Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 19, 2026

Assessment as of: 8:30 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET

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Ukraine has been imposing increasing challenges on Russia at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels since the beginning of 2026. Ukrainian drone units have been increasingly prioritizing and executing successful strikes against Russian artillery, drone operators and logistics targets in the near rear to achieve tactical effects.[1] The planning head of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on March 17 that Ukrainian forces have shifted the focus of their drone strikes to prioritize targeting Russian artillery, drone operators, ground lines of communication (GLOCs), and staging areas rather than Russian infantry, reducing the number of Russian assaults and enabling Ukrainian forces to make local gains.[2] The planning head added that frequent Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian communications antennas are demoralizing Russian forces, as well as inhibiting Russian frontline communications.[3] A Ukrainian drone unit reported on March 19 that Ukrainian drone operators destroyed an entire battery of six Russian Grad multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in the Pokrovsk direction, and geolocated footage published on March 19 confirms the destruction of two Grad systems in Zhuravka (roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline southeast of Pokrovsk).[4] Ukraine’s short-range strike campaign against the Russian tactical near rear is therefore increasingly degrading both Russian offensive and defensive capabilities by enabling Ukrainian forces to make tactical gains and hindering Russia’s ability to conduct artillery preparation for the anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[5]

Ukrainian forces are also conducting a systematic effort to degrade Russian air defenses and expose other valuable assets in the Russian rear within their mid- and long-range battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst reported on March 18 that the reported monthly Ukrainian mid-range strikes between 50 and 250 kilometers behind the frontline have quadrupled from an average of roughly 11 between March and October 2025 to an average of 45 since November 2025.[6] The analyst noted that Ukrainian forces conducted a total of 365 mid-range strikes between March 19, 2025 and March 9, 2026, of which one third occurred in the previous three months alone (roughly since January 9, 2026). The figures include some Ukrainian long-range strikes that have similar impacts, as mid-range strikes are typically at an operational depth (about 20 to 120 kilometers from the frontline).[7] The OSINT analyst noted that Ukrainian forces targeted radar stations, missile launchers, and other elements of the Russian air defense system in almost half of the strikes since March 19, 2025. The OSINT analyst added that Ukrainian forces have used Ukrainian-manufactured mid-range strike drones with ranges of up to 250 kilometers to partially replace the role that High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) systems used to fill, and notably increased their usage of FP-2 long-range strike drones over the past five months (roughly since October 9, 2025). BBC’s Ukraine Service reported on March 19 that Ukrainian General Staff data indicates that Ukrainian forces struck 55 Russian air defense systems during Winter 2025-2026.[8] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on March 16 that Ukrainian forces struck 23 more air defense systems between March 1 and 16, for a total of 80 systems during Winter 2025-2026 and early Spring 2026.[9] Dutch open-source project Oryx visually confirmed on January 1, 2026 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 77 Russian surface-to-air-missile (SAM) systems and 23 radar stations in 2025.[10] Ukraine’s degradation of the Russian air defense network through concentrated strikes against radars and air defense systems allows subsequent Ukrainian strikes to target other valuable assets in the Russian rear, enhancing the reach of Ukraine’s mid-range BAI campaign.[11]

Recent Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction and the continued success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances have forced the Russian military command into competing tactical and operational dilemmas on the battlefield. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed on March 19 that Russian forces possess insufficient strength to simultaneously seize Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advance to Zaporizhzhia City from the south in a single offensive.[12] Mashovets noted that the Ukrainian defensive line along the Kinska River that runs through Orikhiv to the northwest south of Zaporizhzhia City, and the recent Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction that are diverting Russian forces from efforts against Orikhiv from the east both hinder a Russian seizure of Orikhiv. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces would likely have to draw reinforcements from the Kherson direction to conduct such an effort in western Zaporizhia Oblast, considering Russian forces’ attempts to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts against the Fortress Belt, Dobropillya, Kupyansk, and to create a ”buffer zone” in northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.[13] Mashovets previously observed on March 12 that a Russian push toward Dobropillya would force Russian forces to divert resources away from their efforts against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt to significantly reinforce the exhausted 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 2nd CAAs (Central Military District [CMD]) in the area.[14] Mashovets noted on March 19 that Russian forces are unable to leverage a hypothetical mobilization to rapidly generate manpower for such an effort, as Russian forces lack the time to train recruits for a summer offensive.[15]

The competing dilemmas that Ukraine has imposed on the Russian military command have likely disrupted Russian preparations for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Mashovets stated that he has not observed credible reports of Russian forces’ redeployment of significant formations to the 58th CAA's (SMD) area of operations (AoR) west to south of Orikhiv that Russian forces would require to conduct a major operation against Zaporizhzhia City during Spring or Summer 2026, however.[16] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are accumulating infantry southwest of Orikhiv for offensive efforts against the town and against Novopavlivka (just northwest of Orikhiv), but that this accumulation is insufficient given the lack of Russian gains to the west and northwest.[17] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk (Kostyantynivka) direction reported on March 19 that the intensity of Russian attacks in this direction is relatively low and that Russian forces have failed to achieve even tactical advances northeast of Kostyantynivka before a presumably fabricated Russian March 10 deadline to wedge between Mayske and Markove (both northeast of Kostyantynivka) and a similarly fabricated March 15 deadline to seize the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal in the area.[18] The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces have not observed a large accumulation of Russian heavy equipment in the Kramatorsk direction, which would be an indicator of Russian offensive preparation. The Russian failure to make even tactical advances to seize favorable starting positions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area for the anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt directly undermines Russia’s ability to achieve significant gains in the anticipated offensive.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely formalized some Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) elements. The Russian MoD stated on March 18 that the BARS-22 detachment is subordinated to the 55th Naval Infantry Division (Pacific Fleet, newly formed from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade) and is operating in the Dobropillya tactical area.[19] ISW has observed recent reports of elements of the 55th Naval Infantry Division operating in both the Dobropillya and Hulyaipole directions, and the division may be split between these two sectors.[20] The Russian MoD reorganized the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade into the 55th Naval Infantry Division on December 1, 2025 as part of ongoing reforms and efforts to form new maneuver divisions that then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu first announced in December 2022.[21] BARS elements have operated largely as informal units since 2022, and the Russian MoD may be taking advantage of these ongoing expansion efforts to formalize the BARS units.[22]

Tankers carrying Russian oil are reportedly sailing to Cuba in violation of the US embargo. Co-founder of maritime intelligence company TankerTrackers.com Samir Madani told the Financial Times (FT) that the Hong Kong-flagged Sea Horse tanker is carrying 27,000 tons of gas and will arrive in Cuba on Monday, March 23.[23] Maritime intelligence company Kpler identified the gas as Russian in origin. Madani added that the Russian-flagged Anatoly Kolodkin, which carries roughly 100,000 metric tons of crude, will likely arrive in Cuba on April 4. The FT reported that the vessels would be the first to arrive in Cuba in three months.

Kremlin officials are reportedly considering military means to escort Russian ships. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev told Russian business outlet Kommersant on March 18 that Russia is considering installing “special protective equipment” on ships, including mobile fire groups to defend ships (likely from drone strikes), and Russian naval vessels to escort merchant ship convoys.[24] Patrushev’s statements are set against the backdrop of increased US and European seizures of shadow fleet tankers off the European coast and in the North Atlantic and Indian oceans and the Caribbean Sea.[25]

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor is reportedly struggling to block all blacklisted resources on the Russian internet as Russian authorities are attempting to slowly throttle access to Telegram. A source at a Russian fixed-line telecommunications operator told Forbes’ Russia service on March 18 that Roskomnadzor has “completely lost control” of its blocking efforts, allowing users to periodically access some previously blocked websites and apps.[26] A source at a Russian "backbone" internet service provider confirmed to Forbes’ Russia service that Roskomnadzor “does not have the bandwidth” to handle all ”RuNet” traffic to completely block all banned resources. ”RuNet” is Russia’s sovereign internet system that uses state-controlled domain name servers (DNS) to match IP addresses with domain addresses and connect users with websites.[27] Roskomnadzor denied the claim that it possesses insufficient bandwidth to conduct the required blocks.[28] Russian authorities have failed to prepare adequate technical means to block Telegram along with other banned applications and websites. Russian authorities have also failed to adequately prime the information space to absorb increasingly restrictive measures, and the Kremlin has faced backlash over its information control attempts from pro-war information space figures that it cannot fully co-opt or subordinate to state control.[29] Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on March 18 that the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) expelled Russian State Duma Deputy Andrei Svintsov for actions that “discredited” the LDPR, likely referring to controversial statements that he recently made regarding the blocking of Telegram, virtual private networks (VPNs), and the internet in Russia.[30] The Russian rhetorical response to the backlash toward impending internet crackdowns appears uncoordinated, and the Kremlin is likely unprepared to deal with such backlash.

The US decision to lift sanctions against Belarus will likely directly benefit Russia’s economy and therefore Russia’s war effort. US Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale met with Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko on March 19, after which Lukashenko announced that he freed 250 political prisoners.[31] Coale told reporters that the United States will lift sanctions from two Belarusian state banks, the Belarusian Finance Ministry, the top Belarusian potash (a key ingredient for fertilizer and major Belarusian export) producers.[32] Coale told Reuters that the United States will remove all sanctions placed on Belarus over the suppression of protests in 2020 if Belarus releases all remaining political prisoners by the end of 2026.[33] ISW has long assessed that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that the states have a combined defense industrial base (DIB).[34] Lifting US sanctions on Belarus therefore directly benefits Russia’s war effort.

A Russian Su-30 fighter jet briefly violated Estonian airspace on March 18. The Estonian Defense Forces reported on March 19 that a Russian Su-30 fighter jet violated Estonian airspace over the Gulf of Finland near Vaindloo Island (about 81 kilometers southeast of Helsinki) for roughly one minute on March 18.[35] The Estonian Defense Forces reported that the Russian aircraft had no published flight plans and no two-way radio contact with Estonian air traffic control.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine has been imposing increasing challenges on Russia at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels since the beginning of 2026.
• Recent Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction and the continued success of Ukraine’s defensive lines in constraining Russian advances have forced the Russian military command into competing tactical and operational dilemmas on the battlefield.
• The competing dilemmas that Ukraine has imposed on the Russian military command have likely disrupted Russian preparations for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely formalized some Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) elements.
• Tankers carrying Russian oil are reportedly sailing to Cuba in violation of the US embargo.
• Kremlin officials are reportedly considering military means to escort Russian ships.
• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor is reportedly struggling to block all blacklisted resources on the Russian internet as Russian authorities are attempting to slowly throttle access to Telegram.
• The US decision to lift sanctions against Belarus will likely directly benefit Russia’s economy and therefore Russia’s war effort.
• A Russian Su-30 fighter jet briefly violated Estonian airspace on March 18.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the Pokrovsk and Oleksandrivka directions. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the Hulyaipole direction.
• Russian forces launched 133 drones against Ukraine, including in Chernihiv, Volyn, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Lviv oblasts.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely struck a chemical plant in Stavropol Krai overnight on March 18 to 19. An open-source intelligence channel posted footage reportedly of Russian air defense repelling a Ukrainian strike and of a large fire in Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai.[36] The channel and Ukrainian source Militarnyi stated that locals reported four strikes against the Nevinnomyssk Azot chemical plant, which produces mineral fertilizers used to make explosives.[37] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies at the chemical plant the night of March 18 to 19.[38] Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov claimed that Russian forces repelled a large-scale strike against the region but that buildings in Nevinnomyssk sustained damage.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Potapivka (north of Sumy City along the international border) and advanced west of the settlement.[40]

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy direction, including north of Sumy City toward Nova Sich and Mala Korchakivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on March 18 and 19.[41]

The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) is focusing on increasing drone supplies and the effectiveness of drone strikes. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov inspected the Northern GoF on March 17 and heard reports from Northern GoF Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.[42] Nikiforov claimed that Russian forces have increased their effectiveness in countering Ukrainian drones due to improved coordination and training of first-person view (FPV) interceptor drone crews. Nikiforov claimed that the Russian military command has increased the supply of modern strike and reconnaissance drones to the Northern GoF, increasing Russian strikes against Ukrainian positions and ensuring continuous aerial reconnaissance in the Northern GoF's area of operations. Nikiforov stated that the Russian military command created an analytical center at the Northern GoF's unmanned systems command post to assess the effectiveness of drone operators. Nikiforov stated that the Northern GoF deployed technical and operational units equipped with 3D printers and programming equipment to ensure the uninterrupted supply of drones to frontline units.

Order of battle: Drone operators of the Russian 15th Tank Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian towed artillery in Mala Rybytsya (east of Sumy City).[43] Elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[44]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Veterynarne, Zolochiv, Kozacha Lopan, Zelene, and Slatyne and northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Lyman, Starytsya, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe and toward Zybyne, Bochkove, Okhrimivka, and Verkhnya Pysarivka on March 18 and 19.[45]

Russian forces continue efforts to find alternatives to Starlink in the Kharkiv direction. The commander of a Ukrainian drone group operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on March 19 that Russian forces in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City) are trying to establish alternative data transmission channels after losing their access to Starlink terminals.[46] The commander stated that Russian forces are installing antennas closer to the border and have increased their use of Wi-Fi bridges. The commander stated that Russian forces are trying to camouflage the antennas but that Ukrainian forces are effectively conducting drone reconnaissance to target these antennas. The commander stated that Ukrainian forces are also reconnoitering and striking Russian drone take-off locations.

A commander of a Ukrainian mortar battery operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on March 19 that Russian forces continue efforts to infiltrate behind Ukrainian positions to accumulate and consolidate forces for further attacks.[47] The commander stated that Russian forces are attempting to exploit poor weather conditions to conduct infiltrations but that springtime mud is making it difficult to attack. The commander stated that Russian forces have increased their use of first-person view (FPV) drones as compared to six months ago (September 2026) and are targeting Ukrainian logistics.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka on March 18 and 19 but did not advance.[48]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on March 18 shows Russian forces operating in Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[49]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka and Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kurylivka and toward Hlushkivka on March 18 and 19.[50]

Russian forces are intensifying their human safari campaign against civilian targets in the Kupyansk direction. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on March 18 that Russian forces have significantly intensified their first-person view (FPV) drone and guided glide bomb strikes against civilian vehicles, ambulances, and infrastructure in this direction since March 13.[51] The officer noted that Russian forces recently struck civilian ambulances near Oleksandrivka (west of Kupyansk) and Prosyanka (northwest of Kupyansk); civilian cars near Novoosynove (southeast of Kupyansk), Prosyanka (northwest of Kupyansk), and Borivske (west of Kupyansk); and critical infrastructure facilities in Hrushkivka (southwest of Kupyansk). The officer assessed that Russian drone operators are striking civilian targets when their drone batteries run low and they have yet to find any military targets. The officer noted that Ukrainian forces find many fallen Russian Molniya-2 fixed-wing FPV drones that have fallen when their batteries ran out. Russian forces have been conducting their "human safari" campaign — a term describing the practice of using FPV drones to strike civilian targets — in Kherson Oblast and have been expanding this campaign throughout the entire theater.[52] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military seeks to both weaponize and institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.[53]

A Ukrainian channel reporting on the Kharkiv direction stated on March 19 that Ukrainian forces struck drone control points and supply storage areas of the Russian 1843rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in the first weeks of March 2026 near Holubivka and Radkivka (both north of Kupyansk) after Russian forces failed to remove the white winter camouflage covering the targets.[54]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are striking Ukrainian forces in Pishchane.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Korovii Yar and east of Oleksandrivka (both southeast of Borova).[56]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Borivska Andriivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Novomykhailivka, Novovodyane, Novoserhiivka, Novoyehorivka, Olhivka, and Serednie; and south of Borova toward Korovii Yar and Oleksandrivka on March 18 and 19.[57]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on March 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Fedorivka Druha (southeast of Slovyansk).[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kalenyky (east of Slovyansk).[59]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and toward Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky; southeast of Lyman near Dibrova and Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Platonivka; east of Slovyansk toward Riznykivka and Kalenyky; and southeast of Slovyansk near Lypivka and Nykyforivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on March 18 and 19.[60]

Order of Battle: Howitzer crews of the Russian 83rd Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and drone operators of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[61]

Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 16 shows Russian forces operating in southern Kostyantynivka in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[62]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Pavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[63]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar, Holubivka, Minkivka, and Pryvillya and toward Malynivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk, Ivanopillya, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Berestok and Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka and toward Pavlivka on March 18 and 19.[64] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on March 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault of an unspecified echelon on the southwestern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[65]

Russian heavy bomber drone shortages are likely restricting Russian forces' ability to use these systems on the frontline. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported on March 19 that Russian forces are using heavy bomber drones to conduct rear-area logistics rather than for strikes against Ukrainian positions or logistics to frontline positions.[66] The spokesperson assessed that Russian forces are likely using the drones only in the rear out of fear that Ukrainian forces will destroy them closer to the frontline. The spokesperson assessed that Russian forces are therefore likely preserving the drones due to shortages. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces conduct logistics to forward positions on foot, by FPV drone, or by unmanned ground system (UGV).

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka).[67] Drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Raiske and Novopavlivka (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[68] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces between Slovyansk and Kostyantynivka.[69] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Druzhkivka.[70] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya toward Vilne; and southeast of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas on March 18 and 19.[72]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Dobropillya, Novofedorivka, and Nadiya (both west of Dobropillya).[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka and Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske, Sukhetske, and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne on March 18 and 19.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novooleksandrivka.[75]

Russian forces may be renewing limited mechanized assaults in the Pokrovsk direction. A spokesperson of Ukraine's 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on March 19 that Russian forces recently intensified assaults in Hryshyne and conducted a platoon-sized mechanized assault with three armored fighting vehicles — the first mechanized assault in the area since December 2025.[76]

Ukrainian forces have reportedly blocked a small group of relatively elite Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 18 that Ukrainian forces have blocked up to 10 Russian naval infantry and Spetsnaz personnel near an unspecified settlement in the area.[77] The brigade reported that most of the soldiers are wounded and that Russian forces are unable to conduct evacuations to deliver medicine. The brigade assessed that Russian forces may use foreign recruits, particularly from Ethiopia and Morocco, that are currently undergoing training as an "extreme" reserve to attack in the area, likely to unblock the soldiers.

Russian forces continue to lie about battlefield advances in the Pokrovsk direction. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that there are only two or three Russian personnel in Bilytske and that Russian forces are lying to the Russian military command about the control of terrain (COT) in the area.[78]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on March 19 that Russian attacks along the Hryshyne-Rodynske line and Bilytske intend to support a future Russian effort against Dobropillya from the Pokrovsk area.[79] Another milblogger claimed that Novooleksandrivka and southern Vasylivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) are becoming contested "gray zones."[80]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems are striking Ukrainian forces in Vodyanske (northwest of Pokrovsk).[81]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Muravka; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on March 18 and 19 but did not advance.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai; east of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve and Sosnivka; southeast of Oleksandrivka near Stepove; and south of Oleksandrivka near Krasnohirske, Zlahoda, and Rybne on March 18 and 19.[83] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dobropasove (just east of Oleksandrivka).[84]

Russian forces have recently increased their number of attacks in the Oleksandrivka direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that Russian forces were attacking two to three times per day one week ago (roughly March 12) but have since almost tripled their number of attacks.[85] The spokesperson stated that the number of Russian personnel in the area has also increased and that Russian forces are starting to use a limited number of heavy armored vehicles in attacks. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using more Molniya drones as compared to February and the start of March.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian artillery brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated over 285 square kilometers in the area in one month (since roughly February 19).[86] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated 126 square kilometers between February 19 and March 18, but ISW’s conservative mapping methodology underestimates Ukrainian advances. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces periodically try to counterattack to slow down Ukrainian advances and stabilize the situation but that Ukrainian forces maintain the initiative.[87] The spokesperson noted that Russian tactics are unchanged as Russian forces continue to use infiltration missions and a high number of FPV drones. The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes are keeping Russian equipment five to 10 kilometers away from Ukrainian positions. The spokesperson stated that Russian airborne (VDV) forces in the area are well trained and well equipped but are unable to reach the frontline due to Ukrainian FPV drone strikes. The spokesperson assessed that Russian forces will try to take advantage of spring foliage to advance.

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of March 18 to 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition depots in Donetsk City (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline) and Yalta (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline); a material and technical supply warehouse near Vesele (one of a number of settlements ranging from 10 to 120 kilometers from the frontline); and a personnel concentration near Yalta.[88]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Hulyaipole.[89] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 6 that Ukrainian forces were holding positions near Ivana Franka Street in northwestern Hulyaipole.[90]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Tsitkove, Zelene, and Dobropillya and toward Verknya Tersa and Vozdvyzhivka; west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Staroukrainka; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne and toward Hulyaipilske on March 18 and 19.[91] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Rizdvyanka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[92]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that claims that Russian forces reached Hulyaipilske, Charvine (southwest of Hulyaipole), and Myrne are unconfirmed.[93]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]); 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]); and BARS-20 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are striking Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[94] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are intercepting Ukrainian drones near Varvarivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[95] FPV drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and vehicles near Rizdvyanka, Liubytske, and Rivne (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[96] FPV drone operators of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[97]

Ukrainian forces recently eliminated Russian infiltrators in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian infiltrations and refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 19 shows Ukrainian forces raiding a Russian-occupied building and taking Russian servicemembers prisoner in southern Richne (northwest of Orikhiv) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[98] The geolocated footage also indicates that Ukrainian forces are operating in the area, contrary to previous Russian claims.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and toward Mahdanylivka on March 18 and 19.[99]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated on March 19 that elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating near Mala Tokmachka (southwest of Orikhiv) and that elements of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, SMD) are operating near Prymorske.[100] FPV drone operators of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Malokaterynivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[101] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv.[102]

Ukrainian forces continue their frontline and mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. A Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion reported on March 18 that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian Buk-M1 air defense systems, two energy infrastructure facilities servicing the Russian military, two fuel and ammunition warehouses, two towers with mesh network communication antennas to control Shahed drones, and satellite communications infrastructure and repeaters in unspecified areas of occupied Ukraine.[103] Geolocated footage published on March 18 confirms the Ukrainian strikes against Russian communications towers in occupied Enerhodar (southwest of Orikhiv along the Dnipro River) and energy infrastructure facilities in Tokmak (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[104]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on March 19.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kherson direction.[105]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast overnight on March 18 to 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Kalanchak (roughly 57 kilometers from the frontline) and a fuel and lubricants depot near occupied Novotroitske (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline).[106]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea overnight on March 18 to 19. The Ukrainian General Staff and the Ukrainian Navy reported on March 19 that Ukrainian forces struck the Granit Innovation Center, a facility of the Russian state defense conglomerate Almaz-Antey, in occupied Sevastopol, and a Russian manpower concentration near Striletska Bay (near occupied Sevastopol).[107] The Ukrainian General Staff and the Ukrainian Navy reported that the Granit Innovation Center repairs and maintains Russian air defense systems, including S-400, S-300PM2, Buk-M2/M3, and Tor-M2 air defense systems and 92N6E and 96L6E radar systems. The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported that at least five drones struck the center.[108] Geolocated footage published on March 19 shows damage to the Granit Innovation Center near the Fiolentovske Highway in occupied Sevastopol after Ukrainian drone strikes.[109] Sevastopol Occupation Governor Mikhail Razvozhayev claimed that drone debris fell near Striletska Bay and set fire to an industrial building near the Fiolentovske Highway.[110] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near occupied Ovrazhky overnight.[111] Geolocated footage published on March 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Shahed drone repeater antenna northwest of occupied Olenivka on an unspecified date during the first two weeks of March (between March 1 and 14).[112]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 133 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which roughly 70 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Oryol and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[113] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 109 drones, that 20 drones struck 11 locations, and that fragments of downed drones fell in seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged educational, residential, energy, and military infrastructure in Chernihiv, Odesa, Volyn, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[114] Ukrainian officials reported that drone debris fell on the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) building in Lviv City.[115]

Russian drone adaptations with mesh networks are reportedly allowing Russian forces to increase their use of Geran-type drones in frontline areas. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on March 19 that Russian forces steadily increased the number of Geran-type drone strikes, particularly in frontline areas where intercepting drones is difficult but targets are abundant.[116] The milblogger claimed that these Russian strikes are not “massive” but are primarily targeting energy and fuel infrastructure to create problems for the Ukrainian military and local authorities. The milblogger claimed that the strikes are targeting "low-level" infrastructure components that do not produce an immediate effect but rather systematically degrade the Ukrainian economy. The milblogger noted that Russian drone adaptations, such as the use of mesh networks, are making such strikes possible. (A mesh network is a wireless network that enables a group of drones to maintain a signal amongst themselves, as opposed to individually relying on ground signal systems.)

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.