March 14, 2026

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 14, 2026

Data Cutoff: 1:30 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 13 to 14 that caused significant civilian casualties in Kyiv City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles from occupied Crimea; 13 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast; 25 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black and Caspian seas; 24 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Vologda Oblast; and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast and unspecified areas of occupied Donetsk Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 430 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other types of strike drones, of which about 250 were Shaheds, from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 402 drones, one Zirkon hypersonic cruise missile, seven Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, 25 Kalibr cruise missiles, 24 Kh-101 cruise missiles, and one Kh-59/69 cruise missile. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that six missiles and 28 strike drones struck 11 locations and that drone debris impacted seven locations. Russian forces most recently used Zirkon, Iskander-M, and Kalibr missiles in the March 6 to 7 large-scale strikes on Ukraine.[2] ISW has consistently assessed that Russian forces will withhold from launching missiles in strike packages to stockpile such munitions and increase the devastation of future strike packages.[3]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on March 14 that the strikes impacted Kyiv City and Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[4] Zelensky noted that Russian forces targeted energy infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast but that they also struck residential and educational infrastructure. Ukrainian energy officials reported on March 14 that the strikes disrupted power in Kyiv City and Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[5] Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes destroyed civilian, transportation, and agricultural infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast.[6]

Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported on March 14 that the strikes killed at least five people and injured at least 22 people.[7] Kalashnyk reported that the strikes damaged residential infrastructure facilities, warehouse facilities, and vehicles and that the strikes left thousands without power and heating.[8]

Ukrainian forces continued long-range strikes against Russian military and oil infrastructure overnight on March 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery and the port of Kavkaz in Krasnodar Krai overnight on March 13-14.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes caused a fire at the Afipsky Oil Refinery and damaged port infrastructure at Kavkaz. Geolocated footage published on March 14 shows a fire at the refinery, and a Ukrainian open-source intelligence project assessed that the strikes destroyed the main refining unit at the refinery.[10] Russian sources claimed that the strikes damaged a berthing system at the Kavkaz port.[11] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that it struck the Slavyanin railway ferry and Avangard, likely referring to the Avangard cargo ship, which had been ferrying Russian logistics across the Kerch Strait.[12] The GUR stated that the strikes rendered the Slavyanin inoperable and damaged the Avangard. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Khanskaya Airfield at Maykop Airbase, Republic of Adygea.[13] The Khanskaya Airfield reportedly houses the Russian 272nd Training Aviation Base and can accommodate aircraft, including Tu-134 short-range airliners, An-12 transport aircraft, and Il-18 airliners.[14] Geolocated footage published on March 14 additionally shows an explosion in Tolyatti, Samara Oblast, reportedly near the KuybyshevAzot chemical plant.[15] The cause of the explosion is currently unclear. Ukrainian forces struck the KuybyshevAzot chemical plant overnight on March 10 to 11.[16]

Ukrainian forces are intensifying their mid-range strike campaign, increasing their ability to contest Russian missile strikes, degrade Russian air defenses, and disrupt offensive operations ahead of an expected Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Ukrainian forces struck a variety of mid-range Russian military targets in Russia and occupied Ukraine overnight on March 13 to 14. Mid-range strikes are typically at an operational depth (about 20 to 120 kilometers from the frontline), though Ukrainian forces also conducted similar strikes deeper into Russian-held areas.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff and SSO reported that Ukrainian forces struck an Iskander-M ballistic missile launcher that had been preparing to launch missiles at Ukraine from occupied Vyshneve, Crimea (roughly 209 kilometers from the frontline), and an Iskander missile launcher storage warehouse near occupied Kurotne, Crimea (roughly 217 kilometers from the frontline), and geolocated footage confirmed the strikes.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Nebo-U radar station near occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea (roughly 198 kilometers from the frontline), and geolocated footage confirmed the strike.[19] A Ukrainian unmanned systems brigade reported on March 13 that its drone operators struck five Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense systems in the Belgorod direction, and geolocated footage shows a strike on a Pantsir in eastern Belgorod City (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck an S-300 air defense missile depot near occupied Sadove, Donetsk Oblast (one of multiple settlements between 80 to 85 kilometers from the frontline); a Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) command post near Vulehirsk (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline); and command and observation posts in Hrafske and Kermenchyk raions.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian repair center and warehouse near occupied Andriivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (one of multiple settlements between 75 and 125 kilometers from the frontline), a force concentration near Novomykolaivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (one of multiple settlements between 50 and 80 kilometers from the frontline), and a materiel and equipment warehouse near Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline).[22] A Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment reported that it struck two Russian trains conducting logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on March 12, disabling the trains, and geolocated footage confirms that Ukrainian forces struck two trains east and southwest of occupied Tokmak (roughly 28 kilometers from the frontline).[23]

Ukrainian forces have been intensifying their mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower, which will also likely interfere with the expected spring-summer Russian offensive.[24] These strikes have largely targeted Russian forces and assets in eastern and southern Ukraine, where Russian forces have been prioritizing offensive operations in recent weeks.[25] Ukrainian forces have also begun more intensively targeting Russian multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in the Slovyansk and Kostyantynivka directions, which will likely degrade Russia's ability to conduct artillery preparation of the battlefield ahead of any planned ground operations in these directions.[26]

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 13 to 14 that caused significant civilian casualties in Kyiv City.
  • Ukrainian forces continued long-range strikes against Russian military and oil infrastructure overnight on March 13 to 14.
  • Ukrainian forces are intensifying their mid-range strike campaign, increasing their ability to contest Russian missile strikes, degrade Russian air defenses, and disrupt offensive operations ahead of an expected Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
  • Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced near Slovyansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on March 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy Oblast, including northwest of Sumy City near Sopych on March 13 and 14.[27]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on March 13 that Russian forces continue attempts to seize Popivka, Pokrovka, and Ryasne (all southeast of Sumy City).[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 137th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[29] Drone operators of the Krechet unit of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in Sumy Oblast.[30]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Izbytske, Vovchanski Khutory, and Prylipka and toward Verkhnya Pysarivka.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory.[32]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 14.

The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force reported on March 14 that Russian forces continue to accumulate forces in preparation to resume offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 14 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kucherivka, Petropavlivka, and Podoly (all east of Kupyansk).[34]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka and Novoosynove on March 13 and 14.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in northern Kupyansk.[36]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian positions within Kupyansk remain unstable and that Russian forces are struggling to conduct logistics into Kupyansk.[37] The milblogger claimed that the current logistics corridor into Kupyansk is only 500 meters wide and that Russian forces cannot use the corridor on foot or on vehicles, forcing Russian troops to rely on drones to supply positions within Kupyansk.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems are striking Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; south of Borova near Oleksandrivka and toward Vovchyi Yar; and southwest of Borova toward Krymky on March 13 and 14.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Hlushchenkove and near Ridkodub and Novomykhailivka (all southeast of Borova).[40]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the contested "gray zone" near Ridkodub expanded in size.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 14 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in western Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[42]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and toward Sosnove; north of Lyman near Stavky; north of Slovyansk near Svyatohirsk; east of Slovyansk near Rai-Oleksandrivka, Riznykivka, Zakitne, and Kryva Luka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka and toward Yampil on March 13 and 14.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sosnove, Riznykivka, and Yarova (northwest of Lyman).[44]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported on March 14 that Russian forces have almost fully exhausted available frontline troops in the Slovyansk direction and have had to send servicemembers from logistics units into assaults and to conduct small group infiltrations.[45] The spokesperson stated that the frontline forces received replacements and are now attempting to gradually increase the number of assaults. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are poorly trained, primarily infiltrate at night, and use anti-thermal cloaks to remain concealed. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are using improvised bridges to cross the Bakhmutivka River (northeast to southeast of Slovyansk).

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in western Riznykivka.[46] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 9th Engineer-Sapper Regiment (reportedly of the 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Mykolaivka (northwest of Siversk).[47] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) airstrikes against Ukrainian positions in Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[48]

The Ukrainian Atesh partisan group reported on March 14 that Russian forces are withdrawing vehicles deeper into rear areas in the Slovyansk and Siversk directions due to increased vehicle losses.[49] Atesh reported that Russian forces are withdrawing vehicles from occupied Siversk (four kilometers from the frontline), occupied Kreminna (about 27 kilometers from the frontline), and occupied Bilohorivka (about 18 kilometers from the frontline) toward occupied Lysychansk and Severodonetsk (about 30 to 37 kilometers from the frontline).

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on March 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building near the O0508 highway in central Holubivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[50] Geolocated footage published on March 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building and a Russian position and servicemember on the eastern and southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka in what ISW assesses were infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA at this time.[51]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Novomarkove; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, and Kleban-Byk; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Dovha Balka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and toward Mykolaipillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka on March 13 and 14.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Illinivka and Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Illinivka is a contested ”gray zone.”[54]

A Ukrainian company commander operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported on March 13 that Ukrainian forces are employing infiltration tactics in the Russian near rear and often seizing the tactical initiative with such missions — potentially disrupting Russian offensive plans for a spring or summer offensive.[55] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that improving weather conditions have allowed Russian forces to intensify their FPV drone operations, but that Russian forces have not intensified KAB guided glide bomb strikes.[56]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements and Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic FPV drone operators of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces), including its 1008th and 1307th motorized rifle regiments, are striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka.[57] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are coordinating VKS airstrikes against Ukrainian positions in the northwestern suburbs of Kostyantynivka.[58] Lancet loitering munition operators of the Reconnaissance and Strike Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (southeast of Druzhkivka).[59] FPV drone operators of the 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaipillya.[60] Artillery elements of the Dikaya Division of Donbas (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka and Kramatorsk directions.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Toretske and east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and Nove Shakhove on March 13 and 14.[62]

Order of Battle: Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) artillery crews of the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian personnel concentrations in the Dobropillya tactical area.[63] Elements of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya tactical area.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[65]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Serhiivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Zatyshok, Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, and Sukhetske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, and Novopidhorodne on March 13 and 14.[66]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian artillery system near occupied Zelene (south of Pokrovsk, roughly seven kilometers from the frontline) on the night of March 13 to 14.[67]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 14 that Ukrainian forces regularly use unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) en masse for frontline logistics and casualty evacuation.[68] The spokesperson also stated that Russian FPV drone operators target Ukrainian UGVs, hampering Ukrainian logistics and evacuation efforts.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Vodyanske (northeast of Pokrovsk).[69] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating west of Rodynske.[70]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka on March 13 and 14 but did not advance.[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Zlahoda, Krasnohirske, and Kalynivske and toward Vyshneve on March 13 and 14.[72]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles south of Oleksandrivka.[73] Drone operators of the 69th Covering Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[74]

Russian milbloggers continue to warn of increased Ukrainian drone range and effective drone operations. A Russian milblogger purportedly located in occupied Donetsk City claimed on March 13 that Ukrainian forces can conduct FPV drone strikes up to 100 kilometers behind the frontline and that Ukrainian forces have advanced technology that Russian forces cannot copy.[75] A different Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Ukrainian forces gained superiority in low-altitude drone operations and that Ukrainian forces are using fiber-optic drones, mothership drones, and changing radio frequencies.[76] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are using AI drone swarms to strike the Russian rear.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued attacking near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Olenokostyantynivka, Varvarivka, and Verkhnya Tersa and toward Vozdvyzhivka and Rizdvyanka; west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne; and southwest of Hulyaipole toward Hulyaipilske and Myrne on March 13 and 14.[77]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Barvinivka, Lisne, and Dolynka (all northwest of Hulyaipole).[78] Drone operators of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones south of Pryvilne (northeast of Hulyaipole).[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Shcherbaky, and Stepnohirsk on March 13 and 14.[80]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are submitting false reports about Russian positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast and that Ukrainian forces are operating on the outskirts of Prymorske and Stepnohirsk, which the milblogger noted that Russian forces previously claimed that they control.[81]

Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on March 14 that Russian forces launched four KAB guided glide bombs against Zaporizhzhia City that killed one, injured 13, and damaged residential infrastructure.[82]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on March 14.[83]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian communications antennas in Antonivka (east of Kherson City).[84] Yolka interceptor drone operators of the 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the direction of occupied Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City).[85] Elements of the 674th Separate Signals Battalion (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[86]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/57963

[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/

[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2026/

[4] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18315; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2032722072581939212?s=20; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2032722067997532659?s=20

[5] https://t.me/chernigivoblenergo/4882; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1263736-znestrumleni-1-835-abonentiv-rosijski-bezpilotniki-atakuvali-energoobekt-u-cernigivskomu-rajoni/; https://suspilne dot media/1263676-cerez-udari-rf-e-znestrumlenna-u-kievi-ta-sistoh-oblastah-ukraini-minenergo/; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4769; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4764  

[6] https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8316; https://t.me/synegubov/20523 

[7] https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/9312; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/9302;

[8] https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/9301; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/9300; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/59751

[9] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36071 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ogccQ1gzV1nKwYXyY5wYTpn8gJR5yZtkJYkUTkku2oozGxHTTQQNvEKwek7tcrUsl

[10] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12674; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/17440; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34220; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2032591493890977856; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2032789291357843586 https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2032584243805552985 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-urazyly-afipskyj-npz-goryt-ustanovka-pervynnoyi-pererobky-nafty/

[11] https://t.me/bazabazon/44681; https://t.me/opershtab23/15416; https://t.me/tass_agency/366101v

[12] https://t.me/DIUkraine/7999  

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MoJaRAzJ2XFF5pNEF7kxvPZXywDzUXQGU7ioKrhKt41TjzNrPbQVushtPA8vKGBSl

[14] https://euromaidanpress dot com/2026/03/14/ukraine-strikes-khanskaya-airfield-where-moscow-trains-its-top-military-pilots-its-500-kilometers-inside-russian-territory/

[15] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2032783877723546080; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2032738002590470246

[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2026/

[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/

[18] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2615; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0i72R9WQmj44NvKPVYHjveZkYUc1xKfhDGKQ38ySH4eoA344C6NfKLzGdz5iUkcUZl; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2032802396259180810?s=20; https://x.com/SOF_UKR/status/2032799151662973251?s=20; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34225; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2032799584020214246?s=20; https://x.com/MaxximOSINT/status/2032804575971881136; https://x.com/MaxximOSINT/status/2032803955957268722;

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0i72R9WQmj44NvKPVYHjveZkYUc1xKfhDGKQ38ySH4eoA344C6NfKLzGdz5iUkcUZl; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2032595959272603853; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2032472916277731390

[20] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2032581033024008390; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2032583079101976837; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2032547677418754432; https://x.com/achilles_429/status/2032497039926317287; https://t.me/fedorenkoys/1789; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/27643

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0i72R9WQmj44NvKPVYHjveZkYUc1xKfhDGKQ38ySH4eoA344C6NfKLzGdz5iUkcUZl

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dZPh4GUpe4Er8fVW1QzpUbp1xLzUGAka3QZPhvYCNG9u6Sjhf5HVFQwqin4Afxjrl

[23] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2032534267146698864?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2032539275669987538?s=20  https://t.me/Proofs_Dnepr1/62200; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/luftwaffe-urazyly-dva-rosijski-lokomotyvy/

[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2026/

[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2026/

[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2026/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2026/

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0384HYLRVe5fWjFmKvLYrvL9edeYE4HfzVH7uVouBziXECMFF3Gowpn1FUwKgaZX8ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vyurgL9HQsGWZEvabGd2vmhT4d6bhPTr23SDvmndN5jBgQfHhAR5bgKiAEeGKi6wl; https://t.me/severnnyi/7144; https://t.me/dva_majors/89584; https://t.me/wargonzo/32885

[28] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/13/na-sumshhyni-ta-harkivshhyni-vorog-atakuye-malymy-sylamy-ale-postijno-zdijsnyuye-tysk/; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20238

[29] https://t.me/severnnyi/7148

[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40794

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0384HYLRVe5fWjFmKvLYrvL9edeYE4HfzVH7uVouBziXECMFF3Gowpn1FUwKgaZX8ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssHAzLiDKgoSCY4ULR56cvJMY1SQPQUpFDAN6WLP7QaNVU1UcDoaFTJP2YPetZoql; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20242; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vyurgL9HQsGWZEvabGd2vmhT4d6bhPTr23SDvmndN5jBgQfHhAR5bgKiAEeGKi6wl; https://t.me/dva_majors/89584; https://t.me/wargonzo/32885; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40784

[32] https://t.me/severnnyi/7144; https://t.me/dva_majors/89584

[33] https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20242

[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40804

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0384HYLRVe5fWjFmKvLYrvL9edeYE4HfzVH7uVouBziXECMFF3Gowpn1FUwKgaZX8ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssHAzLiDKgoSCY4ULR56cvJMY1SQPQUpFDAN6WLP7QaNVU1UcDoaFTJP2YPetZoql; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20242; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vyurgL9HQsGWZEvabGd2vmhT4d6bhPTr23SDvmndN5jBgQfHhAR5bgKiAEeGKi6wl

[36] https://t.me/gvZapad/18019; https://t.me/dva_majors/89584

[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40804

[38] https://t.me/Osintpen/2660; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1203

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssHAzLiDKgoSCY4ULR56cvJMY1SQPQUpFDAN6WLP7QaNVU1UcDoaFTJP2YPetZoql; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20242; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vyurgL9HQsGWZEvabGd2vmhT4d6bhPTr23SDvmndN5jBgQfHhAR5bgKiAEeGKi6wl; https://t.me/gvZapad/18019; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40783; https://t.me/rybar/78538

[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40783 ; https://t.me/rybar/78538;

[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40783

[42] https://t.me/Osintpen/2661; https://t.me/SB123OMSBr/137

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0384HYLRVe5fWjFmKvLYrvL9edeYE4HfzVH7uVouBziXECMFF3Gowpn1FUwKgaZX8ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssHAzLiDKgoSCY4ULR56cvJMY1SQPQUpFDAN6WLP7QaNVU1UcDoaFTJP2YPetZoql; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20242; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vyurgL9HQsGWZEvabGd2vmhT4d6bhPTr23SDvmndN5jBgQfHhAR5bgKiAEeGKi6wl; https://t.me/gvZapad/18019; https://t.me/rybar/78538; https://t.me/motopatriot78/49528; https://t.me/wargonzo/32885; https://t.me/rybar/78567

[44] https://t.me/rybar/78538; https://t.me/motopatriot78/49528

[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/14/pidrozdily-zabezpechennya-vidpravlyaly-v-shturmy-na-slovyanskomu-napryamku-vorog-obnulyv-resurs-zhyvoyi-syly/

[46] https://t.me/Osintpen/2661; https://t.me/SB123OMSBr/137

[47] https://t.me/red_war_machine/411

[48] https://t.me/dva_majors/89577

[49] https://t.me/atesh_ua/9486

[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11469; https://www.facebook.com/reel/4054463124855529

[51] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2032605179544060183?s=20; https://t.me/Gryphon501/93; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2032582991931719765?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2032579981843284043?s=20; https://t.me/libertas666_28/150

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0384HYLRVe5fWjFmKvLYrvL9edeYE4HfzVH7uVouBziXECMFF3Gowpn1FUwKgaZX8ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssHAzLiDKgoSCY4ULR56cvJMY1SQPQUpFDAN6WLP7QaNVU1UcDoaFTJP2YPetZoql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vyurgL9HQsGWZEvabGd2vmhT4d6bhPTr23SDvmndN5jBgQfHhAR5bgKiAEeGKi6wl; https://t.me/rybar/78537

[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/32885; https://t.me/dva_majors/89584

[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/49532

[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/14/my-uspishno-provodymo-infiltracziyu-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-taktyka-zapraczyuvala-v-inshyj-bik/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/

[56] https://youtu.be/BBXpsY0Mdd8; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/14/pidrozdilu-fpv-perehoplyuvachiv-suttyevo-dodalosya-roboty-na-kostyantynivskomu-napryamku-masovo-zbyvayut-vorozhi-drony/

[57] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2032610695028625416?s=20; https://t.me/verumreactor/34148; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2032591461724635197?s=20; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4331; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2032585097711403154?s=20; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4326; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2032595519529173100?s=20; https://t.me/verumreactor/341463

[58] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2032602742309458158?s=20; https://t.me/dva_majors/89577

[59] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15134

[60] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15133

[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/32883

[62] https://t.me/wargonzo/32885; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0384HYLRVe5fWjFmKvLYrvL9edeYE4HfzVH7uVouBziXECMFF3Gowpn1FUwKgaZX8ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssHAzLiDKgoSCY4ULR56cvJMY1SQPQUpFDAN6WLP7QaNVU1UcDoaFTJP2YPetZoql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vyurgL9HQsGWZEvabGd2vmhT4d6bhPTr23SDvmndN5jBgQfHhAR5bgKiAEeGKi6wl

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/61934

[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/32883

[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/49541

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0384HYLRVe5fWjFmKvLYrvL9edeYE4HfzVH7uVouBziXECMFF3Gowpn1FUwKgaZX8ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssHAzLiDKgoSCY4ULR56cvJMY1SQPQUpFDAN6WLP7QaNVU1UcDoaFTJP2YPetZoql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vyurgL9HQsGWZEvabGd2vmhT4d6bhPTr23SDvmndN5jBgQfHhAR5bgKiAEeGKi6wl; https://t.me/wargonzo/32885; https://t.me/motopatriot78/49536

[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dZPh4GUpe4Er8fVW1QzpUbp1xLzUGAka3QZPhvYCNG9u6Sjhf5HVFQwqin4Afxjrl

[68] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/14/nazemni-drony-motayutsya-po-peredovij-postijno-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-regulyarno-ryatuyut-poshkodzheni-nrk/

[69] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15133 

[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/49541

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssHAzLiDKgoSCY4ULR56cvJMY1SQPQUpFDAN6WLP7QaNVU1UcDoaFTJP2YPetZoql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vyurgL9HQsGWZEvabGd2vmhT4d6bhPTr23SDvmndN5jBgQfHhAR5bgKiAEeGKi6wl

[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0384HYLRVe5fWjFmKvLYrvL9edeYE4HfzVH7uVouBziXECMFF3Gowpn1FUwKgaZX8ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssHAzLiDKgoSCY4ULR56cvJMY1SQPQUpFDAN6WLP7QaNVU1UcDoaFTJP2YPetZoql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vyurgL9HQsGWZEvabGd2vmhT4d6bhPTr23SDvmndN5jBgQfHhAR5bgKiAEeGKi6wl; https://t.me/voin_dv/18946; https://t.me/voin_dv/18952

[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/18958

[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/18955

[75] https://t.me/filatovcorr/6712

[76] https://t.me/germansadulaev/4449

[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0384HYLRVe5fWjFmKvLYrvL9edeYE4HfzVH7uVouBziXECMFF3Gowpn1FUwKgaZX8ol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssHAzLiDKgoSCY4ULR56cvJMY1SQPQUpFDAN6WLP7QaNVU1UcDoaFTJP2YPetZoql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vyurgL9HQsGWZEvabGd2vmhT4d6bhPTr23SDvmndN5jBgQfHhAR5bgKiAEeGKi6wl; https://t.me/wargonzo/32885

[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/18953; https://t.me/voin_dv/18954; https://t.me/voin_dv/18956

[79] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2032452123678625861; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2032452252074651818; https://t.me/burpobeda/18222

[80] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ssHAzLiDKgoSCY4ULR56cvJMY1SQPQUpFDAN6WLP7QaNVU1UcDoaFTJP2YPetZoql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vyurgL9HQsGWZEvabGd2vmhT4d6bhPTr23SDvmndN5jBgQfHhAR5bgKiAEeGKi6wl; https://t.me/wargonzo/32885; https://t.me/dva_majors/89584

[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/89584

[82] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/36339; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/36329; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/57405; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/36318; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/36306; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/36303; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/36301; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/57389; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/57389

[83] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0384HYLRVe5fWjFmKvLYrvL9edeYE4HfzVH7uVouBziXECMFF3Gowpn1FUwKgaZX8ol

[84] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/33304; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/33301; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/33298; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/33307

[85] https://t.me/mod_russia/61935

[86] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40794

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