March 01, 2026

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 1, 2026

Assessment as of: 1:45 PM ET

Data cutoff: 11:00 AM ET on March 1

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russia continues to offer no support but boilerplate condemnations to Iran following the deaths of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several other senior Iranian officials.[i] Russian President Vladimir Putin sent a message to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on March 1 expressing condolences for the deaths of Khamenei, Khamenei's family members, and several Iranian officials due to US-Israeli strikes.[ii] Putin criticized the deaths as an "assassination" committed in "cynical violation" of "human morality and international law," but did not mention the United States or Israel. Putin stated that Russia will remember Khamenei as an "outstanding statesman" who elevated Russian-Iranian relations to the level of a strategic partnership. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) expressed outrage at the deaths and criticized the United States and Israel for "hunting" Iran's leaders in violation of international law and the principles of "civilized interstate relations."[iii] The Russian MFA reiterated its calls to cease hostilities and resume diplomatic dialogue and criticized civilian casualties in the Gulf States, damages to civilian infrastructure, and the alleged cessation of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had separate calls on March 1 with UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani, and People's Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Minister Wang Yi about the US-Israeli strikes against Iran and reiterated his condemnation of the strikes.[iv] Lavrov and Wang jointly offered to coordinate actions with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other international organizations to help "stabilize" the situation.[v] Russian officials, including Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya, Commissioner for Human Rights Tatyana Moskalkova, and the Ambassador to Israel Anatoly Viktorov, all made similar condemnations and calls to resume dialogue.[vi] Russia's boilerplate responses continue to highlight the limits of Russia's ability to support Iran and the asymmetry of the Russian-Iranian relationship.[vii] The Kremlin will likely remain constrained by its own war effort in Ukraine and its desire to extract concessions from the United States without sacrificing its goals in Ukraine.[viii]

European states continue to crack down on Russian shadow fleet vessels sailing in violation of international sanctions. Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken announced on March 1 that Belgian forces successfully boarded and seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker with support from French forces during Operation Blue Intruder.[ix] Francken stated that authorities are escorting the ship to the Port of Zeebrugge to formally seize it. French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed that the French Navy helicopters helped Belgian forces during the operation and noted that European states are determined to enforce sanctions against Russia.[x] Belgian officials told Western and Belgian news outlets that the seized oil tanker is the Ethera, which flew a Guinean flag and was headed toward Russia at the time of the seizure.[xi] Data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the vessel has previously sailed under the flags of Guinea, Panama, Martinique, and Equatorial Guinea and made at least two trips to Novorossiysk, Russia. Starboard also indicated that the ship’s automatic identification system (AIS) went dark from October 2, 2025, to February 1, 2026. The United States Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) and the European Union have both listed the ship as a sanctioned entity.[xii] The Belgian seizure comes against the backdrop of increasing European — especially French — and US efforts to crack down on vessels sailing in violation of international sanctions.[xiii] The Russian Embassy in Belgium claimed that it has not received official communications from Belgium about the seizure of the Ethera and is working to determine the nationality of its crew.[xiv]

Key Takeaways:

  • Russia continues to offer no support but boilerplate condemnations to Iran following the deaths of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several other senior Iranian officials
  • European states continue to crack down on Russian shadow fleet vessels sailing in violation of international sanctions.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continue their strike campaign against Russian military assets in Russia's immediate rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 1 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Priselye, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 600 meters from the international border) on February 28.[xv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Varachyne and southeast of Sumy City near Pokrovka, on February 28 and March 1.[xvi]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on March 1 that the Russian military command began transferring servicemembers from all detachments of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to the 74th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (72nd Motorized Rifle Division) at the end of January 2026.[xvii] The milblogger claimed that Russian military command transferred sick and elderly servicemembers into the battalion and that the 74th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion trained for a week in occupied Bilovodsk, Luhansk Oblast and is already suffering serious casualties. The milblogger noted that the Russian military command has not formally listed these servicemembers under the command of the 74th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, which is preventing them from receiving pay or eligibility for compensation for injuries or death.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Ryzhivka (northwest of Sumy City).[xviii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Prylipka, Vovchanski Khutory, and Zybyne and toward Vesele on February 28 and March 1.[xix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka and toward Vikhuvatka and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne on February 28 and March 1.[xxi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 1 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka and toward Kurylivka on February 28 and March 1.[xxii] A Russian milblogger reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk.[xxiii]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 1 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka, southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka on February 28 and March 1.[xxiv] A Russian milblogger reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksandrivka.[xxv]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on March 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova and Sosnove; north of Lyman near Drobysheve and Stavky; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; south of Lyman near Dibrova and toward Staryi Karavan and Brusivka; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne and Dronivka; east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Fedorivka Druha on February 28 and March 1.[xxvi] A Russian milblogger reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yarova and Sosnove.[xxvii]

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating guided glide bomb strikes in the Slovyansk direction.[xxviii]

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Kostyantynivka.[xxix]

 

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Pryvillya; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka, Novopavlivka, and Pavlivka on February 28 and March 1.[xxx]

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Grachi Detachment of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and of the Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[xxxi] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[xxxii]

 

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[xxxiii]

 

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Shakhove and east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, Toretske, and Nove Shakhove on February 28 and March 1.[xxxiv]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[xxxv]

 

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne on February 28 and March 1.[xxxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske.[xxxvii]

 

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad areas reported on March 1 that Russian forces have increased the use of all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) because the ATVs have better cross-country driving capabilities and load capacity.[xxxviii] The spokesperson noted that ATVs have limited maneuverability, however, making it easier for Ukrainian drone operators to strike.

 

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Bilytske.[xxxix]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on March 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[xl]

 

Russian forces attacked southwest of Novopavlivka near Filiya on February 28 and March 1.[xli]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 1 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove, Stepove, Sichneve, Kalynivske, and Vorone on February 28 and March 1.[xlii]

 

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on February 27 that Russian forces are extending the Russian FPV drone ranges even though Russian forces are not advancing and are increasingly using sleeper drones to target Ukraine's near rear areas.[xliii] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using more sleeper drones in areas where Ukrainian forces could previously move freely on foot or by car. The spokesperson also noted that Russian forces may be trying to set up more formal communications as they no longer have Starlink capabilities.

 

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strikes against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missile system near occupied Manhush (just west of occupied Mariupol and roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) and a S-300V4 radar station near Novokrasnivka (roughly 88 kilometers from the frontline).[xliv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Yalta (roughly 102 kilometers from the frontline) and a manpower concentration near occupied Molodyi Shakhtar (roughly 85 kilometers from the frontline). Geolocated footage published on March 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot, an S-300 anti-aircraft missile system, and a radar in occupied Yalta.[xlv] Footage published on March 1 shows fires and smoke at an oil depot in occupied Makiivka (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline) after a likely Ukrainian strike.[xlvi]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 1 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Zelene, Svyatopetrivka, Rizdvyanka, and Varvarivka, and toward Pryluky, Vozdvyzhivka, and Verkhnya Tersa; and west of Hulyaipole near Staroukrainka and Zaliznychne on February 28 and March 1.[xlvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rizdvyanka and Ternuvate.[xlviii]

 

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast against Russian military assets in the near rear areas on the night of February 28 to March 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole and roughly five kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian manpower concentration near Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole and roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline).[xlix]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv near Myrne, west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk, and northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske, Zapasne, and Mahdalynivka on February 28 and March 1.[l]

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[li]

 

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and medium-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of February 28 to March 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv); a Russian fuel and lubricants storage facility near occupied Pryshyb (roughly 37 kilometers to the frontline); a Russian repair unit near occupied Bahativka (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline); and Russian concentration of forces near Dunaivka (roughly 107 kilometers from the frontline).[lii]

 

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on March 1.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces on the right bank of the Dnipro River.[liii]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

 

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 28 to March 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 123 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which roughly 70 were Shaheds — from the directions of Kursk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[liv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 110 drones as of 0830 local time and that 13 drones struck seven locations and debris from downed drones fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged educational infrastructure in Kharkiv City and targeted Odesa City.[lv]

 

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

 

Nothing significant to report.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[i] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-february-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-us-and-israeli-strikes-february-28-2026/;

[ii] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79238; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/letters/79237; https://t.me/tass_agency/363537; https://t.me/tass_agency/363538 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/03/01/tsinichnoe-narushenie-vseh-norm-chelovecheskoy-morali-putin-soboleznuet-v-svyazi-s-ubiystvom-hamenei

[iii] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2083359/

[iv] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2083311/; https://t.me/MID_Russia/74831; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2083364/; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2083372/

[v] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2083372/

[vi] https://t.me/tass_agency/363450 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/363454; https://t.me/MID_Russia/74848; https://t.me/MID_Russia/74884; https://t.me/ombudsmanrf/8535; https://t.me/MID_Russia/74853

[vii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2026/

[viii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2026/

[ix] https://x.com/FranckenTheo/status/2028054041838665893?s=20; https://suspilne dot media/1252392-belgia-zatrimala-naftovij-tanker-tinovogo-flotu-rosii-u-mzs-ukraini-vidreaguvali/

[x] https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/2028035399054942433?s=20

[xi] https://www.rtbf dot be/article/pour-la-premiere-fois-la-belgique-arraisonne-un-navire-suspecte-d-appartenir-a-la-flotte-fantome-russe-11685633; https://www.france24 dot com/en/europe/20260301-belgium-france-seize-russian-shadow-fleet-tanker-in-north-sea; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/01/suspected-russian-shadow-fleet-tanker-seized-north-sea

[xii] https://eur-lex.europa dot eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32025R2033; https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=54900

[xiii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2026/

[xiv] https://t.me/MID_Russia/74874; https://t.me/amrusbel/1520

[xv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35546 

[xvi] https://t.me/wargonzo/32600; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20156; https://t.me/severnnyi/6958

[xvii] https://t.me/severnnyi/6966

[xviii] https://t.me/severnnyi/6958

[xix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20156; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35527; https://t.me/wargonzo/32600; https://t.me/severnnyi/6958

[xx] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/200105

[xxi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20156; https://t.me/wargonzo/32600

[xxii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20156; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35527; https://t.me/wargonzo/32600

[xxiii] https://t.me/gvZapad/17868

[xxiv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35527; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20156; https://t.me/wargonzo/32600; https://t.me/gvZapad/17868

[xxv] https://t.me/gvZapad/17868

[xxvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35547 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20156 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35527 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32600 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/17868

[xxvii] https://t.me/gvZapad/17868

[xxviii] https://t.me/dva_majors/89009

[xxix] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027987161442562473; https://t.me/rozvidka_noem/22503

[xxx] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35547 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35527 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32600 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/88979

[xxxi] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15086 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/88983

[xxxii] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15084

[xxxiii] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/33952; https://t.me/Lynx25stories/72

[xxxiv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35547 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35527 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32600

[xxxv] https://t.me/rusich_army/28561

[xxxvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35547 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35527 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32600 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/28561

[xxxvii] https://t.me/rusich_army/28561

[xxxviii] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/01/okupanty-pochaly-chastishe-zastosovuvaty-kvadroczykly-dlya-manevriv-u-myrnogradi-79-a-brygada/; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1DVvQEHN8W/

[xxxix] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15085

[xl] https://t.me/rusich_army/28561

[xli] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529

[xlii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35527

[xliii] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/01/zhduniv-staye-bilshe-fpv-zalitayut-dali-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-vorog-namagayetsya-adaptuvatysya-do-novyh-umov/; https://youtu.be/NzKm0rHX48E

[xliv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35546; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2028059460015628671; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/16899;

[xlv] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2028059460015628671; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/16899

[xlvi] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/u-makiyivtsi-pislya-udaru-droniv-spalahnula-naftobaza/

[xlvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35547 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35527 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32600 ; https://t.me/rybar/78009 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70834

[xlviii] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70834

[xlix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35546

[l] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35547; https://t.me/wargonzo/32600 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35529; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35527

[li] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40332 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40341 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40351 

[lii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35546

[liii] https://t.me/mod_russia/61621

[liv] https://t.me/kpszsu/56839 

[lv] https://t.me/odesaMVA/1390; https://t.me/synegubov/20274; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3543

View Citations