Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:15 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET

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Russian forces have conducted two days of nearly continuous strikes against Ukraine with over 1,600 total long-range drones and missiles that heavily targeted Kyiv City and resulted in high civilian casualties.[1] Russian forces launched a strike package totaling 892 drones and missiles against Ukraine from 1800 on May 12 to 1830 on May 13.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force subsequently reported that Russian forces launched 731 drones and missiles from 1800 local time on May 13 to the morning of May 14.[3] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Kinzhal Kh-47 aeroballistic missiles, 18 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, and 35 Kh-101 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 675 strike drones, decoy drones, and Banderol drone-based cruise missiles.[4] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 29 Kh-101s, 12 Iskander-M/S-400s, and 652 drones. Ukrainian Air Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces largely concentrated the strikes against Kyiv City in an effort to overwhelm Ukraine's air defenses.[5] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes since the evening of May 13 damaged at least 20 locations in Kyiv City alone, and that a Russian ballistic missile strike collapsed a nine-story residential building in the capital, killing at least 12 people, including a 12-year-old child, and injuring at least 57.[6] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, energy infrastructure in Khmelnytskyi and Chernihiv oblasts, and residential areas in Kharkiv City.[7] Russian strikes injured at least 28 in Kharkiv Oblast and at least two in Odesa Oblast.[8] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned on the evening of May 13 that Russian forces intended to launch missiles against Ukraine that evening following earlier efforts to exhaust Ukraine's air defenses.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces downed about 94 percent of the Russian drones and 73 percent of the missiles from the evening of May 12 to the morning of May 14 despite this effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.[10]

The large-scale strike against Kyiv City did not violate the Russian-Ukrainian Victory Day ceasefire but nonetheless demonstrates that Russia is a bad faith negotiator. The Kremlin made multiple threats to launch a concentrated strike at decision-making centers in Kyiv City if Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russia's Victory Day celebrations in Moscow City on May 9.[11] Some Russian officials called for Russia to use ballistic missiles, including the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), against Kyiv City.[12] Zelensky agreed to a ceasefire between May 9 and 11 and signed a decree on May 8 stipulating that Ukraine would not strike Moscow's Red Square for the duration of the parade.[13] Ukraine did not strike Moscow during the ceasefire as agreed. Russian forces did not strike the decision-making centers in Kyiv City or use Oreshniks as Kremlin officials had threatened, but Russia's latest massive strikes against Kyiv City illustrate Russia's bad-faith understanding of compliance.

The Kremlin continues to replace border oblast governors, likely to scapegoat regional officials for broader border security failures. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed two decrees on May 13 stating that Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov and Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz both resigned from their posts at their "own requests."[14] Putin appointed Irkutsk Oblast Deputy Governor Major General Alexander Shuvayev as acting Belgorod Oblast governor and former Chelyabinsk Oblast Deputy Governor and occupation Chairperson of the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Government Yegor Kovalchuk as acting Bryansk Oblast governor. ISW first observed reports in early April 2026 that the Kremlin was considering replacing Gladkov with Shuvayev, who is a graduate of the “Time of Heroes” program that seeks to install veterans of the war in Ukraine in various government positions.[15] Russian opposition source Meduza, citing a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration, noted that the Russian political bloc wanted the new Belgorod Oblast governor to have more experience in civilian administration, but ultimately settled on Shuvayev.[16]

The replacement of Gladkov and Bogomaz comes after a series of dismissals and arrests of other border oblast officials. The Kremlin has persecuted and scapegoated former officials of Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk oblasts for the Kremlin’s own failures to adequately respond to Ukraine's 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion and Ukrainian cross-border raids in 2023 and 2024.[17] The Kremlin replaced former Kursk Oblast governors Roman Staravoit and Alexei Smirnov in May and December 2024, respectively.[18] The replacement of Gladkov and Bogomaz marks leadership changes in all three Russian oblasts bordering northern Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[19] Residents of Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts have routinely complained about Russian authorities' insufficient efforts to protect the regions from, and respond to, the consequences of Ukrainian strikes.[20] The Kremlin may also be attempting to deflect dissatisfaction in border areas away from Putin and the ruling United Russia party ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections. Gladkov has also been outwardly critical of the impacts of the mobile internet and Telegram shutdowns in the Belgorod Oblast border area, and the Kremlin may have replaced Gladkov with someone the Kremlin deems more loyal.[21]

Shuvayev, who has been in command of units that have reportedly committed war crimes in Ukraine, is part of the new "elite" Putin is forming in the Russian government through the "Time of Heroes" program. Shuvayev previously commanded the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd LNR Army Corps ]AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) from February 2022 to August 2022, during the battles for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk (Luhansk Oblast) and then commanded the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) during the seizure of Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast.[22] The 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade has committed numerous war crimes, including executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), in and around Avdiivka under Shuvayev's command.[23] The Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted effort to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine who have passed through the "Time of Heroes" program to local, municipal, regional, and federal positions in order to reintegrate servicemen into Russian society and to bolster civil-military relations and support for the war.[24] The Kremlin's decision to replace Gladkov with Shuvayev is likely part of its long-term effort to militarize the Russian government with loyalists and pro-war veterans.

The Kremlin is increasing its efforts to censor reactions to Ukrainian strikes against Moscow City, suggesting that it is growing concerned about its inability to protect the Russian rear. The Moscow City Anti-Terrorist Commission adopted a regulation on May 12 prohibiting government authorities, media organizations, emergency services, and citizens from disseminating information about strikes prior to official publications from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) or from official Moscow Mayor and Government sources.[25] The new Moscow City regulation is consistent with the Kremlin's ongoing censorship campaign aimed at restricting the spread of evidence of successful Ukrainian strikes.[26] The new regulation is an implicit acknowledgement that the Kremlin expects Ukrainian strikes on Moscow City to not only continue but to also result in successful hits and damage to infrastructure that the Kremlin wants to conceal. Recent Ukrainian strikes against western Russia have demonstrated Russia’s inability to reliably defend its rear against drone and missile strikes, a reality that the Kremlin is trying to cover up by censoring the information space.[27]

Russian commanders continue to order Russian soldiers to commit war crimes in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian infiltrators desecrated and then publicly displayed the bodies of two Ukrainian servicemembers who were killed in action (KIA) in the Hulyaipole direction on May 14.[28] The Ukrainian officials stated that radio intercepts indicate that the commander of the Russian unit directly ordered the act and that the Russian soldiers expressed readiness to carry out the order. Russian infiltrators conducting such atrocities are more broadly indicative of Russian war fighting tactics that integrate war crimes and intentional harm into their operational template.[29] ISW has long assessed that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering such war crimes on the battlefield.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have conducted two days of nearly continuous strikes against Ukraine with over 1,600 total long-range drones and missiles that heavily targeted Kyiv City and resulted in high civilian casualties.
• The large-scale strike against Kyiv City did not violate the Russian-Ukrainian Victory Day ceasefire but nonetheless demonstrates that Russia is a bad faith negotiator.
• The Kremlin continues to replace border oblast governors, likely to scapegoat regional officials for broader border security failures.
• Shuvayev, who has been in command of units that have reportedly committed war crimes in Ukraine, is part of the new "elite" Putin is forming in the Russian government through the "Time of Heroes" program.
• The Kremlin is increasing its efforts to censor reactions to Ukrainian strikes against Moscow City, suggesting that it is growing concerned about its inability to protect the Russian rear.
• Russian commanders continue to order Russian soldiers to commit war crimes in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Belgorod Oblast on the night of May 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor air defense system near Stary Oskol (roughly 100 kilometers from the international border) and a counterbattery radar station near Novosyolovka.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 14 but did not advance.[32]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 14 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[33]

A Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces recently seized Chaikivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 13 that while Russian forces advanced into Chaikivka, that Russian forces do not control the settlement and that fighting is ongoing. Russian milbloggers previously claimed that Russian forces had seized Chaikivka as of May 12.[35]

Order of battle: A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command redeployed the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) to the Vovchansk direction.[36] ISW last observed elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction as of March 26.[37]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 14.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 14.[38] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 14 that Russian forces advanced on the eastern outskirts of Kupyansk and in eastern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[39] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are expanding their presence in Kupyansk but that Russian forces are far from fully controlling the town. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of most of Petropavlivka (west of Kupyansk) and that only a limited number of Ukrainian forces remain on its southern outskirts. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone operators continue to complicate the situation for Russian forces and limit their offensives in the Kupyansk area.

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian drone operators and are extending the kill zone in the Kupyansk direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on May 14 that Russian forces have not achieved any success in the Kupyansk direction despite increased greenery that can provide Russian forces concealment from Ukrainian drones. The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian drone operators continue to target Russian drone operators and ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in the Kupyansk direction and are extending the kill zone deeper into the Russian rear.[40]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 14 but did not advance.[41]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi posted geolocated footage on May 14 showing Ukrainian forces strike a Russian Tor air defense system near occupied Bursivka (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline).[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction as Russian forces continued offensive operations in the area.[43] Geolocated footage published on May 13 and likely taken on a prior date indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced into central Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk).[44]

Russian forces appear to be concentrating attacks on Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces have intensified attacks on Rai-Oleksandrivka and are increasing strikes against Mykolaivka and Orekhuvatka (northeast and east of Rai-Oleksandrivka, respectively) to disrupt Ukrainian logistics east of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal.[45] Another milblogger claimed that Rai-Oleksandrivka is a Ukrainian strongpoint and that Russian forces need to seize the settlement before Russian forces can begin attacks toward the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.[46]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kostyantynivka direction. Geolocated footage published on May 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in western Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[47] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Mykolaivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[48]

Russian forces continue to struggle to advance in the Kostyantynivka direction amid Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 14 that Russian forces have concentrated a significant amount of manpower in the Kostyantynivka direction with the ultimate goal of seizing the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka agglomeration but that a majority of Russian forces remain outside of the city.[49] Mashovets reported that Russian forces have sent small groups of servicemembers to infiltrate into Kostyantynivka but that Russian forces are operating in less than 10 percent of the city.[50] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and trying to reinforce Russian forces in the area with additional drone operators in preparation for an assault on central and western Kostyantynivka. Mashovets noted that Ukrainian counterattacks in southern and eastern Kostyantynivka and near Illinivka, Berestok (both south of Kostyantynivka), and Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) are impeding Russian advances and halted a previous Russian attempt to break into central and western Kostyantynivka.[51] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger admitted on May 13 that Ukrainian forces are effectively targeting concentrated Russian forces near Kostyantynivka and preventing Russian forces from advancing near Chasiv Yar.[52] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are stuck in the Kostyantynivka direction and have been advancing at a maximum pace of one kilometer per week for over a month. Mashovets speculated that Russian forces have shifted their focus to the Dobropillya and Pokrovsk directions as the Russian military command intends to attempt to outflank Kramatorsk from the south and southwest bypassing Kostyantynivka, although ISW assesses that such an envelopment is extraordinarily implausible given the vast distance Russian forces would have to cover and the Russian forces’ slow rate of advance.[53] Mashovets noted that Russian forces in this direction rely on a mix of resources from several combined arms armies (CAAs) and army corps (ACs), and that Russian forces are unlikely to deploy reserves in this direction. ISW continues to assess that the slowing rate of Russian advances and the challenging nature of the Ukrainian-held terrain in Donetsk Oblast make it unclear that Russian forces will ever be able to seize the oblast by military force.[54]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Dobropillya on May 14 but did not advance.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northwest of Pokrovsk on May 14 but did not advance.[56] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that Russian forces continue to transfer reserves, equipment, artillery, and personnel to Pokrovsk in an attempt to turn Pokrovsk into a logistics hub for Russian forces.[57] The 7th Corps reported that Ukrainian forces recently struck a troop concentration of the Russian 51st CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) in Rivne (east of Pokrovsk), causing at least 30 Russian casualties.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Novopavlivka direction on May 14 but did not advance.[58]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on May 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in northeastern Nove Zaporizhia (south of Oleksandrivka).[59] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 13 that Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) is a contested gray area that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are able to break into.[60]

Russian forces used the May 9 to 11 ceasefire to accumulate infantry and motorcycles in the Oleksandrivka direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on May 13 that Russian forces did not stop shelling during the May 9 to 11 ceasefire and used the pause in fighting to accumulate infantry and motorcycles in rear areas.[61] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have been moving some of this infantry closer to the frontline but are not very actively using motorcycles. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces decreased the tempo of offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction after Ukrainian forces successfully repelled a large-scale Russian mechanized assault in early April.

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of May 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Redut-2US mobile communications system in the occupied Frolivske Raion of Donetsk City (roughly 46 kilometers from the frontline).[62] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi posted geolocated footage on May 14 showing Ukrainian forces striking a command post and temporary deployment point of the Russian Kaira Drone Detachment of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) in occupied Staromlynivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[63]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces are reportedly increasing the intensity of offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and are attempting to restore previously lost positions.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole).[65]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[66]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of May 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian communications node in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[67]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on May 14 but did not advance.[68]

Russian forces struck United Nations (UN) humanitarian mission vehicles in Kherson City. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on May 14 that Russian forces struck vehicles belonging to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Korabelnyi Raion, Kherson City.[69]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast on the night of May 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair unit in occupied Hromivka (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline).[70]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on the night of May 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical equipment depot in occupied Perevalne (roughly 230 kilometers from the frontline).[71]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russia has reportedly been falling behind on production plans for ballistic missiles. Ukrainian source Militarnyi reported on May 14 that procurement documents show that the Russian Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau (KBM) in Kolomna, Moscow Oblast, which makes Iskander-M ballistic missiles and Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, received an order to produce 589 Iskander-Ms in 2024 and 643 in 2025.[72] Militarnyi noted that Ukrainian official reports show that Russia launched 302 ballistic missiles of all types, including S-300/400 missiles and North Korean KN-23/24 missiles, in 2024 and 511 in 2025. Militarynyi stated that reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) from July 2025 to April 2026 show that Russia maintained a relatively constant reserve of 200-250 ballistic missiles, suggesting that Russia was not directing a significant portion of new missile production to stockpiles. Militarnyi reported that downed missile debris from late 2025 and early 2026 shows that Russia was launching recently produced missiles, suggesting that Russia had not met its production plans, possibly due to the combined effects of sanctions pressure and Ukrainian strikes against the Russian defense industrial base.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.