Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 5, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 1:00 PM ET

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Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's offer to negotiate an end to the war and reiterated the Kremlin’s commitment to fulfilling its war goals. Putin also reiterated his belief that Russian forces’ military victory is inevitable, despite available data indicating otherwise. Putin met with the heads of media companies at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 4 and at SPIEF's plenary session on June 5. Putin claimed that Russian forces seized "two thousand four hundred forty thousand thousands square kilometers" (likely meaning 2,440 square kilometers rather than 2.4 million square kilometers; 2.4 million square kilometers is an area much larger than Ukraine itself) of territory in an unspecified time period and currently occupy 85 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 80 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast, and all of Luhansk Oblast.[1] Putin also falsely claimed that Russian forces are advancing across all areas of the frontline. Putin claimed that Russian forces have achieved drone parity with Ukrainian forces across the battlefield and have the advantage in some areas. Putin's June 4 and 5 statements are consistent with his theory of victory, which posits that Russia can win a protracted attritional war provided that Russian forces advance across the entire theater.[2] Russia is increasingly struggling with sustaining its method of waging protracted attritional war, and Russian battlefield performance has decreased.[3] Russia is also struggling with the compounding effects of the war on the Russian economy, declining recruitment rates, and societal discontent.[4] Ukrainian forces have intensified their intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns and contested the tactical initiative in several areas of the frontline in recent months, imposing additional challenges on Russia to continue its war effort.[5] Putin's SPIEF statements indicate that he remains committed to his war goals, his theory of victory, and his current way of waging war in Ukraine despite these mounting difficulties.

Putin's claims about the battlefield are incompatible with available evidence and suggest that the Russian military command is not providing Putin accurate intelligence about the reality of Russian battlefield performance. Russian advances have largely stagnated while Ukrainian forces have achieved some tactical successes in 2026. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command’s repeated exaggerations have likely given Putin a false perception of the battlefield situation.[6] ISW has observed evidence that Russian forces have seized 99.77 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 79.93 percent of Donetsk Oblast, and 74.99 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast as of June 5. Even including areas in which Russian forces have infiltrated but do not control falls short of Putin's claims. ISW assesses as of June 5 that Russian forces maintain a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in 99.77 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 80.82 percent of Donetsk Oblast, and 75.7 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces have liberated more territory than Russian forces seized in April and May 2026, highlighting Russia's dwindling battlefield performance and Ukraine's successes in halting the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[7] Russian forces are struggling to advance in 2026 at the same rates that Russian forces did in 2025, in part due to successful Ukrainian ground counterattacks that have liberated tactically significant areas and Ukraine's growing mid-range strike campaign that is inhibiting Russian logistics and ability to sustain attacks on the frontline.[8] Given current trends it remains unclear that Russian forces will be able to seize the Fortress Belt or the remainder of Donetsk Oblast at all.

Russian officials, including Putin, are again leaning on the lack of clear information about the August 2025 Alaska Summit to falsely portray Russia as willing to negotiate with Ukraine. Putin responded to Zelensky's June 4 open letter calling for a ceasefire and a leader-level meeting, claiming that he had seen the letter "briefly" but that Putin "does not see the point in meeting."[9] Putin claimed that Russia is ready to reach an agreement with Ukraine to end the war but that such an agreement must be based on unconfirmed agreements Putin and US President Donald Trump supposedly reached during the Alaska Summit.[10] Putin claimed that Russia is willing to accept the compromises that US and Russian officials discussed during the summit. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin also claimed on June 4 and 5 that Russia agreed to US proposals to end the war at the Alaska Summit.[11] Neither the US nor Russia released public statements or communiques about any agreement reached following the Alaska Summit, however, and the Kremlin has repeatedly exploited the lack of official documents codifying the outcomes of the Alaska Summit to conceal Russia's continued unwillingness to compromise and commitment to its maximalist war aims.[12] Putin reiterated longstanding Russian demands at SPIEF on June 5, claiming that Russian military operations will end when Russia achieves its goals.[13] Putin also issued veiled nuclear threats against Ukraine, claiming that Russia is only using Oreshnik nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) against Ukraine as tests and implied that Russia has not used the Oreshnik for its intended purpose.[14] Putin's nuclear saber rattling —particularly as Russia's military performance on the battlefield is dwindling — likely aims to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate to Russia's demands.

Putin also used his SPIEF remarks to posture economic strength, ignoring Russia's economic realities over four years of war. Putin broadly spoke about Russia's claimed economic successes on June 5, claiming that Russia's GDP grew by 1.3 percent in April 2026, that Russia's unemployment is 2.2 percent, and that real Russian wages have grown by over 30 percent in the last five years.[15] Putin acknowledged that the Russian economy is in a cooling period but claimed that the Russian government did so intentionally for the "health" of the Russian economy.[16] Putin's statements are in line with other Russian official statements at SPIEF, which have ignored Russia's economic problems and fuel shortages in efforts to maintain the facade of economic stability.[17] Putin's claims of economic strength do not reflect the true nature of the Russian economy, as the Kremlin has pursued a series of sub-optimal policies that will have long-term economic implications. Russian officials often highlight Russia's unemployment rate as a sign of economic prosperity, despite the fact that the extremely low unemployment rate reflects the fact that Russia is experiencing labor shortages which is causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors and contributing to overall inflation.[18] Russia is also struggling with liquidity problems and high levels of external debt after having steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine, and has resorted to selling its gold reserves and raising the value added tax (VAT) to offset unsustainably high spending.[19] Russian regional and occupation authorities have also begun restricting gasoline sales in recent days in response to increasing gasoline shortages from successful Ukrainian intermediate- to long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and logistics into occupied Ukraine.[20] Putin is attempting to push a narrative of a stable and growing economy despite growing fuel shortages, increasing debt, and stagnating economic growth as he prioritizes his war in Ukraine over economic health despite the mounting economic and societal costs.

Ukrainian forces are expanding their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to strike Russian naval vessels and railway infrastructure in occupied southern Ukraine and in the Sea of Azov. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported and geolocated footage confirmed on June 5 that Ukrainian drone operators struck five Russian cargo ships that reportedly supported Russian military logistics near the ports of occupied Berdyansk (approximately 102 kilometers from the frontline), Yalta (approximately 259 kilometers from the frontline), and Mariupol (approximately 115 kilometers from the frontline) in a single night.[21] Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that the cargo ships also previously transported stolen Ukrainian grain and turned off their radar transponders.[22] The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reported on June 5 that drones struck the Natra and Zirkon cargo ships in the Taganrog Bay of the Sea of Azov, killing five Azerbaijani citizens and wounding three of a total of 25 Azerbaijani citizens on board the ships.[23] The Azerbaijani MFA stated that the cargo ships did not belong to the Azerbaijani government. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Project 10410 Svetlyak-class patrol ship near occupied Yurkyne (on the Kerch Peninsula and roughly 250 kilometers from the frontline) on June 4, likely as part of a broader effort to destroy Russian seaborne anti-drone defenses in the Azov Sea.[24] Ukrainian forces have also expanded and intensified the frequency of strikes on Russian railway infrastructure. A Ukrainian drone regiment reported on June 4 that Ukrainian drones struck two Russian locomotives near Rozdolne and Vladyslavivka (approximately 194 and 185 kilometers from the frontline, respectively), Crimea, along a railway line supporting Russian logistics between occupied Dzhankoi and Kerch, Krasnodar Krai.[25] Ukraine's intermediate-range strike BAI campaign includes extensive targeting of logistics involving Russian railway lines and naval vessels in addition to logistics along roads and highways.[26]

Romanian and Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems caused a Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle (USV) to enter Romanian territorial waters at the Port of Constanta on June 5. The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that authorities spotted a maritime drone near Berth 78 in the Port of Constanta, Romania (approximately 302 kilometers from Odesa City) at around 0550 local time and noted that the drone self-destructed at around 1030 local time.[27] The Ukrainian Navy confirmed on June 5 that a Ukrainian maritime drone sailed off the coast of Romania from the Black Sea after Russian electronic warfare (EW) jamming severed Ukrainian forces’ control over the drone.[28] The Ukrainian Navy reported that Ukraine provided the necessary information to the Romanian Navy to prevent civilian casualties, and Romanian Defense Minister Radu Miruta stated that the Ukrainian warning allowed for a timely evacuation.[29] Romanian President Nicusor Dan stated that a second drone self-destructed near the port of Constanta and that two other drones detonated about 145 kilometers east of Constanta, causing no casualties or significant damage.[30] Dan stated that the drones were part of a Ukrainian defense operation and noted that the June 5 Ukrainian naval drone incident and the May 29 Russian Geran-2 drone strike in Galati are “direct consequences” of Russian aggression against Ukraine.[31]  Russian officials broadly criticized Romania's official reaction to the June 5 drone incident, deflecting Russia's culpability as the aggressor in the war.[32] Russian officials used the incident to advance false Russian narratives that Ukraine is the aggressor in the war. The Kremlin will likely continue using incidents like the May 29 Russian drone strike against Galati and the June 5 Ukrainian naval drone detonation at the Port of Constanta to absolve Russia of blame for any accidental Russian drone strikes or a false flag attack against Romania or neighboring Moldova in the future.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's offer to negotiate an end to the war and reiterated the Kremlin’s commitment to fulfilling its war goals. Putin also reiterated his belief that Russian forces’ military victory is inevitable, despite available data indicating otherwise.
• Putin's claims about the battlefield are incompatible with available evidence and suggest that the Russian military command is not providing Putin accurate intelligence about the reality of Russian battlefield performance. Russian advances have largely stagnated in while Ukrainian forces have achieved some tactical successes in 2026.
• Russian officials, including Putin, are again leaning on the lack of clear information about the August 2025 Alaska Summit to falsely portray Russia as willing to negotiate with Ukraine.
• Putin also used his SPIEF remarks to posture economic strength, ignoring Russia's economic realities from over four years of war.
• Ukrainian forces are expanding their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to strike Russian naval vessels and railway infrastructure in occupied southern Ukraine and in the Sea of Azov.
• Romanian and Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems caused a Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle (USV) to enter Romanian territorial waters at the Port of Constanta on June 5.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Ukrainian forces continue strikes against Russian military assets in border regions. Russian forces launched two cruise missiles and 216 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continue strikes against Russian military assets in border regions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration in Zhuravlevka, Belgorod Oblast (about three kilometers from the international border) on June 4 or the night of June 4 to 5.[34]

Battlefield damage assessments of recent Ukrainian strikes show damage to Russian energy infrastructure and a warship. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that the May 31 strike against the Lazarevo linear production and dispatching station in Kirov Oblast destroyed two storage tanks and damaged two other tanks and a pumping station.[35] Independent Russian-language source Radio Svoboda reported that satellite imagery collected on May 20 and 23 and June 2 and 4 confirms the Ukrainian General Staff's assessment about the three fuel tanks.[36]

A Russian source posted footage on June 4 of the aftermath of the June 3 Ukrainian strike against the Russian Project 20380 Boykiy Steregushchiy-class corvette stationed at the Kronstadt Naval Base in St. Petersburg.[37] Former Norwegian Navy officer and independent OSINT analyst Thord Are Iversen assessed that the footage shows significant damage to the upper parts of the structure between the bridge and aft mast and indicates that the main mast had collapsed.[38]

Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia to strengthen its air defenses against Ukrainian strikes during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 5.[39] Putin stated that Russian forces must shoot down Ukrainian drones more effectively.[40] ISW continues to assess that the increasing frequency, size, and depth of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign are forcing Russia to overstretch its air defenses across a wide swathe of territory such that Russia is unable to effectively defend major cities like Moscow City.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 4 and 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[42]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 4 and 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces resumed offensive operations in  Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City) near the Lypets River northeast of the settlement after a lull in activity in the area.[44]

Ukrainian strikes are preventing Russian forces from crossing the Vovcha River in the Vovchansk direction (northeast of Kharkiv City). The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps reported that Ukrainian forces struck and destroyed a Russian VMM-3M armored bridge-laying vehicle on June 3 in the Vovchansk direction.[45] The 16th Army Corps assessed that Russian forces likely aim to build a bridge over the river to increase their use of armored and automative equipment in the area. Geolocated footage published on June 5 confirms the strike against the bridge-laying vehicle within Vovchansk just north of the Vovcha River.[46]

Russian forces are continuing their “human safari” campaign in Kharkiv Oblast. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on June 5 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone targeted two families walking down the street in Hubarivka (northwest of Kharkiv City), injuring six civilians, including two children.[47] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are expanding their use of the human safari tactics they used in Kherson Oblast to other areas and are resorting to the use of terror to conceal Russian shortcomings on the battlefield.[48]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks southeast of Velykyi Burluk on June 5 but did not advance.[49] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 5 that a Russian Geran-type drone strike destroyed a Ukrainian drone control point near Velykyi Burluk.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on June 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in northern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[51]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 5 but did make confirmed advances.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 5 that Russian forces seized Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova).[53]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian fuel tankers in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Russian opposition media and open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources reported on June 5 that Ukrainian forces struck oil tankers at an oil depot in an unspecified area of occupied Luhansk Oblast, causing explosions and a fire.[54] Ukrainian strikes against fuel tankers in southern Ukraine and Crimea are contributing to the ongoing gasoline shortages in Crimea, and Ukraine is likely expanding this campaign to other areas of occupied Ukraine. [55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on June 4 and 5 but did not advance.[56] Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows a Ukrainian Su-27 aircraft using a 1,000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) glide bomb to strike a Russian position in northern Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[57] Ukraine is overall trying to expand its use of glide bombs, recently creating its own domestically produced glide bomb.[58] Ukrainian forces have been conducting a campaign to suppress and destroy (SEAD / DEAD) Russian air defenses since late 2025, and Ukraine’s SEAD / DEAD campaign may enable Ukrainian fixed wing aircraft to fly closer to the frontline and at higher altitudes to enable the Ukrainian glide bomb to drop heavy ordinance on critical hardened targets in Russia’s operational rear.[59]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets in the near rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near occupied Soledar (roughly eight kilometers from the frontline and southeast of Slovyansk).[60]

Ukrainian drone strikes are holding back most Russian infiltration groups in the Lyman direction. The head non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 4 that Ukrainian forces destroy most Russian infiltration groups before they reach Ukrainian positions such that there are rarely small arms battles.[61] The head NCO added that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to support ground assaults with artillery strikes but that Ukrainian counterbattery efforts are more precise and effective now.

Russian forces recently advanced and infiltrated in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on June 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Chervone (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[62] ISW assesses that this event indicates a change in the Russian forward line of own troops (FLOT) as ISW has not observed a Ukrainian presence in the area between Chervone and Predtechyne (around Chervone) since March 2026. Additional geolocated footage published on June 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in eastern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[63]

Ukrainian strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and drone launch sites in the Kostyantynivka direction are reducing Russian infantry and drone activity. The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on June 5 that Ukrainian forces have fire control over Russian logistics on the outskirts of Kostyantynivka and that Ukrainian forces regularly target Russian vehicles transporting ammunition, components, and equipment for drone crews along these GLOCs.[64] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces are striking Russian logistics to a depth of 50 kilometers in the mornings and evenings when Russian forces try to move resources to the combat zone. The commander stated that the amount of territory that Russian forces must traverse on foot to reach Kostyantynivka has increased from 10 to 20 kilometers. The commander noted that these interdiction efforts have decreased Russian drone activity and the movement of Russian infantry in the area. The commander added that Ukrainian forces are increasingly striking Russian drone launch sites and the equipment and personnel at the site — a shift from previous Ukrainian tactics focusing on targeting Russian antennas.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Dobropillya on June 4.[65]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on June 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[66] Geolocated footage published on June 4 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in northern Rodynske, indicating that Ukrainian and Russian positions are intermixed in the area. ISW assesses that Russian forces no longer maintain a continuous forward line of own troops (FLOT) in western and central Rodynske, given that footage observed since April 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces have maintained or regained positions in western or central Rodynske.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 5 that Russian forces advanced north of Vasylivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[68]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on June 5.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on June 4 and 5 but did not advance.[69] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on June 5 that Ukrainian forces are conducting search and strike missions but are not disclosing the locations for operational security reasons as the missions are ongoing.[70] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked as Ukrainian drone strikes are preventing Russian forces from concentrating the necessary personnel.

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Oleksandrivka direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 5 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Komar and Voskresenka (both east of Oleksandrivka).[71]

Ukrainian forces have reportedly gained fire control over the occupied Donetsk City Airport, preventing its effective use as an airfield and long-range drone launch site. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) 1st Separate Center reported on June 4 that Ukrainian forces have taken the Donetsk City Airport under fire control, which the center reported is the first operation of this type.[72] The 1st Separate Center noted that Russian forces have turned the airport into a logistics hub and a major Shahed drone launch site. The 1st Separate Center reported that Ukrainian forces are striking launchers, transport vehicles, and crews on the runway and are targeting mobile fire groups and air defense assets in the area.

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strikes against other areas of occupied Donetsk Oblast, including the major M-30 highway. Geolocated footage published on June 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian fuel truck along the M-30 Donetsk City-Luhansk City highway.[73] Ukrainian forces have widely expanded their mid-range strike campaign against Russian GLOCs in occupied Ukraine, including the M-30 road, over the last several months, which has been generating cascading effects on the battlefield and inhibiting Russian advances.[74] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian manpower concentrations near occupied Mariupol, Shevchenko, and Fedorivka.[75]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 4 and 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole).[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 4 and 5 but did not advance.[78]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post near Kamyanske (either just near the frontline west of Orikhiv or about 50 kilometers from the frontline), drone control points near Konovalova (about five kilometers from the frontline) and Yablukove (roughly nine kilometers from the frontline), and a manpower concentration near Promin (about 60 kilometers from the frontline).[79]

Russian and Ukrainian forces are negotiating a localized ceasefire to allow for repairs to the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that it brokered a localized ceasefire near the ZNPP starting June 5 to allow technicians to repair a damaged power line at the ZNPP.[80] Russian nuclear energy state agency Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev stated on June 5 that the ceasefire will likely last until June 23.[81]

Russian forces continued limited ground offensives east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on June 4 and 5 but did not advance.[82]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian oil facilities in occupied Crimea. Geolocated footage published on June 4 shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike against a fuel truck along the M-14 Feodosia-Kerch highway near Yerofieieve, and a fuel truck along the P-23 Feodosia-Simferopol highway east of Bahate.[83] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that the May 30 Ukrainian strikes against the marine oil terminal in occupied Feodosia damaged the RVS-20000 oil tank and two RVS-5000 tanks.[84]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and 216 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and Banderol-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[85] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 198 drones, that 16 drones struck 13 locations, and that debris fell on 12 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that neither of the two cruise missiles reached their targets. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential, commercial, and transport infrastructure in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts.[86]

Russian forces are reportedly adjusting their strike patterns in Ukraine to place pressure on Ukrainian air defense systems. Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on June 5 that Russian forces have shifted strike tactics against Kharkiv Oblast in the past month (since early May 2026).[87] Synehubov stated that Russian forces used to conduct large-scale nighttime drone strikes with tens of drones targeting one to two facilities but have shifted to only targeting civilian infrastructure, such as railway and energy facilities. Synehubov stated that Russian forces are trying to trigger the air raid sirens continuously for 24 hours by launching one to two drones at a time throughout the day and night.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Demchenko stated on June 5 that Russia is not accumulating forces near the Ukrainian-Belarusian international border.[88] Demchenko stated that Russian forces are increasingly flying long-range drones targeting Ukraine through Belarusian territory and that Russia continues to pressure Belarus to enter the war on a larger scale.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.