Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2025

June 2, 2025, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on June 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on June 2 and only reached agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges. Russia's refusal to give Ukraine its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement before the meeting ensured that the meeting was largely unproductive and further protracted the negotiation process. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul for roughly one hour.[1] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, who led the Ukrainian delegation in Istanbul, stated that Ukraine proposed a 90-day ceasefire, the release of all prisoners of war (POWs), the return of Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have abducted, and another round of Ukrainian-Russian talks between June 20 and 30 to prepare for a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[2] The Russian delegation appears to have rejected Ukraine's proposal for a 90-day ceasefire. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations agreed to conduct an "all for all" exchange of seriously ill and wounded POWs and POWs aged 18 to 25, which the Russian delegation later claimed would involve at least 1,000 total POWs.[3] The delegations also agreed to exchange the bodies of dead servicemembers in a “6,000 for 6,000” format. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the Russian delegation, stated that Russia proposed a two-to-three-day ceasefire on unspecified areas of the front to allow both sides to retrieve bodies from the battlefield.[4] Medinsky stated that Ukraine and Russia will create permanent medical commissions to conduct regular exchanges of seriously wounded POWs without having to wait for ”political decisions."[5] Umerov noted that Russia first gave its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement to Ukraine during the meeting and that Ukraine will study the document for a week before deciding on further action.[6] Umerov stated on May 28 that Ukraine, in contrast, had already presented its memorandum to Russia — well ahead of the June 2 talks.[7] ISW continues to assess that Russia is trying to disrupt the peace process and prolong the war in order to make additional battlefield gains.[8]

Ukrainian and Russian media published the major points of both sides' memorandums on June 1 and 2, respectively. Ukranian outlet Suspilne published the full text of Ukraine's memorandum on June 1, which reflected Umerov's statements about Ukraine's proposals during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks.[9] Ukraine's memorandum calls for:

• A complete and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land, and at sea as a precondition to peace negotiations;
• Confidence building measures, including the return of all Ukrainian children and civilians and the exchange of all POWs;
• The goal of negotiations to be a permanent, lasting peace agreement, as part of which Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees and maintains its territorial integrity and ability to join any security alliance, including NATO;
• And for Russia and Ukraine to continue negotiations after the June 2 Istanbul meeting, work towards confidence building measures, and prepare for a future Zelensky-Putin meeting.

Kremlin newswire TASS published photos of Russia's memorandum following the Ukrainian-Russian talks on June 2.[10] Russia's memorandum is divided into three sections: the first section defines Russia's demands for the "final settlement" of the war; the second section proposes two different sets of pre-conditions that Russia would accept as part of a ceasefire; and the third section outlines Russia's ideal timeline for negotiations. The first section of Russia's memorandum lists demands that Ukraine should concede to as part of a long-term peace agreement, including:

• International recognition of Russia's occupation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea and the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from these oblasts;
• Indefinite Ukrainian commitment to neutrality (a promise to never join military alliances and coalitions), a ban on future foreign military deployments and infrastructure in Ukraine, termination of all of Ukraine's existing security agreements, and a permanent ban on Ukraine having nuclear weapons;
• And protection of the "full rights, freedoms, and interests" of Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine and legislation against the "glorification and propaganda of Nazism."

The second section of Russia's memorandum demands that Ukraine and Russia pursue one of two paths toward a ceasefire. The first path requires Ukraine to completely withdraw from the unoccupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts up to an unspecified distance beyond the oblasts' borders. The second path requires Ukraine to agree a different set of Russian demands, including:

• Ban redeployments of all its units, except as part of withdrawals from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts;
• End all Ukrainian force generation efforts, begin demobilization, end martial law, and organize presidential elections within 100 days of ending martial law, and elect a new government;
• And terminate all foreign military assistance, including the supply of satellite imagery and intelligence, and ban all foreign military deployments to Ukraine.

The third section of Russia's memorandum recommends that Russia and Ukraine sign a longer-term ceasefire agreement after exchanging the bodies of dead servicemembers and a two-to-three-day general ceasefire to retrieve bodies from the battlefield. The memorandum demands that Ukraine completely withdraw from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts within 30 days of the beginning of the ceasefire and that Ukraine elect a new government before Russia and Ukraine sign a formal peace agreement.

Russia's memorandum reflects the Kremlin's long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own. Russia's memorandum is imbued with its long-standing demand that any peace settlement address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war - namely the eastern expansion of NATO since the early 1990s and Ukraine's supposed discrimination against Russian-speakers and Russian culture.[11] The Kremlin has called for the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, and ISW has previously noted that these terms amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[12] Kremlin officials have consistently demanded regime change in Ukraine and falsely claimed that all pro-Western Ukrainian governments since Ukraine's 2014 Revolution of Dignity have been "illegitimate."[13] Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly argued that Russia should not conclude or respect any agreements with the current "illegitimate" Ukrainian government, and ISW has previously noted that any peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the current Ukrainian government.[14] The current Ukrainian government is legitimate, however, and continues to abide by the Ukrainian Constitution, such that Russia's demand that Ukraine elect a new government before concluding a long-term peace agreement is simply another demand for regime change.

Putin demanded during a speech on June 14, 2024 that Ukrainian forces must begin to "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts (which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in September 2022) and that Ukraine officially abandons its goal to join NATO before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[15] ISW noted that Russia occupied roughly 75 percent of the four oblasts as of June 14, 2024, and Russia now occupies 79.8 percent of the four oblasts as of June 2, 2025. Ukraine currently controls the remaining twenty percent of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, which totals approximately 21,616 square kilometers of territory. The remaining twenty percent of the four oblasts is also home to five major cities (Kherson and Zaporizhzhia cities and Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, and Slovyansk) with a combined pre-war population of over 1.3 million people – not accounting for the thousands of people who live in the smaller towns and populated settlements throughout these oblasts.[16] Russian forces have not demonstrated the capacity to seize cities of this size since early 2022, and the Russian military is almost certainly incapable of conducting a successful offensive operation to seize one of these cities after three years of war and degradation. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.[17]

The Russian delegation dismissed Russia's systemic kidnapping of Ukrainian children. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak reported that the Ukrainian delegation gave Russia the names of "hundreds" of kidnapped Ukrainian children that Russia must return to Ukraine.[18] Medinsky claimed that the Ukrainian list contained 331 names yet downplayed this list as not "thousands" or "millions" of children but "dozens."[19] Medinsky claimed that Russia returns Ukrainian children when Russian authorities can locate the children's parents or other legal representatives and that Russia does not kidnap Ukrainian children but "saves" them.[20] Medinsky's statement downplays the true extent of Russia's pre-war preparations, legal mechanisms, and various schemes to hide and justify the forced deportation, forced assimilation, and militarization of Ukrainian children.[21] Ukraine has verified Russia's deportation of at least 19,456 Ukrainian children, and only 1,345 deported Ukrainian children have been returned to Ukraine as of June 2.[22] Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab placed the number of deported children closer to 35,000 as of March 19, 2025.[23] Kremlin Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova (against whom the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant in March 2023 for her role in abducting Ukrainian children) claimed that Russia had “accepted” a stark 700,000 Ukrainian children between February 2022 and July 2023.[24] The United Nations (UN) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide explicitly forbids the forcible transfer of children from one group to another group for the purpose of destroying, in whole or in part, a national or ethnic group, and considers these violations as constituent acts of genocide.[25]

Russian forces appear to be intensifying efforts to widen the frontline in northern Sumy Oblast along three axes of advance north and northeast of Sumy City. Geolocated footage published on June 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and northeast of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently seized Oleksiivka, Novomykhailivka, and Kindrativka (all north of Sumy City) and advanced into northern Andriivka and west of Yablunivka and Kostyantynivka.[27] Russian forces have recently intensified ground assaults north of Sumy City toward Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City toward Yunakivka and toward Myropillya.[28] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on June 2 that elements of the Russian 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are fighting along the Kostyantynivka-Kindrativka line and along the Volodymyrivka-Oleksiivka line (all north of Sumy City).[29] Mashovets stated that elements of the 104th, 234th, and 237th airborne (VDV) regiments (all of the Russian 76th VDV Division) are operating along the Loknya-Yunakivka line and west of Loknya (all northeast of Sumy City). Mashovets previously reported that Russian forces recently redeployed elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD) from the Lyman and Chasiv Yar directions respectively in order to reinforce the Russian force grouping in northern Sumy Oblast.[30]

Russian officials have long called for the establishment of a buffer zone into northern Sumy Oblast and have recently intensified efforts to set informational conditions to justify renewed offensive operations toward Sumy City.[31] Russian forces are likely attempting to advance to the Khotin-Khrapivshchyna line (south to southeast of Andriivka and Yunakivka) to within roughly 12 to 15 kilometers of Sumy City, which would place Russian forces within tube artillery range of the entirety of Sumy City. Russian forces likely intend to leverage intensified drone and artillery strikes against the city to support further advances toward Sumy City and likely aspire to conduct an offensive operation to seize the city in the future. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to seize Sumy City in the near- to medium-term, as Russian forces have not seized a Ukrainian city with a pre-war population greater than 100,000 since July 2022.[32]

Open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series on June 1. Open-source analysts on X assessed that available imagery published on June 2 indicates that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged four Tu-95 bombers and three Tu-22M3 bombers at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast and one A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft at Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast.[33] Open-source analysts on X claimed that available video footage published on June 1 and 2 indicates that Ukrainian special services destroyed or damaged five Tu-95 bombers and one An-22 transport aircraft at Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast.[34] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone operations in Russia, reported on June 2 that Ukrainian forces destroyed at least 13 Russian fixed-wing aircraft and damaged over 40 aircraft in total during the strike.[35] Ukrainian military observer Tatarigami stated on June 2 that Russia has not built new Tu-95 or Tu-22M3 since 1991 and that Russia only had 70 to 90 Tupolev aircraft before the June 1 strike series.[36] ISW will continue to monitor for additional satellite imagery confirmation of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian air bases.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on June 2 and only reached agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges. Russia's refusal to give Ukraine its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement before the meeting ensured that the meeting was largely unproductive and further protracted the negotiation process. 

• Ukrainian and Russian media published the major points of both sides' memorandums on June 1 and 2, respectively. 

• Russia's memorandum reflects the Kremlin's long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own. 

• The Russian delegation dismissed Russia's systemic kidnapping of Ukrainian children. 

• Russian forces appear to be intensifying efforts to widen the frontline in northern Sumy Oblast along three axes of advance north and northeast of Sumy City. 

• Open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series on June 1. 

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk. 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 1 and 2.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 2 that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[38]

Russian milbloggers claimed on June 2 that Russian forces are struggling to supply units in Tetkino.[39]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Guyevo (southeast of Sudzha).[40]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 2.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

See topline text for reports about Russian operations in northern Sumy Oblast.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 1 and 2.[41]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Anvar Spetsnaz” detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions along the Kharkiv Oblast international border.[42] Elements of the Russian “Smuglyanka” detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions east of Vovchansk.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 2 but did not make advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka and Krasne Pershe; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on June 1 and 2.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova near Nadiya and Zelenyi Hai, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 1 and 2.[45]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Karpivka (north of Lyman).[46]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[47]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Novomykhailivka, Novyi Myr, and Lypove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on June 1 and 2.[48]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), reinforced by elements of the 1st and 15th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD), are attacking near Katerynivka (northeast of Lyman), Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, and Nove (north of Lyman) and that elements of the 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division) are attacking south of Zelena Dolyna.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 1 and 2.[50]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar.[52]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[53]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on June 1 and 2.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[55]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 2 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[56]

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) recently advanced up to 300 meters near Yablunivka and Oleksandropil (south of Yablunivka) and that unspecified Russian units recently advanced toward Stepanivka (north of Yablunivka) along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[57] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked south of Popiv Yar (west of Yablunivka) and pushed elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 163rd Tank Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) back toward Nova Poltavka (south of Popiv Yar).

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Yablunivka and toward Pleshchiivka, and southwest of Toretsk near , Zorya on June 1 and 2.[58] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zorya and Romanivka (east of Zorya).[59]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on June 2 that fighting west of Toretsk is less intense than fighting near Pokrovsk.[60] A Russian milblogger noted that intensified Ukrainian counterattacks are slowing Russian advances southwest of Toretsk.[61]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated on June 2 that elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) and the 1436th Motorized Rifle Regiment (132nd Motorized Rifle Division, 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are continuing to attack toward Oleksandropil and Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk).[62] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment with participating in the recent seizure of Zorya.[63] Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division's 68th Reconnaissance Battalion and 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies' Typhoon detachment are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Novyi Trud, and Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on June 1 and 2.[65]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction are using infantry and motorcycles groups to make creeping, gradual advances.[66] Trehubov stated that Russian losses have decreased from roughly 1,000 losses per week three to four months ago (February-March 2025) to roughly 700 per week now as Russian forces are using fewer people in attacks.

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attacking near Malynivka and Myrolyubivka.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 2 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) during a successful counterattack.[68]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka and toward Muravka and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove on June 1 and 2.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Horikhove.[70]

Mashovets reported that Ukrainian counterattacks are preventing Russian forces from advancing north of Kotlyarivka.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that the area north of Kotlyarivka is a contested ”gray zone.”[72]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in and near Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and that elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are operating near Kotlyraivka and Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka).[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove towards Novoukrainka; west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr; and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on June 1 and 2.[74] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoukrainka.[75]

Order of Battle: Droner operators of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate near Bahatyr.[76]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along a windbreak south of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[77]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on June 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced west of Zelene Pole (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), Novopil and Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[78]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Vilne Pole, and Shevchenko and toward Komar; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole, Novopil, and Levadne on June 1 and 2.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 2 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Komar.[80]

Order of Battle: Droner operators of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[81] Drone operators of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novopil.[82] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Temyrivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[83] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[84]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on June 2.

Order of Battle: Droner operators of the Russian 35th Radiation, Biological, and Chemical Protection Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[85] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[86] Elements of the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction.[87]

Russian forced continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove on June 1 and 2.[88]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that Russian forces are often repeatedly attacking in small groups of 10 soldiers in order to gradually accumulate infantry closer to Ukrainian positions, even if eight or nine soldiers are killed in the assault.[89]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 2.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 1 and 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-K cruise missile from Bryansk Oblast; three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; and 80 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[90] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 15 drones and that 37 drones were ”lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes struck Kharkiv and Zaporizhia oblasts.[91]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.