Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 6, 2026

Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Different sources continue to conclude that the Russian military's performance is declining, despite utilizing differing mapping methodologies to visualize the battlefield situation. Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi, citing its sources within the Ukrainian military, reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces liberated more territory in May 2026 than Russian forces seized.[1] Militarnyi's sources reported that Ukrainian forces "restored control of" or eliminated Russian infiltrators in about 250 square kilometers in May 2026 while Russian forces seized only 130 square kilometers in the same period. The source reported that Ukrainian forces liberated or cleared about 80 square kilometers in April 2026 while Russian forces seized between 150 to 160 square kilometers.

The recent calculations from Militarnyi and from other sources, including those linked with Ukrainian military intelligence, differ from ISW's due to methodological differences but nonetheless point to Russia's declining rate of advance and increased Ukrainian advances.[2] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized or infiltrated about 40 square kilometers in May 2026, but ISW's calculations, excluding Russia's infiltration areas, found that Russian forces lost control of about 280 square kilometers.[3] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized or infiltrated about 28 square kilometers in April 2026 but lost control of about 116 square kilometers.[4] ISW’s infiltration layer shows areas in which Russian forces — sometimes very small groups of a few soldiers — have infiltrated and maintain a limited presence but do not control in the doctrinal sense. The current battlefield situation, in which Ukrainian and Russian positions are often interspersed and the “kill zone” (an area of elevated drone strike risk) is expanding, makes precise calculations about Russian and Ukrainian gains and losses difficult. Each source is likely using different methodologies to calculate Russian and Ukrainian gains, but is still arriving at similar general conclusions about Russian and Ukrainian battlefield performance at this stage of the war.[5]

 Ukrainian forces conducted a second series of strikes against St. Petersburg as the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) closed on June 6, demonstrating again that Russia cannot reliably defend its major cities from Ukrainian strikes even during prominent international events. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the Kronstadt Naval Base (the main base of the Russian Baltic Fleet) in St. Petersburg; the Petergofskaya Oil Depot and Neste Oil Terminal in Lomonosov (west of St. Petersburg across Neva Bay); and a weapons, ammunition, and vehicle arsenal of the Russian 1060th Material-Technical Support Center (Leningrad Military District) in Bolshaya Izhora (northwest of Lomonosov on the Neva Bay).[6] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that the strikes also hit the Russian Navy's 15th Arsenal near Lomonosov.[7] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that several Ukrainian drones reached the Kronstadt Naval Base.[8] Geolocated footage and photos confirm Ukrainian strikes against the 15th Arsenal and the Kronstadt Naval Yard.[9] Leningrad Oblast authorities acknowledged that Ukrainian drone strikes caused a fire near Bolshaya Izhora.[10] St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov called on residents to stay inside for the duration of the strikes, reportedly for the first time since February 2022.[11]

 This is the second Ukrainian strike series against St. Petersburg during the 2026 SPIEF.[12] Russia likely prioritized allocating air defense assets for the city during SPIEF, which is a major event that draws tens of thousands of guests and international delegations. Russia appears to have failed to sufficiently protect St. Petersburg for SPIEF, however, even after Leningrad Oblast was among the first regions to announce reforms to increase its air defenses to protect energy and defense industrial infrastructure.[13] The Kremlin appears to be more heavily focused on defending Moscow City. Geolocated footage published on June 6 shows Russian authorities erecting an additional Pantsir-SMD-E anti-drone air defense system on a high-rise building in Moscow City, for example.[14] Ukraine's escalating long-range and intermediate-range strike campaigns are imposing additional requirements for air defenses across Russia's operational and deep rears, and these requirements will likely compete with each other given the vast amount of land and large number of facilities Russia must protect.[15]

 Ukrainian strikes against St. Petersburg undermine Kremlin efforts to use SPIEF to project stability within Russia domestically and to international audiences. The Kremlin has historically capitalized on SPIEF to project economic strength and power to global audiences, and Ukrainian strikes against St. Petersburg on June 3 and June 6 have undercut this Russian narrative.[16] Russian opposition media source Meduza reported on June 6 that SPIEF organizers focused on providing “normal” conditions to the attendees, particularly foreign guests.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin made several exaggerated statements about Russia's battlefield performance and the economy at SPIEF that aimed to paint a positive picture but did not acknowledge Russia's ongoing issues with air defenses, economic challenges, or mounting battlefield concerns.[18] Ukrainian long-range strikes over 1,000 kilometers from the international border continue to demonstrate how Ukraine is bringing Russia’s war closer to home.

 Ongoing gasoline shortages in occupied Ukraine are creating long lines on the Kerch Bridge and at gas stations in nearby Russian territories. Local Krasnodar Krai and Crimea channels reported on June 6 that drivers from occupied Crimea are travelling to gas stations in Temryuksky Raion, Krasnodar Krai to buy gasoline amid ongoing shortages and sale restrictions in Crimea.[19] The local channels and Russian opposition source Astra reported long lines to cross the Kerch Bridge from the Crimean side all day on June 6.[20] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev announced that major Crimean gas stations TES and ATAN would only sell 20 liters (5.283 gallons) of gasoline on June 6 to customers with previously purchased coupons and that general sale of gasoline would no longer be available.[21] The growing restrictions on gasoline sales in occupied Ukraine will likely exacerbate existing shortages or cause new shortages in nearby areas of Russia as residents from occupied Ukraine seek alternative sources of gasoline.

Fuel shortages continue to spread throughout Russia as well and will likely worsen as high summertime demand continues. Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii reported on June 6, citing local media, that there were long lines at gas stations in the Republic of Tatarstan and that the gas stations were only selling more expensive diesel variants as cheaper diesel is no longer available.[22] Russian opposition sources have recently reported gasoline shortages in Belgorod, Kursk, Leningrad, Saratov, Ryazan, Moscow, Tomsk, Murmansk, Voronezh, Oryol, Novgorod, and Kamchatka oblasts; the Republic of Karelia; and Krasnoyarsk Krai.[23] Any Kremlin efforts to preemptively prevent another gasoline shortage in 2026 like the one Russia faced in 2025 appear to have failed.[24] The 2025 shortages, in contrast to the ongoing ones, emerged at the end of summer and the start of fall.[25] Russia will likely struggle to combat this year's shortages as effectively as it did last year, given the months of high summertime demand that lie ahead.

Ukraine's mid-range strike campaign against major Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Ukraine continues to disrupt vehicle movement. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik issued a decree on June 6 banning commercial passenger transport vehicles from occupied Luhansk Oblast from using the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway) and the section of the Belgorod City-Mariupol highway (the R-150 highway) that runs through occupied Luhansk Oblast.[26] Pasechnik advised private vehicles to not use the highways but stated that bus services will continue to operate along modified routes. Pasechnik's decree also banned commuter train service in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on June 6 that there are no similar restrictions along the M-14 highway in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[27] Ukrainian forces have increased their mid-range strikes against these major GLOCs in the past month and against railway infrastructure in occupied Ukraine in the past two months.[28] The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps notably reported on May 31 that Ukrainian forces have achieved drone-enabled fire control over occupied Luhansk City, Starobilsk, Alchevsk, Bryanka, and Kadiivka, all of which are on or near the Belgorod City-Mariupol highway in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[29]

 Kremlin officials continue to reject any negotiated settlement that fails to address its fabricated “root causes” of the war in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated in a video message for Russian Language Day on June 6 that restoring the rights of Russians and Russian-speaking people in Ukraine is a “necessary condition” for a long-term peace settlement.[30] Lavrov's statement parallels repeated Kremlin rhetoric about the alleged “root causes” of the war — a phrase the Kremlin uses to reiterate its maximalist demands.[31] Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly indicated on June 5 that he is unwilling to deviate from his original war aims and is willing to continue military efforts to achieve these goals.[32] The Kremlin's continued commitment to Russia's original war aims comes as Russia's battlefield performance has been dwindling and Russian advances have been slowing, however.[33]

 Key Takeaways:

• Different sources continue to conclude that the Russian military's performance is declining, despite utilizing differing mapping methodologies to visualize the battlefield situation.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a second series of strikes against St. Petersburg as the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) closed on June 6, demonstrating again that Russia cannot reliably defend its major cities from Ukrainian strikes even during prominent international events.
• Ukrainian strikes against St. Petersburg undermine Kremlin efforts to use SPIEF to project stability within Russia domestically and to international audiences.
• Ongoing gasoline shortages in occupied Ukraine are creating long lines on the Kerch Bridge and at gas stations in nearby Russian territories.
• Fuel shortages continue to spread throughout Russia as well and will likely worsen as high summertime demand continues.
• Ukraine's mid-range strike campaign against major Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Ukraine continues to disrupt vehicle movement.
• Kremlin officials continue to reject any negotiated settlement that fails to address its fabricated “root causes” of the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk and Pokrovsk directions.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and Russian military assets in Russian border regions on June 6. Russian forces launched 272 drones against Ukraine overnight.

 We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for Ukrainian strikes against Russian military and oil assets in Leningrad Oblast.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in Krasnodar Krai overnight on June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the Ust-Labinsk oil depot in Krasnodar Krai, causing a fire at the depot.[34] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that the strike caused fires at three petroleum product tanks.[35] Russian authorities confirmed that a Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at the oil depot, and geolocated footage published on June 6 shows a fire at the depot.[36]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian personnel concentrations near Tetkino and Anatolevka, Kursk Oblast (both along the international border) on the night of June 5 to 6.[37]

Ukrainian sources and satellite imagery continue to provide updated battle damage assessments (BDAs) of recent long-range Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial plants. Satellite imagery published on June 5 shows damage to one of the production buildings of the Elastik propellant powder plant of the Gefest-M company in Ryazan Oblast following Ukrainian strikes against the plant overnight on June 3 to 4.[38] Additional satellite imagery published on June 6 shows three new impacts on the roof of a workshop at the Michurinsk Progress Plant in Tambov Oblast following Ukrainian strikes on the night of June 2 to 3.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

 Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 5 and 6 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[40]

 Russian forces are reportedly increasingly targeting major Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on June 6 that Russian forces have begun to strike the P-46 Kharkiv-Sumy City highway near Bohodukhiv due to its proximity to the international border.[41] ISW observed increased reports of Russian forces striking the P-46 highway near Bohodukhiv in late April 2026.[42] Russian forces likely aim to disrupt Ukraine's ability to supply forward positions near the international border.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

 Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

 Russian forces continued infiltration missions in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on June 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in eastern Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City) and in southern Pokalyane (just east of Vovchanski Khutory) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[43] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 6 that Russian forces seized Shevchenka (northwest of Kharkiv City) as part of efforts to advance toward Kozacha Lopan (just south of Shevchenka).[44]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near Malynovka, Belgorod Oblast (north of Kharkiv City and six kilometers from the international border) on June 5 or overnight on June 5 to 6.[45]

Russian forces continue targeted first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Ukrainian civilians and law enforcement in the Ukrainian near rear. The Kharkiv Oblast Police Department reported that Russian forces conducted an FPV drone strike against a police car near Staryi Saltiv (east of Kharkiv City) on June 5.[46] Derhachi City Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Zadorenko reported that Russian forces also conducted an FPV drone strike against a civilian riding a scooter near Slatyn (northwest of Kharkiv City) on the morning of June 6.[47] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are expanding their use of the "human safari" tactics they used in Kherson Oblast to other areas of the frontline.[48]

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 6 that Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykyi Burluk.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continue infiltration missions near Kupyansk. Geolocated footage published on June 6 shows Russian service members patrolling the dachas on the southeastern outskirts of Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[50]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[51]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on June 6.

Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical warehouse near Karaichne (roughly 38 kilometers from the frontline).[52]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 6 that Russian forces advanced to Lypivka through Nykyforivka and seized Lypivka (both southeast of Slovyansk).[53]

The Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) has achieved tactical successes in its effort to advance toward Slovyansk but is losing momentum amidst Ukrainian counterattacks. Mashovets reported on June 6 that the 3rd CAA achieved tactical successes during late April and May towards its two goals of breaking through from the east to the immediate approaches to Slovyansk and cutting off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Lyman.[54] Mashovets reported that the 3rd CAA is at full strength and is the largest combined arms army in terms of troop strength in the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces. Mashovets reported that the 3rd CAA has focused its efforts on the flanks of its area of operation, including south of the Siverskyi Donets River from Siversk toward Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk), as well as on both sides of the M03 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway (southeast of Slovyansk).[55]

Mashovets reported that Russian forces advanced from Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk) to the area south of Kryva Luka (east of Slovyansk), toward Riznykivka and Kalenyky (both east of Slovyansk), and in the gaps between Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk) and Ukrainian positions south of Riznykivka and Kalenyky.[56] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian forces’ attacks on Rai-Oleksandrivka but that Russian forces threaten to encircle the Ukrainian positions south of Riznykivka. Mashovets noted that Russian forces hold positions on the outskirts of Rai-Oleksandrivka and advanced to Lypivka, and that these positions are only about two and a half kilometers apart. Mashovets reported that Russian forces seized Lypivka and advanced along the Pryvillya-Malynivka and Malynivka-Tykhnovika axes (all southeast of Slovyansk), reaching the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal. Mshovets reported that Ukrainian forces have conducted counterattacks in the past week and that these counterattacks have slowed the 3rd CAA’s pace of advance and limited the 3rd CAA’s gains.

The 3rd CAA continues to exhibit its characteristic pattern of overexerting its forces for small tactical gains. Mashovets reported that the 3rd CAA’s slowing rate of advance amidst Ukrainian counterattacks is characteristic of the army’s pattern of overexertion, noting that it commits excess manpower and resources to achieve small tactical goals.[57] Mashovets predicted that the Russian military command would eventually reinforce the 3rd CAA but noted that such a reinforcement would consume resources, manpower, and time. Mashovets noted that even though Russian forces are only about 15.5 kilometers from the outskirts of Slovyansk, Ukrainian forces continue to operate in Lyman and Rai-Oleksandrivka and will engage Russian forces past the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal.

The 3rd CAA has operated in western Luhansk and northern Donetsk oblasts since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The 3rd CAA and its predecessor, the 2nd LNR AC, were involved in battles for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, Luhansk Oblast, in 2022; in the Russian effort to seize Siversk, Donetsk Oblast, through 2025; and the 3rd CAA is now operating toward Slovyansk.[58] The 3rd CAA’s history as a former disorganized and irregular militia-type grouping has caused the army to overexert its forces, as Mashovets noted.[59] Milbloggers previously criticized the 3rd CAA’s 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade in November 2024 for sending several battalions to conduct a simultaneous frontal assault against Ukrainian positions near Bilohorivka without adequate fire support.[60] The Russian military command reportedly arrested and removed several commanders within the 3rd CAA in November 2024 after they made inaccurate reports about Russian advances.[61] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger complained in February 2025 that their removals did not fix the 3rd CAA's reporting issues, however, and claimed that the 3rd CAA’s command continues to systematically file false reports.[62]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on June 2 and 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced on the southwestern and western outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[63] Geolocated footage published on June 3, 4, and 6 shows Ukrainian forces operating in western and southern Kostyantynivka, on the northern outskirts of Ilinivka (south of Kostyantynivka), and in northern Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), all areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[64] Geolocated footage published on May 30 and June 2, 4, and 5 shows Russian service members operating in northern, eastern, southern, and western Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[65] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces control Tykhonivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[66]

Russian forces continued infiltration missions near Kostyantynivka. Mashovets reported that Russian forces reached the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal, suggesting that Russian forces infiltrated west of Holubivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka) on a prior date.[67] Geolocated footage published on May 30 and June 2, 4, and 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in western, southern, eastern, and northern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[68]

Russian forces recently conducted a motorized assault in the Kostyantynivka direction and are allocating additional manpower to replenish units in the area. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on June 6 that Russian forces recently conducted a motorized assault of an unspecified echelon with infantry fighting vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction.[69] The officer reported that Russian forces have replenished 80 percent of their units attacking Kostyantynivka and that Russian forces use summer foliage to infiltrate, hide, and conduct attacks. The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems group operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported on June 6 that Russian infantry continues to move one at a time to bypass Ukrainian positions.[70] The Ukrainian commander stated that Russian forces are likely attempting to reach the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Kramatorsk highway to encircle Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka.

Russian forces continued limited ground operations southeast of Dobropillya on June 6 but did not advance.[71] Geolocated footage published on June 6 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions southwest of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya), indicating that Russian forces do not hold positions in the area, contrary to Russian claims.[72]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on June 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[73] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in and near Rodynske and along the Vasylivka-Novooleksandrivka line (northwest of Pokrovsk).[74]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian personnel concentrations near Pokrovsk and Rodynske on June 5 or overnight on June 5 to 6.[75]

Russian forces recently struck Novopavlivka with a FAB-500 glide bomb but did not conduct offensive operations in the area on June 6.[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on June 5 and 6 but did not advance.[77]

Ukrainian forces are seizing the tactical initiative and forcing the Russian military command to transfer additional troops to the Oleksandrivka direction. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on June 6 that Ukrainian forces are restoring control over previously lost positions in some areas of the Oleksandrivka direction and have managed to seize the tactical initiative in unspecified areas.[78] Voloshyn added that Ukrainian forces are forcing Russian forces to decrease or stop their assault operations, go on the defensive, and transfer additional forces to the area. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on June 6 that there are over 71,000 Russian service members operating in the Oleksandrivka direction.[79]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Oleksandrivka direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Voskresenka (east of Oleksandrivka) and Odradne (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[80]

Russian forces continue expanding the infrastructure to launch long-range drones from the occupied Donetsk City Airport. A Ukrainian source, citing satellite imagery collected on April 22, reported on June 5 that Russian forces have continued construction of drone launch point infrastructure at the Donetsk City Airport since the end of April 2026.[81] The source reported that Russian forces have constructed 130 drone storage garages, four concrete drone warehouses, and four launchers as of June 2. The source added that Russian forces appear to be building new positions for air defense systems. The source noted that Russian forces use the airport to launch jet-powered drones but that the satellite imagery does not show the corresponding infrastructure.

Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strikes against Russian military assets in other areas of occupied Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on June 5 shows Ukrainian K2 drones striking a warehouse of the Russian 90th Engineer Regiment  (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) in northwestern Yenakiyeve (approximately 41 kilometers from the frontline), destroying four trucks.[82] Geolocated images published on June 5 show damage to three or four Russian trucks after a Ukrainian drone strike east of occupied Novoazovsk (approximately 143 kilometers from the frontline).[83] Geolocated footage published on June 6 shows a smoke column after a purported Ukrainian drone strike against a substation near occupied Khrestivka (approximately 54 kilometers from the frontline).[84] Open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources and geolocated footage published on June 5 and 6 show a fire at the Mariupol port (approximately 115 kilometers from the frontline) after a Ukrainian strike.[85] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data for June 6 shows heat anomalies near the Mariupol port.[86]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 5 and 6 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[87]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 5 and 6 but did not advance.[88]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Zaliznychne (southwest of Hulyaipole) and Novofedorivka (southeast of Orikhiv).[89]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge and southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on June 5 and 6 but did not advance.[90]

Ukrainian forces have reportedly gained fire control over the land corridor in southern Ukraine that connects Russia to occupied Crimea.[91] A Ukrainian special operations regiment reported that Ukrainian drones systematically strike Russian equipment and logistics on the T-22-09 Melitopol-Chonhar highway. The regiment added that Russian forces are struggling to deliver fuel to occupied Crimea and to supply Russian forces.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 272 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type drones; Banderol loitering munitions; and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[92] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 249 drones, that 19 drones hit 11 locations, and that drone debris fell at 13 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts.[93] DTEK, Ukraine’s largest energy company, reported on June 5 that Russian forces struck an unspecified DTEK thermal power plant (TPP), causing significant damage.[94] DTEK noted that Russian forces have conducted almost 230 strikes against DTEK TPPs since the start of the full-scale invasion, 11 of which occurred during Winter 2025-2026.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.