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June 02, 2026
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2026
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.
Russian forces conducted yet another devastating drone and missile strike series against Ukraine on the night of June 1 to 2, heavily targeting Kyiv City. The Russian strikes killed at least 22 civilians and injured at least 130.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 73 missiles -- including eight Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles, 33 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, 27 Kh-101 cruise missiles, and five Kalibr cruise missiles -- and 656 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, Banderol, and Parodiya drones overnight.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 11 Iskander-Ms, 26 Kh-101s, three Kalibrs, and 602 drones; that 30 ballistic missiles, three cruise missiles, and 33 drones struck 38 locations; and that debris hit 15 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the strike mainly targeted Kyiv City. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 2 that the Russian strike damaged dozens of residential buildings and civilian infrastructure locations in Kyiv City and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv City.[3] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that Russian strikes damaged a medical clinic, a gas station, preschools, and residential buildings in Kyiv City.[4] Klitschko reported that the strikes on Kyiv City killed at least seven people and wounded at least 90, including two children.[5] Geolocated footage published on June 1 shows fires and damage to a residential building, a medical facility, a car dealership, and a gas station in Kyiv City.[6]
Ukrainian sources reported that Russian strikes against Dnipro City damaged residential infrastructure, killed at least 16 people, and injured at least 42, including four children.[7] Russian forces reportedly used cluster munitions against Dnipro City during the June 1 to 2 strikes.[8] The Ukrainian State Emergency Services (DSNS) reported on May 5 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap missile strike against Dnipro City, killing a rescue worker who was responding to the aftermath of an earlier Russian strike.[9] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck commercial, transport, residential, energy, and other critical infrastructure in Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Odesa, Sumy, Khmelnytsky, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[10]
Russia's June 1 to 2 strikes are part of a pattern of escalating Russian strikes against Kyiv City intended to take advantage of Patriot interceptor shortages and distract from Russia's inability to secure its deep rear from Ukrainian long-range strikes, as well as from its battlefield setbacks. The Kremlin attempted to provide several justifications to add a thin veneer of legitimacy for its June 1 to 2 strikes. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on June 1 (ahead of the start of the overnight Russian strikes) intended to reiterate claims that Ukraine's May 21 to 22 strike against a Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies headquarters in occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, hit an exclusively civilian object, calling for Ukrainian authorities to be held responsible for the strike.[11] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Putin issued orders to the Russian military in connection with the Starobilsk strike following the June 1 meeting.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 2 that Russian forces conducted the June 1 to 2 strikes in response to the Starobilsk strike and publishing a list of military and defense industrial targets that Russian forces allegedly hit. The Russian strikes caused significant damage to civilian and critical infrastructure and inflicted high civilian casualties, however.[13] The June 1 to 2 strikes are also part of an escalating pattern of Russian strikes following the May 9 to 11 ceasefire, which highlighted Russia's inability to defend its deep rear from Ukrainian strikes as Putin was forced to ask Ukraine to refrain from conducting strikes during Moscow's Victory Day celebrations.[14] Putin and other Russian officials had threatened to strike Kyiv City decision making centers if Ukraine conducted deep strikes during the ceasefire, and Russia has since violated the spirit of the ceasefire by continuously conducting strikes that disproportionately affect civilians in Kyiv City.[15] Russian claims that recent strikes are in response to a single strike against occupied Starobilsk are attempting to obfuscate the reality that Russia would have very likely conducted these strikes anyway.[16] The Russian MoD recently threatened a systematic series of strikes against Ukraine as Russian ultranationalist milbloggers continue to express frustration over the lack of a significant response to Ukraine’s deep-rear strikes.[17] Russia’s use of cluster munitions and its conduct of double-tap missile strikes targeting first responders continues to demonstrate a Russian strike pattern aimed at inflicting maximum civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. Putin is using massive strike packages against Kyiv in an effort to break Ukraine's will to fight as well as to disguise his weakness, particularly his inability to secure Russian territory, including Russia’s capital, from Ukraine’s deep strikes. He is also seeking to recover from the embarrassment of having had to ask Ukraine permission to hold even a dramatically scaled-down Victory Day parade on May 9.[18]

Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces conducted yet another devastating drone and missile strike series against Ukraine on the night of June 1 to 2, heavily targeting Kyiv City. The Russian strikes killed at least 22 civilians and injured at least 130.
- Russia's June 1 to 2 strikes are part of a pattern of escalating Russian strikes against Kyiv City intended to take advantage of Patriot interceptor shortages and distract from Russia's inability to secure its deep rear from Ukrainian long-range strikes as well as from its battlefield setbacks.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances throughout the theater in the past day.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure on the night of June 1 to June 2. The Ukrainian General Staff and the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight, causing a fire.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ilsky Oil Refinery is one of the largest oil refining enterprises in southern Russia with a capacity of about 6.6 million tons of oil per year. The Krasnodar Krai operational headquarters confirmed on June 2 that Ukrainian drones struck the refinery.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Ustinka, Belgorod Oblast.[21]
Ukrainian sources and satellite imagery provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) and additional information about recent Ukrainian strikes in the Russian rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 2 that a May 31 Ukrainian Neptune strike against the Novoshakhtinsky oil refinery in Rostov Oblast damaged the AVT-1 and AVT-2 primary oil refining units and caused a fire.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 2 that a Ukrainian strike on the Lazarevo linear production and dispatching station in Kirov Oblast on May 31 damaged two RVS-50,000 M3 tanks and the main pumping station buildings and that a Ukrainian strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery on May 31 damaged the AVT-6 primary oil processing unit.[23] Satellite imagery published on June 1 shows damage to the Matveev Kurgan oil depot in Rostov Oblast following a Ukrainian strike on May 31.[24] Satellite imagery published on June 1 shows a destroyed storage tank at the Yaroslavl-3 oil pumping station following Ukrainian strikes on May 19 and May 29.[25] Satellite imagery published on June 2 shows damage to the Volgograd Oil Refinery following a Ukrainian strike on May 29, including the ELOU-AVT-1, ELOU-AVT-5, and the technical overpasses near the eighth water block.[26] Reuters reported on June 1 that the Volgograd Oil Refinery halted the crude distillation unit CDU-1, which accounts for 40 percent of the plant’s capacity, and the CDU-5 and CDU-6 units following Ukrainian strikes on May 29.[27]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on June 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position northeast of Bachivsk (northwest of Sumy City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[28]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the northern Kharkiv Oblast direction on June 2 but did not advance.[29]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 2.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions on June 2 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Borova.[30]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on June 2 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Slovyansk.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 1 that Russian forces advanced north of Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk), south of Dibrova (southeast of Slovyansk), and east of Malynivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on June 2 but did not advance.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka) overnight.[34]

A Ukrainian military observer published footage on June 1 of a Ukrainian strike against a command post of the Russian 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) in occupied Soledar (roughly 13 kilometers from the frontline) on an unspecified prior date, reportedly killing 14 Russian personnel and injuring at least one other.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff previously reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post in Soledar on May 19 to 20.[36]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area and in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions on June 2 but did not advance.[37]

Warmer weather continues to impact offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian artillery battery operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on June 2 that Russian forces are conducting infiltration missions under the concealment of summer vegetation, making it more difficult for Ukrainian drone operators to detect the Russian infiltrators.[38] The deputy commander noted that the warmer weather is draining drone batteries less than cold weather, allowing drones to operate for longer periods of time, and is contributing to the growing "kill zones" of areas saturated with drones. The deputy commander noted that Russian forces are less frequently fielding heavy artillery because heavy artillery is vulnerable to drone strikes, but that Russian forces still frequently field mortars.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian personnel concentrations near Komar and Maliivka (both east of Oleksandrivka and about four kilometers from the frontline) on June 1 or overnight on June 1 to 2.[39]
Ukrainian forces continued mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone concentration near occupied Shakhtarske (about 28 kilometers from the frontline) on June 1 or overnight on June 1 to 2.[40] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a manpower and vehicle concentration of the 5th Separate Command Battalion of the Russian 3rd Army Corps (AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) near occupied Shyrokyne (about 129 kilometers from the frontline) overnight, destroying at least 18 command staff vehicles and cargo vehicles and damaging another four vehicles.[41] Magyar reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a deployment point of a tank battalion of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) near occupied Zhelanne (22 kilometers from the frontline); a drone workshop of the Russian 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) in occupied Donetsk City (about 55 kilometers from the frontline); and Neva-B and Neva-B2M coastal radar systems near occupied Mariupol.[42]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 2 but did not advance.[43]
Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky on June 2 but did not advance.[44]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Luhove (southwest of Orikhiv and around four kilometers behind the frontline) on June 1 or overnight on June 1 to 2.[45]
Ukrainian forces continue to interdict Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast as part of their mid-range strike campaign. A geolocated image published on June 2 shows a Russian fuel truck on fire after a reported Ukrainian strike along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway in occupied Prymorsk (roughly 94 kilometers behind the frontline).[46] Geolocated footage published on June 1 shows Ukrainian drone strikes against a Russian fuel truck near occupied Yelyseivka (about 65 kilometers from the frontline and just north of the H-30 Berdyansk-Tokmak-Vasylivka highway) and a KamAZ transport truck near occupied Sofiivka (roughly 72 kilometers from the frontline and just south of the H-30 highway).[47]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on June 2 but did not advance.[48]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Hola Prystan (southwest of Kherson City on the left bank of the Dnipro River).[49]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid- and long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 2 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir S1 air defense system near occupied Vydne (approximately 159 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian demagnetization vessel and command post of the Dnepr Flotilla of the Black Sea Fleet near occupied Mizhovodne (approximately 113 kilometers from the frontline).[50] Geolocated footage published on June 1 shows a Ukrainian cruise missile striking a garrison of the Russian 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps, Black Sea Fleet) near occupied Perevalne (approximately 237 kilometers from the frontline).[51]
Ukrainian mid-range strikes on occupied Ukraine are affecting the railway infrastructure in occupied Ukraine. Footage published on June 2 shows Ukrainian drones striking railway infrastructure in occupied Dzhankoi (approximately 144 kilometers from the frontline), causing a fire and damaging an administrative building.[52] Rossiyskaya Gazeta claimed on June 2 that Russian occupation authorities closed the Dzhankoi Station in occupied Crimea for passengers due to Ukrainian strikes, causing major delays.[53]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarusian energy exports to Russia are skyrocketing as Russian fuel shortages worsen across Russia and occupied Ukraine. Kremlin newswire TASS claimed on June 2 that the total sales of Belarusian gasoline on the St. Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange (SPIMEX) are currently 26 times higher than at the same point last year, and sales of diesel are three times higher.[54] The SPIMEX National Exchange Price Agency claimed that imports of Belarusian energy aim to support the domestic Russian market during a period of “high demand.” Russian outlet RBK claimed on June 1 that Russian authorities are considering increasing the import damper for Belarusian fuel, a policy mechanism used to incentivize the sale of fuel to Russia.[55] Russian news agency Interfax claimed on June 1 that diesel and gasoline prices are rising in Moscow City, and Russian opposition source Astra reported on June 2 that Rosneft gas stations in Belgorod and Kursk Oblast have imposed temporary restrictions on the sale of gasoline.[56] ISW continues to assess that the expanding Ukrainian mid-range strike campaign on logistics and long-range campaign on Russian oil and gas infrastructure is placing significant pressure on both the Russian economy and Russian offensive operations.[57]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/istories_media/12397
[2] https://t.me/kpszsu/63655
[3] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19308
[4] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/6832
[5] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/6849; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/6850
[6] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2061647432581026217?s=20; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2061647434862690573?s=20; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2061693352286818482?s=20; https://t.me/kievinfo_kyiv/89764; https://t.me/kievinfo_kyiv/89757 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2061663897216524664?s=20; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2061663899724718084?s=20; https://t.me/kievinfo_kyiv/89789; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2061654958684926441?s=20; https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2061612808815477194
[7] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29929; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/65149; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29927; https://t.me/borys_filatovv/3395
[8] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/29903
[9] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/65149
[10] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29530; https://t.me/synegubov/22429; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1KbA4kpXLW/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/33355; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16479; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/65167; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/65200; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/41162; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/41149; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/41154; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/41162; . https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19308
[11] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79935
[12] https://tass dot ru/politika/27608223
[13] https://t.me/mod_russia/64201;
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2026/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2025/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.primer.ai/workspaces/87234166-aa92-4e53-8ab0-c1686d382d32/document/661130a9-ea7c-563c-ad4c-ee35805e779d;
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39428; https://t.me/usf_army/2010; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/02/odyn-iz-najbilshyh-na-pivdni-rosiyi-ukrayinski-drony-urazyly-ilskyj-npz/
[20] https://t.me/opershtab23/16170 ;https://t.me/opershtab23/16169; https://suspilne dot media/1320931-droni-ilskij-npz-so-u-krasnodarskomu-krai-vlada-rf-zaavila-pro-pozezu-na-pidpriemstvi/;https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/02/v-krasnodarskom-krae-ukrainskie-bespilotniki-atakovali-ilskiy-neftepererabatyvayuschiy-zavod-eto-uzhe-16-ya-ataka-na-nego-s-nachala-voyny; https://t.me/andriyshTime/59345; https://t.me/astrapress/114372; https://t.me/astrapress/114376;
[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39428
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39428
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39428; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/
[24] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2061500583115468952 ; https://x.com/kromark/status/206143685900419087; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/
[25] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2061561725829414935 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/52678 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/
[26] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7621; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/
[27] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-volgograd-oil-refinery-halts-processing-after-may-29-drone-attack-2026-06-01/
[28] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2061789765897203897?s=20; https:// t.me/shadow_strike_27/655
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39408; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20810; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39410; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39438
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39408; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39410; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20810; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39438; https://t.me/dva_majors/93913; https://t.me/wargonzo/34565; https://t.me/grvZapad/18745
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39408; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39410; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20810; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39438; https://t.me/rybar/80750; https://t.me/rybar/80762; https://t.me/wargonzo/34565; https://t.me/grvZapad/18745; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43774;
[32] https://t.me/rybar/80750; https://t.me/rybar/80750; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72636; Source: https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72636
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39408 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39410 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39438 ; https://t.me/rybar/80755 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/93913 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34565 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72636
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39428
[35] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/29911
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2026/
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39408 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39410 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39438
[38] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/02/batarejky-sidayut-povilnishe-kilzona-roste-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-vorozha-artyleriya-na-minimumi/
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39428
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39428
[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/02/krym-i-shyrokyne-palaly-vsyu-nich-sbs-roznesly-panczyr-rls-ta-shtabnu-tehniku-rosiyan/; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2430
[42] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2430
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39408 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39410 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39438
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39438
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39428
[46] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2061743235958022381?s=20; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2061753880711495914?s=20; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/939; https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2061749334400475290?s=20; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2061733423379579153?s=20; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2061736690146791806?s=20; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13107
[47] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2061545602605875630
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2061546140621770901
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2061516429984243959 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2061521893099028617;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2061522215896600983;
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39408; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39410; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39438
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39428
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39428; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/02/krym-i-shyrokyne-palaly-vsyu-nich-sbs-roznesly-panczyr-rls-ta-shtabnu-tehniku-rosiyan/; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2430 ; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2430; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/02/krym-i-shyrokyne-palaly-vsyu-nich-sbs-roznesly-panczyr-rls-ta-shtabnu-tehniku-rosiyan/
[51] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2061522996032852043; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2061523031776801118; https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/764; https://x.com/CasetaBosque/status/2061529185324003570 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2061423516860190912 ; https://x.com/CasetaBosque/status/2061529185324003570 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2061423516860190912; https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/764
[52] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/21668; https://rg dot ru/2026/06/02/reg-ufo/poezd-simferopol-sankt-peterburg-otmenen-iz-za-zakrytiia-stancii-v-dzhankoe.html; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2061689423117398248?s=20; https://t.me/andriyshTime/59363; https://t.me/vrogov/24833 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/116281
[53] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/21668; https://rg dot ru/2026/06/02/reg-ufo/poezd-simferopol-sankt-peterburg-otmenen-iz-za-zakrytiia-stancii-v-dzhankoe.html; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2061689423117398248?s=20; https://t.me/andriyshTime/59363; https://t.me/vrogov/24833 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/116281; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72644; https://t.me/andriyshTime/59371; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/212904 ; https://t.me/astrapress/114521
[54] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27608241; https://belta dot by/economics/view/prodazhi-belorusskogo-benzina-na-peterburgskoj-birzhe-vyrosli-v-26-raz-784015-2026/
[55] https://www.rbc dot ru/business/01/06/2026/6a1d69409a7947ec1fee3d9f?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=messenger&utm_campaign=rbc_news&utm_content=6a1d69409a7947ec1fee3d9f&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Ft.me%2F
[56] https://www.interfax dot ru/moscow/1093058; https://t.me/astrapress/114516
[57] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/
