Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 18, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11am ET on June 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. 

Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Toretsk direction on June 17. Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault west of Yablunivka (west of Toretsk) with at least three armored vehicles and four motorized vehicles, likely all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).[1] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported on June 18 that Russian forces conducted a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 15 pieces of heavy equipment and eight motorized vehicles.[2] Russian forces have been conducting mechanized assaults less frequently since Winter 2024–2025, likely due to Ukrainian drone capabilities and Russia's dwindling supply of armored vehicles.[3] ISW recently observed reports indicating that Russia's consumption of Soviet-era tank stores is slowing.[4] Russian forces have become increasingly reliant on civilian vehicles, ATVs, and motorcycles for assaults, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) began efforts in April 2025 to formally integrate motorcycle usage into offensive operations.[5] Russian mechanized assaults in the Toretsk direction may indicate that the Russian military command intends to prioritize this sector of the front. ISW will continue to monitor this area of the frontline for additional evidence of mechanized assaults.

The Kremlin likely aims to use the ongoing St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) to support ongoing efforts to consolidate control over the information space and prepare Russian society for a prolonged war effort. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on June 18 that it obtained a document from the Russian Presidential Administration instructing Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets on which events to cover at SPIEF on June 18 to 21.[6] The events that Russian media should reportedly focus on include the presentation of a new civilian vehicle from a Russian car manufacturer, flag-raising ceremonies for fishing vessels, ceremonies connecting a village and factory in Tambov Oblast to gas networks, and events hosted by organizations subordinate to the Presidential Administration. The document reportedly instructs journalists to focus on events from the "Znanie" (Knowledge) Society, the board of which Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko heads; the "Russia-Land of Opportunities" non-profit organization, which runs the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program placing veterans in federal, regional, and local government positions; and presentations of books about war, economics, and disinformation. A political strategist who has worked for the Russian Presidential Administration told Meduza that Russian news coverage of SPIEF previously focused on foreign investment and high-profile foreign guests, but that the Kremlin now aims to project social optimism and the "appearance that everything is moving forward." The Kremlin may have also limited internet access around SPIEF in order to better control the information space. Russian opposition media reported that Russians in and around St. Petersburg began experiencing internet outages overnight on June 17 to 18.[7] Russian authorities previously disconnected large swaths of Russia from mobile internet using the Sovereign Internet system during Victory Day celebrations on May 9 under the guise of ensuring security but likely aimed to limit reports, footage, and imagery of Ukrainian strikes that could destroy the facade of Russian victory.[8] Russian authorities may be employing similar measures during SPIEF as part of efforts to forward the Kremlin's social optimism messaging.

The Kremlin also aims to use SPIEF to promote Kremlin narratives to Western audiences. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on June 18 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet with journalists from different countries, including "unfriendly" countries and the Global South, in order to accurately convey Putin's and Russia's point of view to Western audiences.[9] Peskov claimed that Putin will hold a question-and-answer session with journalists about global events and Russian domestic and foreign policy.[10] Peskov did not specify which journalists will attend the meeting with Putin. Russian state media has historically platformed pro-Kremlin media sources and journalists from other countries in efforts to legitimize and spread ongoing Kremlin rhetoric internationally.[11] Putin likely aims to use this meeting to promote Kremlin narratives to support Russian foreign policy objectives, including deterring Western support for Ukraine and supporting Russian efforts to improve bilateral relations with the United States.

Ukraine's Western partners continue to supply Ukraine with military aid and announce new sanctions packages against Russia. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced on June 17 that Canada will provide Ukraine with two billion CAD (roughly $1.4 billion) for the purchase of helicopters, drones, armored vehicles, and ammunition and will lend Ukraine 2.3 billion CAD (roughly $1.6 billion) for the reconstruction of Ukrainian infrastructure.[12] Canada is providing Ukraine with the loan through the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans mechanism, which will finance and repay the loan using future profits from seized Russian assets.[13] Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand announced on June 17 that Canada is imposing sanctions against 77 Russian individuals, 39 entities, and 201 vessels in Russia's shadow fleet and sanctioning the trade of goods, including those related to chemical and biological weapons, dual-use industrial goods and technologies, and Russian coal and metal exports.[14] The European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) recently announced additional sanctions against Russia’s financial, military-industrial, and energy sectors.[15]

The Kremlin continues to crack down on critical Russian milbloggers as part of its years-long effort to censor and control the Russian information space. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 18 that its law enforcement sources stated that Russian authorities detained Mikhail Polynkov, the administrator of the "Soldatskaya Pravda" Telegram channel.[16] TASS's sources claimed that Russian authorities opened a criminal case against Polynkov for abandoning his military unit. Russian state media outlet RBK reported that Polynkov's lawyer stated that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained Polynkov and took him to the 517th Military Investigative Department of the Russian Investigative Committee but that the charges against Polynkov were still unclear.[17] Polynkov reported his detention on his Telegram channel on June 18 and implied that Russian authorities may have detained him due to his previous posts criticizing Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov's stance on Israel and Iran.[18] Russian milbloggers and opposition outlets noted that Polynkov was a member of the Russian Strelkov Movement, which advocates for the release of imprisoned former officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin.[19] The Russian Strelkov Movement claimed on June 18 that Polynkov's arrest was due to his efforts to search for Russian servicemembers who are missing in action (MIA), suggesting that Russian authorities may have detained Polynkov over concerns he would expose the scale of Russian losses.[20] The Kremlin has been engaged in a wide censorship campaign against the Russian information space since 2022, including by arresting the administrators of Telegram channels that were publicly critical of Russian political and military leadership.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Toretsk direction on June 17.
• The Kremlin likely aims to use the ongoing St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) to support ongoing efforts to consolidate control over the information space and prepare Russian society for a prolonged war effort.
• The Kremlin also aims to use SPIEF to promote Kremlin narratives to Western audiences.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue to supply Ukraine with military aid and announce new sanctions packages against Russia.
• The Kremlin continues to crack down on critical Russian milbloggers as part of its years-long effort to censor and control the Russian information space.
• Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 17 and 18.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[23]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and of the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[24]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 18.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 16 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[25]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including near Yablunivka and Yunakivka (both northeast of Sumy City), on June 17 and 18.[26]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly continue to operate in Yablunivka (north of Sumy City).[27] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Andriivka (west of Yablunivka).[28] Drone operators of the 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Yablunivka and Yunakivka (southeast Yablunivka).[29]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[30]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 17 and 18.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchanski Khutory and Vovchansk.[32]

Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed Ukrainian crossings to the northern bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 18 that Russian forces seized Dovhenke (north of Kupyansk).[34]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 17 and 18.[35]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova toward Olhivka and Hrekivka on June 17 and 18.[36]

An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction stated that Russian forces are conducting infantry assaults and reconnaissance-in-force in this area.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Lypove, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on June 17 and 18.[38]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are constantly replenishing their assault units and attacking in infantry groups without heavy equipment.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Siversk direction on June 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and toward Serebryanka on June 17 and 18.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Serebryanka.[41] Elements of the 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Fedorivka (southwest of Siversk).[42]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southern Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and likely seized the settlement.[43]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to eastern Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[44]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove and Markove; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Bondarne; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on June 17 and 18.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Regiment and 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[46]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Dyliivka and seized Dachne (both north of Toretsk).[47]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Dyliivka, north of Yablunivka, and southwest of Katerynivka (all northwest of Toretsk).[48]

Please see topline text for more details about a recent mechanized assault in the Toretsk direction.

Russian forces continued ground assaults near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka and Poltavka and toward Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, Stepanivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Kleban-Byk; and west of Toretsk toward Shcherbynivka on June 17 and 18.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near a mine northwest of Toretsk.[50]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[51] Drone operators of the 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka, Popiv Yar (west of Toretsk), Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Stepanivka.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, and Koptieve; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Novopidhorodne on June 17 and 18.[53]

A Ukrainian soldier operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting multiple waves of small-group motorcycle assaults to overwhelm Ukrainian positions and make it difficult for Ukrainian drones and artillery to strike the motorcycle groups.[54] The soldier reported that these Russian motorcycle groups are highly maneuverable and hide in houses and basements to launch sudden assaults against Ukrainian forces.

Russian milbloggers posted footage claiming to show Russian long-range Geran (Shahed) drone strikes against Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk.[55]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 137th Separate Battalion of the Russian 1438th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Lysivka.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Fedorivka and Vesele (both southeast of Novopavlivka) and toward Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka).[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may remain in Zelenyi Kut and Novoukrainka (both southeast of Novopavlivka).[58]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Novoukrainka, Bahatyr, Odradne, Oleksiivka, and Vesele; and south of Novopavlivka near Komar, Fedorivka, Zaporizhzhia, and Myrne on June 17 and 18.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka.[60]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on June 18 that Russian forces are increasing pressure in the Novopavlivka direction as activity declines in neighboring sectors of the frontline.[61] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are promoting “fictional victories” in an attempt to support the narrative that Russian forces are making gains on the ground but that Ukrainian forces continue to repel Russian attacks. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian detachment operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that Russian forces are increasing the number of attacks in the Novopavlivka direction but that Russian forces continue to use artillery, aviation, and first-person view (FPV) drones to advance at a ”creeping” pace.[62] The deputy commander also stated that Ukrainian forces intercepted around 700 Russian drones with stationary electronic warfare (EW) equipment from June 14 to 18. A Russian milblogger claimed that difficult terrain and Ukrainian FPVs are slowing Russian advances toward Novoukrainka and Zelenyi Kut.[63]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued to claim on June 18 that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) seized Oleksiivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[64] A former Storm-Z instructor and Russian milblogger reiterated June 16 claims that the brigade is submitting false claims and exaggerating its control over Oleksiivka, highlighting an ongoing problem with some Russian units embellishing their reporting about territorial gains.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on June 17 and 18.[66]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[67]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited attacks east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 17 and 18 but did not advance.[68]

Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vysoke (east of Hulyaipole).[69]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky on June 18.[70]

Elements of the "Nemets" group of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[71]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in Kherson Oblast on June 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near the Antonivsky Bridge (east of Kherson City on the east [left] bank of the Dnipro River) on June 17 and 18.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near the Tendrivska Spit (southwest of Kherson City in the Black Sea).[73]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 58 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 12 drones and that 18 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian drones struck residential and industrial infrastructure in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[75]

Ukrainian officials reported on June 18 that the death toll from the Russian drone and missile strikes against Kyiv City on the night of June 16 to 17 has risen to 28 civilians and that the strike injured at least 134.[76]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.