Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 11, 2026

Assessment as of: 5:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations throughout the theater on the final day of the May 9 to 11 ceasefire. Russian and Ukrainian officials accused the other side of violating the ceasefire with artillery, air, and drone strikes and limited ground operations across the theater on May 11.[1] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range strikes against Ukraine overnight on May 10 to 11.[2] Observed NASA Fire Information for Resources Management System (FIRMS) data signatures from May 11 indicate that hostilities continued to decrease on May 11 but did not cease. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces used the ceasefire to pull forward reserves, accumulate personnel, and continue artillery and first-person view (FPV) strikes.[3] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces increased strikes with Molniya fixed-wing drones during the ceasefire compared to before the ceasefire, and speculated that Russian forces may have stockpiled Molniya drones ahead of the ceasefire for this purpose.[4] The prevalence of mutual accusations and continued localized kinetic combat activity throughout the final day of the ceasefire continues to highlight the fact that ceasefires without explicit enforcement mechanisms, credible monitoring, and defined dispute resolution processes are unlikely to hold.

Recent reports of Ukrainian drones operating near occupied Mariupol as part of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast and Crimea are raising significant concerns among Russian milbloggers. Russian milbloggers expressed concern on May 10 in response to recent Ukrainian footage of Ukrainian Hornet drones freely operating over the T-0509 Mariupol-Donetsk City highway (also called the H-20 highway) near occupied Mariupol, targeting Russian tanker trucks and other military transport vehicles.[5] One of the milbloggers expressed serious concern that the situation along GLOCs near Mariupol is beginning to resemble conditions along the M-30 Horlivka-Panteleymonivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk City highway, where the milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have paralyzed Russian logistics and civilian traffic by using drones.[6] The milblogger claimed that the M-30 highway was safer in 2024 to 2025, despite being closer to the frontline, compared to 2026, when the M-30 at its closest is 35 kilometers from the frontline, due to the increased range of Ukrainian drones. The milblogger claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) can only jam Ukrainian Hornet drones if they do not use Starlink or do not have time to auto-lock onto the target. The milblogger expressed concern that Ukrainian forces may be able to fully automate Hornet drones within the next six to 12 months (about December 2026 to March 2027).[7] Another milblogger echoed these concerns, expressing worry that Ukrainian Starlink-enabled drones with a range of up to 200 kilometers are reaching the M-14 Mariupol-Berdyansk-Melitopol-Henichesk highway, a key Russian GLOC along the Sea of Azov coast to occupied Crimea.[8] The Ukrainian 1st Azov National Guard Corps published footage on May 8 of Ukrainian drones reconnoitering and interdicting Russian GLOCs through Mariupol, demonstrating Ukraine's increased capacity to strike moving targets further into Russia's operational rear areas as part of an intensifying BAI campaign.[9] Ukraine's ability to strike moving targets in areas previously considered relatively risk free for Russian forces will likely achieve partial BAI effects and appears to be a point of increasing neuralgia in the Russian ultranationalist information space.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations throughout the theater on the final day of the May 9 to 11 ceasefire.
• Recent reports of Ukrainian drones operating near occupied Mariupol as part of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast and Crimea are raising significant concerns among Russian milbloggers.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces conducted long-range strikes on May 10 to 11.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian authorities extinguished the fire at a Russian oil pumping station in Perm Krai twelve days after a Ukrainian strike. Radio Svoboda reported that satellite imagery shows that Russian authorities extinguished the fire at the Transneft Perm Linear Production Dispatch Station in Perm Krai on May 11, 12 days after an April 28 to 29 Ukrainian strike against the facility.[10] Radio Svoboda assessed that the fire fully destroyed six oil storage tanks at the station.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission in Sumy Oblast as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked.[11] Geolocated footage published on May 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers and a Russian position south of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[12]

Ukrainian forces conducted the first drone-assisted rescue of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in the North Slobozhansk (Sumy) direction. A Ukrainian brigade reported on May 11 that a Ukrainian Vampire drone crew helped free two Ukrainian service members in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) in April after Russian forces captured the soldiers during an assault on neighboring Ukrainian positions.[13]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 11 but did not advance.[14]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 11.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited ground activity in the Kupyansk direction on May 11 amid the May 9-11 Victory Day ceasefire.[15]

Russian forces continue infiltration efforts against Ukrainian positions on the left (east) bank of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on May 11 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian efforts to reenter Kupyansk through Holubivka (north of Kupyansk) as Russian forces continue attempts to infiltrate toward Kurylivka through Pishchane (both southeast of Kupyansk) and reduce the Ukrainian foothold on the left bank of the Oskil River.[16] Trehubov stated that drone operations on both sides are hindering Russian and Ukrainian logistics on the left bank of the Oskil River.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Borova direction. Geolocated footage published on May 10 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position east of Hrekivka (southeast of Borova), indicating that there are likely no Russian positions near Ukrainian positions in the area, contrary to Russian claims.[17]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 11, intensifying drone strikes as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the area.[18]

Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked.[19] Geolocated footage posted on May 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian servicemembers in eastern Markove (north of Kostyantynivka) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[20]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on April 29 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position east of Dovha Balka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), indicating that there are likely no Russian positions in the area, contrary to Russian claims.[21]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on May 11 as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in this direction.[22] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya tactical area reported on May 11 that Russian forces continued ground operations, artillery and drone strikes, and reconnaissance during the May 9-11 ceasefire.[23]

Russian forces recently advanced north of Pokrovsk while continuing to rely on drones and airstrikes. Geolocated footage published on May 10 shows Ukrainian forces conducting an airstrike on a Russian-occupied building in central Rodynske, indicating that there are likely no Ukrainian positions in the area.[24] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on May 11 that Russian forces are conducting large-scale airstrikes against Ukrainian forces with KAB guided glide bombs.[25] The officer added that Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian heavy armored vehicles have forced Russian forces to rely on drones to achieve most of their frontline missions.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of frontline strikes against Russian positions in and around Rodynske on May 10. Geolocated footage published on May 10 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a guided aerial bomb strike on a Russian-occupied building in Rodynske.[26] Geolocated footage published on May 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position at a mine near Rodynske.[27]

Russian forces continued limited ground activity in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on May 11 amid the May 9-11 Victory Day ceasefire.[28]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on May 11 but did not advance.[29]

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Orikhiv direction on May 11 but did not advance.[30]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on May 11 amid the ongoing May 9-11 Victory Day ceasefire.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces are employing BM-35 and BM-70 strike drones to strike residential buildings. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and EW expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on May 10 that Russian forces are using BM-35 and BM-70 drones in strikes against large stationary targets, such as residential buildings in Sumy City, Kramatorsk, and other cities, due to Russian forces’ inability to maintain communications with the drone at low altitudes for strikes against moving targets.[31] Beskrestnov noted that BM drones reach speeds of 200 kilometers per hour near the ground and become uncontrollable as a result. Beskrestnov added that Russian forces control BM drones from stations on the roofs of multistory buildings at least 15 kilometers behind the frontline. Beskrestnov stated that Ukrainian forces have a shortage of EW systems that suppress analog video feeds on BM drones, as it is difficult for Ukrainian forces to jam the video feeds with existing systems, and directional EW systems are unable to suppress them at a distance of “tens of kilometers.” ISW first observed a report of Russian forces employing BM-70 strike drones on May 10.[32]

Russian forces have reportedly developed four significant variants of the Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile since February 2022 in efforts to bypass Ukrainian air defenses and increase damage from missile strikes. The Ukrainian MoD reported on May 11 that Russia reduced the Kh-101's range to increase its payload by reducing the volume of its fuel tank to accommodate a second warhead.[33] The Ukrainian MoD reported that Russia also modified the Kh-101 to carry a cluster warhead to increase the number of objects damaged in a single missile strike and equip some of these cluster warheads with zirconium balls that ignite upon impact and sustain combustion. The Ukrainian MoD reported that Russia also used a new type of explosive in some variants containing cluster munitions that is 30 to 40 percent more powerful than the type of explosive used in other generations of the Kh-101. The Ukrainian MoD noted that Russia also modernized the guidance system and EW countermeasures of the Kh-101. The Ukrainian MoD reported that Ukrainian forces continue to down Russian cruise missiles, however, and have downed 88 percent of Russian Kh-101, Kh-55, and Kh-555 cruise missiles launched since January 2026. The Ukrainian MoD also noted that Russia produces and stockpiles missile components up to several months in advance but only assembles missiles within two weeks of launching them.

Increased Russian air-launched missile strikes against Ukraine may be degrading Russia's strategic bomber aviation fleet. The Ukrainian MoD reported that a Russian Tu-160 strategic bomber expends 6 to 8 percent of its engines' service life in one flight from Ukrainka Airfield in Amur Oblast to the Caspian Sea to strike Ukraine and that Russian Tu-95MS strategic bombers now only carry two missiles instead of six when conducting strikes against Ukraine.[34]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.