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems continues to adapt its drone tactics and technologies to changing battlefield conditions. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) correspondent Roman Pahulych reported on May 18 that Rubikon drone operators are increasingly equipping first-person view (FPV) drones with both daytime and thermal imaging cameras, increasing their strike effectiveness at night.[lx] Pahulych stated that Rubikon operators often conduct strikes using a traditional strike FPV alongside a sleeper drone, with the sleeper drone waiting for Ukrainian servicemembers to run out of their position. Pahulych noted that Rubikon drone operators have started posting a small number of FPV drone strikes on Ukrainian radio communications deep in the Ukrainian rear. Russian forces have been notably expanding the range of their FPV drones using fixed-wing mothership drones, fiber-optic cables, and repeater drones for signal relay.[lxi] Pahulych stated that Russian forces now leverage FPV drones for airstrike target acquisition, as Ukrainian drone interceptors do not allow Russian fixed-wing reconnaissance drones to perform this role.[lxii] Pahulyuch stated that Rubikon drone operators have also managed to intercept Ukrainian long-range strike drones, indicating increasing Russian capabilities to intercept fast-flying drones and possibly hindering the Ukrainian long-range strike campaign in Russia in the future.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes.